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«In senso proprio possiamo dunque parlare di potere solo quando siano dati 
due elementi: da un lato una vera energia, capace di modificare la realtà 
delle cose, e di determinare le loro condizioni e le loro reciproche relazioni; 
dall’altro una coscienza che ne sia consapevole; una volontà che stabilisca 
delle mète, una capacità che disponga della forza per raggiungere quelle 
mète. 
Tutto ciò presuppone lo spirito, quella realtà che è nell’uomo ed è capace 
di sottrarsi alla immediata complessità della natura e di disporre 
liberamente di essa.» 
 
“In a proper sense, therefore, we can talk about power only when two 
elements are given: on the one hand a true energy, capable of modifying the 
reality of things, and of determining their conditions and their reciprocal 
relationships; on the other hand a conscientiousness that is aware of it; a will 
that sets goals, a capability that has the strength to reach those goals. 
All of this presupposes the spirit, that reality that is in human beings and 






The main purpose of this research is to frame the possible causal relationships between 
corruption in public procurement and performance of local governments. With this aim, a fully-
integrated research design is adopted to dynamically mix quantitative and qualitative methods 
at every phase of the research process. 
The Dynamic Performance Management (DPM) and Governance (DPG) approaches, 
supported by in-depth interviews, formal modelling and simulations, are here adopted to 
analyse a representative case-study of an Italian small Municipality, where some corruption 
episodes in procurement activities occurred in the early 2000s. In particular, the local Authority 
in question was disbanded twice for mafia-like infiltrations and is currently facing a financial 
instability. 
In the light of that, the overall work studies the possible outcomes of those facts on the 
organisational performance as a whole, based on three sources: qualitative primary data 
generated by face-to-face convergent interviews; secondary data retrieved from both 
documents describing legal cases and open-access repositories; an extensive literature review. 
At the beginning, a broad and composite literature overview helps the reader become aware 
about the contents, theories and boundaries of corruption. Thereafter, an examination of the 
most widespread measurement strategies and measures to either prevent or repress it is 
proposed. Overall, a special focus is set on procurement in local public contexts. 
Following a discussion on the possible advantages and disadvantages of the most common 
public sector paradigms in terms of opportunities and constraints for corruption, the DPM and 
DPG views are explored to understand their theoretical contribution in supporting policy- and 
decision-makers to curb corruption phenomena in heterogeneous governance contexts. 
Afterwards, based on coding techniques, an exploratory-descriptive approach of the selected 
case-study allows for a better understanding of the extent to which the investigated corruption 
events impacted on the overall performance of the Municipality under scrutiny over time, by 
means of non-structured face-to-face interviews held with some Public Officials in 2019. 
Therefore, a system perspective in performance management is adopted to frame the emerging 
cause-and-effect relationships of the case-study. Assuming a DPM approach allows politicians 




corruption strategies at local government level. More precisely, the use in a DPM chart of 
performance drivers adjusted for the risk of corruption linked to its structural and 
individualistic causes may not only put right to ambiguities and flaws deriving from the 
adoption of ‘red-flags’ in public procurement, but also to failures of mechanistical controls in 
detecting the actual presence of corruption, thus providing decision-makers with prompt 
signals arising from the emergent effects of clandestine practices. In addition, emphasising the 
role of community civic morality at system level may back up the understanding of some 
counterintuitive results in the past research on corruption in public procurement and deduce to 
what extent investments in Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) and 
personnel training may enhance local government accountability and expertise. 
With regard to managers’ and staff’s professionalism, as individualistic cause of corruption, 
political patronage stemming from legal opportunities results significant in explaining poor 
performance in public procurement over time. Within this framework, the DPM view also 
allows for better singling corruption out from resource waste due to non-corrupt actions. 
In summary, a DPM approach may lead public managers to constantly maintain their ‘cognitive 
radar’ reactive, so as to identify and suppress unlawful practices in procurement, detect 
emerging malfeasances that could be otherwise overlooked by traditional static diagnostical 
and interactive approaches, foster ethical learning and enhance community outcomes. 
Finally, the DPG perspective may be effective in supporting formulation and fine-tuning of 
collaboration-based anti-corruption strategies and probing their feasibility and impacts over 
time within local areas characterised by poor governance structures. Hence, on the basis of 
previous successful projects throughout the world, in the last part of this research thesis a DPG 
approach is used to outline and evaluate an anti-corruption strategy for the case under scrutiny 
according to collaboration settings, in a way to frame possible synergies and interdependencies 
among relevant participants as critical levers to hinder systemic risk of corruption at local level. 
 
Keywords: corruption; corruption measurement; corruption causes; corruption theory; corruption 
models of analysis; small municipalities; local governments; financial distress; public procurement; 
patronage; community outcomes; planning and control systems; principal-agent theory; Dynamic 
Performance Management; System Dynamics; risk performance drivers; collective action theory; 
Dynamic Performance Governance; collaborative governance; content analysis; open coding; axial 
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1.1 Research background 
Corruption occurs where public office (World Bank, 1997: 8) or, more in general, entrusted 
power (Transparency International, 2020a) is abused, misused or omitted for personal gain. It 
emerges where privates look for some kind of personal benefit that collides with regulation and 
social norms (Rose-Ackerman & Søreide, 2011: XIV), and usually persists in communities 
characterised by low rates of growth (Rose-Ackerman, 2006: XVI), poor levels of law 
compliance, transparency and accountability. 
Corruption can both appear as a stand-alone episode at individual level and 
systematically involve group of people in an organised fashion (Bac, 1998: 101). It has context-
specific aspects, assumes different features and spreads in different ways (Lambsdorff & 
Schulze, 2015: 101). As such, it is considered as pertaining to ‘wicked problems’, which 
disclose complexity and dynamicity, and contemporary involve different actors, levels and 
sectors (Head & Alford, 2013; Laegreid & Rykkja, 2014), such that there are not ultimate 
approaches, best ways to frame and permanent solutions to fix them, respectively (Bianchi, 
2016: 61). 
In public management, research on corruption is huge and has greatly made use of the 
traditional statistical and econometric methods to mainly investigate the phenomenon at macro 
level – see, for instance, Ades and Di Tella (1997); Mauro (1995, 1997); Tanzi and Davoodi 
(1997). This has resulted in a scarce empirical evidence in micro-level − i.e., organisational − 
corruption literature, albeit civil servants and public institutions should deserve special 
attention (Meyer-Sahling, Mikkelsen, & Schuster, 2018). Public agencies have to be guarantors 
of ethics (Boardman & Klum, 2013), but local governments represent the cornerstone of public 
service integrity as, producing a significant impact on the daily lives of citizens, constitute the 
most evident form of public governance systems (Masters & Graycar, 2016: 46). 
Uncontrolled misuse and diversion of public resources for private advantage in local 
realities is not without consequences. In Italy, it has implied the loss of trust in civil servants 
by citizens and encouraged hyper-regulation and formalism to reduce inefficiencies and illegal 
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acts (Fantini & Simonetti, 2017: 27-28). What is more, maladministration and 
misappropriation of public resources undermine the public interest by causing many visible 
failures in the delivery of good governance to communities (Gardiner, 1978), which inevitably 
suffer the consequential economic and wealth losses (Liu, Moldogaziev, & Mikesell, 2017: 
681). Notably, one of the principal outcomes produced by corruption at local level is the 
redefinition of expenditure priorities that subsequently causes an enormous dispersion of public 
resources and the shift of significant part of spending charge onto who cannot have access to 
goods and services privately (Robinson, 2006: XIV). 
Over the last thirty years, several Italian municipalities showed serious financial 
problems, especially small municipalities localised in the Sicilian region (Ca' Foscari 
University of Venice, 2021). Such financial instabilities are usually explained by structural 
shortages in tax collection processes and the consequential impossibility to provide citizens 
with adequate services. Nevertheless, Italy has always been threatened by the presence of 
organised crime that easily makes use of corruption practices and tools to reach its vile 
purposes. The influence of organised crime in a territory exacerbates the risk of corruption and 
influences the capability of local governments to foster sustainable development of the served 
communities, provided that criminal insinuations in public administrations (PAs) exercise 
pressing conditioning and compromise the efficient, sound and regular management of public 
bodies themselves. As such, the study of possible connections between corruption and 
performance of local realities characterised by poor governance cannot be ignored any more. 
In coping with corruption, the role of governance is crucial in developing decisive 
policies and strategies (Fukuyama, 2005: XI). Especially at local government level, this 
requires the adoption of appropriate performance management tools to enable possible 
interventions against the problem in object and elicit cultural change where formal rules and 
routines are inclined to encourage corrupt behaviours. Thus, performance management systems 
(PMSs) may reveal themselves as strategic in overcoming common shortcomings of corruption 
detection and measurement, as well as in supporting planning and control (P&C) processes to 
successfully prevent and repress the negative outcomes associated to illicit practices. 
Curbing corruption requires to single specific configurations out from other possible 
forms (Klitgaard, Maclean-Abaroa, & Parris, 2000: 27), so as to avoid confusing endeavours 
being lacking in vigour. Accordingly, procurement represents one of the most significant 
activities of local governments damaged by corruption (World Bank, 2007: 7) due to the 
considerable amount of money involved (Strombom, 1998: 22). At any level, it is an activity 
that transversally regards any area of public intervention and governmental department, such 
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that it has evident connections with several other public management fields and produces 
visible outcomes on the effectiveness and efficiency of public service delivering. 
Knowledge about outcomes of corruption may enable policy- and decision-makers to: 
deploy resources to intervene in risk areas; evaluate public sector effectiveness; increase 
efficiency in procurement budgeting; clearly define accountabilities of civil servants; foster 
institutional trust among citizens (Hatry, 2003: 142-143). Within this framework, an outcome-
based perspective of performance may allow for figuring out feasible policy alternatives aimed 
at curbing corruption and restoring local governments’ capability to provide their communities 
with high-quality services, improve their quality of life and enhance their trust in government. 
The outcome perspective focuses on the impacts of public administration operativity 
on the context beyond the organisational boundaries (Borgonovi, Anessi-Pessina, & Bianchi, 
2018: XI). In particular, this approach allows for analysing end-results of the management 
process that, on the one hand, indicatively measure the performance of organisations as a whole 
and, on the other hand, represent flows varying the set of resources considered strategic for 
their goals that cannot be acquired by recurring to the market (Bianchi, 2016: 73). 
Some significant contributions in the literature on community outcomes of corruption 
in public procurement have been proposed − see, for instance, Basheka (2009); Basheka, 
Oluka, and Karyeija (2013); Basheka, Oluka, and Mugurusi (2015); Coviello and Gagliarducci 
(2017); Odeku (2018). However, the empirical research on this topic does not contemporary 
adopt a systemic, dynamic and causal approach of outcome-based local public performance. 
On the light of what above, the first part of this research project explores the meaning 
and characteristics of corruption, its general causes, models of analysis and background 
theories; the issues in its measurement, the possible measures to take on to curb it, as well as 
in presence of which public management archetypes it may theoretically either take advantage 
or be opposed. Most importantly, shedding the lights on the prevalent literature about the 
general phenomenon of corruption is useful – and necessary as well – to highlight the 
ontological aspects of it and, as a result, to set up the conceptual boundaries of the present 
study. Indeed, corruption can assume different, broad or narrow meanings in function of 
economic, social and legal premises, and may overlap with other kinds of crimes1. 
 
1 For instance, corruption is different from organised crime, but this last can make use of corruption for its 
purposes. For more details about organised crime, see European Commission & Europol. 2001. Annual European 
Union Organised Crime Situation Report. data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-10415-2000-INIT/en/pdf: 
European Commission and Europol, United Nations. 2004a. United Nations Convention Against Transnational 
Organized Crime and the Protocols Thereto. In U. Nations (Ed.), vol. 55/25, 55/255. New York: United Nations 
Office on Drugs and Crime, Vienna. 
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Thereafter, the research sets the focus of study onto the specific form of illicit practice 
for private benefit in public procurement. Management aspects on the conditions and impacts 
creating opportunities for malfeasances and facilitating the diffusion of corruption are, then, 
explored through a real case of an Italian small municipality, which experienced corruption in 
public procurement and, in addition, it is currently dealing with an important financial 
instability. Coherently with the outcome-based perspective mentioned above, the scope of the 
research is not circumscribed to the organisational boundaries of the municipality, but it also 
includes the exploration of the impacts on the served community’s wealth over time. 
With this aim, a DPM approach (Bianchi, 2016) was adopted for capturing the system 
feedback processes, behavioural non-linearities and delays concerned with the case under 
analysis, so as to reproduce the dynamicity, systematicity and complexity of the problem at 
hand. Such an approach made also possible to create a simulation model that provided for some 
insights on the impacts over time both of certified wrongdoings of public knowledge and 
possible policies and managerial choices on the performance of the studied municipality. 
If concretely implemented, a DPM chart may provide local governments policy and 
decision-makers with important information for proper use of strategic resources and allow 
them to strategically prevent, monitor, assess and intervene against malfeasances in public 
procurement. This applies not only to corroborate to what extent possible illicit practices 
produce negative effects on organisational performance, but also to investigate the causes 
underlying them, which are often blurred or even disregarded just because linked to legal 
political practices or managerial tools. 
Public entities are expected to comply with national regulation on corruption 
prevention, often overlooking cultural factors that may even change within the same regional 
area. As such, albeit aimed at warding corruption off, preventive and repressive 
countermeasures may not be effective if local governments act alone. More precisely, the 
exclusive commitment of public bodies may produce desired outcomes in the short-term only, 
since the resilience of pathological management paradigms, enabled by cultural beliefs and 
traditions, may make any normative tool ephemeral. 
In general, wicked problems cannot be fixed completely by means of the simplistic 
adoption of strict rules and protocols, which may paradoxically increase organisational 
complexity and even favourite malfeasances. Differently, tangled socio-economic issues often 
require deliberated, accountable and joint decision-making processes including community 
stakeholders, whose efforts are essential for successful anti-corruption interventions by virtue 
of the ownership of tangible and intangible resources that represent strategic crossroads of 
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collaborative synergies. The most significant premise, however, is that a collaborative anti-
corruption approach may not always be a good solution due to the likelihood of confidence 
relationships − upon which the collaboration builds on − that may unintentionally favourite 
collusion between participants and cheating. 
Based on what above, an experiment with a collaborative governance strategy through 
a DPG view is proposed at the end of this research project. DPG represents an extension of the 
DPM perspective, since, in relation to a wicked problem, it adopts a focus going beyond the 
organisational boundaries and includes the synergies and interdependencies with and between 
relevant external actors in achieving collective goals purposefully. The creation of policy 
networks may result effective to handle context-specific cultural, economic, social and political 
issues being crucial to prevent and tackle corruption, especially in presence of public contexts 
that are notably vulnerable to poor governance mechanisms. 
 
1.2 Research design 
Albeit a local system shows apparent and incontrovertible pathological conditions, corruption 
prevention and repression can be promoted by following some ideal steps (Monteduro et al., 
2013: 17), that is: 
i. making the comprehension of its causes as clear and deep as possible; 
ii. providing for reliable measurement and evaluation strategies and tools of the 
phenomenological magnitude; 
iii. endeavouring reliable estimations of its effects; 
iv. defining strategies and adopt tools appropriately, even by basing on international 
experiences. 
These four points constitute the fundamental guidelines of the research design. 
 
1.2.1 Research objective and questions 
The aim of this research project is to explore, describe and explain the possible relationships 
between corruption in public procurement and performance of local governments by designing 
a DPM and a DPG model able, on the one hand, to capture, explain, and analyse the resulting 
structure of behaviour and, on the other hand, to support policy-makers and public managers 
in setting and assessing effective strategies to prevent corruption and counteract the associated 
negative implications over time. 
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This research work mainly adopts a combined study method research design (Saunders 
et al., 2019: 188), which sequentially uses an exploratory, a descriptive, an explanatory and an 
evaluative approach. Accordingly, the exploratory perspective (Saunders et al., 2019: 186-187) 
is adopted at the beginning of the research and represents an essential premise to: 
- enlighten the nature of corruption, its causes, theories and models of analysis; 
- avoid confusion with other forms of crime and, therefore, outline the boundaries of the 
analysis; 
- identify measurement concerns and select an effective methodological strategy being 
suitable to improve corruption measurement and understanding. 
Thereafter, an exploratory-descriptive approach provides for a detailed profile of the 
past and the current situation of the system under scrutiny (Saunders et al., 2019: 187-188). As 
such, it enables the building process of the model structures proposed here. It follows an 
explanatory study (2019: 188) to identify and model the cause-and-effect relationships between 
the variables being linked to corruption and affecting local government performance over time, 
in a way to suggest possible anti-corruption policies. Finally, an evaluative study (2019: 188) 
is conducted to assess feasibility, concerns and outcomes of a possible collaboration-based 
anti-corruption initiative at local level. 
In the light of what above, the main research questions are the following: 
i. How to define corruption in public domains? What is the state of the art in this specific 
research field? What are the main gaps in framing this phenomenon? 
ii. Is it possible to measure corruption? What are the advantages and shortcomings of the 
extant approaches to detect corruption practices generally, and in public procurement 
corruption specifically? 
iii. To what extent may the dynamic performance management and governance views 
provide for more effective frame of corruption at local level? How do such perspectives 
work in different public governance settings? 
iv. Among its multiple forms, how does corruption in public procurement impact on the 
financial instability of a local government? To what extent may a dynamic performance 
management approach support policy-makers and public managers to better frame 
mechanisms and drivers leading to corruption in public procurement? What are the 
implications emerging from its application in terms of preventive and repressive 
countermeasures, respectively? 
v. What are the causal interdependencies and the main decisional levers enabling a potential 
anti-corruption collaborative governance strategy based on the dynamic performance 
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governance approach? What are the roles played by the policy-network participants in 
designing and implementing such a strategy? 
The fourth research question is actually declined into specific sub-questions being 
linked to the selected representative case-study, whose choice is exhaustively explained below. 
 
1.2.2 Research methodology: The Dynamic Performance Management and Governance 
approaches 
As claimed above, empirical research on the impact of corruption in public procurement on 
local government performance is very limited (Basheka, 2009), such that country (Ntayi, 
Ngoboka, & Kakooza, 2013; Sargiacomo, Ianni, D'Andreamatteo, & Servalli, 2015; Siddiquee, 
2005) and cross-country-based studies (Cordis & Milyo, 2016; D'Souza & Kaufmann, 2013) 
actually prevail. 
The relationship between corruption in public procurement and performance of local 
governments is broad and it has mainly been explored statically through efficiency-based proxy 
measures. Studying the possible presence of malfeasances through prices, thresholds in public 
contracting, competition degree in tendering, level of public servants’ discretion and so forth, 
is of course relevant in public procurement, since it is important both in terms of economic 
efficiency and of quality of public purchasing (Domberger & Jensen, 1997). Nevertheless, 
statically investigating these elements may reconduct to some issues in corruption 
measurement through objective parameters (Monteduro et al., 2013). In particular, it may be 
misleading because of unforecastable and sometimes contradictory circumstances that, despite 
desirable levels of competition and prices, do not exclude the presence of corruption in a system 
– see, for instance, Finocchiaro Castro, Guccio, Pignataro, and Rizzo (2018). 
Costanza and Ruth (1998: 183-184) argue that statistical methods typically rely on 
quantification of relationships among the system elements based on cross-sectional data and 
historical series. As such, they are constrained in giving insights on the possible future 
evolution of a system according to alternative management configurations, since their results 
are driven by data and criteria which, on the one hand, are useful to gain information on 
historical or punctual empirical relationships, but, on the other hand, are not able to appreciably 
identify new appropriate paradigms to foster system change2. 
 
2 On the topic, see also Allen, P. 1988. Evolution, innovation and economics. In G. Dosi, C. Freeman, R. Nelson, 
G. Silvergerg, & L. Soete (Eds.), Technical change and economic theory. London: Pinter. 
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Although one must recognise the appreciable attempt of statistics in formulating models 
analysing cause-and-effect relations among system variables (Granger, 1969) − for instance, 
see Ribeiro, Alves, Martins, Lenzi, and Perc (2018) −, it does not seem to be always suitable 
to support the exploration of context-specific, dynamic and complex phenomena, such as 
corruption. Indeed, the static nature of those models is such that the relationships under 
investigation in presence of combinatorial complexity are assumed to remain more or less 
stable over the considered time lapse (Bianchi, 2016: 3, footnote 5). As a result, they are useful 
to measure the overall weight of corruption at macro level, but fail in capturing the presence of 
non-linearities, delays and feedback loops – i.e., its dynamic complexity (Senge, 1990; 
Sterman, 2000) – in those interrelations. It follows that possible anti-corruption interventions 
designed by means of findings abstracted from the processes they stem from may be ineffective 
or even produce unintended impacts over time. Thus, in order to face the above critical issues, 
an attempt to combine system perspective and context-specific analysis is needed. 
Based on what above, this research project adopts a DPM perspective, which stems 
from the System Dynamics (SD) methodology (Forrester, 1961) and stretches out the financial-
based and static approach of the conventional PM tools that often miss the significant 
connection between outputs and outcomes due to the exclusive and bounded organisational 
perspective (Bianchi, 2016: 20). In particular, based on a cause-effect approach, to design and 
implement PMSs according to a dynamic point of view allows for singling out and analyse 
end-results, performance drivers, and accumulation and deploy processes of relevant strategic 
resources (Bianchi, Cosenz, & Marinković, 2015: 2). 
In the public field, policy-makers may adopt symptomatic solutions to tangled issues, 
as well as only focus on inputs and not also on outcomes (Bianchi, 2016: 61). Accordingly, 
political reforms, performance management and cultural levers (Borgonovi, 2005) may take 
advantage of the integration of an outcome-based perspective at the extent to which it: 
- makes reforms more understandable and desirable by stakeholders; 
- versatilely includes the key-actors over time; 
- makes PMSs more flexible and pervasive in assessing policy trade-offs and sustainability 
– both in time and space – through coherent outcome performance indicators; 
- fosters insightful broad-range collaborations with both inter-institutional and non-
governmental actors, whose involvement is significant in terms of system structure 
generating observed behaviours (Bianchi, 2016: 63). 
More in particular, to adopt a DPM approach makes possible to: 
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- provide adequate support to manage strategic resources, measure and keep under control 
the key performance variables and end-results that could be affected by corrupt 
behaviours over time; 
- guide policy- and decision-making processes of organisational areas being particularly 
prone to corruption under a perspective of sustainability; 
- enable public bodies to capture delays between the moment when a corruption event 
occurs and the moment when its effects on organisational performance come through; 
- foster an ethical learning-oriented approach (Bianchi, 2016: 63) and identify 
responsibilities in particular corruption episodes; 
- support anti-corruption strategic planning in local governments according to a holistic 
perspective, in a way to boost performance in specific organisational areas that actually 
require it; 
- facilitate communication between policy-makers and public managers, as well as 
between them and all relevant interlocutors inside and outside the interested organisation. 
This last feature is crucial for enabling planning processes that involve multiple 
stakeholders and setting effective whole-of-government strategies against corruption in local 
areas, as an outside-in perspective of DPM (Bianchi, Bereciartua, Vignieri, & Cohen, 2019) − 
i.e., DPG − may support possible policy-network participants to identify, share and deploy 
resources being considered strategic in curbing local corruption jointly. 
 
1.2.3 Research strategy: The orthodox case-study, methodological choices and time horizon 
Given the strongly context-dependent nature of corruption and its high-level complexity, the 
case-study research strategy (Saunders et al., 2019: 196-199), combined with formal 
modelling, was chosen. In particular, the specific case was selected because it is representative 
of the most common corrupt behaviour in local governments and it has given the opportunity 
to the researcher to both approach the people who lived through the problem under examination 
directly and develop a detailed inquiry into the corrupt phenomenon in its real-life environment 
(Robson, 2002; Yin, 2018). As such, the research strategy configures a ‘phenomenon 
replicating explanation’ (de Gooyert, 2018: 657). 
The empirical investigation appears particularly suitable when one wants to acquire a 
detailed understanding of a ‘wicked’ problem within specific contexts (Morris & Wood, 1991). 
Coherently with what Yin (2018) argues, this kind of strategy allowed for exploring, describing 
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and explaining the phenomenon under study and its effects on local performance, according to 
a realistic perspective. 
At the aim to frame the analysed problem, this research adopts a combination of 
heterogenous qualitative and quantitative data sources, collection methods and processing. In 
fact, SD − therefore, DPM and DPG as well − can support the elaboration of both qualitative 
and quantitative models (de Gooyert, 2018: 656), so that a ‘fully integrated mixed method 
research design’ enhanced the understanding and portraying of the problem, by dynamically 
mixing quantitative and qualitative methods at every stage of the research process (Saunders 
et al., 2019: 183). This choice was made to reduce the risk of mistakes in interpreting causalities 
among variables, as well as to corroborate the meaning of data and foster relevance and 
consistency of findings iteratively (Tashakkori & Teddlie, 2003). 
Accordingly, this research relies on two main tool categories, which were used 
iteratively along the overall research process, that is to say: 
- primary data that was autonomously produced from non-structured, face-to-face, 
convergent interviews; 
- secondary data retrieved from multiple-sources. 
In particular, qualitative primary data was generated by non-standardised in-depth 
interviews – i.e., ‘face-to-face convergent interview’ (Dick, 1998) – with apical Civil Servants 
of the Municipality chosen as a representative case-study, according to specific interviewee 
selection criteria (Zhang & Shaw, 2012: 8-10). The interviewees were made able to talk freely 
in the first part of the meetings and answer to probing questions in the second part of them 
(Saunders et al., 2019: 436-444). In this way, they provided for useful stories, examples, 
clarification, data, definitions, patterns and insights allowing for searching and testing dynamic 
hypotheses of the problem at hand (Luna-Reyes & Andersen, 2003: 280-281). 
Thereafter, a process of thematic content analysis (Boyatzis, 1998), based on open 
(Corbin & Strauss, 2008: 2) and axial coding techniques (2008: 27), allowed to clarify the 
meanings of the information retrieved from the mentioned interviews, as well as to combine 
and group terms and arguments according to internally-consistent schemes of meaning. 
The primary data was aimed at corroborating the meaning of the secondary one 
retrieved from heterogeneous sources, such as documents describing legal cases, public 
balance-sheets and open-access repositories of official statistical Italian institutions – in 
particular, ISTAT and SIOPE. Such a typology of data was essential to explore, describe and 
explain the analysed phenomenon (Saunders et al., 2019: 348-351) and, in addition, to quantify 
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the exogenous and initial variables of the models. Indeed, the use of both statistical and 
judgmental estimations (Sterman, 2000: 867) constitute a reliable choice in parameter 
assessment test (Barlas, 1996; Sterman, 2000). 
Last, along the development stages of the model building process, some informal 
‘disconfirmatory assessment interviews’ (Andersen, Luna-Reyes, Diker, Black, Rich, & 
Andersen, 2012) were held according to the needs of the case with relevant municipal key-
actors, in order to enhance the reliability of the models. 
Overall, the research choices described above were applied within a longitudinal time 
horizon (Saunders et al., 2019: 212). This has the advantage to observe and study the change 
and development of events over time, so as to allow researcher to control the studied variables 
(Adams & Schvaneveldt, 1991). 
 
1.2.4 Research philosophy 
The resulting research design is representable by means of the ‘research onion’ provided by 
Saunders et al. (2019) and illustrated in Figure 1.1. 
 
 
Figure 1.1. Research ‘onion’ for this research project. Source: Adapted from Saunders et al. (2019: 174). 
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It was useful to specify the central part of the research design before to explain what 
kind of paradigm and approach were assumed in this project. This made possible to provide 
the readers with a detailed overview to understand the main pillars of the research design. 
The emerging paradigm for the purpose of this research is pragmatism (Saunders et al., 
2019: 150-151). As any research philosophy, this one can be analysed basing on four aspects 
(Saunders et al., 2019: 133-134) − see Table 1.1 −, namely: 
- ontology, which concerns with the nature of reality and how the system actually works; 
- epistemology, which is related to what represents acceptable knowledge with reference 
to the specific research; 
- axiology, which refers to the study of judgement about values; 
- typical methods adopted. 
 
Table 1.1. Pragmatic research philosophy in business and management research. Source: Adapted from Saunders et al. 
(2019: 145, 150-151). 
Ontology Epistemology Axiology Typical methods 
The reality is made of 
experiences, processes and 
practices, and it is assumed to 
be complex and the corollary 
of ideas. 
Knowledge and theories 
are valuable in function 
of the investigated 
problem and the 
environment where it 
occurs, as well as of 
their capability to make 
actions successful and 
provide useful 
contributions for the 
future research. 
The researcher’s 
system of values, 
background and 
beliefs guide the 
overall research 
process. 
The significance of 
solutions to the problem 
to fix and the related 
outcomes prevail, with 
the awareness that a 
single problem can be 
analysed and faced by 
means of several, 
qualitative and 
quantitative approaches, 
methods and tools. 
 
For each of them, there exist both an objective and a subjective aspect. The first one 
considers that entities exist in the reality regardless of actors concerned with their existence, 
while the subjective one assumes that phenomena are created by perceptions and consequent 
actions of actors themselves (Saunders et al., 2019: 134-138). On the basis of these parameters, 
it is possible to provide for some insights about the way to approach the present research. 
Firstly, the usefulness of pragmatism in analysing corruption is such that both the 
objective and subjective views matter as, on the one hand, the phenomenon is usually analysed 
under the form of pure perception because of its clandestine nature but, on the other hand, it 
can also be detected by adopting objective techniques relying on valuable proxies and 
experiences. As such, by integrating both the aspects, it was possible to improve the reliability 
of data interpretation linked to the phenomenon at hand. Secondly, values shine through the 
research project itself, since they guide human action (Heron, 1996). Interpreting data and 
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results according to the values emerging by directly approaching people concerned with the 
specific case-study reduced the risk of deceptive understanding of the information retrieved by 
both convergent interviews and multiple-source secondary data. In this way, subjective and 
objective profiles corroborated and supported each other in a credible way. 
Finally, the scientific approach adopted is inductive (Saunders et al., 2019: 154-155), 
since it allowed the researcher to: 
- understand problem and its internal causalities by involving empirical concepts, data and 
variables; 
- express them in operational terms, in a way to gain new knowledge on the system under 
study; 
- reason on the dynamic hypotheses critically by also taking into consideration 
interviewees’ experiences, interpretations, and beliefs; 
- analyse the system behaviour and, through an exam of the possible outcomes, suggest 
some feasible policies. 
 
1.2.5 Research plan 
The research project was conducted on a full-time basis with a minimum of 35 hours per week. 
The time span for undertaking the research overlapped with the duration of the PhD course, 
that is three years. The evolution of the research work is depicted in Table 1.2. 
 
Table 1.2. Schedule of the intermediate research products and related processing time. 






1st trimester First draft of the literature review 
2nd trimester Development of possible research trajectories 
3rd trimester 
Formulation of feasible research objectives and questions; selection of the 
research strategy and methodology 








1st trimester Investigation of the case-study 
2nd trimester Data negotiation and collection through convergent interviews 
3rd trimester Data analysis and first rough results 






1st trimester Refinement of the literature review 
2nd trimester Review of the research findings 
3rd trimester Refinement of the formal structure of the research thesis 
4th trimester Presentation of the final research and paper proposal for submission 
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Figure 1.2. Research time frame through a Gantt chart. 
 
1.2.6 Research ethics and data 
The focus of this research is strictly managerial, and it does not stress on the individuals who 
may be concerned with the problem statement. It is based on objective facts which were 
ascertained by the Italian Magistrates Courts and emerging from official documents being 
publicly available and corroborated by the convergent interviews with the municipal Public 
Officials held in 2019. As a result, this research neither wants to be defamatory towards specific 
individuals nor towards the Municipality itself, since its purpose is academic only. 
Given the sensitive topic, information obtained from the interviewees has not been and 
will not be used for purposes different from the research objectives of the present thesis, of all 
the scientific articles linked to this manuscript and of any other literary work written or edited 
by the author. No reference to specific persons was intentionally made and the interview output 
was entirely paraphrased by using notes taken during the meetings and opportunely integrated 
with information present in legal documents. 
The interviewees had the faculty to withdraw from the interview in any moment 
together with the provided information. The purpose of the research and the use of information 
retrieved from the interviews was made transparent to all participants via standard informative 
paper − see Appendix A. Finally, to ensure complete transparency, the data and information 
based on which this research develops are fully available in this thesis. 
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In order to search for relevant literature, this research project made use of Elsevier’s 
Scopus, Clarivate’s Web of Science and Google Scholar web engines. In addition, it adopted a 
‘reference-from-reference’ strategy to include the relevant research material. 
Data and information used in this research project are retrieved from official public 
sources, such as judgements, public budgets, financial statements and open-access repositories 
of specialised Italian institutions, which are publicly accessible. 
For the building and simulation processes of the models, Powersim’s Studio 10 
Academic, version 10.14.5555.6, and Ventana Systems’ Vensim PLE for Windows, version 
7.3.5, were used. 
 
1.3 Structure of the thesis 
Figure 1.3 shows the structure of the thesis according to the research design described above. 
In particular, given the combined nature of the research design, the specific approach of 
research adopted in each chapter is emphasised, together with the main methodological choices 
and data sources. 
Each chapter endeavours to answer the research questions highlighted in the sub-
paragraph 1.2.1 on the basis of the systematisation below: 
- Chapter 2: research question i; 
- Chapter 3: research question ii; 
- Chapter 4: research question iii; 
- Chapters 5, 6 and 7: research question iv − further detailed in function of the case-study; 
- Chapter 8: research question v. 









FRAMING CORRUPTION: A LITERATURE OVERVIEW OF THE NATURE, 





As argued by Anthony (1965: 2-3), to single-out a framework constituted by topics and sub-
topics in relation to a particular subject allows researchers to outline the boundaries within 
which relevant statements and generalisations are valid and significant, as well as research 
results pertinently apply. Corruption is an ample topic, subjected to continuous evolutions and 
analysed under disparate perspectives in heterogenous fields of knowledge. Specific forms of 
corruption are also characterised by unique peculiarities, origins and dynamics. Nonetheless, 
common traits and premises always remain valid for whatever form of this phenomenon, so 
that it is possible to attribute specific kinds of malfeasance within a clear theoretical framework 
and, as a result, exclude others from it. 
In this research project, corruption phenomena are investigated under a performance 
management perspective and, as such, it adopts broad identification criteria of what illicit acts 
can be actually considered as corrupt in relation to their capability to directly or indirectly affect 
infra-, inter- or supra-institutional objectives and goals. This may imply that such criteria may 
differ from the ones of other fields of study, being they focused on other cognitive objectives, 
metrics and value judgments. In making this clear, it is therefore necessary to put readers in 
the best position to better understand this ambiguous phenomenon through an analysis of its 
fundamental elements, features, dynamics and approaches adopted in the prevalent literature. 
Accordingly, the present chapter is aimed at clarifying the nature, meaning, main 
theories, causes and analytical approaches of corruption, in a way to answer the questions: How 
to define corruption in public domains? What is the state of the art in this specific research 
field? What are the main gaps in framing this phenomenon? 
Particularly, in the first part, this section meticulously explores the general meaning of 
corruption and its essential facets according to the traditional way to define its characteristic 
behaviour of voluntary and aware deviation from formal duties for private interests. Then, the 
principal-agent and collective action theories are explored as main frameworks according to 
which corrupt phenomena are understood. 
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In the second part, this chapter explorers the individualistic and structural causes of 
corruption and the main political-administrative models to analyse it (Vannucci, 2015). It 
finally narrows the focus on local government level, emphasising how the issue needs a 
systemic approach both at organisational and at community level. 
 
2.2 Definition and general characteristics of corruption 
Corruption has plagued human society since the most ancient governments and remains one of 
the most important economic, social and political diseases of the modern age (Campos & 
Pradhan, 2007: 2). It is nowadays considered a quite complex phenomenon to hinder (Cosenz 
& Noto, 2014: 239), as it owns disparate features, assumes different aspects in the environment 
where it occurs and can refer to a broad range of activities (Morris, 2011: 10). 
Despite it is a debated topic in several subject areas (Allegrini, Lai, & Cecchetti, 2018: 
167), corruption phenomenon is not simple to define. It is important and rampant throughout 
the globe (Shleifer & Vishny, 1993: 599), but whatever possible univocal meaning has been 
deeply contested (Dawood, 2014: 104). In spite of the enrichment of knowledge about its nature 
and mechanisms, it is still not enough to acquire a sufficient and comprehensive understanding 
of its dynamics due to the fact that corrupter and corrupted are two figures evolving over time 
(Transparency International Italia, 2017: 4). 
Identifying corruption turns out to be a not simple exercise, since it can involve both 
acts of omission and commission − i.e., abuse or misuse −, as well as legal and illegal activities 
(Klitgaard et al., 2000: 2). Furthermore, as it is highlighted by the Council of Europe, there is 
not an univocal and universally-accepted definition that is valid for all forms and levels of 
corruptive behaviour in all the jurisdictions around the world (World Bank, 1997: 20). 
Therefore, to realise a comparison between both a case of crime and another, as well as 
to collect data that are comparable across several countries, is an activity requiring high levels 
of carefulness (Rose-Ackerman, 2006: XXI). It is various and variable in time and space and 
not always possible to detect systematically, because it is clandestine due to its illicitness 
(Lambsdorff & Schulze, 2015: 100). As such, it is a context-specific phenomenon because of 
its changeable causal factors, specific national regulations and, above all, people’s culture 
about what it is actually an unethical behaviour and what is not (Davis, 2009: 319). 
The term ‘corruption’ has ancient roots and derives from Latin cum and rumpere, which 
mean ‘to break together’ (Ferrante & Vannucci, 2017: 33). In a broader sense, even if there is 
not general agreement, it may also be extensively labelled as ‘maladministration’ (2017: 30) 
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or ‘bad governance’, comprehensively including every act being not compliant with sound 
administration. 
Past research provided disparate conceptualisations of corruption, with the emphasis, 
respectively, to the public office, to the public interest or to the market (Philp, 1997). According 
to Leff (1964: 8), corruption can be intended as an extra-legal institution through which 
individuals or groups of people try to acquire supremacy over administrative structures. 
However, most of the definitions is referred to the public field. For instance, Nye (1967: 416) 
and Huntington (1968: 59) state that corruption phenomenon represents a behaviour deviating 
from accepted rules and formal obligations of public charges due to private advantages and, as 
such, it discloses a lack of effective political institutionalisation. Coherently with that, Shleifer 
and Vishny (1993: 599) compare corruption to a commercial transaction of government 
property by public officials for private purposes. 
With an international focus, a comprehensive definition is provided by the OECD 
(1997: 7), which posits that corruption constitutes a criminal act of whoever intentionally − 
personally or indirectly − offers, promises or grants any undue benefit to a foreign public 
official in exchange for either an omission or a commission in his/her formal duties to obtain 
private advantages in managing international businesses. 
Whatever territorial extension is considered, it is definitely possible to affirm that the 
mainstream definition of corruption is the improper use − or abuse − of public power for 
personal benefit (World Bank, 1997: 8), broadened by the more general ‘entrusted power’ 
instead of the bounded ‘public office’ by Transparency International (2020a) at the aim to also 
include any relevant occurrence in the private sector (Pope, 2000: 2). 
Nevertheless, given that the most important difficulty in studying corruption is to 
ascribe an univocal identity to the phenomenon (Jain, 2001: 73), identifying its nature and 
common characteristics to explain this broadly accepted definition is the favourite solution 
among academics, professionals and international organisations. At this regard, Ferrante and 
Vannucci (2017: 16-23) single-out three fundamental ‘realities’ of human being dimension that 
corruption unavoidably degrades, that is: a power delegated ‘to us’ or ‘from us to others’; the 
trust outlining the written and non-written boundaries within which the entrusted power can be 
exercised; to give the power in custody for its safekeeping. In summary, the main elements of 
this widespread conceptualisation of corruption are: the power; the subject; the abuse; the 
private benefit. 
Framing Corruption: A Literature Overview of the Nature, Theories, Causes and Models of Analysis  
20 
 
The first element refers to the mandate to either establish or impose rules or make 
decisions for other people (Monteduro et al., 2013: 18). As highlighted above, the power can 
be both ‘mandated from’ and ‘mandated to’ others, since one can be either responsible for 
others or transfer a responsibility to third parts. 
The subject can be referred to both public and private entities (Arnone & Iliopulos, 
2005: 18) and conceptually leaves room for the inclusion of relationships which individuals 
establish each other both in the private and in the public context. However, corruption becomes 
worthy of special attentions when public sector is concerned more than in other cases. Public 
sector is, indeed, centred on collective ownership and social purposes that drive the exercise of 
the public choice (Bovaird & Löffler, 2009: 5) but, when personal affluence and public power 
obstruct each other (Rose-Ackerman, 2006: XVII), the private interest may clash with the 
delegating side’s one in an unsolvable conflict (Ferrante & Vannucci, 2017: 30). 
The abuse refers to a deviation from the provisions of the mandate itself, since not only 
the power acquire its own meaning when an individual intentionally addresses it towards what 
he/she is responsible for (Søreide, 2002: 2; Tanzi, 1998b: 167-168), but also when it is either 
badly exerted – intended as both abused and misused – or even omitted. 
The last element is an advantage of any nature − not only financial − that derives from 
breaking the power custody agreement and benefited by either the entrusted person or by 
individuals next to him or her (Monteduro et al., 2013: 19; Søreide, 2002: 2; Tanzi, 1998b: 
167-168). In the public sector, it is typically supported by a hidden quid pro quo purposefully 
diverting the natural direction of the power being originally entrusted. 
Jointly considered, these constitutive elements of corruption make the phenomenon 
more inclusive in terms of meaning, as it goes beyond the legal interpretations which national 
regulations use to provide in a numerus clausus of circumstances. Indeed, provided that the 
intrinsic arbitrariness of the corrupt decision-making process leads to actions which do not take 
into consideration any − either present or future − external interest1 that, both directly and 
indirectly, it may run over (Dawood, 2014: 107), establishing what represents corruption a 
priori is not always a wise choice. 
As Rose-Ackerman and Søreide (2011: XIV) underlined, law generally uses to tag 
something as ‘corrupt’ basing on a disapproval perception of this phenomenon. Differently, 
 
1 Collective interest is not the simplistic sum of overall the single private interests, and it raises from a conceptual 
legal regime perspective anchored to the fact that subjective rights can exist together with social intervention. For 
more details, see Gabardo, E. 2017. The Principle of Supremacy of the Public Interest over Private Interest as the 
Foundation of Social Administrative Law. Revista de Investigações Constitucionais, 4(2): 95-130. P. 97. 
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economic scholars and practitioners look for a more objective concept being suitable to be 
studied both theoretically and pragmatically before to evaluate its own normative features. For 
this reason, corruption as a field of study and economic analysis have been marked by mutual 
frictions (Rose-Ackerman, 2006: XIV). 
Despite possible academic disputes, a convergent point can be found. Corruption 
involves a betrayal against society by whom is appointed for accomplishing a public duty in 
terms of resource reallocation in favour of exclusive groups of individuals, which implies lower 
– or even none – availability for anyone else who has exactly the same access right to collective 
resources. It means that its principal effect is the ineluctable reduction of the decision-making 
scope from a given human community − for instance, a local area − to an individual or smaller 
groups of people, in violation of the power-transfer agreement within a trust relationship 
(Pozsgai-Alvarez, 2019: 3-4). Therefore, personal wealth-seeking behaviours of public 
authorities’ representants (Amundsen, Sissener, & Søreide, 2000: 11) realised through a 
divergence from their formal obligations (Nye, 1967: 416) produces the foremost result of 
obtaining an unjust advantage at expenses of the public welfare, by exploiting a power 
legitimately exerted in accordance with a public mandate. 
Under a different perspective, corruption might not result as much deleterious as people 
may generally think about. In particular, a non-recent research line argues that corrupt 
behaviour may be tolerable and foster economic development by virtue of the fact that public 
officials may be more useful in performing their duties and making private subjects able to 
overcome the muddled bureaucratic mechanisms (Huntington, 1968; Leff, 1964). 
Possible benefits may also derive in political terms. At this regard, Dawood (2014: 128-
129) stated that political corruption may be divided into ‘right’ or ‘wrong’, depending on 
whether there exists an acceptable political gain, constituted by electoral campaign-support in 
exchange of favourable outcomes for donors, in view of sure consensus and possible future re-
election that may represent reliable guarantees against any public power abuse. Besides, it 
seems that there is no general agreement about what should count as ‘corrupt’ within the 
specific context of financial support to political candidates (Rose-Ackerman, 2006: XIX), such 
that the border between quid pro quo of corruption and donation is not glaring (Arnone & 
Iliopulos, 2005). Likewise, Bearfield (2009) posits a re-conceptualisation of political 
patronage, underlying its beneficial effects and attenuating common demonisations. 
Although political corruption may realistically provide some positive outcomes, as 
Rose-Ackerman (2006: XV) pointed out, bureaucratic corruption systems always undermine 
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other public objectives. With different magnitude, whatever form of corrupt behaviour, 
whether ‘petty’ or ‘grand’2, slows down economic development (Mauro, 1995: 705-706). It 
weakens the public performance as it moves public money away from required high-value 
interventions to projects that may not be totally needed, but which instead promise better 
chances to hide corruption practices (Shleifer & Vishny, 1993: 616). 
Therefore, the phenomenon in question harms relationships of trust between citizens 
and institutions (Allegrini et al., 2018: 168)3 and whatever corruption-exorcising mindset does 
not consider the injurious effects on the multiple and multi-faceted interests of human 
communities, since misuses of public entrusted power unavoidably involve the exclusion of 
parts of society in favour of few powerful interest’s groups that have the opportunity to exert a 
greater pression on policy- and decision-makers. In the extreme case, corruption substantiates 
into a ‘state-capture’ (Hellman, Jones, & Kaufmann, 2000) that undermines political processes 
of rule shaping of a country (Arnone & Iliopulos, 2005: 22) and, thus, its government stability. 
Corruption is moralistically, socially, politically and economically wrong in and of 
itself, since it leads to undesirable consequences (Kolstad, 2008: 2), such as growing 
transaction costs and uncertainty in an economy, frictions on long-run investments, talent 
misallocations, distortions of technology choices, and so on (Gray & Kaufman, 1998: 1). A 
compliant point of view does not take into account the systemic long-term effects of corrupt 
behaviours that compromise societal welfare and inter-generational equality. 
 
2.3 The principal-agent theory 
The meaning of corruption underlies a notion of degradation from an original condition4 
(Dawood, 2014: 118) that arises from the decisions made by individuals (Groenendijk, 1997: 
207). This way to frame it helps to understand the reason why the abuse of entrusted power is 
 
2 ‘Petty’ corruption arises where an individual breaks laws and regulations to exploit some opportunities by asking 
for kickbacks, distorting public funds and promising favours against private gains. Differently, ‘grand’ corruption 
involves the highest government levels and, as a consequence, the entire social-economic-political environment, 
so that it undermines state legitimacy and economic functioning. For more details, see Allegrini, V., Lai, Y., & 
Cecchetti, I. 2018. La collaborazione tra comuni e il suo impatto sulla qualità dei Piani Triennali di Prevenzione 
della Corruzione: un’analisi empirica [Collaboration between municipalities and its impact on the quality of 
Triennial Plans of Prevention of Corruption: An empirical analysis]. Azienda Pubblica(2): 165-188, Arnone, M. 
& Iliopulos, E. 2005. La corruzione costa. Effetti economici, istituzionali e sociali [Corruption costs. Economic, 
institutional, and social effects]. Italy: Vita e Pensiero, Jain, A. K. 2001. Corruption: A review. Journal of 
Economic Surveys, 15(1): 71-121, Pizzorno, A. 1992a. Lo scambio occulto. Stato e mercato, 34(1): 3-34, Rose-
Ackerman, S. 2006. International Handbook on the Economics of Corruption. Cheltenham, UK; Northampton, 
MA, USA: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited (UK); Edward Elgar Publishing, Inc. (USA). 
3 See also Del Monte, A. & Papagni, E. 2007. The determinants of corruption in Italy: Regional panel data analysis. 
European Journal of Political Economy, 23(2): 379-396. 
4 It recalls the core meaning of the adjective ‘corrupt’, that is, unreliable due to modifications or mistakes. Cf. 
Oxford English Dictionary. 2012a. Corrupt. In M. Waite (Ed.), Seventh ed.: 156. UK: Oxford University Press. 
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typically represented as a pathology of the agency theory, about which a huge body of literature 
− for instance, Berle and Means (1932); Eisenhardt (1989); Fama and Jensen (1983); Grossman 
and Hart (1983); Jensen and Meckling (1976); Mitnick (1975); Panda and Lepsa (2017); Ross 
(1973) − dealt with. 
The agency theory implies that the principal delegates its power to carry out one or 
more tasks to an agent on his/her behalf5, according to a clear agreement that the agent 
undertakes to comply with (Berle & Means, 1932; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Panda & Lepsa, 
2017; Ross, 1973). 
The principal-agent literature is a part of the neo-institutional economics, according to 
which, based on the preferences of individuals, institutions are “collectively binding working 
rulesˮ (Groenendijk, 1997: 207) and, as such, they structure and constrain the decision-making 
process. Such a theory is helpful to understand the behaviour of the real world, as represents 
the pillar around which institutions are built and grow up (Mitnick, 1975). Therefore, it helps 
to single out governance mechanisms aimed at controlling and regulating the agent’s behaviour 
(Panda & Lepsa, 2017: 76) under the principal’s perspective (Grossman & Hart, 1983) when 
there is separation between the decision formal approval and monitoring and  the 
implementation of decisions (Fama & Jensen, 1983: 302). 
The prevalent research on this topic emphasises the typical issues in terms of 
phenomenon understanding, forms and implementation costs related to different knowledge 
fields where it has become operative – e.g., economics, finance, sociology, political sciences, 
and so forth (Eisenhardt, 1989: 57; Panda & Lepsa, 2017: 75). One of the most salient points 
relates to possible events of break within the principal-agent relationship. More precisely, the 
model underlying the theory assumes that the principal’s and agent’s interests may diverge in 
presence of information gaps to the advantage of the agent and, based on that, the principal can 
prescribe the pay-off rules of their relationship (Groenendijk, 1997: 208). 
Possible distortions of the agent’s behaviour may occur when the binding relationship 
induces the agent to improve his/her utility from and/or reduces his/her effort in the 
relationship, because of the fact that the principal is not able to provide for an adequate 
sanctioning/incentivising system to control the agent’s behaviour (Arnone & Iliopulos, 2005: 
34). These relational debasements are commonly identified with the so-called ‘agency costs’, 
which are framed into the transaction costs category of an agreement (Coase, 1960). 
 
5 The relationship may not be one-to-one only, but also pluralistic, that is, one-to-many, many-to-one or many-to-
many. 
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In this picture, information asymmetry represents a transaction cost (Coase, 1960; 
Williamson, 1985) that can show up in the form of either ‘adverse selection’ or ‘moral hazard’, 
in function of the object of the knowledge. Assuming that the agent is rational and reward-
seeker6 (Panda & Lepsa, 2017: 79), on the one hand, information asymmetry can configure, 
both before and after contracting, as ‘adverse selection’ when there is lack of knowledge about 
either the agreement object or the agent’s conduct, respectively; on the other hand, it can take 
the form of ‘moral hazard’ only after contracting, since the possible lack of knowledge 
concerns the agent’s behaviour (Sung, 2005: 1021). 
More in particular, in the case of ‘adverse selection’, the fact that the agent’s interests 
may be misaligned from those of the principal may provoke ex ante costs, which are costs of 
drafting, negotiating and safeguarding an agreement (Williamson, 1985: 20-21). Moreover, the 
misaligned interests may create ex post costs, which refer to transaction costs aimed at 
monitoring the agreement execution (Groenendijk, 1997: 208). They can assume different 
forms, such as haggling costs to correct eventual misalignments, setup and running costs 
associated with the governance structure to which disputes are referred, and so forth 
(Williamson, 1985: 21). Contrarily, in the case of ‘moral hazard’, the principal has some 
difficulties to maintain a continuous control over the agent and his/her conduct, so that ex post 
costs may only occur. 
Some authors (Pepper & Gore, 2012; Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia, 1998) focused their 
attention on different core behavioural or subjective factors of the theory, such as motivations 
and abilities of the agent, risks and opportunities. In particular, the behavioural agency theory 
points out the necessity to assess the link between the agency costs and the agent’s 
performance, assuming that, on the one hand, the agent opposes to risks by analysing both 
endogenous and exogenous advantages of breaking the agreement under the bounded 
rationality condition and, on the other hand, there exists a linear relationship between the 
performance and motivation of the agent (Panda & Lepsa, 2017: 79). 
The agency relationship is the core of the corrupt transaction. Typically, based on what 
argued above, the principal’s control over the agent is exercised by the prospect of negative 
payoffs in the comparison between advantages and disadvantages to engage in corruption 
(Rothstein, 2011b; Teorell, 2007). 
 
6 The compliance with the bounded rationality principle is a premise of the principal-agent model. About the 
bounded rationality, cf. Cristofaro, M. 2017. Herbert Simon’s bounded rationality: Its historical evolution in 
management and cross-fertilizing contribution. Journal of Management History, 23(2): 170-190, Simon, H. A. 
1947. Administrative Behavior: a Study of Decision-Making Processes in Administrative Organization. New 
York, NY: Macmillan. 
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Despite the literature usually refers to this theory by emphasising its historical roots 
and applications to private companies, it is well-suited for a large proportion of social 
relationships (Eisenhardt, 1989: 59). 
Accordingly, in the public sector, briberies, kickbacks and other private gains incentive 
civil servants to take actions undermining the principals’ interests, with the aim to retrieve the 
best possible benefit from the agency relationship. Typically, civil servants represent the agents 
by virtue of a relationship of mandate to the behalf of the belonging public bodies – i.e., the 
principals (Galli, Giacomelli, & Valotti, 2018: 149). Obviously, the possible presence of a third 
actor may be considered whether an external part pushes the civil servant to displace a public 
interest with a private one, so that another principal-agent relationship is established between 
this external ‘client’ and the corrupt official (Groenendijk, 1997: 209). However, in general, 
the roles of principal and agent may be singled out, for instance, in the relationships between 
bureaucratic superiors and subordinates, politicians and public officials, or even between a 
public body and a given citizenry (Rose-Ackerman, 2006: XVII). 
Both the principal’s and agent’s point of view seem to be suitable when corruption in 
the public domain is the problem to address. Interestingly, Perrow (1986) highlighted how the 
agency problem can also be seen from the agent-side, as the principal may have a cognitive 
and factual dominance on the agent. 
As regard the principal’s point of view, it is peaceful to argue that − at least in 
democratic realities − communities represent the principal who should monitor the work of 
politicians and public officials – i.e., the agents –, possibly leading the agreement back to its 
original status in the event of improper exercise of entrusted public power for achieving private 
aims. Both collective and widespread interests are concerned here7, where the former belong 
to well-identified, distinct and structured groups of individuals (Contaldi, 2020: 10; Giannini, 
1976), while the latter are referred to a collective indistinctly (Contaldi, 2020: 10; Vocino, 
1982). Accordingly, whatever ‘state’, intended as “nation or territory considered as an 
organized political unit under one government” (Oxford English Dictionary, 2012b: 712) − 
which includes its offshoots in the case of decentralised governments − encompasses several 
public interests claimed by multiple stakeholders − e.g., citizens, businesses, non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs), and so forth −, for which it should guarantee adequate protection 
mechanisms, anti-corruption included. 
 
7 Interests that are related to private relationships are logically excluded in this digression. 
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Moving the focus on the agent’s perspective, especially when a large amount of money 
is channelled by power groups among principals – i.e., the so-called ‘lobbies’ – within a 
community, agents succumb to the predominant stakeholders’ influence, which provokes a 
mismatch between the objectives of power groups and those of communities. As a result, one-
sided political and economic reforms generate policy distortions leading to the highest level of 
‘state capture’ (Hellman et al., 2000: 34). Nevertheless, depending on the lawfulness and 
transparency levels of the means adopted, influences from the private sector are not always a 
symptom of pervasive corruption, rather they are physiological and may even boost national 
reforms and public efficiency (Arnone & Iliopulos, 2005: 22). 
Beyond the thin line that may justify corrupt practices, malfeasances for personal gains  
objectively disempower people, since the outcomes resulting from the related decision-making 
processes are not legitimated by the equal participation and influence of who is, in turn, affected 
by the process itself  (Dawood, 2014: 108-109; Warren, 2004). Whatever the perspective is, 
individuals’ myopic judgment and self-interest in state-society relationships erode government 
evenness and rightfulness, as well as cause resource waste and failing public spending choices8 
(Rose-Ackerman, 2006: XVI). 
 
2.4 The collective action theory 
Despite the behavioural agency model (Pepper & Gore, 2012; Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia, 
1998) introduces more realistic assumptions to the principal-agent model − e.g., agents are not 
risk-takers and have bounded rationality (Panda & Lepsa, 2017: 79)  −, a conceptual limitation 
of the latter is the implicit hypothesis that, where the power exercise is misaligned from − or 
even threats − the interest for which it is entrusted, the principal wishes to monitor and possibly 
leads the agreement back to its initial conditions. This cannot be taken for granted. 
Detecting such a conceptual limitation of the traditional principal-agent approach, a 
body of the literature (Booth & Cammack, 2013; Mungiu-Pippidi, Loncaric, Vaz Mundo, 
Sponza Braga, Weinhardt, Pulido Solares et al., 2011; Persson, Rothstein, & Teorell, 2013; 
Rothstein, 2011a) pointed out that corruption should be better considered as a matter of 
collective action, especially when it systemically impacts on specific contexts (Marquette & 
Peiffer, 2015). As a general concept, the collective action theory discloses the capability of a 
 
8 It is worthy to highlight that, within the public context, both the agent and the possible third actor engaging in 
corruption are not disconnected from the bad outcomes produced by breaking the principal-agent relationship, 
since their well-being belongs to the same set of public interests which the agent is called to deal with. In other 
terms, the main mistake that corrupters and corrupted make refers to the carelessness of the undesired outcomes 
that themselves have contributed to realise over time and that, sooner or later, will affect their wealth as well. 
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community to collectively act for realising the public good (Olson, 1971; Ostrom, Walker, & 
Gardner, 1992). 
Although this kind of approach may logically appear desirable in dealing with tangled 
socio-economic issues, collective action theories were often considered a chimera in the past, 
since hardly practicable and costly. More in particular, as Holahan and Lubell (2016: 24) 
pointed out, Olson’s (1971: 2) assumed that, because of their self-interested nature, individuals’ 
rationality fosters cooperative behaviour only if either they are part of narrow groups or there 
exist particular mechanisms − for instance, coercion − pushing them to act towards the 
attainment of the same goal. 
This is coherent with the Hardin’s (1968) statement on individuals’ short-sighted view 
in exploiting common pool of resources. Paraphrasing the Author, collective resources need to 
be managed either at central government level or by a single private institution because of the 
fact that, since they are freely-accessible by everyone, benefits coming from their growing 
usage are retrieved by users only, but the related costs are shared in the overall community and 
this, sooner or later, will lead to the ‘tragedy’ of resource impoverishment. In other terms, 
governmental intervention should constitute the favourited way to manage rivalrous and non-
excludable collective goods. 
Nevertheless, centralised − public or private − coordination may fail in overcoming 
these issues related to provision of collective goods (Holahan & Lubell, 2016: 25). Institutional 
theory may provide a solution to make cooperation a feasible strategy by means of formal rules 
and informal social norms (Ostrom, 2006) affecting individuals’ behaviour − therefore their 
interactions, mental models and, as a result, choices (Aoki, 2001) −, in a way to make 
cooperation an − even the most − prevailing strategy (Holahan & Lubell, 2016: 25). 
Accordingly, self-organised institutions − such as collective actions − may arise within 
other institutional frameworks belonging to higher layers of complex socio-economic-political 
systems (Ostrom, 2006), even if with different results in terms of trade-off between costs and 
benefits that involved actors may respectively incur and take. Furthermore, these outcomes 
may be affected by externalities stemming from interactions among actors involved in 
different, but contiguous, governance settings of institutions (Holahan & Lubell, 2016: 27), so 
as to destabilise or catalyse them. 
In other terms, it is possible a co-existence between top-down and bottom-up 
governance settings (Holahan & Lubell, 2016: 28), where the latter are characterised by 
voluntary cooperation among key-actors that, by means of trust, mutuality and selflessness, 
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enable successful co-management of common resources (Ostrom, 1990) towards more 
sustainable socio-economic-political equilibria. 
In the light of what above, it is possible, on the one hand, to conceptualise corruption 
as a form of ‘free riding’ of common-pool resources, which are non-excludable but rivalry by 
definition (Marquette & Peiffer, 2015), and, on the other hand, to identify the so-called ‘tragedy 
of the commons’ (Hardin, 1968) as its typical outcome. Under this point of view, being 
corruption ‘free riding’, an agent should logically engage in it (Jancsics, 2019: 525), but the 
contextual dependency of its configurations should contain hasty conclusions and, rather, 
trigger an appropriate research effort on the related causes. 
 
2.5 Causes of corruption 
In spite of international agreements moved by the common desire to tackle corruption 
expressed, for instance, by the Convention Against Corruption (CAC) of the  (UN), defining 
corruption is a not easy task and finding out its determinants proves equal, provided that it is 
complex, contextual and many-sided, as well as characterised by several forms, functions, 
causes and impacts (Amundsen et al., 2000: 9). 
Although to establish an univocal sense of the cause-effect relationships is not always 
immediate (Arnone & Iliopulos, 2005: 5) due to the resulting feedback loops that create 
difficulties in isolating its causes (Lambsdorff, 2006: 4), the prevalent literature (Ades & Di 
Tella, 1997; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1999; Lambsdorff, 2006; Mauro, 
1995, 1997; Montinola & Jackman, 2002; Persson, Tabellini, & Trebbi, 2003; Rose-Ackerman, 
1999; Tanzi, 1998b; Treisman, 2000) proposed a raft of macro and cross-national studies 
related to the general causes of corruption. Within this framework, distinguishing between 
individualistic and structural factors can better explain differentiated corrupt behaviours case-
by-case (Heggstad & Frøystad, 2011: 6-7). 
 
2.5.1 Individualistic causes 
The decision to corrupt by a public servant may depend on a series of subjective factors 
associated to either an objective conditions or personal status of individuals. More precisely, 
the decision may be made by virtue of: the net expected value of the retrievable benefits; the 
degree of the individual’s professional integrity and/or his/her personal economic situation; the 
effectiveness degree in monitoring and supervising systems; the level of harshness of penalties 
and the probability to be caught (Heggstad & Frøystad, 2011: 7); the frustration for a missed 
promotion; ideological reasons linked to wealth redistribution matters; an immoral obligation 
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to be compliant with or succumb to group pressure to adopt corrupt practices and routines 
(Isaksen, 2005: 11-12); and so forth. 
Especially when public officials’ wages are lower than their actual needs, governments 
may even give up to corruption, because it may not make sense to adjust salaries to compensate 
for that gap if they will keep going to get bribes and steal anyway (Besley & McLaren, 1993). 
Public officials may not stop to accept kickbacks even when they have achieved their desired 
life standard degree by getting briberies (Søreide, 2002: 4), but an extension of their 
responsibility may discourage them (Di Vita, 2011). 
High complexity, bureaucratisation and overregulation may lead to corruption where 
governments lack of responsibility and transparency for outcomes (Eizenstat, 1998: 7). Overall, 
poor expertise and training of managers and civil servants who are involved in designing, 
executing and controlling plans and budgets, as well as in implementing risk management 
systems, increase the risk of corruption (Heggstad & Frøystad, 2011: 13). 
 
2.5.2 Structural causes 
Structural causes refer to systemic factors affecting the general level of corruption in a country 
(Heggstad & Frøystad, 2011: 6). To provide an overview of the most significant findings and 
a classification of them is useful to address the identification issues of any corruption form. 
This classification responds to the necessity to categorise single contextual causes of relevant 
behaviours to better understand and distinguish different aspects of the same problem. 
According to the heterogenous value judgments given to these causes, corruption can 
move either from social-economic-political systems’ disfunctions, such that it can be 
considered as a structural problem of politics or economics, or from economic-social-political 
factors and processes, such that it can be seen as a cultural and individual moral problem 
(Monteduro et al., 2013: 35). The prevalent literature (Dimant & Tosato, 2017: 2-12; 
Lambsdorff, 2006; Mauro, 1997: 84-86; Mensah, 2014: 5-12; Monteduro et al., 2013: 35-38; 
Treisman, 2000: 402-407) identified and classified them into homogenous macro categories – 
i.e., social and cultural traditions, social and political institutions, economic policy and 
structure, juridical factors –, which are discussed below. 
 
2.5.2.1 Social and cultural traditions 
Culture denotes peculiar attitudes and ways to act − revealed, for instance, by language, values 
and history − being able to differentiate a specific group of people from all the others (Temin, 
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1997: 268). Causes related to socio-cultural traditions mainly refer to dearth of ethical and 
moral values among individuals within a certain context, to educational, political, cultural, 
religious, colonial and legal origins and traditions leading to rule-misaligned behavioural 
models (Glaeser & Schleifer, 2002; Hofstede, 1991; Husted & Instituto Tecnologico y de 
Estudios, 1999; La Porta et al., 1999; Lambsdorff, 2006; Mensah, 2014; Treisman, 2000). 
It is undoubtful that the value system being shared within a community’s culture 
represents a fundamental structural determinant of corruption (Husted & Instituto Tecnologico 
y de Estudios, 1999: 343). Previous research (Hofstede, 1991; House, Hanges, Javidan, 
Dorfman, & Gupta, 2004; Schwartz, 1999) outlined a couple of cultural dimensions 
characterising human societies and attempted to explain to what extent they are linked to 
corruption, coming to non-univocal findings. An important part of it (Gerring & Thacker, 2005; 
Hofstede, 1991; Mensah, 2014; Schwartz, 1999) also focused on political, economic and social 
traditions and the rule-misaligned behavioural models which result from them. Nevertheless, 
in a country, possible correlations between level of corruption and cultural traditions are not 
acceptable for causal deductions (He, 2016: 268). 
Within this specific category of structural causes, the religion-corruption relationship 
was quite discussed among scholars and different Authors provided conflicting findings. The 
general perception is that societies characterised by rooted religious values are usually more 
corrupt than those which have showed rational mentalities towards authorities (Lambsdorff, 
2006: 19). Besides, coherently with the argument that hierarchy-based cultures generally allow 
for higher corruption levels (Husted & Instituto Tecnologico y de Estudios, 1999), some 
Authors attributed a positive sign to this relationship in the case of religions based on 
hierarchical structures (La Porta et al., 1999), while some others a negative sign by simply 
changing the reference unit of measure of GDP from national to per-capita (Gerring & Thacker, 
2005; Treisman, 2000). The basic idea is that hierarchy does not allow for an equal distribution 
power, so that a better power control may be ensured to a few people only. However, religion 
does not seem to be a deterministic factor of corruption, even though policy reforms should 
always consider pre-existent cultural circumstances and traditions (Lambsdorff, 2006: 17). 
An ethically-significant aspect of the duo culture-corruption is represented by the 
gender inclusiveness in the economic, social and political life. Regarding this point, some 
empirical findings (Debski, Jetter, Mösle, & Stadelmann, 2018; Dollar, Fisman, & Gatti, 2001; 
Frank, Lambsdorff, & Boehm, 2011; Jha & Sarangi, 2018; Lee & Guven, 2013; Sung & Chu, 
2003; Swamy, Knack, Lee, & Azfar, 2001) showed that corruption level decreases as the 
female presence grows in the labour market and in political and institutional bodies. It was also 
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found  that the greater the masculinity of a culture is, the higher the level of corruption will be 
(Husted & Instituto Tecnologico y de Estudios, 1999: 345). Overall, male-dominance-based 
societies show a more or less evident bias to corrupt behaviours, probably due to the fact that 
men are more likely to accept and adapt to corruption than women (Fišar, Kubák, Špalek, & 
Tremewan, 2016). Indeed, the latter are more risk-adverse and, as such, they usually seize the 
opportunity for undue private gains when they can easily disengage themselves from a hidden 
corrupt agreement with no repercussion (Frank et al., 2011: 59). However, less corrupt 
communities do not generally allow for any sexual dominance from both the sides 
(Lambsdorff, 2006: 20-21). 
The intuitive relationship between religion, culture and subtended values does not make 
easy to establish which specific factors are the direct and exclusive determinants of a particular 
corrupt behaviour. What it is possible to argue is that, according to the ‘cultural hegemony’ 
concept formulated by Antonio Gramsci (1948-1951), particular power relations are 
considered acceptable or even opportune within systems characterised by coherent normative 
and cultural assumptions (Hyman & Brough, 1975: 199). As a result, a group of people may 
even conscientiously claim that corruption is totally absent in its environment just because of 
a natural acceptance of crooked behaviours in its own cultural system and mindset. 
Overall, it emerges how socio-cultural causes of corruption are probably the most 
important variables explaining the quality of anti-corruption reforms and their impacts on 
public performance. 
 
2.5.2.2 Social and political institutions 
The socio-political causes of corruption are related to: 
- features of political process, in terms of velocity, delays, access and exclusion models 
(Amundsen et al., 2000: 52-53; Monteduro et al., 2013: 36); 
- characteristics of political and administrative system in terms of decentralisation and 
federalism (Amundsen et al., 2000: 52-53; Fisman & Gatti, 2002; Huther & Shah, 1998; 
Persson et al., 2003; Tabellini, 2000; Tanzi, 1998b); 
- role of democracy at institutional level and the related public scrutiny and social pressure 
(Kalenborn & Lessmann, 2013; Saha, Gounder, & Su, 2009; Sung, 2004); 
- press freedom (Bhattacharyya & Hodler, 2015; Brunetti & Weder, 2003; Kalenborn & 
Lessmann, 2013), trust degree of citizens in institutions (Del Monte & Papagni, 2007; 
Mauro, 1995) and political stability (Treisman, 2000). 
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Democracy, political process, press freedom, trust in government and political stability 
were largely studied, but the general findings are disparate and not always united in 
establishing an unambiguous relationship with corrupt phenomena. 
Likewise, the relationship between administrative decentralisation degree and 
corruption level is not always clear, since, on one hand, ‘state-capture’ and other similar 
undesirable outcomes can arise both in centralised and in locally-administrated realities and, 
on the other hand, this relationship is also influenced by the measure of decentralisation 
adopted (Lambsdorff, 2006: 15). In particular, some Authors (Fisman & Gatti, 2002; Huther 
& Shah, 1998) used an empirical approach to estimate the decentralisation-corruption and 
governance-decentralisation relationships through the use of specific indexes. Coherently with 
the fact that corruption and bad governance are usually related to the misuse or plundering of 
public resources, these Authors assumed the ratio between the regional or local governmental 
spending and the total amount of public expenditure as a measure of decentralisation degree of 
a country. Albeit a further distinction for specific governmental intervention sectors should be 
made, their findings suggest that, in the case of systems with a growing rate of fiscal 
decentralisation in government spending, corruption assumes low levels. However, corruption 
may lurk where tax collection is managed by central governments (Lambsdorff, 2006: 16). 
Diversely from the case of a centralised PA, where the contribution-rewards 
relationship is holistically referred to the national public performance, decentralisation may be 
an appreciable solution aimed at increasing policy and decision makers’ accountability (Fisman 
& Gatti, 2002; Tabellini, 2000). Especially in local governments, political competition for 
leadership may support this inclination (Albornoz & Cabrales, 2013), as it is the means of the 
democratic method through which people’s electoral choice can effectively and efficiently 
represent the acquisition of the decision power (Schumpeter, 1942). 
Premising that political competition is not a panacea for corruption evils per se (Moe, 
1984), just like an ‘invisible hand’,  it may allow communities to control politicians’ actions 
and react against poor policy-making by triggering mechanisms that support the pursuing of 
public welfare (Lambsdorff, 2006: 10). Furthermore, considering that corruption reduces 
attractiveness of communities (Hawkins, 2000: VII), political competition may be strategic in 
fostering competition between local governments as well. The latter attracts residents (Brennan 
& Buchanan, 1980) and lessens the opportunities for officials to extract undue incomes in 
return for particular services (Fisman & Gatti, 2002: 327). 
Another research line argued a different kind of link between decentralisation degree 
and corruption. In particular, some Authors (Gerring & Thacker, 2004; Goldsmith, 1999: 878; 
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Kunicová & Rose-Ackerman, 2005; Treisman, Bannerjee, Bloom, Rushakov, Keat, Cox et al., 
2002) found that corruption instead increases as the federalism scheme is growly adopted 
(Rose-Ackerman, 2006: 16). 
The context-specific and complex features of corruption (Lambsdorff & Schulze, 2015: 
101) always require to systematically investigate, case by case, the possible effects of a certain 
solution in relation to the territorial historical events and growth perspectives, such that whether 
decentralisation may be or not be a good solution against corruption is a dilemma for which 
both theory and practice cannot provide an univocal answer (Albornoz & Cabrales, 2013: 103-
105). 
 
2.5.2.3 Economic policy and structure 
The economic causes of corruption include factors such as: 
- degree of country wealth and dependency on natural resources (La Porta et al., 1999; 
Mauro, 1997); 
- territorial income distribution and poverty level (Deininger & Squire, 1996; Forbes, 2000; 
Kuznets, 1955; Mauro, 1995; Tanzi, 1998b); 
- economic openness degree to foreign trade (Ades & Di Tella, 1995, 1997; Gerring & 
Thacker, 2005; Sung & Chu, 2003; Treisman, 2000); 
- level, size and range of government political and public intervention (Ades & Di Tella, 
1997; Chafuen & Guzman, 2000; Tanzi & Davoodi, 1997; Treisman, 2000); 
- inflation level (He, 2016); 
- lack of public service delivering, public employment selection modality and job tenure 
(Mensah, 2014; Monteduro et al., 2013); 
- dearth of economic freedom (Chafuen & Guzman, 2000; Graeff & Mehlkop, 2003; 
Henderson, 1999; Lambsdorff, 2006: 8-10; Saha et al., 2009). 
Although data comparison among countries should deserve carefulness (Deininger & 
Squire, 1996; Lambsdorff, 2006), it is possible to claim that corruption generally leads to a 
slower economic growth (Shleifer & Vishny, 1993), counteracts capital attractiveness from 
abroad (Brada, Drabek, Mendez, & Perez, 2018; Tanzi, 1998b) due to inefficiency that it 
creates within government institutions (Arnone & Iliopulos, 2005), and increases as the 
abundance of natural resources of a country enlarges (Leite & Weidmann, 1999; Sachs & 
Warner, 1997). 
Corruption also undermines private investments, given that costs and uncertainty 
degree unavoidably increase (Mauro, 1995), but it fosters public investments, since the linked 
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projects are more suitable for officials’ manipulations aimed to obtain kickbacks (Tanzi, 
1998b: 585). Overall, corruption slows down productive investments and absorbs wealth by 
both reducing private consumption of goods and services and creating inequalities in income 
distribution, although deepen investigations about the secular trends in income structures and 
the underlined causal factors should be conducted to acquire a better knowledge of the whole 
economic growth process (Kuznets, 1955: 27). 
With regard to country economic openness, empirical research was inhomogeneous and 
discordant about to what extent corruption characterises economically-isolated nations. Indeed, 
under a certain point of view, corrupt governments reduce national benefits acquirable through 
globalisation because of the discouragement of foreign capital inflows, but, on the other hand, 
even in the case of a higher global economic competition, they may provide kickback-paying 
multinational corporations with a competitive advantage to illegal earnings (Sung & Chu, 
2003: 97). 
Empirical research also found that corruption is inversely linked to the importations-
in-GDP ratio (Ades & Di Tella, 1995, 1997; Gerring & Thacker, 2005; Sung & Chu, 2003; 
Treisman, 2000). In particular, even if economic openness to foreign trade − measured by 
means of that ratio − seemingly reduces corruption degree, a small shift in corruption level 
reductions would require a gigantic trade liberalisation effort (Treisman, 2000: 439). However, 
the use of other kinds of measures corroborated the weak relevance of the imports-in-GDP 
ratio in terms of corruption magnitude, since it is strongly dependent on the country size and, 
even in the case of a low importation level, highly populated countries could control corruption 
through a significant internal competition (Lambsdorff, 2006: 9). 
Concerning public intervention, Lambsdorff (2006: 4) stated that, in spite of the little 
evidence available, the belief that minimising it leads to positive effects in terms of corruption 
comes from the widespread entrusting of economists on market mechanisms and the 
politicians’ unreliability. Accordingly, Boycko, Shleifer, and Vishny (1996) posited 
privatisation of public institutions as a possible solution for the regression of corruption by the 
virtue of the benefit in terms of efficiency gain. 
However, contributions in the literature about the public intervention in national 
economies did not completely agree with a straightforward relationship between governmental 
power and corruption degree. More precisely, some empirical studies found a negative 
association between the size of government intervention and corruption (Adserà, Boix, & 
Payne, 2003; Goel & Budak, 2006; Goel & Nelson, 2010; Graeff & Mehlkop, 2003; Montinola 
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& Jackman, 2002). Contrarily, other research works found that higher governmental spending 
and intervention rates increase corruption levels (Arvate, Curi, Rocha, & Miessi Sanches, 2010; 
Goel & Nelson, 1998; Tanzi & Davoodi, 1997; Treisman, 2000). Hence, there is no rule 
establishing whether private is better than public as, even in the case of transition into the 
private regime, corruption may simply shift and occur through the new privatised organisations 
(Lambsdorff, 2006: 5). 
Finally, a high level of competition can, in principle, reduce the probability of 
corruption, since growing economic freedom reduces corruption degree (Paldam, 2002; Saha 
et al., 2009). Nevertheless, if, on the one hand, a lower competition degree among firms within 
a specific market may allow for more profits from which politicians and public servants can 
obtain a share, on the other hand, a high level of competition may open to the opportunity for 
public officials to obtain kickbacks in the case they accept lower or different quality standards 
in relation to those requested by law (Lambsdorff, 2006: 8). 
 
2.5.2.4 Juridical factors 
The juridical causes are substantially related to the effectiveness of corruption legislation and 
its pragmatical application (Herzfeld & Weiss, 2003: 621). A juridical system mainly needs a 
structure with a robust and clear set of strict rules, as well as well-defined operating, preventive 
and sanction mechanisms to tackle corruption, especially within public institutions. Indeed, the 
level of corruption is affected by the quality of government which, in turn, is affected by legal 
codes (Dimant & Tosato, 2017: 5). 
In the wake of the provisions of the United Nations Convention against Corruption 
(United Nations, 2004b), several updates of the subject have led the Member States into the 
approval of a series of new more effective laws. In spite of the efforts in harmonising the cross-
country regulations, anti-corruption programmes still need to be systematically contextualised 
in relation to the specific national reality and, even though the evidence suggests that to 
streamline and simplify rules is an ‘evergreen’ solution for hindering corruption, enhancing 
productivity and attracting new capital stocks, the heterogeneity of incentives of corruptive 
deals makes cross-country analyses unsuitable to design opportune reforms (Rose-Ackerman, 
2006: XXIV). 
The abuse, misuse or omission of public office for private gain is fostered by the low 
risk of getting caught and punished, which depends on juridical system effectiveness 
(Treisman, 2000: 402). Corrupt political elites attempt to reduce the effectiveness of juridical 
systems by manipulating resource allocation and appointing crooked people to key positions, 
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thus making anti-corruption battle arduous for legal systems and allowing for corruption 
diffusion in a vicious circle (Jain, 2001: 72). In this framework, firms, citizens and other 
members of a community are extorted by politicians and/or bureaucrats shaping the regulatory 
regime for their private goals, but it may also happen that groups with a high-bargaining power 
‘capture’ the state, in a way to extract rents wrongfully at the expenses of the overall society 
(Hellman et al., 2000: 2). 
Differences between common and civil law systems were highlighted by some scholars 
(David & Brierley, 1985; La Porta et al., 1999; Treisman, 2000), recognising the superiority of 
the first model over the second kind of systems in improving some aspects of governmental 
performance. Treisman (2000: 401) argued that ‘legal culture’, regarding the most widespread 
expectations and practices about how norms are enforced, is one of the most important aspects 
of legal tradition, which goes beyond the distinction between common and civil law systems 
and plays a fundamental role in guaranteeing the success of law against corruption. 
In principle, identifying a well-suited or an inappropriate set of rules to tackle a ‘wicked 
problem’ such as corruption is possible, but to establish if a regulation opens the door to it does 
not, since what is not considered relevant with respect to provoking corruption may not be so 
with respect to other issues (Lambsdorff, 2006: 6), and vice versa. 
Rules and policies should be neither vague nor difficult to understand and handle, as 
well as they should not allow broad discretional margins for their concrete application and 
foster and sustain a proper decision-making process, otherwise they may lead to some 
distortions creating fertile ground for corruption, and vice versa (Ades & Di Tella, 1997; 
Lambsdorff, 2006). Generally, even a good law may not have any relevance without an 
adequate level of culture of legality in a community, which is a potential cause of corruption 
according to the principal-agent model perspective (Ceschel, Hinna, & Rotundi, 2018: 127; 
Treisman, 2007). 
 
2.6 Three main approaches for analysing corruptive phenomena 
Vannucci (2012: 70-73; 2015) identifies three different approaches, applied by the prevalent 
literature, explaining the ways through which corruption settles within political-administrative 
systems, that is: 
- the socio-cultural branch, which focuses on heterogeneity of traditions, social norms and 
pressure, cultural values, beliefs and civic culture, based on which individuals shape their 
ethical preferences and, as a result, make decisions about engaging in corruption or not, 
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according to the expected utility loss linked to reprehensibility of it (Pizzorno, 1992b: 
46); 
- the political-economic model, whose pivot is constituted by economic incentives to put 
in place corrupt practices, which are given by the trade-off between expected costs and 
rewards (Becker, 1968: 172); in particular, the incentive to engage in corruption is based 
on the rational choice driven by the comparison between monetary gains, institutional 
opportunities and possible sanctions linked to a specific incorrect exercise of entrusted 
power. 
- the neo-institutional approach, which encompasses the first two ones by taking into 
account both endogenous and exogenous variables and dynamics of corruption. 
In particular, this last perspective lies on a model of path dependence coming from the 
mutual influence between economic incentives and basis of values over time, and assumes that 
illicit agreements take place within organisations thanks to governance and enforcement 
mechanisms being consolidated through cultural adjustment processes, which provide for 
reduced internal and external threats to corrupt practices, more and more tolerable degrees of 
safety, satisfying earning levels and opportunities, as well as a greater moral acceptance of 
corrupt relationships (Vannucci, 2012: 72). In other terms, the emphasis is here on the systemic 
and dynamic features of the individuals’ expectations and choice on being involved in corrupt 
practices − i.e., multiple interactions with other actors over time −, by including moral 
preferences, economic incentives and social outcomes (2012: 73). 
Dealing with corruption by exclusively focusing on a single type of variables − 
economic, cultural, social or political − may run the risk to lose a broader perspective of 
investigation that instead results crucial to deeply understand context-specific organisational 
and environmental dynamics characterising a given form of corruption. Therefore, an equally 
systemic and dynamic approach in political-bureaucratic systems need to be adopted to 
identify and trigger those drivers enabling key-actors to reach desired outcomes by means of 
well-identified strategic resources. 
 
2.7 Corruption in local governments 
Local governments represent the link between citizens and public officials delivering public 
goods and services on their behalf in an equitable and socially acceptable way (Masters & 
Graycar, 2016: 42). Accordingly, the concept of public official should be considered aside 
his/her private interests in the pursuit of the common good and serve the community (Perry, 
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2010: 679) without them conditioning decision-making processes (McDevitt, 2014: 4), by 
virtue of a public formal role occupied within political, juridical or administrative institutions. 
Corruption can be both political and bureaucratic (Søreide, 2002), depending on the 
fact that the underlined decisions are made by politicians during the ‘budget preparation phase’ 
(Tanzi, 1998a) − or whenever distortions of political power for private gain occur (Amundsen 
et al., 2000), such as in public hiring − or by civil servants in the ‘budget execution phase’, 
respectively. This distinction applies for any government level and especially proves to be 
useful to identify, explore and systematise forms of corruption in activities and processes often 
overlapping each other, as it usually happens at local government level. 
Corruption is a rooted symptom of misgovernance (Kaufmann, 2000: VIII) that, at local 
level, may assume several forms, such as: bribery; collusion; conflict of interest; cronyism; 
nepotism; fraud; gifts; hospitality; lobbying; revolving door; trading in influence; vote rigging 
(Pyman, Hristova, & Doig, 2018: 3-4). Meyer-Sahling et al. (2018) pointed out that an 
important limitation in corruption literature is given by the preferred focus on the correlation 
with the social, economic and political macro perspective, while public servants and 
organisations should attract more attention in the light of their key-role in fighting it. Indeed, 
each form of corruption is characterised by heterogeneity and context-specific features and 
may also combine with other forms, thus increasing its secrecy and making its detection 
extremely difficult in practice. As such, to improve the probability to curb this phenomenon 
effectively requires an ad hoc approach and a careful attention by researchers and practitioners. 
In a local area, public sector performance may turn out to be either a catalysator or an 
inhibitor of the related community’s wealth and socio-economic development  (Bianchi, 2016: 
58-59). Improper management of collective resources due to corruptive reasons raises 
government expenditures and causes dissatisfaction of citizens because of low-quality public 
services (de Araujo Santos, Pereira, & Rodrigues, 2018: 461). In fact, distorting public funds 
because of the prevalence of private gains upon collective interests has as a consequence the 
shift of the financial burden onto poorest people (Savedoff & Hussmann, 2006), in a way that 
they may be excluded from the access to the essential public services (Eigen, 2005). 
It follows that local governments may fail in delivering even standard services in the 
course of time, so that people within the interested communities may suffer the economic 
losses resulting from the bad administration of public resources and the opportunities which 
could have been exploited by deploying them more effectively and efficiently (Liu et al., 2017: 
681). More in particular, with different magnitude, mismanagement of common resources may 
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imply disparate failures in the delivery of good governance to communities, which are more 
visible to the citizens than at higher levels – e.g., inadequate planning in education, urban, 
water, and recreation facilities; construction of crumbling buildings; inflated prices for home 
buyers (Gardiner, 1978; Masters & Graycar, 2016: 43). 
Thus, good governance is fundamental to guarantee sustainable resource production 
and related economic benefits and impacts on living standards (Søreide & Truex, 2011). 
Policies leading far away from these goals and related outcomes weaken public institutions 
and erode trust in government by communities (Labelle, 2013; Robinson, 2006). 
It emerges how an organisational perspective on local governments may better probe 
the actual ability of public servants to purposefully reduce risk of poor integrity and improve 
organisational reaction to possible infractions, hence supporting the integral success of local 
governments (Minkova, 2018: 1). 
Nevertheless, in facing so-called ‘wicked problems’, such a perspective may not be 
sufficient to capture crucial community-based outcomes. Notably, in performing their 
activities, the public and private sectors − but also the so-called ‘third-sector’9 − unavoidably 
interact each other, affecting the qualitative and quantitative endowment of common tangible 
and intangible resources within a given local area (Bianchi, 2016: 60). 
Political and bureaucratic corruption deteriorates both the endogenous capability of 
public, private and third-sector organisations to address socio-economic needs and their 
capability to create value together for the survival and sustainable development of a 
community. As such, an approach of corruption analysis, policy design and implementation 
being exclusively based on an organisational stand-alone point of view may not be sufficient. 
It may also apply when the institutional perspective takes into consideration possible 
environmental constraints and outcomes produced towards and feeding-back from the outdoor 
socio-economic reality of reference. 
 
9 The ‘third sector’ includes organisations that are neither ascribable to the public sector nor to the private one, 
but either performing socio-economic activities where the former − cf. Weisbrod, B. A. 1975. Toward a theory of 
the voluntary nonprofit sector in a three sector economy. In E. S. Phelps (Ed.), Altruism, Morality, and Economic 
Theory: 171-196. New York, USA: Russell Sage Foundation. − or the latter − cf. Hansmann, H. B. 1980. The 
Role of Nonprofit Enterprise. The Yale Law Journal, 89(5): 835-901. − fails, or attaining a goal different from 
profit − cf. James, E. 1990. Economic theories of the nonprofit sector: a comparative perspective. In H. K. Anheier 
& W. Seibel (Eds.), The third sector: comparative studies of nonprofit organizations: 21-29. Berlin, Germany; 
New York, USA: De Gruyter. As such, they are formal institutions provided with decision-making autonomy that 
do not distribute profits and being characterised by voluntary labour − cf. Salamon, L. M. & Anheier, H. K. 1997. 
Defining the Nonprofit Sector: A Cross-national Analysis. Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press. Two 
traditional examples of third-sector organisations are NGOs and religious congregations. 
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Therefore, uncorrupted deployment of resources, such as social capital – e.g., trust in 
government – and quality of community life, which are strategic for the prosperity of a local 
area, requires a good public governance enabling proper resource restoration and synergic 
virtuous cycles that make, on the one hand, easier detecting and repressing corruption and, on 
the other hand, more arduous for it to occur. 
Given the unescapable presence of multiple stakes, as well as the complex, uncertain, 
and dynamic nature of corruption, a clearer understanding of mechanisms underlying specific 
corrupt phenomena may take advantage from a community point of view of public management, 
integrating the organisational one. 
Considering that whatever anti-corruption effort may be successful as long as it is 
arranged to clash with well-outlined forms of illicit behaviour (Klitgaard et al., 2000), even if 
every form of corruption is worthy to be investigated and hindered, diagnostic analysis for 
shaping decisive interventions should be firstly performed for the most widespread and 
significant kinds of malfeasance due to private benefits, so as to produce a bigger echo for 
curbing contingent and minor types of corruption. 
 
2.8 Concluding remarks: The need for a systemic focus 
The previous research has provided the academic community with specific and 
multidisciplinary studies about the disparate features of corruption, which – it is recognised – 
can be to sum up into the abuse of entrusted power for private benefit. 
Corruption has been analysed from different perspectives and by adopting equally 
disparate techniques and methodologies in order to improve the understanding of the 
phenomenon and try to tackle its consequences for society. 
Structural and individual causes of corruption are essential to explain the phenomenon, 
even if research results may appear ambiguous. Indeed, the figures of corrupter and corrupted 
and their tools are constantly in evolution, but always rely on trust relationship to make the 
corrupt effort successful. As such, the context-specific characteristic of the phenomenon at 
hand requires a narrower perspective to be opportunely understood and to have some chances 
to curb it. 
Given the recognised lack of attention in the literature on local realities in spite of their 
immediate proximity with citizenry, a branch of research confirms the necessity of deepen local 
government research to provide for quick, feasible and shareable anti-corruption interventions 
able to hinder the displacement of public resources and enhance, preserve or restore good 
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performance of public bodies, in order to ensure effective and efficient public service 
delivering. 
Concluding, a systemic perspective at local government level, being coherent with the 
neo-institutional approach, seems to be opportune to allow researchers, practitioners, policy- 
and decision-makers to design and implement feasible and successful anti-corruption 
strategies. Indeed, in explaining deviance towards corrupt behaviours within organised 
structures, a system focus has the advantage of stressing on routines, culture, legal and social 
rules (Ashforth & Anand, 2003; Jancsics & Jávor, 2012), thus embracing both the 
organisational and the environmental factors affecting and being affected over time by 










Measuring corruption has a crucial role for local policy- and decision-makers in corroborating 
its occurrence risk, estimating its possible effects on public performance, as well as designing 
and adopting opportune measures to prevent and repress it. 
Unique characteristics of corruption and processes where it roots need a specific focus 
in carrying such analyses out, also provided that non-customised anti-corruption efforts rapidly 
become vague and blurred due to uncertainty, complexity and dynamicity of the phenomenon. 
Accordingly, procurement represents one of the most significant, transversal and damaged 
activities of local governments by corruption (World Bank, 2007) and, as such, it deserved a 
special attention − even if non-exclusive − in this research project. 
Therefore, this chapter aims at answering the following questions: Is it possible to 
measure corruption? What are the advantages and shortcomings of the extant approaches to 
detect corruption practices generally, and in public procurement corruption specifically? 
PMSs may contribute to strengthen the informative capability of the common practices 
of detection and measurement of corruption in public procurement, giving adequate support to 
P&C processes for copying with it. 
Nevertheless, common key performance indicators (KPIs) may be not completely 
suitable for management of performance, as they should include a risk component in their 
construction. Provided that they generally ignore the feedback structure underlying the 
organisational processes to which they refer, the use of dynamic indicators within a systemic 
framework may result a solution to prevent and repress corruption in public procurement. 
In the first part of this chapter, a broad overview on the common methods to measure 
the general phenomenon of corruption is conducted. Then, measures of prevention and 
 
1 In compliance with the Emerald’s Copyright Transfer Agreement, submitted by the author on the 1st of February 
2021, some parts of this chapter, sections 3.5 and 3.6 in particular, are based on the article: Gnoffo, S. 2021a. A 
Dynamic Performance Management Approach to Frame Corruption in Public Procurement: A Case-Study. 
Journal of Public Procurement, 21(1): 75-96. © 2021, Emerald Publishing Limited. 
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repression suggested by the prevalent literature are explored. It follows an identification of the 
possible forms of corruption that commonly occur along the public procurement phases and an 
analysis of the methods through which corruption in public procurement is conventionally 
measured by scholars and practitioners. 
 
3.2 Corruption measurement: Main practices and issues 
To measure corruption is a current and very debated issue in several arenas, especially because 
of the difficulties and error margins that whatever adopted measurement strategy implies 
(Monteduro et al., 2013: 23). To probe actual levels of corruption directly and objectively is 
practically impossible (Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2006: 3; Lambsdorff, 2001a: 5) due to 
its secrecy, the complex set of variable interactions and processes characterising it, as well as 
the existence of various metrics (Golden & Picci, 2005: 37). 
However, it is broadly recognised that: 
- corruption can be and is being measured2; 
- evidences of corruption can show themselves in many forms, rather than through simple 
documentation; 
- although corruption indicators are not precise and accurate, they can be useful to develop 
policies to hinder it (World Bank, 2007: 5). 
Research about corruption measurement has become simpler over time thanks to 
national and cross-national comparative studies and data provided by international institutions, 
such as Transparency International, the World Bank, the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF), 
the PRS Group, and other disparate anti-corruption agencies dispersed throughout the world. 
They usually rely on data elaborated to create two different kinds of indexes, that is people’s 
perception-based and experience-based indexes. Most of used corruption data and information 
refers to the former, as retrieving experience-based data is quite rare (He, 2016: 271). 
Perception-based – or subjective – indexes can be either national or sub-national 
(A.N.A.C., 2013) − see Table 3.1. Among the others, the first group includes, for instance, the 
Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), the Global Corruption Barometer (GCB), the Bribe Payers 
Index (BPI), elaborated by Transparency International; the Control of Corruption Index (CCI) 
 
2 Corruption can be measured by: 
- gathering the informed views of significant stakeholders; 
- tracking countries' institutional features; 
- careful audits of specific projects. 
Cf. Kaufmann, D., Kraay, A., & Mastruzzi, M. 2006. Measuring Corruption: Myths and Realities: 5: World 
Bank, Draft, May 1st, 2006., p. 1. 
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and the World Business Environment Survey (WBES), elaborated by The World Bank; the 
Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS). All of them give a score 
to countries about their level of endogenous corruption by basing on studies of sources that are 
typologically, methodologically and extensionally different (Monteduro et al., 2013: 27). The 
second group instead includes subjective indexes, such as the Governance Anti-Corruption 
(GAC) Country Survey, the GATEway Project and the Quality of Government (QoG) 
Institute’s Indicators. 
 





The CPI searches for measuring the perceived corruption in the public sector in 180 countries 
throughout the world, according to businesspeople and expert assessments. It assigns zero to 




The GCB is a worldwide survey assessing the citizens’ personal experience of kickback, their 
perceptions of country-level corruption and their readiness to oppose to it (Pring, 2017: 3). 
Bribe Payers 
Index (BPI) 
The BPI classifies 28 large economies on the basis of the perceived probability of native enterprises 
to pay kickbacks outside their national boundaries. In addition, the Bribe Payers Survey assesses 
cross-sectoral perceptions of kickback in the business field and investigates various kinds of bribery 




The CCI detects perceptions of abuses of public office for private benefit, distinguishing between 
‘petty’ and ‘grand’ corruption, as well as estimating the degree of ‘state-capture’ by lobbies (World 




The WBES surveys a sample of about 100 enterprises per each Member Country of the World Bank 
and, through an unchanging methodology, assesses the business states and structural conditions 
enabling entrepreneurial growth, such as governance, economic policy, different barriers, law and 






The BEEPS aims to capture businesses’ perceptions related to the environment where they normally 
operate, by means of a survey administered to a typical sample of a particular private sector asking 





The GAC integrates macro analysis on corruption with sub-national data retrieved by administering 
surveys to citizens, entrepreneurs, and public officials. It uses surveys at local level to identify 
forms, sources and institutions where corruption occurs frequently, as well as to value corruption 
costs and advance tackling reforms (A.N.A.C., 2013: 8-9). 
The GATEway 
Project 
The GATEway Project investigates the field of corruption measurement by singling out possible 
gaps in the state of the art, outlining new assessment tools and effectively applying the extant ones 
according to the needs to address (McDevitt, 2012: 3). 




The QoG is, firstly, broken apart into four categories, such as corruption and public administration 
performance, and, secondly, summarized into a unique national and regional index (A.N.A.C., 2013: 
9). 
 
In general, relying on perception-based corruption measures may be a good solution 
where the analysis requires comparisons at cross-national level, detections of important aspects 
of prevention policies and integrity promotion, as well as estimations of the possible effects of 
corrupt practices (Monteduro et al., 2013: 26). In addition, perception-based indexes are 
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considered more reliable in countries where information about corruption is retrieved by a 
higher number of surveys, since a low number of available surveys may lead to systematic 
biases in the analysed dataset, thus causing less-reliable scores and making this kind of indexes 
useful just where corruption is less prevalent (Golden & Picci, 2005: 39-40). 
During the last two decades, a body of literature highlighted not only that there is a 
significant gap between perceptions and experiences (Clausen, Kraay, & Nyiri, 2011), but also 
how the use of perception-based indexes leads to various disadvantages (Abramo, 2008; 
Andersson & Heywood, 2009; He, 2016; Knack, 2006; Ko & Samajdar, 2010; Olken, 2009; 
Razafindrakoto & Roubaud, 2010; Thomas, 2010). 
Firstly, since they are built up through surveys, they may suffer of evident weaknesses 
and flaws due to subjective assessments by people interviewed, whose cultural biases may be 
conflated with corruption itself (He, 2016: 268; Lambsdorff, 2001a: 6). Besides, the aptitude 
of perceptions to be influenced by different interpretations and cultural schemes at local level 
was strongly emphasised (Monteduro et al., 2013: 27). 
Secondly, interviewees may not consider any valid comparison of the corruption level 
of their country with foreign ones − thus adopting different definitions of corruption and 
evaluation standards −, or compare corruption to other less pressing issues of the same country, 
or even use too high cultural and social standards in their personal evaluations (Lambsdorff, 
2001a: 6-7)3. Moreover − and thirdly −, the risk to underreport corruption involvement by 
respondents, which may lead to lack of accurate knowledge – or, at least, awareness about the 
problem – useful to express reliable perceptions (Golden & Picci, 2005: 39; Monteduro et al., 
2013: 27), represents another typical cons. 
Fourthly, the fact that people involved in most of these surveys either belong to the 
business world or are specialists in the field implies that other significant stakeholders, such as 
NGOs and common citizens, are not taken into consideration, so that results may lack of 
comprehensiveness and, therefore, be misleading. 
Fifthly, it was detected that the speed in perception changes with no apparent logical 
reason, but produces visible effects on real corruption (Lambsdorff, 2001b: 2; Monteduro et 
al., 2013: 26-27). At this regard, mass media play an important role in the reliability of 
perception-based indexes, as perceptions may be affected by them in a way that respondents’ 
 
3 In particular, this intrinsic weakness is exacerbated when surveys are devised by asking about mere perceptions 
instead of first-hand experiences with corruption. Cf. Golden, M. A. & Picci, L. 2005. Proposal for a New Measure 
of Corruption, Illustrated with Italian Data. Economics & Politics, 17(1): 37-75. 
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formal declarations to surveys will not report their personal experiences, but will depend on 
media coverage and other external reporting (Lambsdorff, 2001a: 7)4. 
Sixthly, the quality and the utility of governance indexes, such as the CPI and CCI, 
were widely criticized (Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2007; Knack, 2006; Kurtz & Schrank, 
2007) by virtue of their composite nature undermining their internal comparability. In 
particular, these indexes aggregate data coming from various sources which, in turn, define 
corruption heterogeneously, gather opinions by disparate panels of respondents and adopt 
different methodologies (He, 2016: 272). Furthermore, most of statistical evidences obtained 
by adopting perception-based indexes show lack of robustness, since the consequential results 
change as the kind of index in turn changes (2016: 270). Finally, since most of the common 
widespread perception measures are aggregated, they do not allow one to know who most 
likely runs the risk to be influenced by corruption, what are possible effects of anti-corruption 
programmes, as well as to exam the phenomenon in specific regions, hence causing 
ineffectiveness and inefficiency of hindering strategies (Seligson, 2006: 386). 
Given that the reliability of the information retrieved by surveys to elaborate this kind 
of indexes is actually unknown (Golden & Picci, 2005: 39), the CPI, the CCI and other similar 
composite indexes may not assess corruption levels on the basis of objective truth, but rather 
on subjective opinions and sensations (He, 2016: 270), which may not lead to valid results. 
Therefore, perception-based indexes may run the risk to become self-referential (Golden & 
Picci, 2005: 40). However, albeit subjective data may reflect generic feelings about corruption 
and since corruption does not leave track in any documentation, subjective data often provide 
with the best knowledge that one can obtain (Kaufmann et al., 2006: 1; Lambsdorff, 2001a: 6). 
Alternatively, an important body of research (Bandiera, Prat, & Valletti, 2009; 
Bertrand, Djankov, Hanna, & Mullainathan, 2007; Di Tella & Schargrodsky, 2003; Ferraz & 
Finan, 2008, 2011; Fisman, Fisman, Galef, Khurana, & Wang, 2012; Fisman & Miguel, 2007; 
Golden & Picci, 2005; Lasthuizen, Huberts, & Heres, 2011; McMillan, 1991; Olken, 2006, 
2007; Reinikka & Svensson, 2004, 2005; Sequeira, 2012) proposed the use of more objective, 
direct and specific explicative proxies of corruption outcomes. 
To some extent, objective measures may improve cross-country comparability and 
overcome the subjective interferences mentioned above. These measures can be divided into 
 
4 Precisely, the widespread publicization of corruption indexes themselves may affect respondents' answers to 
surveys because of the fact that they may report what they believe the corruption is and to what extent it acts 
within the context they conduct their lives according to the earliest results provided by specialized organizations 
like Transparency International. Cf. Golden, M. A. & Picci, L. 2005. Proposal for a New Measure of Corruption, 
Illustrated with Italian Data. Economics & Politics, 17(1): 37-75. 
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economic, if they rely on the use of proxies such as market indicators or statistics5, and judicial, 
if they use the number of condemnations, detentions, sentences and other juridical statistics 
related to already-emerged of corruption crimes committed by public officials according to the 
law (A.N.A.C., 2013: 11-12). 
Nevertheless, the use of corruption-explicative proxies in place of the common 
practices may also result untrustworthy, since, even when inefficiency without private gain 
prevails over corruption-related waste, it does not mean that corruption is not a serious problem 
(Bandiera et al., 2009: 1305). Analogously, as transparency in public sector has become central 
in public reforms of OECD Countries, corruption has gained a higher attention, but it does not 
mean that corrupt phenomena have necessarily grown (Davis, 2009: 311). 
Simply adopting quantitative data and information is not enough, as human behaviour 
may rely on creativity to bypass law and binding procedural rules. Likewise, considering 
corruption as deviation from legal rules allows one to rely on objective and detailed measures, 
but they are not suitable for prevention, are barely comparable at international level, strongly 
dependent on the efficiency of judicial systems6 and influenced by the citizens’ trust in these 
systems (Monteduro et al., 2013: 24), as well as scarcely understood in terms of actual effect 
and exclusively linked to past legal judgements (A.N.A.C., 2013: 12). 
Table 3.2 resumes the advantages and disadvantages of using subjective and objective 
indexes to measure corruption being described above. 
Monteduro et al. (2013: 23-32) proposed three measurement strategies based on 
juridical statistics, perception indexes and experience-based measures, respectively. They 
arise from three fundamental forewords. Firstly, it should be established whether the 
phenomenon is understood in its broad sense of deviation from moral rules or according to a 
narrower legal sense. In the first case, the Authors suggest to adopt a social rules criterion to 
define corruption while, in the second case, they suggest a legal rules criterion. Secondly, it 
has to be understood whether one wants to detect either the direct experiences or just the 
indirect perception of people, so that either experience-based or perception-based indexes 
should be respectively adopted, in order to define the way to collect data. Thirdly, it is needed 
to establish whether the analysis is about emerged or submerged cases of corruption. 
 
5 These measures, for instance, capture differences in public procurement prices, in the attempt to capture the 
money dispersion due to corrupt behaviour, or differences between expenditure and physical quantity of public 
infrastructures. 
6 Monteduro and colleagues pointed out that a growth of sentences may be due to an improvement of the efficiency 
of judicial systems, rather than an actual increase of corruption. Likewise, a reduction in reporting may be 
explained through an equally reduction in trust in government and police, but not by a lower corruption level. 
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Table 3.2. Advantages and disadvantages in using subjective and objective corruption measures. 
Type of indexes Advantages Disadvantages Examples of measures 
Subjective - Reliable in countries 
where information about 
corruption is retrieved by a 
high number of surveys 
and where corruption is 
less prevalent. 
- Useful for comparisons 
at cross-national level, 
detections of relevant 
aspects of prevention 
policies and estimating 
effect of corruption at 
macro level. 
 
- Suffering of weaknesses and flaws 
because of people’s subjective 
assessment and opinions. 
- Aptitude of perception to be influenced 
by cultural schemes, even at local level. 
- Scarce heterogeneity of the categories 
of individuals involved in surveys. 
- Speed in perception changing with no 
logical reason and effect on actual 
corruption. 
- Risk to underreport corruption 
involvement by respondents and 
possibility of lack of awareness to 
express reliable perception by who is 
not involved. 
- Composite and aggregated nature 
undermines their comparability and 
makes impossible to probe effectiveness 
and efficiency levels of anti-corruption 
programs. 
- Lack of robustness of measurement 







- GAC Country Survey 
- GATEway Project 
- QoG Indicators 
Objective 
 
- Explanation of specific 
corruption outcomes 
through opportune and fair 
proxies. 




- For economic measures: limitations in 
distinguishing between corruption- and 
non-corruption-related reductions in 
public performance. 
- For judicial measures: no suitability 
for prevention; barely comparability at 
international level; strong dependence 
on the efficiency of judicial systems and 
the influence of citizens’ trust in 
government; scarce understanding of 
actual effects of their usage. 
- For economic measures: 
market indicators and 
statistics. 
- For judicial measures: 
juridical statistics of 
emerged corruption. 
 
A.N.A.C. (2013: 7) also considers economic data, so that corruption is defined as 
positive or negative according to an efficiency criterion that focuses on minimization of 
resource waste. Economic data allows analysts for a more objective approach in measuring 
corruption, since it relies on real or estimated values retrieved from disparate sources − e.g., 
accounting and statistical archives − useful to detect both emerged and submerged corruption. 
All data types should not be considered separately in a stand-alone perspective. In 
addition to the shortcomings linked to people’s perceptions and experiences seen above, 
corruption may overcome legal and procedural constraints thanks to people’s creativity and 
ingenuity, and efficiency is just a condition of the broader effectiveness condition of any 
activity being prone to corruption. Notably, even when data and evaluations are highly reliable, 
they may lose meaningfulness if not properly associated to institutional efficacy. For instance, 
even when public procurement regulation is obeyed and efficiency degree is high thanks to 
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equally high competitiveness and low prices, goods or services purchased may not meet the 
required quality because of corruption agreements, thus causing citizens’ dissatisfaction. 
The discussed measurement typologies are summarised and exhibited in Table 3.3. 
 
Table 3.3. Four possible corruption measurement strategies. Sources: Monteduro et al. (2013: 23) and A.N.A.C. (2013).  





Juridical statistics Juridical rules criterion Direct experience Emerged corruption 
Perception indexes Moral rules criterion Perception Submerged corruption 
Experience-based measures Moral rules criterion Direct experience Submerged corruption 
Economic data Economic rules criterion Objective sources Emerged and submerged 
 
It emerges that whatever effort to measure corruption by using any kind of data involves 
elements of uncertainty (Kaufmann et al., 2006: 2). As such, measurement strategies should be 
considered systematically, in a way to reduce the interpretative ambiguity of analytical results. 
Overcoming this issue requires an approach allowing one to understand the complexity 
of a specific environment and capturing the real cause-and-effect relationships among variables 
being, on the one hand, affected by corrupt behaviours and, on the other hand, able to impact 
on national, sectorial or organisational performance over time. 
 
3.3 Prevention and repressive measures against corruption 
There is no generic and always-valid model able to make an in-depth contextual diagnosis and 
simultaneously elaborate a univocal policy to hinder the abuse, misuse or omission of entrusted 
power for private gain. However, to fight corruption effectively requires both ex-post measures 
to contrast the phenomenon and ex-ante efforts to monitor, detect and intervene before corrupt 
facts or acts may occur (Ceschel et al., 2018: 124; Leotta, 2017), that is to prevent them. 
Contrast measures are penal-repressive, come from legal justice and activate where law 
provides for a judicial intervention aimed at verifying single responsibilities (The State of the 
Italian Republic, 2012: 29). Beyond their legal aspect, they are generally control-oriented and 
include mechanisms aimed to guarantee accountability and correct use of discretion (Davis, 
2009: 320). 
On the contrary, prevention measures are aimed at identifying and inhibiting corruption 
opportunities, as well as all possible factors promoting their diffusion (The State of the Italian 
Republic, 2012: 30). Preventive measures are ordered to boost greater transparency and 
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awareness about what is not in line with ethics (Davis, 2009: 320). Some examples of 
preventive – or pre-emptive – measures are: 
- the adoption of integrity rules and ethic codes for public servants, as well as of 
incompatibility and ineligibility limits (The State of the Italian Republic, 2012: 31-32); 
- to foster training plans for organisational personnel (Hauser, 2018); 
- the implementation of corruption risk management systems (Ceschel et al., 2018); 
- the use of web-based open access services to manage relationships with citizens (Cho & 
Choi, 2004); 
- the adoption of web platforms for public procurement procedures (Ferreira, Camões, 
Cunha, & Amaral, 2017); 
- and so forth. 
 
3.4 Process and procedures of public procurement and related risks of corruption  
Local governments involve several of the multi-sector functions of a national government and, 
as such, it appears useful to consider them as a discrete sectors, provided that councils deal 
with the totality of public services as a whole, and whose distribution to citizens is their 
responsibility (Pyman et al., 2018: 2). 
Despite that, hindering corruption implies the adoption of ad hoc strategies, which 
implies to opportunely single different kinds of corruption out and concentrate the anti-
corruption effort on one form each time (Klitgaard et al., 2000: 27). Accordingly, given its 
fundamental role in the management of public resources, procurement activity deserves 
particular attention in exploring corruption phenomena, especially at local level, where 
providing customised support to policy- and decision-makers may be the only way to curb 
rooted pathological practices and improve the performance of local governments they steer. 
Public procurement is the process through which public bodies acquire resources from 
companies, such as public works, goods and services, to realize their institutional activities 
(European Commission, 2019b). It represents a transversal activity of local governments, 
whose functioning is unavoidable and essential to foster private and public investments aimed 
at accumulating economic and social capital in local areas (Cavalieri, Guccio, Lisi, & Rizzo, 
2019: 1). 
Public procurement weights the largest share of government expenditure of a country 
– even up to 45% of public expenditures – and 20% of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
(World Bank, 2007: 6). It produces a considerable impact on public service delivery and 
represents a significant strategic lever both to enhance effectiveness and efficiency of public 
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expenditure and to achieve multiple policy goals – e.g., stimulating innovation; making public 
tendering more accessible to small and medium enterprises, etc. (OECD, 2019: 134, 136). 
Public procurement can be strategic (Guarnieri & Gomes, 2019), but it is also a high-
risk activity (OECD, 2014: 142)  and one of the most affected and damaged public activities 
by corruption (World Bank, 2007)7 due to the noteworthy financial amount of public contracts 
(Klitgaard et al., 2000: 117; Strombom, 1998: 22). As such, international agreements and 
regulations on public procurement, such as the WTO’s Agreement on Government 
Procurement (GPA) (World Trade Organization, 2019) and the directive of The European 
Parliament and The Council of the European Union (2014), have pledged the most virtuous 
countries all over the world. 
 Corruption increases the number of public projects, enlarges their size and exacerbates 
their complexity and inefficiency, in a way that the average productivity of investments may 
be lower than one should expect (Tanzi & Davoodi, 1998: 1). Especially in public works, 
corruption is susceptible to provoke cost overruns8 and time delays (Cavalieri et al., 2019: 2), 
such that it reduces the potential benefits deliverable to citizens and, as a result, their trust in 
government (Heggstad & Frøystad, 2011: 2). 
In public procurement, the principal ways to purchase works, goods and services are 
two: public purchasing and public tendering. Through the former – also called ‘negotiated 
procedure’ –, suppliers are directly chosen by public authorities, while the latter can assume 
different aspects in relation to both the discretional degree of public organisations and the 
object of purchase (World Bank, 2007: 8). In particular, public tendering typically involves 
large scale projects, while purchasing does not need any public bidding due to its very limited 
financial entity9 (Heggstad & Frøystad, 2011: 3), even if they usually imply market sounding 
for the selection of best offers. 
Along one or more stages of the procurement process, methods of corruption are 
disparate – e.g., bribery, kickback, bid rigging, fraud (Heggstad & Frøystad, 2011: 7-8) − and 
malfeasances can be demand- or supply-driven, depending on the situation in which 
 
7 In the case of systematic corruption, the impact of malfeasances may account more than 30% of public 
procurement. World Bank. 2007. Corruption and technology in public procurement. Washington, D.C.: The 
World Bank., p. 7. 
8 On the theme see Guasch, J. L. 2004. Granting and Renegotiating Infrastructure Concessions: Doing it Right, 
WBI Development Studies. Washington, DC: World Bank. 
9 For more details on thresholds of public contracts cf. European Commission; Thresholds; 
https://ec.europa.eu/growth/single-market/public-procurement/rules-implementation/thresholds_en; May 29, 
2019. Special provisions are usually given by specific national regulations. 
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interferences are, respectively, requested by public officials or offered by potential suppliers 
(2011: 2). 
Corruption may occur both during the budget planning phase and the budget 
execution10 one and may differ in relation to specific kinds of goods or services (Søreide, 2002: 
2). For instance, a R&D-based supply usually shows different patterns from a complex project-
based, a standard or a customised one (Rose-Ackerman, 1999), such that corrupt germs may 
insinuate themselves in procurement stages by exploiting supply conditions or features being 
both complex and, unsuspiciously, simplistic. Indeed, in direct purchasing, malfeasances are 
usually more difficult to detect than in public tendering, because of laborious inspections in 
quantities and qualities of consumable supplies (1999). 
Rose-Ackerman (1975) singles out ‘number of providers in the market’ and ‘purchase 
preferences of public organisations’ as two fundamental parameters affecting corruption degree 
in procurement. Theoretically, it is possible to distinguish infinitive potential combinations of 
them, but four basic configurations constituting extreme situations − see Figure 3.1 − can be 
highlighted, that is: 
- a multitude of providers and clarity about the object of the purchase; 
- a multitude of suppliers and unclarity about the needed product or service; 
- one provider and clarity about the object; 
- one supplier and unclarity about what is actually requested by the public institution’s 
processes to create public value. 
 
 
Figure 3.1. Corruption probability depending on the number of providers and clarity of the object of procurement. 
Source: Author’s elaboration based on Rose-Ackerman (1975). 
 
The likelihood that corruption may occur when the first two configurations are of the 
case is low, since the financial incentives to corrupt are low as well (Ferwerda, Deleanu, & 
 
10 These two moments disclose the typical management control cycle, which is articulated in: programming, 
budgeting, operating and reporting, evaluation. For an in-depth study see Anthony, R. N. & Welsch, G. A. 1974. 
The Management Control Process. In R. D. Irwin (Ed.), Fundamentals of Management Accounting. 
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Unger, 2017) by virtue of sufficient information availability for both the purchaser and the 
supplier, an adequate competition level and a negligible degree of uncertainty of the object of 
purchase. Nonetheless, Søreide (2002: 4) argues that even when several suppliers are involved 
in a public contract assignment, they may be led to think that their competitors are inclined to 
pay kickbacks to get a contract and accept to comply with the ‘rules of game’ too11. Indeed, 
there is no guarantee on whether or not competition is able to ward corruption off, although it 
may enhance openness and transparency degrees of bidding and, therefore, create pressure in 
justifying inefficiencies and low quality of provisions (Heggstad & Frøystad, 2011: 3). 
A generally-accepted principle in public procurement is that contracting authorities 
have to single out and select the most economically advantageous proposal on the basis of the 
best price-quality ratio (Estermann & Kupriyanova, 2018: 12). It means to create value for 
money, which implies a trade-off between quality and procurement cost that can be evaluated 
through the consideration of the contractual nature, stakeholders’ expectations and resource 
availability (Erridge, 2009: 100). 
Since it is not always possible to choose the best available bid due to inadequate 
information about either the quality of supply or the collective need for which the procurement 
is requested, uncertainty often reduces supply effectiveness and efficiency (Arrow, 1963; 
Savedoff & Hussmann, 2006: 5). In particular, uncertainty may allow a provider to exploit an 
advantage position thanks to the existence of information asymmetries with the contracting 
authority, such that the purchased product, service or work might instead be obtained in the 
market at better conditions or – even worse – it might not be completely pertinent to the 
activities that a public body has to perform (2006: 5). 
Based on what above, risk of depletion or misappropriation of public resources due to 
abuse, misuse or omission of public power for private benefits may insinuate itself along one 
or more of the five stages of the typical cycle of public procurement depicted by the European 
Commission (2018: 16) and showed in Figure 3.2. 
 
 
11 In cases of high-profile corruption, expedients and criminal acts may configure situations characterised by 
formation of cartels among tenderers, prevention from bid submissions by means of physical threats to bidders, 
by tampering tender documents or by delaying calls for bid and contract terminations. Cf. World Bank. 2007. 
Corruption and technology in public procurement. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank. 




Figure 3.2. The typical phases of public procurement. Source: Adapted from European Commission (2018: 16). 
 
The World Bank (2007: 10) detected some typical wrongdoings that can occur in each 
of them12: 
- during the phase of preparation and planning, the supply decision may favour private 
interests instead of addressing existing needs through specific purchase requirements;  
- in the publication and transparency phase, some risks are linked to abuses of exceptions 
in participation to a tender, to limitations to significant stakeholders’ participation and to 
evaluation criteria elaborated ad hoc to support some bidders or are too vague and/or not 
objective; 
- during the phase of tendering process, contracting authorities may contain the number of 
bidders, for instance, by reducing the time to submit an offer, not adequately publicising 
a tender or increasing information asymmetries among bidders to benefit some of them13; 
- in the evaluation phase, criteria may not be clearly stated and objective, so as to leave 
room for manipulations; 
 
12 Klitgaard and colleagues also propose a framework for public procurement corruption including four stylised 
steps of procurement process for which they highlight: a) types of corruption and problems; b) conducive 
conditions to corruption; c) indicators of potential corruption; d) conventional policy remedies to stem or prevent 
corruption. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) also provides similar list of 
integrity risks in the procurement process. For more details, cf. Klitgaard, R., Maclean-Abaroa, R., & Parris, H. 
L. 2000. Corrupt cities: a practical guide to cure and prevention: 180. California: Institute for Contemporary 
Studies: Institute for Contemporary Studies., pp. 120-135; OECD. 2016. Preventing Corruption in Public 
Procurement: 32. Paris, France: OECD., p. 9. 
13 Moreover, public contractors may collude with some bidders to influence prices, as well as bidders may share 
the market by losing a bid expressly or even avoiding to present any offer. 
Measurement of and Measures Against Corruption in Public Procurement  
55 
 
- in the awarding phase, results may not be adequately publicised and/or possible 
subcontractors may be unaccountable or used to bribe contracting authorities; 
- finally, during the contract management and monitoring stage, contracts may be 
renegotiated and upset to establish more favourable conditions for winners and/or 
supervising instances may be influenced to alter inconsistencies in the performance of 
supplies and/or public contractors may misrepresent procurement reports and suppliers 
may pay kickbacks to obtain authorisations requested in specific economic sectors. 
Across these phases, factors such as lack of expertise, accountability and transparency, 
presence of conflicts of interest with public officials, huge financial endowment, dearth of 
adequate monitoring capacity and effort, political influences and ambiguity of regulation may 
generate vulnerabilities that are difficult to detect, so that both citizens’ trust in government 
and public and private resources may ineluctably undermined (World Bank, 2007: 9, 11). 
 
3.5 Red flags in public procurement: Prevalent literature and flaws 
In relation to a system or process, corruption is generally modelled as a risk and measures the 
institutional vulnerabilities enabling wrongdoings for private gain by means of an occurrence 
probability factor and the related impact, representing a more precise estimation that can be 
compared or integrate with perception and experience indexes (McDevitt, 2011: 1-2) discussed 
above. 
Most of the relevant research suggested the usage of corruption risk indicators called 
‘red flags’, which represent the most common alert tools of corruption along the different 
phases of public procurement process. They are based on objective measurement approaches 
relying on proxy variables, such as supply prices, competition level, contract awarding 
selection criteria, and so forth. 
Various scholars and practitioners proposed heterogenous models framing sets of red 
flags – for instance, Rabl and Kühlmann (2008), Samuel (2009), Ferwerda et al. (2017), and 
Galli et al. (2018). Among the others, Ferwerda et al. (2017), based on the earlier work of 
Kenny and Musatova (2011), identified significant red flags by analysing some cases of 
detected and non-detected corruption in public procurement to support investigation, detection 
and contrast of wrongdoings along the underlined process. 
Red flags have also been used to develop corruption measures. Interestingly, Fazekas, 
Tóth, and King (2016b: 369), by means of big data, developed a composite indicator through 
the identification of possible signals linked to restrictions of competitive procedures and 
contract awarding in procurement. The Authors found that cases where, for example, firms 
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with higher profitability, higher contract-value-to-estimated-price ratio and higher possibility 
of political interferences also show higher level of corruption risk. The ‘Corruption Risk 
Index’, as it was labelled, uses a normalised simple average of individual risk indicators related 
to the typical procurement process (Fazekas & Kocsis, 2017: 158). 
In an extensive work, Fazekas, Cingolani, and Tóth (2016a: 5) elaborated a set of 
objective proxies involving both tendering risk indicators and warnings, such as: political 
connections between bidders and political office holders; the presence of hidden corrupt 
agreements that exploit winning bidders to extract rents and reward all participants of the deal; 
the presence of bureaucratic vulnerabilities in formal structures used to favour specific tenders. 
Despite their remarkable usefulness, the reliability of red flags is not always ensured, 
since some of them may not even be correlated with corruption: particular features and traits 
are, indeed, present both in corrupt and in noncorrupt public procurements, and this makes their 
signalling capability unreliable (Ferwerda et al., 2017: 261). In addition, part of the literature 
(Fazekas et al., 2016a: 33-34; Ferwerda et al., 2017: 246) recognised that construction of red 
flags may be affected by an econometric shortcoming called ‘selection bias trap’, which implies 
carefully choosing atypical samples to elaborate risk indicators that cannot be extensively used 
to ground deductions about distinctive characteristics of corrupt procurements from a single 
case-study (Ferwerda et al., 2017: 246-247). For this reasons, even the use of a broader set of 
warnings requires an unambiguous definition of the scope of their applicability, validity and 
reliability (Fazekas et al., 2016a: 33). 
Some shortcomings in corruption measurement may also involve common risk 
management systems (RMSs). In making use of red flags, such systems may encounter some 
applicative difficulties in highly-bureaucratised organisational contexts (Ceschel et al., 2018), 
such as: opportunism exploiting formalisation to demean the diagnostical capability of such 
systems (Power, 2007); resistance to avoid interferences from formal controls (Courpasson, 
Dany, & Clegg, 2012); possible frictions in procedural mechanisms and decision-making 
processes, with consequential efficacy and efficiency losses due to excessive bureaucratisation 
(Anechiarico & Jacobs, 1996); blind reliability on RMSs, which leads to poor learning 
processes and low capability of critical understanding that undermine adaptation to 
environmental changes (Merton, 1949). 
Finally, even though it was empirically proved that the use of e-procurement 
technologies may realistically improve transparency and accountability of regional and local 
governments (Pina, Torres, & Royo, 2007), possible consequential benefits in terms of data 
and information collection to support corruption measurement and control may be reduced by 
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specific features and limits of e-procurement technologies themselves, which not always ensure 
broad participation of bidders, objective selection of evaluation criteria and publicity of calls 
for bid (World Bank, 2007: 19-20). 
Therefore, even if sophisticated bid-monitoring procedures and red flags systems are 
implemented, control and measurement of corruption are not taken for granted. It emerges that, 
since honesty always requires clear and detailed cultural, political and technological efforts 
(Ferreira et al., 2017: 1), fostering organisational reaction to hinder corruption needs to link 
measurement to management. 
 
3.6 From a static to a dynamic perspective: Performance indicators to detect corruption 
PMSs have been used at the aim to enhance budgeting process, human resource management 
(HRM), public services, communication with citizens, public accountability, contracting 
process (Wholey & Hatry, 1992: 604, 609; Wholey & Newcomer, 1997: 98), and many other 
organisational processes. In fact, public organisations benefit from performance monitoring 
systems in terms of implementation of benchmarking activities, recognition of improvement 
areas, communication of public performance to external stakeholders – e.g., citizens, 
academics, media, firms – and cooperation aimed to produce desired outcomes on communities 
(Kopczynski & Lombardo, 1999: 133). 
The complexity of corruption requires that characteristics of the object or process to 
submit to accurate performance monitoring for preventing and repressing it need to be clearly 
singled out. At this aim, the Amigoni’s (1978) conceptual framework, defining the 
organisational features and environmental conditions that are significant in designing and 
implementing management control systems (MCSs), can be adapted to the case of public 
procurement process. 
Accordingly, along its different stages, public procurement involves interdependent 
departments inside public organisations − above all, financial and technical offices − requiring 
adequate coordination and, quite often, cooperation. This interdependency increases the degree 
of management complexity together with other interconnected and mutually-affectable 
objective factors, such as strictness and rapid change of legal and bureaucratic rules, formal 
responsibilities, heterogeneity of supplies, presence of multiple bidders; as well as subjective 
elements, which are mainly linked to the expertise of managers and personnel. 
Procurement also implies a high degree of continuity per se, as it is made by 
tendentially-stable operations and procedural rigidity for which the control process makes use 
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of protocols and formal tools being employed continuously and regularly (Amigoni, 1978: 80). 
As such, it is usually characterised by a ‘tight’ managerial style of control, which implies a 
poor participation of staff in decision-making (1978: 81). 
Nevertheless, the high rate of change and the multiple law sources − local, regional, 
national, supernational and international − of applicable regulation may, on the one hand, 
counterbalance the trend stability of procurement processes and, on the other hand, boost 
environmental complexity and uncertainty that public organisations have to deal with. It 
follows that the unpredictable individuals’ willingness to engage in corruption may find fertile 
ground in the emersion of new incentives, in the growth of the already-existent ones and/or in 
the reduction or removal of deterrent factors, which are made possible by weaker or more 
flexible legal provisions that, in turn, might exacerbate the tangled and turbulent system status. 
This especially occurs through gradual quality deprivation and rigidity invalidation of 
procurement-related tools and procedures, which are characterised by lack of detail, relevance, 
selectivity of procurement information and growth of informative asymmetries along the 
overall procurement process. 
In the light of what above, wisely-designed and implemented PMSs may contribute to 
strengthen the explanatory potential of common red flags in procurement through the 
contextualisation of noteworthy issues, the clarification of the meaning of relevant data and 
information at system level, and the identification of organisational resources and levers being 
useful to strategically address them. 
With this respect, Galli et al. (2018) propose a model integrating performance 
management and risk management cycles, stressing on their reciprocal coherence and on the 
capability of KPIs to alert on possible presence of corruption. RMSs are, indeed, coherent with 
the performance management life-cycle14, provided that both the frameworks are developed 
through collection, measurement, processing, incorporating and usage of data and information, 
in order to make informed organisational decisions (Bouckaert & Halligan, 2007; van Dooren, 
Bouckaert, & Halligan, 2015). Therefore, measuring corruption risk in procurement can 
contribute to enhance the related management of performance at the extent to which it allows 
policy- and decision-makers to capture and estimate possible effectiveness and efficiency 
losses of public action provoked by misuses of entrusted power for personal advantage. 
 
14 A declination of the life-cycle approach to performance management is provided by van Helden, G. J., Johnsen, 
Å., & Vakkuri, J. 2012. The life-cycle approach to performance management: Implications for public management 
and evaluation. Evaluation, 18(2): 159-175. 
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By supporting P&C processes that are essential for dealing with corruption, the 
effective integration of PMS with RMS may enable organisations to elaborate feasible anti-
corruption strategies which successfully deploy relevant resources on the basis of consistent 
sets of indicators that work both as signals of the presence of hidden corrupt practices and of 
potential malfeasances. As far as possible, this requires few, detailed and measurable targets to 
deal with managers’ information processing limitations, which also include qualitative 
variables expressed quantitatively by means of opportune proxies (Maciariello, 1980: 9). 
At this regard, static view rooted in the culture and practice of performance 
management often creates confusion between the meanings of ‘index’ and ‘indicator’: 
differently from indicators, indexes depict the state of an investigated system and, as such, are 
just suitable for performance measurement, but not even for performance management, since 
they do not affect any performance measure (Bianchi, 2016: 83). As such, KPIs might not 
always be assimilable to critical levers or success factors for corruption prevention and 
repression that actually influence performance, but they may only depict the current status of 
performance of a given system. 
The simplistic use of KPIs as red-flag indicators of corruption may also imply the 
reproduction of the conceptual and structural flaws that were emphasised by Bianchi (2016: 
66-68) in relation to the use of balance scorecards in performance management and strategic 
planning. In particular, corruption measurement and monitoring through KPIs that are not 
causally and dynamically − i.e., over time − linked each other disregard feedback structures of 
relevant organisational processes and sub-processes, so that it is not possible to identify those 
strategic resources to deploy and re-integrate consciously and sustainably, in order to 
adequately prevent or repress repercussion of corruption on performance. 
Uncertainty permeating corruption in all its forms is such that no change of economic, 
financial and/or social performance of organisations can be univocally ascribed to corrupt 
practices, as it often stems from ‘simple’ − although pathological − management 
inefficiencies15. For these reason, in order to integrate PMS and RMS, managers must prove 
their capability to investigate organisational activities and processes, for which they are 
accountable, both in terms of performance measurement and evaluation and in terms of 
political-economic ‘opportunity windows’ of corruption (Galli et al., 2018: 153). 
 
15 At this regard, Bandiera and colleagues single out ‘active waste’ from ‘passive waste’, where the former only 
is linked to corruption. For more details, cf. Bandiera, O., Prat, A., & Valletti, T. 2009. Active and Passive Waste 
in Government Spending: Evidence from a Policy Experiment. American Economic Review, 99(4): 1278-1308. 
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Considering that, as it was previously mentioned, the assessment of risk of corruption 
operatively implies to detect system and/or process vulnerabilities enabling corruption 
opportunities (McDevitt, 2011: 1), KPIs should be adjusted by a risk component to arrange 
preventive and repressive measures by virtue of the necessity to capture the likelihood and 
impacts of − past, current16 or future − corruption episodes, thus coping with difficulties to 
label management exceptions − i.e., gaps between actual and desired levels of KPIs − as either 
a corruption-related or a non-corruption-related waste. 
An insightful framework integrating PMS and RMS should also emphasise the role of 
subjective factors − especially linked to organisational culture − driving corruption, strictly 
depending on the context of reference and going beyond the features of processes under 
scrutiny. Accordingly, repressive and preventive measures may take advantage from designing 
consistent performance indicators allowing decision-makers to trigger cultural and political 
change and push it away from extant and potential deleterious practices. 
Therefore, coherently with the neo-institutional approach of analysis of corruption in 
political-administrative systems (Vannucci, 2012: 70-73; 2015), adjusted KPIs should also 
include socio-cultural factors and their dynamic co-evolution with the political-economic ones 
over time, with the aim to outline structural patterns and paths that may either encourage or 
mortify corrupt behaviour in the system studied. 
As it was highlighted above, particular situational features activating red flags in public 
procurement connotate both corrupt and non-corrupt practices, so that the discriminating ability 
of these ‘indicators’ may not be important (Ferwerda et al., 2017: 261). They would instead 
require a combination with other approaches to gain a more insightful portray of particular 
cases of procurement process (Heggstad & Frøystad, 2011: 18). 
Assuming that corruption can be intended as either an indicator of the transparency and 
fairness levels of a process or the gap between the actual and a desired situation (McDevitt, 
2011: 1-2), the activation of repressive measures may proceed from the extant MCSs, by means 
of which decision-makers try to guarantee the effective and efficient accomplishment of the 
objectives linked to the organisational processes (Anthony, 1965: 17). Based on that, in 
procurement process, the supervisor may be able to verify that the subordinate performs the 
task for which he/she is made accountable on the basis of standards provided by the regulation 
in force. In the case where this last is not totally or partially respected, the principal may 
 
16 The estimation of risk of corruption is also considered for events being occurring and for those already occurred 
in the past by reason of their inherent secrecy and the uncertainty in identifying their impacts. 
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intervene according to the typical cybernetic (Hofstede, 1978; Maciariello, 1980), that is, 
diagnostic (Simons, 2007a) mechanism of management control. 
Nonetheless, the particular hidden and delayed nature of corruption may elude the 
common mechanisms of MCSs and actually exists despite no performance exception arises. It 
is the case, for instance, of efficient prices for a supply, which does not necessarily mean that 
no corruption occurred in assigning the provision to a particular bidder. In particular, the 
compensation for a preferential awarding may not hypothetically be given in cash or it may be 
improper, difficult, or even impossible to compare the price paid with other similar provisions, 
because of its peculiar features. 
In order to promote the adoption of preventive anti-corruption measures, feedforward 
processes of MCSs (Simons, 2007b) may stimulate and support the search of potential 
weaknesses of the system under scrutiny that could be able to open breaks through regular 
conduction of public activities. Keeping ‘cognitive radar’ constantly active allows 
organisations to perceive emerging and blurred phenomena that could be otherwise ignored by 
the diagnostical approach of MCSs, which may instead result fallacious, even when 
sophisticated technology is adopted. Hence, possible signals of organisational or 
environmental threats may represent intermediate results of the overall organisational 
performance, which may help decision-makers to anticipate apparently uncontaminated 
performance exceptions. 
It emerges how risk-adjusted and contextualised KPIs may not only allow managers 
and personnel to identify and report felonies being already occurred, but also ward off possible 
future illicit acts in their nascent phase, question extant organisational policies against 
corruption, anticipate and intervene on vulnerabilities and enhance governance structures, 
coherently with what Argyris (1982) defines ‘double-loop learning’ process. In so doing, 
measurement strategies of corruption being originally provided for setting up repressive 
measures may be later reviewed for elaborating preventive ones, so as to elicit integrity culture 
among public organisations’ actors dynamically according to a far-sighted managerial logic. 
 
3.7 Closing remarks: The need for a causal and dynamic approach 
Each with its advantages and disadvantages, perceptions, experiences, legal and economic data 
are significant tools to probe the actual existence of some kinds of past, current or possible 
future corrupt behaviours. 
Among the disparate forms of corruption, wrongdoings in public procurement are the 
most important and widespread. Factors such as poor accountability and transparency, 
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inadequate skills for competence, huge financial endowment and control, political influences 
and ambiguity of regulation may exacerbate systemic complexity and allow corruption across 
all the phases of procurement. 
The prevalent research that dealt with corruption in public procurement has adopted red 
flags, as risk indicators linked to the different process stages. Nevertheless, red flags may be 
affected by the so-called ‘selection bias trap’ (Ferwerda et al., 2017: 246-247) and their use 
always requires an unambiguous definition of the scope of their applicability, validity and 
reliability (Fazekas et al., 2016a: 33). Furthermore, this measurement strategy is affected by 
the common applicative difficulties of RMSs within highly-bureaucratised contexts, such as 
opportunism and learning degradation (Ceschel et al., 2018). As a result, even where best 
practices and procurement conditions are ensured, control of corruption needs articulated 
measures of adequate political, managerial, technological and, especially, cultural substance. 
Due to the conceptual misunderstanding of the actual meaning of ‘index’ and 
‘indicator’ (Bianchi, 2016: 83), KPIs might not always be assimilable to critical levers for 
setting successful preventive or repressive corruption strategies, provided that they are not 
usually framed within causal relationship structures underlying the organisational processes to 
which they refer. 
KPIs should be, therefore, adjusted by a probability component weighted by its impact 
on performance in order to cope with uncertainty of corruption, which implies that no exception 
can unambiguously be attributable to practices of misuse of entrusted power for private benefit. 
Furthermore, according to the broad neo-institutional perspective of analysis, the dynamic co-
evolution of socio-cultural and political-economic factors linked to corruption represents an 
unavoidable premise of any model aimed at dealing with it wittingly and purposefully in the 
long-term. 
Concluding, the integration of ad hoc risk-adjusted KPIs within a causal, dynamic and 
systemic framework of performance management that focuses on salient elements of public 
procurement process, on the one hand, may remedy where mechanistical control fails to capture 
actual presence of corrupt dynamics in public procurement and, on the other hand, provide 
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A stand-alone perspective focusing on single causes of corruption in public procurement may 
induce key-actors to vague and misunderstood attributions to specific factors considered 
causally-linked to inappropriate practices. This may provoke an answer in terms of public 
action that, rather than reducing system complexity and uncertainty, may exacerbate the actual 
understanding of the phenomenon, as well as produce unintended side-effects on performance 
in the medium- and long-run. 
Coherently with the neo-institutional paradigm that explains corruption in political-
administrative contexts (Vannucci, 2012: 70-73; 2015), purposeful endeavours to curb such a 
phenomenon require an approach being as comprehensive as needed in terms of system 
knowledge and enabling policy- and decision-makers to frame those governance arrangements 
and enforcement dynamics that influence trade-offs in complying with corrupt practices. 
Moreover, this approach should consider trade-offs in time of such a decision-making process, 
so as to depict the mutual evolution of the related incentives and disadvantages over specific 
time spans. 
At the same time, measuring corruption through KPIs is, in principle, an effective 
strategy as long as KPIs include a risk component and PMSs do not disregard the feedback 
structure underlying corrupt mechanisms affecting relevant outputs, outcomes and resources, 
on which to intervene by leveraging KPIs themselves. Contrarily, they remain static measures, 
such that possible anti-corruption efforts may unintentionally increase the uncertainty and 
complexity of corruption occurrences. 
Therefore, a methodological approach embedding causality is required. 
The DPM approach (Bianchi, 2016) addresses all the methodological requirements 
highlighted above and, as such, it can foster organisational and community learning processes 
in designing and implementing anti-corruption public policies at any government level. 
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With the aim to understand the extent to which DPM can support anti-corruption 
strategies in institutional contexts characterised by specific public management archetypes, 
identifying and understanding specific political-administrative configurations constitutes a 
fundamental premise to detect corruption opportunities and deterrents, as well as to provide 
policy- and decision-makers with appreciable advises for preventive anti-corruption measures. 
Therefore, this chapter attempts to answer the following questions: To what extent may 
the dynamic performance management and governance views provide for more effective frame 
of corruption at local level? How do such perspectives work in different public governance 
settings? 
Accordingly, in the first part of this chapter, the Old Public Administration (OPA), New 
Public Management (NPM) and New Public Governance (NPG) archetypes are explored to 
establish the extent to which their structural elements may theoretically contribute to produce 
advantages and disadvantages in terms of anti-corruption effort. 
Subsequently, a description of the main features and tools of DPM is proposed and the 
fundamental concepts of the System Dynamics (SD) methodology − from which it stems − are 
outlined. The chapter ends with a discussion on possible benefits that the conceptual framework 
of DPM may generate in exploring corruption in different institutional arrangements, according 
to both an inside-out and an outside-in perspective. 
 
4.2 Three performance management archetypes to cope with corruption 
4.2.1 Old Public Administration, New Public Management and New Public Governance 
In the last decades, the OPA, NPM and NPG models have enlivened the public administration 
debate in policy design, implementation and service delivery. Albeit there is not an always-
tidy distinction between these bodies of managerial practices and some of their aspects can 
exist together (Osborne, 2010: 2), they exhibit peculiar features being essential to distinguish 
their contents and implications. 
The OPA arises from the unitary state concept, according to which public managers 
and staff are accountable for realising governmental guidelines by virtue of hierarchical 
mechanisms driving resource allocation in a rational employment of public money, both in 
production and in delivering of public goods or services (Day & Klein, 1987; Osborne, 2006: 
382; 2010: 8; Simey, 1988). In particular, policy implementation and service delivery have 
political nature and, as such, their focus is mainly on the administrative procedures aimed at 
guaranteeing equality of treatment to all citizens in addressing their social and economic needs 
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(Osborne, 2006: 378; 2010: 3). However, citizens are simply viewed as passive users of public 
services (Pestoff, 2012: 14). 
General principles of the OPA (Hood, 1991; Osborne, 2006: 378, 382; 2010: 2-3, 8) 
are: 
- dominance of rules and guidelines; 
- bureaucracy as main pillar in policy-making and implementation processes; 
- inter-personal separation between policy- and decision-making within public 
organisations; 
- high professionalism in service delivery; 
- inclination to incremental budgeting; 
- hierarchy-based resource allocation mechanism and resulting accountability for spending 
public money. 
Started in the late 1970s, the NPM took hold as part of a business management-based 
thinking in the field of public policy implementation and service delivery (Bevir, Rhodes, & 
Weller, 2003: 1). Detaching from the OPA school of thought, the NPM laments the constrictive 
influence of public policies on the management and supply of public goods and services, as 
well as critics their legitimacy within the public management domain (Meier, 1997; Peters, 
2010: 39). 
This paradigm implies a management style mainly stressing change and innovation 
(Osborne & Brown, 2005), notably through freedom of managers; flexible hiring and 
rewarding systems; the use of standards, performance measures and output targets − to which 
rewarding systems are anchored −; and limited-term contracting and public tendering (Hood, 
1991: 4-5). As Osborne (2010: 3-4) emphasised, the NPM trend encourages public institutions 
to equip themselves with workable tools and techniques enhancing their organisational 
effectiveness and efficiency by: 
- learning from good practices of the private sector; 
- splitting up policy-making and implementation at organisational level, in a way to 
improve management independence from politics; 
- focusing on entrepreneurial guidance and cost management of public services; 
- underlining the significance of control and evaluation of organisational inputs and 
outputs, as well as the performance management and audit; 
- increasing the adoption of market mechanisms for resource allocation and public service 
delivery. 
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More precisely, the NPM mainly stresses the efficiency concern of intra-organisational 
processes and management within disaggregated administrative systems, being characterised 
by articulated and separated policy-making and implementation activities (Osborne, 2010: 8). 
An horizontal market-like competition in resource allocation involves service units committed 
at the implementation stage (Peters, 2010: 39), where the use of short-term contracting out is 
particularly promoted (Bevir et al., 2003: 1). Hence, quasi-markets emerge, which are 
organised by the central state that behaves as a simple regulator, on the basis of a principal-
agent relationship (Vickers & Yarrow, 1988). As a result, citizens are considered as active 
consumers, who have the possibility to choose public services providers according to their 
personal preferences (Pestoff, 2012: 14). 
However, as argued by Osborne (2010: 4), the NPM is not a standard paradigm, as it 
may assume different configurations (Christensen & Laegreid, 2007; Hood, 1991). 
Furthermore, it is geographically differentiated (Borins, 2002) and only widespread in a few 
national public systems throughout the world, since the OPA regime broadly prevails (Kickert, 
1997). 
Although the application of managerial techniques stemming from the private context 
in public management has been recognised susceptible to enhance the quality and efficiency of 
public services (Bovaird & Löffler, 2009: 6), criticism was brought forward against the NPM 
view since its origins. For instance, Hood and Jackson (1991: 17) literally labelled the NPM 
paradigm as an actual ‘disaster’, denoting the latter as an extraordinary episode for a particular 
context that generate wide damages and economic losses, as well as unveil the social systems’ 
vulnerabilities and incapability to deal with them. 
The NPM may fail in public policy implementation and service delivery due to a 
managerial focus limited to organisational boundaries and to the inapplicability of often-
obsolete business management tools and techniques to which it relies on (Metcalfe & Richards, 
1991). In addition, if, on the one hand, the growing importance in policy-making process has 
been given to public managers, on the other hand, this has provoked discontent among 
politicians due to meagre political debate and values in the public sector (Bovaird, 2009: 19-
20). 
Thus, despite the good government practices based on compliance with administrative 
and economic rules as guiding stars of the OPA and NPM, respectively, the inability of both 
the archetypes to outline the actual complexity of designing, delivering and managing public 
services in the present age (Osborne, 2010: 5) has come up. 
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As a result, the NPG has taken hold and, even though it is not a new concept in the 
public management field and owns clear connections with the two previous regimes1, it surges 
to a completely-new paradigm with a distinct identity (Osborne, 2010: 7), for the understanding 
of which a clarification of the term ‘governance’ is firstly needed. 
The meaning of ‘governance’ is generally intended as a set of governing structures and 
processes characterising an organised social system, being it public, private or non-
governmental (Bevir, 2012), thus including all the implicit and explicit rules and strategies 
aimed at steer it. Some Authors, such as Kickert (1993), Rhodes (1997) and Offe (2009: 557-
558), provided for detailed studies on the meanings of ‘governance’, practical issues, actual 
application and underlined use, highlighting differences between specific subjects. Among the 
others, Kooiman claimed that governance represents “the pattern or structure that emerges in a 
social-political system as ‘common’ result or outcome of the interacting intervention efforts of 
all involved actors” (Kooiman, 1993: 258). 
Narrowing the focus on what here deserves more attention, public governance is not 
the same as public management2 and, even if to suggest an univocal definition is like “to open 
the Pandora’s box” (Bovaird & Löffler, 2009: 8), it focuses on both how distinct organisations 
interact each other and how citizens and stakeholders perceive what actors playing in the public 
domain put in place in achieving better outcomes (2009: 9). Therefore, from the NPM to the 
NPG, the concept of performance amplifies its content, by expanding its scope beyond the 
simple public institutions’ boundaries and including a growing attention on the outcomes of 
public action – i.e., shift from ‘quality of service’ to ‘quality of life’ –, within a broader and 
broader stakeholder inclusiveness and value-embedded cooperation based on mutual trust 
(Bovaird, 2009: 20). 
The NPG relies on both hierarchical and market-like mechanisms of the OPA and NPM 
paradigms, but it mainly stresses cooperation mechanisms among heterogeneous interest poles 
to cope with so-called ‘wicked problems’, generally because of the proved inadequacy of 
 
1 Osborne distinguishes socio-political, public policy, administrative, contract and network governance 
components of public governance, which intersect the OPA and NPM regimes. For more details, cf. Osborne, S. 
P. 2010. The (New) Public Governance: a suitable case for treatment? In S. P. Osborne (Ed.), The New Public 
Governance? Emerging Perspectives on the Theory and Practice of Public Governance: 1-16. USA & Canada: 
Routledge, Taylor & Francis e-Library., pp. 6-7. 
2 In order to provide a useful example, let us consider the case of a high level of home invasion robbery in a city. 
The typical approach of NPM, aimed at reducing the phenomenon, could be, for instance, to improve the numbers 
of captures as well as to reduce the number of reports by citizens within a specific time span. Instead, the public 
governance approach would suggest the use of means fostering the willingness of citizens, for instance, in 
engaging in public information and/or in educative campaigns, as well as in enhancing the security systems of 
their houses. 
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exclusive intervention of public institutions (Löffler, 2003: 164-165). Forms of governance of 
administrative practices are hybridised and associational (Hill & Lynn, 2004: 173) and can 
make use of different degrees of joint effort of multiple actors − non-state organisations and 
individuals included − in policy and/or decision-making processes, according to specific 
“regimes of laws, rules, judicial decisions, and administrative practices that constrain, 
prescribe, and enable the provision of publicly supported goods and services” (Lynn, Heinrich, 
& Hill, 2001: 7). As a result, the NPG archetype assumes a plural and pluralist state perspective: 
as the state is plural, an inter-organisational perspective involves a variety of key-actors 
interacting with each other, in order to attain desired outcomes; while, as the state is pluralist, 
the governance of policy and decision-making activities is characterised by multiple processes 
(Osborne, 2006: 384; 2010: 9). 
Differently from the OPA and NPM, which respectively rely on hierarchical and 
market-based mechanisms, networks represent the resource-allocation drivers in the NPG, 
which arise from the relationships between the involved actors in relation to a common problem 
and whose accountabilities upon the policy process depend on their negotiation power in 
changing the basic rules of the network’s functioning  (Löffler, 2003: 165; Osborne, 2010: 9; 
Osborne & Kaposvari, 1997). 
In short, as it is outlined by Moore and Hartley (2010), for its importance within the 
public sector, the new concept of ‘governance’ promotes an inclusive inter-organisational 
innovation in structures and processes for complex social systems, by focusing on: 
- the couple production process-product, that is, on ‘which’ products are realised through 
‘which’ processes; 
- mechanisms of resource generation and allocation to deal with social problems; 
- processes of decision-making and, as a consequence, definition of accountabilities; 
- rules aimed at evaluating the overall network performance (2010: 53-55). 
Nevertheless, some issues may derive from the adoption of such a public governance 
approach. After some critical reflections, Offe (2009: 557-558) concluded that the 
conceptualisation of governance implies grey zones, utilitarian and rhetorical usages of the 
word to emphasise positive attributes of its key-actors’ actions, as well as a critical 
contemplation of the role of persuasiveness in policy-making. Indeed, in specific governance 
arrangements, thorny concerns of power exercise may arise, such as contrasts in decision-
making process due to power games among actors, conflicts in involving and coordinating 
stakeholders because of heterogenous goals and quarrels in allocating responsibilities for 
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policy implementation (Peters, 2010: 41-43). More in particular, within NPG-based systems, 
managerial freedom in contracting and allocating public resources configures as an informal 
tool for policy implementation, being able to bypass both political legitimacy and possible 
policy resistances of formal authorities at sub-national levels (Peters, 2010: 45-47). That may 
not be without consequences in practice and may give rise to dilemmas inside and between the 
involved institutions. Regarding the former, the attempt of the NPG to enhance the success of 
policy-making process through higher level of managerial discretion may produce the 
undesired reduction of control by politics (Peters, 2010: 48). This can be labelled as the 
‘internal dilemma’ of the NPG, which is coherent with that part of the literature of the NPM − 
e.g. Meier (1997) − that considers democratic logics of public policy as actual stops to 
successful public management. In relation to the latter, instead, network performance may be 
threatened by the stand-alone focus of the strategic management of involved organisations, 
which should instead call for a policy coordination based on either trust, shared values and 
goals (Peters, 2010: 47-48)3 or influence stemming from hierarchical authority (Hartley & 
Allison, 2000; Moore & Hartley, 2010: 56). This can be called the ‘external dilemma’ of the 
NPG. 
Provided that each of the three paradigms is characterises by different performance 
logics, tools, mechanisms and perspectives, if, on the one hand, the concept of ‘good 
government’ steered by the OPA and NPM may not result sufficient to deal with complex 
social and economic situations, on the other hand, even when policy- and decision-makers try 
to face ‘wicked problems’ through the NPG model-based policies, it may not be possible to 
provide ultimate solutions, but only satisfying and feasible ones, according to the requirements 
of specific circumstances. Indeed, the intrinsic meaning of ‘good governance’4 “is highly 
context-dependent [and, as such, …] must be negotiated and agreed upon by the various 
stakeholders in a geographical area or in a policy network” (Bovaird & Löffler, 2009: 10). 
Table 4.1 shows a summary of the three paradigms discussed above according the 
following main topics: performance logic; policy and implementation style; target; focus 
boundaries; governance tools; and governance mechanisms. 
 
3 Trust, shared values and goals represent fundamental means of a softer way to govern public organisations that 
Peter calls ‘meta-governing’, which carries public managers’ efforts towards the same direction at the benefit of 
communities. Cf. Peters, B. G. 2010. Meta-Governance and Public Management. In S. P. Osborne (Ed.), The New 
Public Governance? Emerging Perspectives on the Theory and Practice of Public Governance: 36-51. USA & 
Canada: Routledge, Taylor & Francis e-Library. 
4 Differentiated meanings of ‘good governance’ have been provided by international organisations and literature. 
For more details, cf. Box 15.2 in Löffler, E. 2009. Public governance in a network society. In T. Bovaird & E. 
Löffler (Eds.), Public Management and Governance, Second ed.: 215-232. USA and Canada: Routledge., p. 217. 
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4.2.2 Theoretical pros and cons of the OPA, NPM and NPG archetypes in dealing with 
corruption 
The presence of the OPA wave is widespread throughout the world (Kickert, 1997). It has 
strongly influenced most of national governments in designing and implementing anti-
corruption measures according to more or less centralised governance mechanisms and tools, 
being defined by authorities that provide pressing political lines (Ceschel et al., 2018: 132-
133). 
In bureaucracy-driven organisations, ethical problems are generally addressed by 
means of legal rules (Davis, 2009: 319) and, as a result, they are obliged to adopt regulatory 
systems that are naturally shaped on the basis of the past experience, so that policy- and 
decision-makers are theoretically provided with optimal solutions to cope with emergent 
problems, minimizing the informational requirement and discouraging behaviours diverging 
from the commonly accepted ones (Ceschel et al., 2018: 150). 
Effective regulatory systems with clear set of rules and guidelines are essential to both 
guaranteeing good levels of governmental quality (Dimant & Tosato, 2017: 5) and increasing 
the likelihood to get caught and be punished for wrongdoings (Treisman, 2000: 402). 
Nevertheless, to rely on law exclusively also implies to adopt costly and non-tailored contrast 
measures, such as legal scrutiny, sanctions, conduct and deontological codes (Davis, 2009: 
320-321). Moreover, as in the case of considerable discretionary power, significant requested 
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degrees of compliance with law and administrative protocols often create opportunities for 
corrupt offences as well (Minkova, 2018: 7). In particular, since bureaucracy-driven public 
organisations are subject to the adoption of strict and complicated administrative procedures 
(VCA Team, 2016: 10), there may be room not only for utilitarian interpretations and creative 
solutions to either overcome or bypass mandatory legal provisions, but also for unintentional 
negative policy outcomes, even where pressing rules and procedures could be able to hinder 
corruption in principle (Ades & Di Tella, 1997; Lambsdorff, 2006). 
As argued by Jain (2001: 72), corrupt policy-makers may endeavour to impoverish the 
efficacy of the regulatory and judicial systems by means of alterations of resource allocation 
and selectively giving critical administrative roles. The natural inclination of highly-
bureaucratised public organisations to incremental budgeting may also work as catalyst of such 
a mortification process of legal systems. Indeed, blind obedience to political goals may feed a 
myopic vision of managers who disregard important economic premises for policy 
implementation − e.g., efficiency and effectiveness of organisational processes −, thus 
undermining sustainable resource management and exacerbating corruption risk. 
Based on what above, it follows that, when law is the main deterrent for inappropriate 
practices, anti-corruption strategies mainly rely on disincentives for public officials to engage 
in illicit behaviours on the basis of previous experiences, but culture, feelings for the 
institutions and other corruption-related subjective factors are neither forecastable a priori nor 
easily affectable by rules, codes of conduct or other similar tools. Especially in contexts 
characterised by poor governance, legal provisions can be easily transgressed with no 
consequence, such that pre-set and strict protocols to cope with the changeable nature of 
corruption may make any attempt to anticipate eventual wrongdoings groundless. Finally, the 
abstraction from a specific organisational context may make anti-corruption policies worthless 
or even favourite the occurrence of side-effects. 
These argumentations may somehow support the findings of Husted and Instituto 
Tecnologico y de Estudios (1999), according to which hierarchy-based cultures are generally 
characterised by high level of corruption. In such arrangements, any appreciable corruption-
tackling interventions by managers can mainly be realised through feedback mechanisms of 
control on rigid and financial targets, for which public offices are made accountable. 
The recognised flaws in the predominant use of ex-post-acting measures in curbing 
corruption and the necessity to undertake effective pre-emptive solutions have pushed most 
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countries to integrate RMSs in public organisations5 (Davis, 2009: 321). With this respect, 
albeit public management scholars did not pay much attention to prevention tools in a first 
moment, the attempt of the NPM wave to foster ex-ante-acting measures has resulted in 
designing policies aimed at enhancing both management systems and controlling single public 
organisations (Ceschel et al., 2018: 124-126). Indeed, by emphasising organisational efficiency 
and effectiveness concerns, the NPM paradigm may naturally identify and deal with 
interferences provoked by wrongdoings within the broader goal of improving the holistic 
organisational monitoring. Also, as discussed in Chapter 3, the adherence of RM cycle with 
that of PM (Galli et al., 2018) may simplify the adoption of preventive measures. 
However, some potential unintended effects of control systems may inhibit anti-
corruption efforts because of managers’ myopic orientation, manipulations in performance 
measurement and record management, which were generally singled out by Merchant (1990). 
Moreover, bearing in mind that “bureaucrats are subject to auditing, budgeting, and public 
reporting controls” (Giroux & Shields, 1993: 239), the application of  RM tools has had 
particular difficulties in taking root in organisations with still-marked law-driven 
arrangements6. This because of a significant incompatibility degree with the dimension of 
uncertainty underlying the RMSs themselves (Galli et al., 2018: 150; Hinna, Rotundi, & 
Ceschel, 2017) and a containment of performance measurement and evaluation practices 
caused by rigid rules and guidelines, which would instead require adequate recurring reviews 
(Galli et al., 2018: 160). As a result, risk of opportunism, unlearning and bureaucratic 
intensification were identified as likely side-effects of the adoption of RMSs in realities with 
still-pronounced bureaucratic settings (Ceschel et al., 2018: 129). 
Besides, the NPM was highly criticised for its failure in providing reforms aimed at 
improving accountability and transparency (Nabatchi, Sancino, & Sicilia, 2017; Pollitt, 1990; 
Terry, 1998). In particular, the exclusive focus on results instead of on processes – for which 
the means may justify the ends – and the preeminent importance to economically-driven values 
and business-like practices promoted by the wave of the NPM may left room for low conduct 
standards and, as a result, for a high potential of corruption in contracting out to the private 
sector (Davis, 2009: 311-313). Public contracting has, in fact, betrayed common expectations 
 
5 Corruption risk management may be framed into the broader integrity management system (IMS). For more 
details, cf. Minkova, M. 2018. Guide To Corruption-Free Local Government. Practical ways to design and 
implement corruption prevention at local levels: United Nations Development Programme., p. 7. 
6 This may be the case of Italy, with a historical high level of bureaucracy and formalism in the public domain. In 
this country, the law 6 November 2012, no. 190, published in the Italian Official Journal no. 265 of 13-11-2012, 
provided the adoption of risk management systems in public organisations within a decentralised model for the 
implementation of anti-corruption strategies. 
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due to closer relationships with private actors: if, on the one hand, the implicit assumption 
moved by the literature is that trusting relationships improve welfare, on the other hand, they 
may serve private interests better (Davis, 2009: 314; Seal & Vincent-Jones, 1997: 7). 
Especially in presence of quasi-market mechanisms in resource allocation, the 
independency of service units underlying the NPM paradigm may cause adoption of bounded 
PMSs characterising myopic and watertight-compartment management styles, which disregard 
links and possible synergies between units that may hinder or even cause corruption over time. 
In addition, even when PMSs are characterised by broad span and depth7 including influences 
from and towards the reference exogenous environment, such a perspective may just consider 
actual and/or potential contributions of external key-actors to the organisational anti-corruption 
objectives and goals, but may not also take into account community stakeholders’ relevant 
needs, aims, possible contributions and willingness to be active in fighting corruption. 
Adequate importance to ex-ante actions against corruption with an inclusive ‘out-of-
boundaries’ focus seems to have been given by scholars of public governance instead, who 
have been typically interested in the implementation of public policies, in the conferment of 
tasks to different governmental levels and in the related relationships (Ceschel et al., 2018: 
124-125). Indeed, the plural and pluralist state approach of NPG may reveal to be particularly 
appropriate in dealing with a ‘wicked problem’ like corruption, since it moves forward by the 
assumption that some issues own hardly-identifiable internal dynamics, high levels of 
uncertainty, disparate processes interplaying each other over time and considerable difficulties 
in eliciting reaction and engagement of critical stakeholders. Therefore, networks consisting of 
public, private and third sector organisations lay the foundation for a more active – sometimes 
even pro-active – role of stakeholders (Pestoff, 2012: 14) in hindering corruption. 
In the best of cases, namely when simple coordination and cooperation between the 
public sector and the private and/or third one become collaboration8, networks enable the 
stakeholders’ engagement in new kinds of consensus-oriented policy-making and joint 
decision-making processes aimed at outlining common action lines against corruption, beyond 
the boundaries of typical organisational settings. In particular, multi-stakeholder processes 
(Hemmati, 2002: 2) may: ensure dialogue; foster common learning and joint understanding; 
 
7 For more details on span and depth of performance, cf. Bouckaert, G. & Halligan, J. 2007. Managing 
Performance: International comparisons (First ed.). London: Routledge., pp. 11-34. 
8 For a detailed distinction between the simple network, coordination, cooperation and collaboration settings, cf. 
Camarinha-Matos, L. M. & Afsarmanesh, H. 2006. Collaborative Networks: Value creation in a knowledge 
society. In K. Wang, G. Kovacs, M. Wozny, & M. Fang (Eds.), International Federation for Information 
Processing (IFIP), vol. 207: 26-40. Boston, MA: Springer US. 
Introducing the Dynamic Performance Management and Governance Approaches for Designing and 
Implementing Anti-Corruption Policies 
74 
 
allow the parties involved to bargain over the policy design phase negotiation and participated 
decision-making; and enable inclusive anti-corruption policy implementation and monitoring 
(Søreide & Truex, 2011: 4). 
At this regard, Poocharoen (2014: 15) singled out four ways through which 
collaboration networking may support anti-corruption strategies: knowledge and know-how 
sharing at support of PCSs; inter-subjective learning; elicitation of new common shared values; 
overcoming political change resistance. The Author also suggested some guidelines for 
practitioners, such as an ad hoc focus of collaboration according to the form of corruption 
which it is supposed to deal with, and a long-term perspective fostering resource sharing, 
relationship and trust building (2014: 23). 
Nevertheless, issues may arise because of the individuals’ personality and intimate 
reasons to commit themselves in actions that are designed to build trust between the involved 
parts and face the problem purposefully. Accordingly, Ostrom (2000) distinguished three types 
of subject: ‘rational egoist’, who is personal short-term interest achievers; ‘conditional co-
operator’, who co-operates in the case where the other group members devote at least the same 
effort; ‘willing punisher’, who pushes the others to stop free-riding and engage with the group 
to cope with the problem at hand. 
It follows that key-actors engaged in anti-corruption initiatives may be diversely 
motivated and even promote contrasting goals, with the consequence that potential appreciable 
results may instead turn out to be totally far from those expected. Especially when such projects 
are not based on an aware and shared accountability, the presence of unwilling or 
‘incompatible’ actors may also lead to hardly-manageable conditions and dangerous outcomes. 
Interestingly, Søreide and Truex (2011: 14-15) identified some possible scenarios9 
going from the situation where multi-stakeholders collaborations impact positively in terms of 
achievements of goals to that in which they paradoxically overturn the substantial purpose of 
initiatives themselves, by making the collaboration a tool to reach private advantages. 
Finally, some issues being typically linked to projects featured by collaborative 
settings, may even favourite corruption. In particular, problems such as: belligerent anti-
corruption upholders and their level integrity; power imbalances; difficulties in setting clear 
trajectories, responsibilities, time and measurable objectives; problems in finding consensus; 
 
9 Precisely, they distinguished five configurations of ‘multi-stakeholder group’ (MSG) process’ according to the 
reached outcomes: catalyst for change; forum for dialogue; status quo; a tool for opportunists; extortion. Cf. 
Søreide, T. & Truex, R. 2011. Collaboration against corruption? Multistakeholder groups in natural resource 
management: 29. Bergen, Norway: CMI - U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre. 
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unsupportive institutional designs; lack of leadership skills of public institutions (Abubakar, 
Prasojo, & Jannah, 2017: 95); may realistically work as intentional retarders or gatekeepers for 
internal sabotages. 
Table 4.2 summarises the possible pros and cons of the three public management and 
governance waves in copying with corruption. 
 
Table 4.2. Pros and cons of the three couples ‘public service archetype-corruption’. 




























Regulatory systems improve 
governmental quality and 
probability to get caught and be 
punished 
Locus on service increases 
attention on organisational 
efficiency and effectiveness 
problems causable by corrupt 
behaviours 
More active and pro-active role of 
stakeholders in bargaining over policy 
design and participating in decision-
making through dialogue, knowledge and 
know-how sharing, and common learning 
of anti-corruption values 
Shaping rules and guidelines 
according to previous 
experience allow for learning 
from the past 
Adherence of RMSs with the 
PM cycle may simplify the 
adoption of preventive 
measures 
Recognition of hardly-identifiable 
internal dynamics and uncertainty of 
corruption 
Minimisation of informational 
requirement and discouragement 
of divergent behaviours 
Improvement of management 
systems and control over public 
organisations 
Overcoming political change resistance 
and foster long-term perspective based on 
resource sharing, relation- and trust-
building processes among stakeholders 

































Costly and non-tailored contrast 
measures (e.g., legal scrutiny; 
general sanctions) 
Difficulties of RMSs in taking 
root in organisations that still 
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Divergent individuals’ motivations may 
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Resuming, no approach is the best in absolute in endeavouring to curb corruption, since 
different contexts react differently to one or another governance structure. Nonetheless, in 
facing context-specific causes and the unpredictability of corruption, the NPG view may ensure 
inclusiveness and sensitisation of strategic actors thanks to its versatility and adaptation ability 
in relation to heterogeneous and dynamic contexts. Of course, it does not mean to exclude tools 
and mechanisms typically characterising the OPA and NPM. It rather implies to promote 
hybrid or less demanding forms of public governance that, according to the necessities of the 
case, may just consider the simple communication and relevant information exchange or even 
the definition of complementary/compatible objectives better strategies than fixing common 
goals to pursue jointly by working together. 
Hence, to foster political willingness, support change in management styles, enable 
key-actors to understand and face such an extremely complex, dynamic and uncertain 
phenomenon, as well as to design and implement appropriate anti-corruption policies at local 
level, a performance management approach able to contemporary: 
- identify performance gaps and their possible multi-faceted connections with corruption; 
- provide a systemic view to frame this dynamic and complex phenomenon; 
- maintain a sufficient degree of specificity to ensure a context-fitting frame; 
- understand possible trajectories, responsibilities and measurable objectives; 
- guarantee versatility in modelling corrupt dynamics; 
- monitor output and outcome measures linked to corruption over time; 
- suggest ad hoc and feasible anti-corruption policies tested in a ‘safe’ environment; 
- communicate strategic information through simple visual language; 
is actually required. 
 
4.3 The Dynamic Performance Management approach 
4.3.1 The conceptual framework 
The utmost attention on financial aspects of management has been recognised to bound the 
majority of P&C systems both in exploring the organisations’ complexity, the underlined 
structures of linear and non-linear cause-and-effect relationships, the time delays that influence 
their performance, and in combining short- and long-term viewpoints of decision-making 
processes sustainably (Bianchi, 2016: 71). 
The DPM approach is notably valuable to filling up this dearth. 
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Based on the cohesion between the traditional performance management tools and the 
SD methodology, the essential reason being of DPM is to elicit and improve a sustainable 
organisational development by systematising: 
- end-results, which are outputs10 and outcomes11 measures, influenceable by means of 
- controllable critical performance levers called performance drivers, which are affectable 
each other and, in turn, activable through the deployment of 
- strategic resources, representing the stocks of tangible or intangible assets to which an 
economic institution can draw on to put in place its organisational activities, as well as 
regenerable by end-results themselves (Bianchi, 2016: 71-83). 
More in particular, end-results are performance measures that can be differentiated 
through a stream of different layers positioned in a causal chain − such that a performance 
measure depicts a more synthetic frame of the overall organisational performance as the layer 
where the end-result is included is placed at a lower level −, and represent sources of 
accumulation and deployment of strategic resources of a given system (Bianchi, 2016: 72-73). 
Diversely, performance drivers − also called ‘intermediate results’ − represent 
organisational levers that trigger critical success processes and are susceptible to provide 
decision-makers with evident and more or less immediate impulses of change in organisational 
performance (Bianchi, 2016: 76, 83). As such, they can promptly prepare potential 
interventions being coherent and effective with respect to the prearranged goals, which can be 
done by identifying the correct relationships between managerial levers and end-results, as well 
as by making decision-makers accountable on what they can actually affect (2016: 117). 
The DPM approach provides researchers, practitioners, policy- and decision-makers 
with three main possible perspectives of performance: instrumental, objective and subjective. 
The instrumental view − Figure 4.1 − helps strategic planners to get an aggregated picture of 
the causal mechanisms of the organisational performance under analysis (2016: 117). 
 
 
10 These can be both indicators of volume and workload. See Ammons, D. N. 2001. Municipal Benchmarks. 
Assessing Local Performance and Establishing Community Standards (Second ed.). Thousand Oaks, 
California: SAGE Publications, Inc., pp. 12-14. 
11 These end-results: “synthetically measure the overall organizational performance [… and] are flows that change 
the endowment of strategic resources that cannot be purchased in the market [… such as those being] generated 
by management routines”. Bianchi, C. 2016. Dynamic Performance Management. Switzerland: Springer 
International Publishing., pp. 73-76. 
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Figure 4.1. The instrumental perspective of performance. Source: Adapted from Bianchi (2016: 73). 
 
The objective view − Figure 4.2 − details the focus of analysis by disaggregating 
performance into macro processes along the system under scrutiny, in order to explain how 
performance measures – i.e., performance drivers and end-results – are met. After the 
identification of the external users to whom the final products and/or services are delivered, 
the internal ‘clients’ and intermediate products, realised through management processes of the 
same kind, are identified (Bianchi, 2016: 118). 
 
 
Figure 4.2. The objective perspective of performance with three hypothetical macro processes. Source: Graphic reworking 
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The subjective view − Figure 4.3 − provides an overall picture of goals and objectives 
to achieve, which are translated into concrete actions – i.e., activities and processes – aimed at 
reaching desired levels of performance of single decision areas, measured through performance 
drivers and end-results (Bianchi, 2016: 135). 
 
 
Figure 4.3. The subjective perspective of performance. Source: Graphic reworking of Bianchi (2016: 136). 
 
4.3.2 Fundamentals of System Dynamics 
The Oxford English Dictionary offers disparate definitions of ‘system’. Among the others: “a 
set of things working together as a mechanism or network”; “an organized scheme or method”; 
“the state of being well organized” (Oxford English Dictionary, 2012d: 740). In other terms, a 
system is constituted by individual and often heterogeneous parts which, together, form an 
unity (Anthony, 1965: 4). 
The Oxford English Dictionary also defines ‘dynamics’ as “the branch of mechanics 
concerned with the motion of bodies under the action of forces”; “the forces which stimulate 
change within a process” (Oxford English Dictionary, 2012c: 221); and implicitly suggests 
some connected words, such as ‘change’. 
Each part of a system is fundamental for its internal dynamics, although with various 
magnitude and fashions in influencing them. Systems are, therefore, higher the sums of their 
parts, which means that the significance of two or more elements of the system taken singularly 
is lower than their sum, and that the latter is lower than the system as a whole. 
Based on what above, SD explores processes involving a set of interconnected 
elements, which produce change within a well-outlined system. Particularly, SD is a 
methodological approach allowing for model-building and simulating material and social 
systems, as well as experimenting with policies aimed at fostering system change (Madnick & 
Siegel, 2008: III). 
A system results in synchronous or diachronic interconnections directly and indirectly 
involving all its elements, such that the change of an element included in the system at time t 
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is the result of the interactions with and between all or a part of the other elements of the same 
system at time t-1. These mutual relations give birth to feedback loops, which can be either 
positive or negative, depending on the values of their components and the direction towards 
which each of them works. Notably, in positive feedback loops, elements act in the same 
direction, by self-reinforcing the change over the considered time span; in negative feedback 
loops, instead, elements act by self-balancing the change over time (Sterman, 2000: 12-14). 
At the aim to understand whether a feedback loop is of the one or the other type, it will 
be sufficient to multiply each polarity of the causal links within the loop and establish if the 
result is either ‘+’ or ‘-’. Alternatively, it is possible to count how many connections have 
negative polarity and, if an odd number, the feedback will be negative, otherwise it will be 
positive. It is important to bear in mind that the polarity relates to the kind of relationship 
between one element and another – i.e., one-to-one –, so that if the sign of the connection 
between A and B is positive it means that, when A increases or decreases, B follows the same 
direction of A; contrarily, if the sign is negative it means that, when A increases or decreases, 
B follows the opposite direction of A, namely decreases or increases, respectively (Sterman, 
2000: 139). 
In SD, feedback structures are typically represented by causal loop diagrams (CLDs), 
being particularly useful to capture and communicate the dynamic hypotheses of problems at 
hand (Sterman, 2000: 137). Figure 4.4 is an example representing two simple CLDs, within 
which two variables are respectively involved in a self-reinforcing – 4.4a, clockwise – and a 
self-balancing – 4.4b, counter-clockwise – feedback loops. 
 
 
Figure 4.4. Examples of positive or reinforcing (a) and negative or balancing (b) feedback loops. 
 
The change can occur even though each single element is abstracted from the system 
of which is part, but it cannot be completely explained if considered apart from the set of 
interactions which have generated it. In such a way, its change would lose important 
information disclosed by the internal dynamics and causalities of the system. This becomes 
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positive and/or negative feedback loops, because of the presence of accumulations, time delays 
and non-linear relationships. 
Understanding accumulation and time delay may not be intuitive. These two concepts 
are strictly related with each other. In particular, accumulation is a gradual temporal process 
which can result in increases and decreases in the entity of a systemic element over a considered 
time lapse. On the other hand, time delay is a characteristic for which an element of a system 
takes time to change, that is to say, it does not change immediately when its causes occur. 
Accumulations occur in stocks or level variables, which depict the status of a system 
and produce the information supporting decision-making and action (Sterman, 2000: 192). 
Stock variables are changeable only through inflows and outflows, which represent the speed 
at which stocks respectively growth and decline over time, and consist of rate equations that 
represent decision functions influenced by information inputs (Forrester, 1961: 81-82). 
Intuitively and logically, any accumulation-drainage process implies delays. Under a 
graphical point of view, flows are portrayed as arrows converging into or emerging from 
rectangles that represent stocks (Forrester, 1961: 81-82) − Figure 4.5. Alternatively, inflows 
and outflows may be merged into a single net-flow, thus capturing the ‘net-change’ of a stock. 
 
 
Figure 4.5. An example of an inflow accumulating into and an outflow draining a stock. 
 
The clouds at the extremities of the flows in Figure 4.5 define the boundary of the 
considered system. Indeed, although pertinent, some elements may not be included in the 
model structure, because of several trade-offs in framing and representing the problem at hand. 
These modelling choices mainly derive from the level of complexity of the problem itself, the 
necessity to highlight some aspects of it in particular, the audience to which one turns, and 
many other factors. 
All SD modellers recognise that there is always something outside the perimeter of 
analysis affecting the problem under scrutiny, which, however, do not deserve so much 
attention (Forrester, 1961: 81-82), either because it is outside the main focus of the study or 
because it does not generate a significant impact on the system. Hence, system boundaries are 
the result of a compromise between completeness and synthesis. For this reason, in order to 
Stock
Inflow Outflow
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avoid losing focus of the fundamental research purpose and operationalise the modelling effort, 
SD model structures frame the problem instead of the system per se, even though the two may 
often match. 
Mathematically speaking, stocks and flows − equations [1] and [2], respectively − 
represent integrals and derivatives in the following forms: 
 







= 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤(𝑡) − 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤(𝑡) 
(Sterman, 2000: 194). 
 
Information coming from stocks and decision functions embedded in flow rates 
influence auxiliary variables, generally represented by circles − Figure 4.6a. Contrarily, 
elements of the system which do not vary according to the evolution of its internal dynamics, 
but that are worthy to be considered as a part of the model, are constant variables or parameters 
(Forrester, 1961: 83), being normally represented by diamonds − Figure 4.6b. Notably, 
constant variables are considered as exogenous compared to the model, since they affect the 
system, but are not affected by it. 
 
 
Figure 4.6. Representation of auxiliary (a) and exogenous (b) variables in a SFD model. 
 
Interestingly, a time delay can be modelled by means of a thin arrow12 linking two 
auxiliary variables with double parallel lines in the middle and a stock inside the effect variable, 
which indicates a process of accumulation or smoothing of the effect produced by the cause 
variable over time − Figure 4.7. 
 
12 Thin arrows represent causal links between variables, while flows are exclusively represented by 2D arrows 
that connect to stocks. 
Auxiliary_1 Constant_1
a. b. 
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Figure 4.7. An example of a delayed effect of A on B. 
 
Mathematically speaking, a linear relationship between two variables is generally 
depicted as a straight line (Stewart, 2012: 23). Otherwise, the relationship is considered non-
linear. The latter is a polynomial whose degree is higher than 1 and, as a result, it is graphically 
represented by a non-straight line − e.g., exponential, s-shaped or parabolic. In SD, its function 
can be either generalised and analytically represented in formula or specified by assigning 
specific input and output values to the variable causing the change. In the second case, any SD 
software allows modellers to employ so-called graphical or table or lookup function − Figure 
4.8 −, by relying on both qualitative and quantitative information (Sterman, 2000: Chpt 14) to 
capture logical relationships that are often estimated and revised along the overall model 
calibration (Bianchi, 2009: 141). 
 
 
Figure 4.8. Representation of a non-linear relationship (a) with an example of s-shaped graphical function (b). 
 
In the light of what above, the resulting causal-relationships between stock, flow, 
auxiliary and constant variables give rise to the so-called stock-and-flow diagram (SFD), which 
reproduces the dynamic hypotheses of a problem just like a CLD, but more in detail and 
allowing for quantitative simulations. 
Finally, it is crucial to bear in mind that: 
A B
Cause Auxiliary Effect Auxiliary
a. b. 
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- polarities of interconnections between variables describe what would happen whether a 
change occurred, but not the actual behaviour of the variables (Sterman, 2000: 139); 
- a system behaviour13 arises from its model structure constituted by feedback loops (2000: 
107); 
- correlation is not causation, so that if conditions change or new policies are implemented, 
previously corroborated correlations may not be reliable any more (2000: 141). 
 
4.4 Supporting the design and implementation of anti-corruption strategies through 
Dynamic Performance Management and Governance 
Specific political and administrative settings characterising the OPA, NPM and NPG 
archetypes can be simultaneously present − with different magnitudes over time − in the same 
particular organisation (Bovaird, 2009: 20), provided that they are not mutually exclusive and 
that a sharp demarcation of their boundaries is often academic only. 
Based on the theoretically pros and cons that it was attempted to single out in the sub-
section 4.2.2, the DPM approach, described in the previous section, may reveal to be 
particularly suitable to: 
- improve the understanding of corruption opportunities, deterrents and impacts on system 
performance; 
- support PMSs − P&C systems in particular −, by shedding light on possible and relevant 
cause-and-effect relationships characterising the governance mechanisms of specific 
political-administrative configurations, which may either enable or constrain corruption 
risks; 
- trigger and foster ethical learning-oriented management methods (Bianchi, 2016: 63) on 
the basis of possible trade-offs between change and resistance (Schweiger, Stouten, & 
Bleijenbergh, 2018). 
In applying the DPM approach, two different perspectives have been suggested by the 
prevalent literature: inside-out and outside-in (Bianchi et al., 2019: 2). 
In the former, the focus of performance management is typically organisational and the 
boundaries of policy-making may include possible outcomes on the external environment that, 
directly or indirectly, affect the institutional performance itself. It means that any other element 
beyond such boundaries is, at the most, considered passively at the extent to which it concurs 
 
13 In SD, there exist six principal modes of behaviour: exponential growth; goal seeking; s-shaped growth; 
oscillation; growth with overshoot; overshoot and collapse. See Sterman, J. 2000. Business dynamics. Systems 
thinking and modeling for a complex world. Boston: Irwin/McGraw-Hill., pp. 108-127. 
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to influence the organisation’s performance, according to what is considered strategically 
relevant for attaining specific institutional goals and outcomes. On the contrary, in the latter, 
the focus of interest is enlarged through a broader scope of analysis that goes beyond the stand-
alone organisational domain, based on the recognition that the performance of a single agency 
or entity is largely influenced by relevant stakeholders’ capability to ensure adequate reactions 
to public policy implementation aimed at copying with community problems14. 
Compared to the corruption problem, the inside-out perspective of performance 
management of the DPM approach helps to overcome feelings of illusory control over 
performance, costly bureaucracy, procedural mechanicalness and decision-making inertia, 
which stem from the OPA and NPM archetypes and may lay the foundations for pathologies 
referable to the principal-agent theory. Among the others, it is possible to mention15: 
- fossilisation of poor governance mechanisms that enable opportunism, unlearning and 
bureaucratic intensification, inhibit anti-corruption monitoring systems and allow for 
manipulation of management and measurement processes, which find fertile ground in 
the emphasis on results rather than processes; 
- prevalent significance given to efficiency, because of the adoption of business-like tools 
in public processes, that may fail in ensuring organisational accountability and 
transparency; 
- violation or utilitarian interpretations of ambiguous legal provisions; 
- unsustainable resource allocation mechanisms due to inclination to incremental 
budgeting and/or risky proximity of public organisations with private actors enabled by 
quasi-market logics; 
- watertight-compartment and myopic management styles provoked by political origins of 
policy implementation, inter-personal distance between politics and administration 
and/or independency of service units, reducing organisational capability to detect corrupt 
practices. 
Following a bottom-up logic, DPM allows one to identify the main outcomes and 
outputs − i.e., end-results − related to specific forms of wrongdoing concerning the problem 
under study, such as to discover which performance drivers that affect them are activated by 
 
14 Generally, the scope of analysis of the outside-in perspective is circumscribed to a local or regional area, but, 
theoretically, a national, supranational or even the overall worldwide area may be considered. Indeed, the 
extension of the analytical focus may vary according to the range of the particular ‘wicked’ problem faced, which 
should constitute the primary element to assume in setting up the system boundaries. 
15 This list that follows stems from a declension of some crucial peculiarities of OPA and NPM that may allow 
for corrupt behaviours − see Table 4.2. 
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the deployment/accumulation mechanisms of strategic resources, as well as why, when, who, 
and how they spring into action. In particular: 
- firstly, causal mechanisms − how − explain the reasons why performance drivers − which 
−  are enabled and who controls the relevant strategic resources, in a way to reduce the 
risk of ambiguities in interpreting their meaning and identifying internal responsibilities; 
- secondly, representation of accumulations and time delays − when − characterising the 
system under scrutiny improves the possibility to anticipate and, as a consequence, 
prevent possible wrongdoings where they might occur; 
- thirdly, systemic focus enlarges the spectrum of attention paid by key-actors in 
monitoring and intervening through policy-levers opportunely, also contemporary 
maintaining the desired level of system detail. 
The need of reliable methods enabling successful connections between design and 
implementation in policy networks (Keast, Mandell, Brown, & Woolcock, 2004) pushed the 
adaptative evolution from the inside-out to the outside-in perspective of DPM. To provide 
practitioners and academics with a framework being effective in facilitating dialogue between 
conflictual mindsets, eliciting reflection, singling out critical performance measures, activating 
learning and information sharing processes, encouraging sustainable stakeholder inclusion and 
bargaining over common resources, may improve network leaders’ endeavours to cope with 
‘wicked problems’ and ameliorate affluence of local areas through governance styles made of 
various degrees of consensus orientation, stakeholder involvement, action power and 
responsibilities. 
The DPG approach aims to support the enlargement and enrichment of the typical locus 
of organisational policy design, which − at the most − considers the external outcomes of stand-
alone institutional actions, in terms of planning of acquisition and deployment of resources 
shared among multiple key-actors (Bianchi, 2021). The latter are affected by policies 
themselves, and their inescapable, cooperative and coordinated commitment contributes to 
attain the common purpose to curb ‘wicked issues’ at community level. 
In other terms, the outside-in perspective underlying the DPG approach expands the 
boundaries of the one-sided institutional scope adopted by the DPM view at the strategic 
planning phase, hence enriching the P&C processes of the institutions involved in 
collaboration-based arrangements. It means that the DPG perspective allows for framing shared 
strategic resources, the deployment of which can activate relevant performance drivers, with 
the goal to reach desired end-results linked to common issues, which actually evolving over 
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time according to the influence of the joint action of different key-actors belonging to the same 
reference system (Bianchi, 2021: 335). 
It is important to stress that it is not possible to talk about ‘control’ in the DPG approach, 
but only about ‘planning’: the DPM approach benefits from the DPG one at the extent to which 
the latter enhances the quality of the institutional planning phase, by retrieving and synthetising 
environmental information, as well as fostering and embedding inter-institutional synergies to 
reach common objectives. 
In short, the DPG view: 
- sets a specific focus on common strategic resources; 
- allows policy- and decision-makers of a single institution to make a strong synthesis of 
information shared at inter-institutional level; 
- produces an improving impact of the P&C systems of the single involved institutions; 
- boosts enhancement of welfare at local or regional level. 
In relation to a ‘wicked’ issue, decision-making process conducted together with 
relevant local stakeholders becomes surpassingly necessary to foster learning and successfully 
implement policies that require broad consensus among participants and their concrete action. 
As it was highlighted in Chapter 2, several Authors (Booth & Cammack, 2013; Mungiu-Pippidi 
et al., 2011; Persson et al., 2013; Rothstein, 2011a) stressed how the principal-agent 
relationship in corruption theories relies on the assumption that the principal always wishes to 
act in a way that the agent realigns his/her behaviour to the original agreement, based on which 
the principal’s power is entrusted to the agent. 
Nevertheless, to take for granted that the principal commits to take purposeful actions 
to fight corruption depicts a very optimistic situation. In fact, this situation is often so far from 
the reality, seeing as the principal may not have any desire or means to obstruct or contrast 
possible corrupt behaviours in public domain. In some cases, the principal may even accept 
corrupt behaviours because of the lack of will and/or ability to combat them. 
Thanks to the assumption that a good-quality collaboration represents a reliable 
indicator of the principal’s willingness to rise up against corruption, the collective action theory 
has taken hold. On this topic, the theoretical contents have already been mentioned in Chapter 
2. However, the last chapter proposes a more detailed dissertation of the state of the art. 
 
4.5 Concluding remarks 
In conclusion, the DPM and DPG approaches may reveal to be effective to support formulation, 
probe the feasibility and impacts over time of anti-corruption policies by framing strategic 
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resources, performance drivers and end-results within and beyond organisational boundaries, 
thus providing a portray of connections being often hardly identifiable, enhancing the 
understanding of performance processes and dealing with resistance to cultural change. 
This implies the necessity to gain appropriate knowledge about context-dependent 
political and administrative settings and strategic levers. With this goal, respectively compared 
to an institution or a local − or broader − area, DPM and DPG can together: 
- provide a better understanding of corrupt behaviours, by focusing on relevant outputs and 
outcomes and capturing causal connections between the endowment of tangible and 
intangible resources, measurable financial-economic indicators and objectively-
observable cultural set of measures, as well as between the latter and end-results; 
- foster communication, ethics, accountability, transparency and diffuse participation of 
key-actors in decision-making processes. 
The following chapters attempt to corroborate these theoretical statements through a 
multi-methodological analysis of a case-study of an Italian municipality, which experienced 
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As it was widely argued in the chapters 2 and 3, to recognise corruption as the abuse of 
entrusted power for private gain (Transparency International, 2020a), adopt eligible 
measurement strategies and make use of suitable tools according to the most important 
guidelines in the field does not automatically exclude mistakes in investigating such a 
phenomenon and ambiguity in the related results. Chapter 4 also showed how specific public 
management paradigms may generate pros and cons in getting even only a chance to curb 
corruption within public organisations successfully. 
To outline premises, features and outcomes of corrupt practices always needs a clear 
frame of the socio-cultural context where it occurs (Davis, 2009; Lambsdorff & Schulze, 2015) 
and, because of its cultural attitude (Arloff, 2012), Italy deserves a particular attention. 
The Italian national government has always been at the forefront of the battle against 
this economic and social evil (Sargiacomo et al., 2015). The increasing dispersion of public 
resources in local realities, fomenting a general distrust in public officials, has justified hyper-
regulation, procedural rigidities and formalism aimed at ensuring efficiency and legality of 
public action (Fantini & Simonetti, 2017: 27-28). Furthermore, quite recent law updates 
amplified the scope of the concept of corruption by including all those circumstances of 
maladministration implying a significant, actual or potential, deviation − i.e., conduct or 
decision − by the public interest in favour of the private one2 (Barbiero & Ferrari, 2015). 
Nonetheless, public corruption remains rooted in the territory due to the presence of 
organised crime in quality of widespread tool of illicit businesses and clientelist practices. 
 
1 This chapter is based on the conference paper presented during the National SIDREA Virtual Conference 2020, 
held on the 20th and the 27th of November, Gnoffo, S. 2021b. Relazioni fra malagestione e dissesto degli enti 
locali: un caso-studio basato su interviste convergenti non-strutturate [Relationships between 
maladministration and financial distress of local governments: A case-study based on non-structured 
convergent interviews]. Paper presented at the National SIDREA Virtual Conference 2020, Bari, Italy. © The 
Author. 
2 Cf. the law 6 November 2012, no. 190, published in the Italian Official Journal no. 265 of 13-11-2012. 




Since 1991, more than 580 decrees of dissolution of municipal councils for mafia infiltrations3 
have been registered throughout the country, of which little more than 80 refer to Sicilian 
municipalities (Avviso Pubblico, 2021). 
At the same time, the financial crisis is harshly affecting the Italian local governments 
with growing frequency. In the last thirty-two years, 685 municipalities out of 8,389 (Ca' 
Foscari University of Venice, 2021) declared “serious and incontrovertible conditions of 
imbalance”4. In particular, 84% of the total is represented by municipalities with no more than 
15,000 inhabitants and almost 12% by entities located within the Sicilian region. 
The declaration of bankruptcy of Italian local authorities finds its reason being in the 
historical increase of public spending with no effective restriction (Gori & Fissi, 2012: 44), and 
aims to both make the management of collective resources more efficient and modernise the 
Italian bureaucratic-administrative apparatus. 
The prevailing literature identifies several and, often, interconnected causes of financial 
distress of local authorities, which are linked to managerial and organisational (Coe, 2008; 
Honadle, 2003), objective and subjective (Levine, 1978), infrastructural (Jones & Walker, 
2007; Winarna, Widagdo, & Setiawan, 2017) and macroeconomic (Trussel & Patrick, 2012) 
factors, as well as to formal budgetary or management results (Gori & Fissi, 2012) of both 
internal and external origin compared to organisations (Civitillo, 2012: 12; 2019: 95-99; Italian 
Ministry of the Interior, 2019: 4-5; Prosperi, 2006: 25). 
However, not only the figures showed above confirm the financial plight of the small 
municipalities of the South of Italy (De Toni, 2017), but also note the possible existence of 
relationships between offences in public office for private advantage and crisis of local 
governments. With this respect, the impact of illicit managerial and administrative practices as 
possible causes of local authority bankruptcy has not received particular attention yet. This is 
probably due to the persistence of major practical and conceptual difficulties of this type of 
investigation, such as the capability to determine to what extent inefficiencies have no reason 
for being justified by personal interests (Bandiera et al., 2009), such as the seriousness of an 
excessive regulatory burden (Kelman, 1990, 2005). 
 
3 The institution of dissolution of municipal authorities for mafia infiltration was introduced by the decree-law of 
31-05-1991, no. 164, bearing “Urgent measures for the dissolution of municipal and provincial councils and the 
bodies of other local authorities, resulting from mafia-type infiltration and conditioning”, and published in the 
Italian Official Journal no. 126 of 31-05-1991. On the conditions and procedure of the dissolution of the municipal 
councils see the Articles nos. 143-146 of the Consolidated Text of Laws on the Organisation of Local Authorities 
(TUEL), legislative decree 18August 2000, no. 267, published in the Italian Official Journal no. 227 of 28-09-
2000. 
4 Art. 242, paragraph 1, of the legislative decree no. 267/2000, published in the Italian Official Journal no. 227 of 
28-09-2000. 




Therefore, this chapter aims to answer the following research sub-question: To what 
extent and how do mismanagement practices for private purposes affect the declaration of 
bankruptcy of a local authority? 
With this end, a literature overview of the main causes of financial distress of local 
authorities introduces the chapter. Afterwards, based on publicly-available past judgments, a 
description of some cases of mismanagement that involved some individuals of a Sicilian local 
Body, being currently in a situation of financial crisis, is followed by a content analysis of some 
interviews conducted by the author of this thesis with five municipal Officials in the summer 
of 2019. In particular, a process of thematic analysis (Boyatzis, 1998), developed by means of 
open and axial coding techniques (Corbin & Strauss, 2008), allowed for identifying clear 
concepts and meanings that resulted useful to answer the remaining research questions of this 
research project. 
 
5.2 Financial distress of local governments and underlying causes: A literature overview 
Financial distress represents a condition of either structural suffering or financial 
destabilisation of local authorities5 and depicts the actual status of a local entity to deliver 
public services according to planned standards of acceptable quality (Jones & Walker, 2007: 
399), since it implies a condition of capital unavailability for infrastructural interventions 
(Winarna et al., 2017: 35). 
Albeit, under particular conditions, such a phenomenon may even be qualified as 
‘physiological’6 (Capalbo, 2010: 85), it presents recurring elements that are attributable to 
difficulties in maintaining budget balances and ensuring the delivery of essential services, as 
well as to high tax burden (Bradbury, 1982). 
Compared to studies of financial instability at business level, the analysis of financial 
distress of local authorities is still not widespread in the relevant literature (Winarna et al., 
2017: 34; Ziolo, Porada-Rochon, & Szaruga, 2016: 315). The extant research mostly shows 
heterogeneity in findings and concurrent factors determining the state of crisis of a local 
authority. For instance, Jones and Walker (2007), taking the reduction of investments in local 
infrastructures in an Australian municipal territory as a proxy-variable for levels of financial 
distress, concluded that the crisis of the institution is positively correlated with both the 
 
5 The TUEL makes the distinction between “structurally distressed” and “financially destabilised” local 
governments, emphasising the different seriousness of the related financial condition. 
6 Cf. the Deliberation no.16/2010/FRG of the Section for the regional and local Authorities of the Italian Court of 
Auditors. 




composition of taxes and the size of the local population. Trussel and Patrick (2012) instead 
explained how fiscal instability can result from external factors compared to some U.S. local 
authorities, such as rising unemployment and poverty rates, insufficient state infrastructure, 
and a significant reliance on revenues from supra-communal governing bodies. 
Italian scholars of business and public administration dealt with the origins of crises 
widely − for instance, cf. Tedeschi Toschi (1993). Notably, in the Italian academic tradition of 
public management, two prevailing theses on the causes of crisis can be highlighted: the first 
one attributes the pathological status to the executive inability of institutions, while the second 
one to objective factors that are uncontrollable and external to them (Prosperi, 2006: 25). 
The causes that can lead to the financial imbalance of local governments are actually 
multiple, interconnected (Gori & Fissi, 2012: 86) and have different nature, scope and origin. 
As such, even though it may be difficult to identify them (Civitillo, 2019: 95; Prosperi, 2003: 
46), the most recent Italian literature provides for useful classifications of the causes of local 
authority financial distress. 
The distinction between internal and external causes compared to public institutions 
was already singled out by Levine (1978: 318), who characterised both of them based on either 
economic-technical or political origins. Without postulating generalisations, external causes 
are typically linked to transient economic shocks, while the internal ones to long-run structural 
budget unbalances stemming from political set of problems (Ziolo et al., 2016: 326). 
Interestingly, among the latter, the so-called ‘spoils system’7 is a factor that relates to 
relationships between politics and management that may play a crucial role in terms of financial 
instability of public organisations. Notably, from a first point of view, such a tool can be 
considered a mechanism of good  governance of public bodies (Ferri & Zan, 2019), but it may 
enable interferences of political power on what is the prerogative of managers, thus hindering 
the ability of the institution to prevent and cope with financial distress in conjunction with other 
criticalities that amplify its scope, such as a weak internal control system and mismanaged 
accounting (Guarini, De Toni, & Vallone, 2015). 
In the Italian context, without pretensions of exhaustiveness, it is possible to list the 
following internal causal factors: mismanagement of cash flows; low tax collection capability; 
excessive debt exposure; endemic black liabilities; incorrect management of tax credits; 
 
7 The mechanism of ‘spoils system’, introduced with the law 25 March 1993, no. 81, published in the Italian 
Official Journal no. 72 of 27-03-1993; and regulated by the law 15 July 2002, no. 145, published in the Italian 
Official Journal no. 172 of 24-07-2002, allows Italian mayors to directly appoint individuals, also belonging to 
the existing municipal staff, for the coverage of executive positions. 




uncontrolled increase in spending; budgetary structural rigidity; inadequate performance audit 
system; criticalities in accounting management; ambitious management objectives; adoption 
of myopic management policies; underqualified staff; existence of organisational 
inefficiencies; inability to identify and/or remove the causes of economic and financial 
instability (Civitillo, 2012: 12; 2019: 95-96; Italian Ministry of the Interior, 2019: 4). 
The exogenous causes include: dependence on state transfers and their uncertainty 
and/or under-sizing in relation to an institution’s real needs; episodes of an extraordinary or 
unpredictable nature of non-recent origin (Civitillo, 2019: 96; Italian Ministry of the Interior, 
2019: 4-5; Tenuta, 2015); the deficit of the ‘strengthening’ regulatory framework of the tools 
for local tax collection; the absence of adequate strategic planning of public resources (Italian 
Ministry of the Interior, 2019: 4-5); significant tax avoidance8. 
Another classification was proposed by Gori and Fissi (2012), who discerned ‘primary 
causes’, having a directional and administrative nature, and ‘formal causes’, constituting the 
accounting evidence of the primary ones and emerging both from the reports of auditing bodies 
and the declarations of bankruptcy issued by city councils. The Authors identified recurring 
and often coexisting formal causes relating to the balance between incomes and expenditures, 
such as: existence of black debts; use of cash advances; budgeting of uncollectable or non-
extant tax credits9; overestimation of incomes and/or underestimation of expenditures (2012: 
82-83). On this topic, Cohen, Costanzo, and Manes-Rossi (2017), in ascertaining both the 
predictive capability of failure and the goodness of certain budgetary financial indexes of some 
Italian municipalities, found that, compared to local incomes, the percentage of expenditure on 
staff, turnover rate of short-term liabilities, and use of subsidies, are peculiar factors of the 
institutions in conditions of financial distress. 
However, the underlying motivations of the involutional processes triggered by 
financial crises must be sought beyond the imbalances emerging from budgets, since these 
crises often rest on the inability of key-players to take full responsibility towards the ruled 
institution consciously, in their quarrels and in lack of a proper organisational culture (Sorci, 
2014: 463). Besides, some budgetary manoeuvres aim, for the most place, to conceal the actual 
state of financial distress of an institution (Gori & Fissi, 2012: 83; Italian Ministry of the 
 
8 On the topic, cf. Chiarini, B., Marzano, E., & Schneider, F. 2013. Tax rates and tax evasion: an empirical analysis 
of the long-run aspects in Italy. European Journal of Law and Economics, 35(2): 273-293, Ponzano, F. & Ottone, 
S. 2019. Prosociality and fiscal honesty: Tax evasion in Italy, United Kingdom, and Sweden: 289-318: Elsevier. 
9 The reform of the harmonised public accounting − introduced with the legislative decree 23 June 2011, no. 118, 
published in the Italian Official Journal no. 172 of 26-07-2011, and came into force in 2016 − provided for an 
extraordinary review of tax credits in the 2015 administrative year and, in order to avoid this phenomenon, the 
forecast in the financial statement of a fund for credits of dubious collectability. 




Interior, 2019: 4) and, in general, the quality levels of information present in publicly available 
budgets may constitute a limit for the analysis of crisis itself (Civitillo, 2019: 92, 94; Cohen, 
Doumpos, Neofytou, & Zopounidis, 2012: 279; Tenuta, 2015: 53; Winarna et al., 2017: 45-
46). 
The primary causes of failure stem from poor financial and accounting management, 
commonly attributable to the work of different administrations over time, aimed to formally 
balance budgets and/or avoid the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP)10 that can lead to time 
mismatches between collection and expenditure, as well as to formation and use of fictitious 
administrative surpluses due to non-existent tax credits11 (Giuncato, 1995; Gori & Fissi, 2012: 
84). 
Some primary causes are also exogenous, often linked to national cutback management 
policies (Levine, 1978; Pandey, 2010; Raudla, Savi, & Randma-Liiv, 2013) that reduce 
incomes, spending capacity of local institutions (Mussari, 2011: 56-63) and, therefore, restrict 
budgetary autonomy in policy-making. This level of uncertainty has led to the economic and 
financial instability of municipal governments, which has facilitated the adoption of 
organisational models that are objectively inadequate for the future functioning of institutions, 
as well as uncreative and unproductive organisational climate (Levine, 1978). These elements 
favour the so-called ‘passive waste’, caused by the carelessness and superficiality of public 
employees, which differs from the so-called ‘active waste’, in which there is the individual’s 
will to use the public power to gain a personal benefit (Bandiera et al., 2009: 1278). 
Practices of mismanagement of public resources resulting in corruption-related waste 
are opposed to the concept of good governance (Gardiner, 1978), as they increase 
administrative expenditures, damage public interest and cause public dissatisfaction with poor 
public services (de Araujo Santos et al., 2018: 461). Indeed, redefining spending priorities as a 
result of mismanagement practices for private purposes causes a huge dispersal of public 
resources, compromising the satisfaction of collective needs and foreclosing access to public 
goods and services to those who cannot obtain them privately (Robinson, 2006: XIV). 
Clearly, these outcomes result more serious than simply reducing the standard quality 
of essential services provided locally, since they imply a distortion of the ontological reason 
being of public action itself. Accordingly, as Liu et al. (2017) highlighted, countries with higher 
 
10 The SGP is an agreement between the EU Member States to promote control over national public budgetary 
policies and thus favour monetary integration under the Maastricht Treaty of 1992. For more details, see 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-euro/economic-and-fiscal-policy-coordination/eu-economic-
governance-monitoring-prevention-correction/stability-and-growth-pact_en; accessed: February 26, 2021. 
11 See footnote 9 of this chapter. 




levels of corruption also have higher and more persistent levels of state and local debt, making 
decentralised governments unable to provide essential public services and plan the socio-
economic development of their territory. 
Based on what above, investigating specific cases of abuse of delegated power for 
private interests in detail turns out to be necessary to better understand origins and mechanisms 
of financial bankruptcy of public bodies, to which little attention has been given by scholars. 
This research effort would favour better recovery choices of institutions from a point of view 
not limited to the accounting rebalancing, but also focused on virtuous organisational 
paradigms that promote learning and a system vision of managerial action. 
 
5.3 The case of Cerda Municipality 
Populated by just over 5,000 inhabitants (ISTAT, 2020a), the Municipality of Cerda is located 
in a hilly area of the province of Palermo, in Sicily. Like many municipalities in southern Italy, 
Cerda is currently subject to the rebalancing procedures provided by the TUEL12, because of 
the certified condition of financial imbalance that has weakened its ability to guarantee basic 
public services to local citizens, as well as to strategically plan its action. 
Following the critical emerging financial situation, in 2012, the Extraordinary 
Commissioner13 noted the urgent need to define the credits and debts of the Municipality and 
adequately intervene in the local public finance with the goal to restore a sustainable balance. 
The exclusion of any chance of restoration of normal conditions of sound management led the 
regional control Section for the Sicilian Region of the Italian Court of auditors14 to recognise 
the actual situation of bankruptcy in 2016, which was formally decided by the City Council the 
following year15. 
According to what emerges from the report of the Sole Auditor of Cerda Municipality 
(2017, February: 7-8), the size of the financial imbalance prevented the local Authority from 
paying short-term liabilities and raised new costs related to legal disputes. In particular, the 
unsustainable debt plight was initially quantified equal to € 1,813,174.23 and was mainly 
attributable to urban waste collection services, water service supplies, unpaid professional 
 
12 Cf. footnote no. 4 of this chapter. 
13 Appointed by the decree of the President of the Sicilian Region of 30 November 2012, published in the G.U.R.S. 
no. 1 of 04-01-2013, replacing the resigning Mayor and remaining in charge until the beginning of 2013. 
14 Cf. the deliberation no. 165/2016/PRSP. 
15 Cf. the deliberation no. 3 of the City Council of Cerda on the financial distress declaration of the 23rd February 
2017. 




assignments, acquisition of goods and services, as well as proven and potential litigations. In 
addition, a low rate of tax collection stemming from an endemic evasion was found. 
A careful reading of such a report shows that the Municipality’s debt essentially 
originated in the decade 2002-2013 (Sole Auditor of Cerda Municipality, 2017, February: 7). 
Interestingly, in the early 2000, Cerda was engulfed in a political and administrative scandal 
that led to the dissolution of the City Council in 2006, because of 
 
“forms of interference of organised crime, detected by the relevant investigative bodies, 
[... that exposed] the Municipality itself to pressing constraints, compromising the free 
determination of the bodies and the good performance of Cerda’s municipal 
management”16. 
 
The behaviours certified by the Italian Magistrates’ inspection activity17 mainly 
concerned with the improper conduct of administrative procedures related to procurement and 
the underlined contractual activity of the local Administration, which consequently implied 
liquidation of sums and accounting choices which were not compliant with legal provisions18. 
Indeed, rather than with a public evidence procedure, commissions of public works carried out 
by direct and fiduciary assignment were identified; in some cases, the necessary conditions for 
the appointment were even disregarded and the regular succession of procedural acts was 
altered, such as to provide unjust capital advantages to specific companies to the detriment of 
the Municipality19. 
More in detail, it was demonstrated that the provisions of the Public Contracts Code 
and the accounting rules of that time were not respected, thus constituting the crime of 
‘ideological forgery in public act’: by means of formal documents, false statements and 
accounting claims were, indeed, produced intentionally to legitimise obvious and unfair capital 
 
16 Page 1 of the provision of the second dissolution of the Municipality of Cerda, issued with the d.P.R. 12 
December 2006, published in the Italian Official Journal no. 301 of 29-12-2006, as a result of the article 143 of 
the TUEL. 
17 Cf. the judgment of the Criminal Collegiate Section of the Court of Termini Imerese of 04-05-2011, no. 296/11, 
procedure no. 757/2007, p. 7. 
18 On some charges, the defendants were acquitted in the first instance by decision of the Judge or thanks to the 
institution of the statute of limitations. Cf. the judgments of the Criminal Collegiate Section of the Court of 
Termini Imerese of 04-05-2011, no. 296/11, procedure no. 757/2007; of 11-05-2012, no. 312/12, procedure no. 
891/2009. Some sentences were, however, partially reduced to the second degree of judgment. Cf. the judgment 
of the Second Criminal Section of the Court of Appeal of Palermo of 06-02-2014, no. 592/14, procedure no. 
891/2009. Finally, in front of the Supreme Court of Cassation, some appeals were found inadmissible. Cf. the 
Supreme Court of Cassation's ordinance of 07-01-2015, procedure no. 891/2009. 
19 Cf. the judgments of the Criminal Collegiate Section of the Court of Termini Imerese of 04-05-2011, no. 296/11, 
procedure no. 757/2007; of 11-05-2012, no. 312/12, procedure no. 891/2009. 




advantages to specific companies and identified professionals20. The false statements mainly 
concerned never-proved ‘informal tenders’ aimed at, on the one hand, targeting the choice of 
the contractor through the restricted negotiated procedure21 and, on the other hand, facilitating 
the related payments22. As it emerges from a sentence: 
 
“a modus operandi such as not to allow anyone to verify that the tender was completed, 
thus allowing the public official to proceed with the most complete arbitration on 
carrying out market consultations”23. 
 
In other cases, on the other hand, the approval of metric computes for specific supplies 
was falsely attested through special executive decisions which, in some cases, were non-
existent24. It was also ascertained that the rules of public accounting were broken not only by 
the false claim of financial coverage, but also by the allocation of expenditure to budget 
chapters that were not relevant, in order to ensure the total availability of the needed 
resources25. 
Other kind of anomaly was related to pre-payment for public works that were neither 
formally assigned nor substantially carried out, which constituted the crime of ‘abuse of office’ 
due to the subversion of the rational execution of tender and the attribution of undue advantage 
to the payees: 
 
“the recurrence of abuse is to be considered indisputable, as there is no room for doubt 
about an excusable interpretative error, inconceivable given the macroscopic nature of 
the anomaly in question.”26 
 
Beyond the outcome of these judgments, and coherently with the purely-managerial 
nature of this research work, such verified practices were enabled by consolidated cultural 
 
20 Cf. the judgment of the Criminal Collegiate Section of the Court of Termini Imerese of 04-05-2011, no. 296/11, 
procedure no. 757/2007, pp. c-m. 
21 In case of informal tendering, the legislation of that time, namely the law 2 August 2002, no. 7, published in 
the Official Journal of the Sicilian Region no. 37 of 10-08-2002, required a careful and actual market scrutiny in 
the search for the highest bidder. 
22 Cf. the judgments of the Criminal Collegiate Section of the Court of Termini Imerese of 04-05-2011, no. 296/11, 
procedure no. 757/2007; of 11-05-2012, no. 312/12, procedure no. 891/2009.  
23 Cf. the judgment of the Criminal Collegiate Section of the Court of Termini Imerese of 11-05-2012, no. 312/12, 
procedure no. 891/2009, p. 12. 
24 Ibidem, pp. 7-9. 
25 Ibidem, pp. 14 et seq. 
26 Cf. the judgment of the Criminal Collegiate Section of the Court of Termini Imerese of 04-05-2011, no. 296/11, 
procedure no. 757/2007, pp. 38-39. 




patterns and governance structure within the Municipality, which undoubtedly impacted over 
its performance and, as a result, the local community. In fact, as highlighted in a sentence, these 
are: 
 
“facts capable of damaging public trust and the interest of the PA [...] the good 
performance and impartiality [...] in the exercise of a public function within the 
administration of the Municipality of Cerda [...] with repercussions not only on the 
budget but also on the image of the PA”27. 
 
Resuming, the key-events concerned: the omission of publication of calls for tender; 
the substantial and formal limitation of participation in tendering procedures; the use of specific 
or too vague evaluation criteria and, therefore, the exclusion in favour of some economic 
operators; pre-payments for public works that were neither formally assigned nor realised28. 
Finally, some events relating to commissions of professional works and out-of-budget 
debt management29 which, following a course of action and producing impacts similar to those 
outlined above, deserve to be mentioned. In particular, for those assignments, on the one hand, 
the political authorisation of the related expenditure was partial or even non-existent; on the 
other hand, the reporting of the out-of-budget debt was not initiated for possible recognition by 
the City Council. Although the contractual relationship was sometimes not formalised for the 
omission of the manager, the Municipality was condemned for unjustified enrichment, as the 
material facts of the performance executions and the recognition of the usefulness for the 
benefit of the local Authority were proven30. 
 
5.4 Research methodology: Thematic analysis and coding techniques 
The case-study research strategy (Saunders et al., 2019: 196-199; Yin, 2018) allowed a direct 
approach with some Public Officials of the Municipality of Cerda. It seems appropriate to point 
 
27 Cf. the judgment of the Criminal Collegiate Section of the Court of Termini Imerese of 11-05-2012, no. 312/12, 
procedure no. 891/2009, pp. 46-47. 
28 For more detailed information on the many events succinctly mentioned here, cf. the judgments of the Criminal 
Collegiate Section of the Court of Termini Imerese of 04-05-2011, no. 296/11, procedure no. 757/2007; of 11-05-
2012, no. 312/12, procedure no. 891/2009. 
29 The Italian regulation establishes that every expenditure of local governments has to be approved and budgeted 
by the related City Councils and, in the case where new expenditures should arise later, it is provided an approval 
procedure for the related debts that are, therefore, called ‘out-of-budget’. At this regard, cf. the articles nos. 191 
and 194 of the TUEL. 
30 For details on these events, cf. the judgments of the Civil Section of the Court of Termini Imerese of 05-06-
2013, no. 291/13, procedure no. 581/2009; of 11-06-2014, no. 576/14, procedure no. 580/2009; of 11-06-2014, 
no. 577/14, procedure no. 1225/2009; of 16-03-2015, no. 253/15, procedure no. 423/2009. 




out that the municipal employee officers interviewed were all on duty during the period under 
investigation and they are in office nowadays, although their names do not emerge from the 
documentary analysis of the judgments. This strategy was, therefore, crucial in extrapolating 
and collecting significant information, clarifications, mental models and perceptions of key-
players characterising the operational and managerial mechanisms of that specific 
organisational reality over the last decades. 
The chosen case is also exemplary in that the public Institution is one of the first to 
have experienced the dissolution for mafia infiltrations31 twice. The case is also representative 
for the type of mismanagement behaviours taken in public bargaining. 
The research was conducted through in-depth, non-standardised, face-to-face 
interviews (Dick, 1998) with five city Officials. The criteria adopted for the selection of the 
interviewees (Zhang & Shaw, 2012: 8-10) were three: 
- relevance of the role in the local policy design and decision-making process; 
- personal expertise; 
- historical knowledge of the Municipality. 
In the first part of the interviews, held at their respective institutional offices in the 
summer of 2019, informal conversations were conducted on the causes of the financial distress 
of the Municipality of Cerda, while, in the second part, probing questions were asked to clarify 
the meaning of certain key-concepts. 
A process of thematic content analysis (Boyatzis, 1998) allowed to systematise ideas 
and statements emerging from the interviews through the adoption of coding techniques of 
qualitative data. In particular, the process of open coding (Corbin & Strauss, 2008: 2) firstly 
allowed to attribute precise meanings to the content of the interviews. This technique, indeed, 
allows to glimpse, interpret and conceptualise possible inherent meanings of qualitative data 
in relation to specific contexts. 
Later, the complex nature of the concepts expressed by the interviewees and the 
relationships existing between them required the use of the axial coding technique (Corbin & 
Strauss, 2008: 27) to identify specific sub-themes within which bring the found open codes 
back. Notably, axial coding allows to combine and cluster arguments, ideas, terms, and so forth, 
according to coherent schemes of meaning. 
 
31 Cf. the d.P.R. 12 December 2006, published in the Italian Official Journal no. 301 of 29-12-2006 and the d.P.R. 
30 September 1991, published in the Italian Official Journal no. 231 of 2 October 1991. 




The codes were extracted from the content analysis of the interviews in the light of both 
the relevant literature highlighted above and the specific case-study. 
Applying such techniques is a time-consuming activity, but it turned out to be 
fundamental for the analysis of the overall case-study on account of the context-dependent 
nature of the phenomenon at hand. Indeed, from this process, three macro thematic areas, which 
were useful to answer the research questions of this and the following chapters, emerged. 
 
5.5 The non-structured, face-to-face, convergent interviews 
Below is a narrative of the in-depth, unstructured interviews on the state of crisis of the 
Municipality of Cerda, lasting an average of 60 minutes each and conducted in the summer of 
2019 at the Cerda’s Municipal House. During this type of interview, respondents are left free 
to express themselves and the researcher asks them to answer exploratory questions to delve 
into certain content useful for research aims (Saunders et al., 2019: 436-444). 
The transcription of the interviews is the result of an iterative process of summarising 
the topics covered during the meetings and recorded by meticulous and faithful annotations, 
which are contained in Appendix A. The coding process was derived from a content analysis 
of the interviews and ultimately allowed the identification of three thematic areas, 12 sub-
themes, and 56 open codes that are showed in Table 5.1. 
 
5.5.1 Theme 1: The signals of the financial distress of the Municipality 
“The signals of the financial imbalance of the Municipality emerged between 2013 and 2014” 
(Public Official #1, 2019). The situation became critical, as it was clearly demonstrated by the 
presentation of budgets, year after year, with considerable delays compared to the statutory 
deadlines32 and the use of administrative surpluses according to the accounting opportunities 
prior to the introduction of the harmonised public accounting33. However, when the latter came 
into force in 2016, the application of the new accounting rules was such that the actual assets 
of the Municipality were lower than the theoretical ones, mainly represented by hardly-
collectable tax credits. 
 
32 See the art. 18 of the legislative decree 23 June 2011, no. 118, published in the Italian Official Journal no. 172 
of 26-07-2011. 
33 The harmonised public accounting stems from the transposition process of the Council Directive 2011/85/EU 
of 08-11-2011, which established common rules for the European national budgetary frameworks, at the aim to 
foster transparency, comparability, completeness and truthfulness. As such, on the one hand, it requested the 
adoption of coordination mechanisms in budget planning between all the sub-sectors of the Italian public 
apparatus and, on the other hand, highlighted the need for uniformity of accounting rules and procedures. This 
implied the transition from the accrual basis of accounting to the cash basis one. 




Table 5.1. Themes, axial codes (or sub-themes) and open codes that can be traced back to the research question. Source: 
Gnoffo (2021b: 12). 
THEMES 
AXIAL CODES OR SUB-
THEMES 
OPEN CODES 
The signals of the 
financial distress of the 
Municipality 
Confusion in reporting and 
approval processes of 
budgets and financial 
statements 
− 2015 is the most recent financial statement approved 
− presentation of budgets beyond statutory deadlines 
Difficulty to adapt to the 
new public accounting 
regime 
− new accounting rules 
− verification by accrual or cash 
− tax credits that are difficult to collect 
− restrictions on the use of administration surpluses 
− credit fund of doubtful chargeability (FCDE) 
Opinion on the declaration of 
financial bankruptcy 
− discordant organisational opinions 
− the Cerda case is atypical 
− no accounting imbalance, only cash one 
Disservices 
− potholes, devastated country roads 
− outages in the municipal water supply network 
− a never-completed school building 
− incomplete sewer 
− non-functioning sewage treatment plant 
National regulation 
− reduction of state transfers 
− blocking of personnel turnover 
Difficulties in collecting 
taxes 
− citizens do not pay taxes or pay them late 
− institution’s low responsiveness in limiting tax avoidance 
The impact of the previous 
administrations’ work on 
the current condition of 
the Municipality 
The mismanagement events 
of the period 2000-2006 
− off-budget debts 
− incremental budgeting logic 
− illegitimate spending commitments 
− professional assignments 
− litigations for professional works 
− local procurement of goods and services at exorbitant costs 
− insufficient financial coverage 
− expenditures that are not committed and not relevant to specific budget 
chapters 
− general organisational connivance 
− circumventing the approval process for the formalisation of expenditure by 
the City Council 
− a physical archive that remains inaccessible due to poor management 
− lack of professionalism (of the internal staff) 
− supremacy of some individuals of the bureaucratic machine over politics 
− injunctions/revaluations/injunctions/foreclosures 
First dissolution (1991) 
− predominantly political scandal 
− spoils system 
− requirement of skills for competence 
− fiduciary relationships 
− inadequate management quality 
Computerised procedures 
and controls 
− adoption of SIOPE 
− CONSIP purchasing procedures adopted only a few years ago 
− ineffectiveness of TPPCTs 
− code of conduct 
General level of vocational 
training of the administrative 
staff and tension to learning 
− compartmentalised management 
− passive acceptance of credit protection and recovery legal acts 
− little responsibility and a weak sense of institutions 
− stigmatised bureaucratic fulfilments 
− non-existence of training programmes 
− emptying of managerial roles 
− missed opportunity provided for by the decree-law no. 35/2013 
Local political-
administrative paradigm 
and level of citizens’ 
satisfaction 
Political dynamics 
− political improvisation 
− administrative short-circuit 
− (non-)virtuous governing model 
− vision focused on control rather than service to the citizen 
Image of the Municipality 
− perception of an inefficient administrative machine 
− loss of trust in public institutions 
− PA is no longer a reference point for the local citizens 
 




Complaining about a general inequality in the criteria for allocating national funds to 
local authorities, the Officials highlighted how the contraction of state transfers34 has put in 
“difficulties municipalities that did not have an efficient working system and administrative 
machinery” (Public Official #3, 2019). “Many municipalities are experiencing financial 
distress, but they are able to avoid to declare it” (Public Official #2, 2019). Indeed, like other 
local experiences, politicians and managers “tended to ignore the situation of insolvency” 
(Public Official #1, 2019), but the local government of Cerda continued to receive injunctions 
for non-payment of debts. 
Despite a faltering financial management, the 2015 financial statement, from which the 
failure procedure began, was approved. From then on, a little more than a year later, the 
situation deteriorated to such an extent that the City Council, with the positive opinion of the 
sole Auditor, but with dissenting organisational opinions, could no longer delay and had to 
declare the financial bankruptcy status of the Municipality35. 
As with many other Italian local authorities, “citizens do not pay taxes or pay them late” 
(Public Official #4, 2019). Over the years, indeed, the average tax avoidance has been around 
50% of the overall certified tax credit (Public Official #1, 2019; Public Official #2, 2019) and 
the local Government’s responsiveness in limiting it has been very low, leading to further 
deferrals in collecting what has been owed by local taxpayers. 
From a different point of view, the municipal financial situation would be in balance, 
since the failure to balance incomes and expenditures would mainly be due to the effects of the 
provisions of the harmonised public accounting, which came into force in 2016. In particular, 
“the Cerda case is atypical and, as such, avoidable” (Public Official #2, 2019), since it would 
seem that there is no accounting imbalance, but only a cash one, caused by the Municipality’s 
inability to collect outstanding assets, replenish treasury and, thus, pay its debts off. 
Moreover, the restrictions imposed by the harmonised public accounting on the use of 
administrative surpluses, to be set aside to the credit fund of doubtful chargeability (FCDE) to 
 
34 The reference is to the provisions of the so-called ‘Calderoli’s Law’ of 5 May 2009, no. 42, published in the 
Italian Official Journal no. 103 of 06-05-2009, in the implementation of the amendments to the art. 119 of the 
Italian Constitution by the Constitutional Law of 18-10-2001, no. 3, published in the Italian Official Journal no. 
248 of 24-10-2001 − i.e., the so-called ‘Title V reform’. 
35 The case of financial distress of the Municipality of Cerda can be traced back to the hypothesis referred to the 
art. 2, paragraph 2, letter c, of the d.P.R. 24 August 1993, no. 378, published in the Italian Official Journal no. 
227 of 27-09-1993. Cf. the resolution no. 165/2016/PRSP of the regional control Section for the Sicilian Region 
of the Italian Court of Auditors. 




cover tax credits that are difficult to collect36, have reduced the Municipality’s spending 
capacity, hence causing its operational inertia. 
Finally, the aggravation of the debt exposure due to what emerges from the judgments 
seems to have had a lesser impact on the Municipality’s insolvency than the bad administration 
due to apathy, unpreparedness and excessive workload (Public Official #2, 2019). 
 
5.5.2 Theme 2: The impact of the previous administrations’ work on the current condition of 
the Municipality 
The general opinion is that the years in which the second dissolution for mafia infiltration 
occurred had a limited impact on the current situation of the Municipality. In particular, 
 
“past administrations created significant budget holes for the assignment of public 
works due to a lack of funds. It was essentially an accounting problem, but there was 
general connivance with such mechanisms” (Public Official #4, 2019). 
 
Albeit “only part of them related to illegitimate spending” (Public Official #2, 2019), 
since the 1990s, the logic of incremental budgeting37 has been politically encouraged within 
the local Government (Public Official #3, 2019). At least until the introduction of harmonised 
public accounting, the accrual basis of accounting system and a greater availability of state 
transfers allowed the Municipality to commission professional assignments – design works in 
particular – with a formal spending commitment lower than the actual burden. 
 
“The completion of the work took place when, with a reallocation of funds, transfers 
could compensate for the full amount of the expenditure. In such a way, off-budget 
debts could arise without any particular concern about the availability of the related 
coverage that, sooner or later, the public Body would have obtained. Having missed 
this opportunity, as a result of the contraction of the sums transferred by the State, the 
permanence of that logic has gradually reduced the level of solvency of the 
Municipality and generated several disputes for professional works which were carried 
 
36 According to Annex 4/1 of the legislative decree no. 118/2011, “The determination of FCDE, in management 
statement, is governed by the applied accounting principle concerning with financial accounting in paragraph 
3.3”, which sets forth that “The dubious and difficult-to-collect incomes are also assessed for the entire amount 
of the credit [...] and they are counted to the year in which the tax roll is issued and a reserve to the credit fund of 
dubious collectability is carried out, constraining for this purpose a share of the administrative surplus”. In other 
terms, for each administrative exercise, this fund inhibits the use of dubious or difficult incomes to cover expenses 
incurred in that financial year. 
37 The incremental budgeting is typical of the Old Public Administration paradigm. See Chapter 4. 




out but not regularised. Indeed, the latter highlight design assignments, without or with 
insufficient financial coverage, from which certain debts derived” (Public Official #5, 
2019). 
 
Prior to the introduction of the SIOPE38 in 2008, 
 
“drawing from resources already allocated in specific budget chapters to cover 
expenditure that were not committed and not relevant to those same chapters, or 
committing more than there was available, did not encounter insurmountable 
difficulties. This was done by circumventing the approval process for the formalisation 
of expenditure by the City Council” (Public Official #4, 2019). 
 
These procedures were facilitated by inadequate record management such that, 
nowadays, “the Municipality has a physical archive that remains inaccessible due to poor 
management” (Public Official #1, 2019). As a result, 
 
“the accounting documents relating to the behaviours of maladministration were not 
available and this made everything blurred and illegible, such as to slow down the 





“purchase procedures in Consip39 were introduced only a few years ago in the 
Municipality. In the past, procurement of goods and services was carried out 
exclusively locally and at exorbitant costs. There were no rotations in either invitations 
or direct assignments in procurement procedures [… also,] reworks due to incomplete 
 
38 “SIOPE (Information System of Public Government Operations) was carried out on the basis of an agreement 
between the General Accountancy of the State and the Bank of Italy, with the aim of making available an archive 
of information concerning the receipts and payments of public administrations.” Cf. SIOPE; Sistema Informativo 
delle Operazioni degli Enti Pubblici [Informative System of the Operations of Public Bodies]; 
https://www.siope.it/Siope/; November 5, 2020. 
39 “Consip is a joint stock company, 100% owned by the Italian Ministry of Economy and Finance, which operates 
– according to the strategic guidelines defined by the Shareholder – in the exclusive service of the Public 
Administration. Its mission is about making the use of public resources more efficient and transparent, providing 
administrations with tools and expertise to manage their purchases and stimulating companies to compete with 
the public system”. Cf. Consip; Consip official website; https://www.consip.it/azienda/chi-siamo; November 30, 
2020. 




or deficient interventions have generated debt upon debt, thus preventing some 
municipal Offices from planning their activities” (Public Official #4, 2019). 
 
As a result, the local community has suffered several infrastructure deficiencies and 
disruptions, such as “potholes, devastated country roads, disruptions in the municipal water 
supply  network” (Public Official #1, 2019), “a never-completed school building, an 
incomplete sewer and a sewage treatment plant, to date, not functioning” (Public Official #5, 
2019). 
The 1990s were also significant for the reverberations on the bureaucratic machine of 
the political scandal, linked to the local organised crime, which led to the first dissolution for 
mafia infiltrations of the City Council in 199140. In those years, there was a strong cultural 
attachment to the consideration of the PA as a guarantor of social welfare, and this favourited 
the adoption of political patronage (Public Official #3, 2019). 
The public Body has increasingly suffered “a lack of professionalism due to the 
emptying of managerial roles linked to retirements and the blocking of personnel turnover 
resulting from national reforms” (Public Official #5, 2019), which established some restrictions 
to fill vacancies in local governments41. Due to redundancies in the administrative staff 
descending from that modus operandi, the local politics had to “cover certain senior positions 
by using the ‘spoils system’ mechanism and appointing those who were already available in 
the staff” (Public Official #5, 2019). 
As in many other local realities, the result was that 
 
“certain roles were occupied without any requirement of skills for competence. Some 
civil servants were inadequate, as they were not legitimised by meritocracy, but by the 
pleasure of politics because of trust-type relationships” (Public Official #5, 2019). 
 
The lack of a capable ruling class created fertile ground for the events that occurred in 
the 2000s, since: 
 
 
40 See the provision of the first dissolution of the Cerda Municipality issued with d.P.R. 30 September 1991, 
published in the Italian Official Journal no. 231 of 02-10-1991. 
41 For the regional and local governments, the regulatory evolution on this topic moved through: the law 27 
December 2006, no. 296, published in the Italian Official Journal no. 299 of 27-12-2006; the decree-law 24 June 
2014, no. 90, published in the Italian Official Journal no. 144 of 24-06-2014; and the law 28 December 2015, no. 
208, published in the Italian Official Journal no. 302 of 30-12-2015. 




“Some elements of the bureaucratic machine were able to acquire positions of concrete 
supremacy in decision-making, even compared to the political class of the time, by 
virtue of the well-established presence in the local government” (Public Official #5, 
2019). 
 
Hence, the Municipality returned to its old schemes, suffering a “significant lack of 
internal controls” (Public Official #3, 2019), inadequate management quality and watertight 
compartment management (Public Official #5, 2019). Also, the insufficient expertise of the 
management and the total non-existence of training programmes seem to have played an 
important role in the financial distress of the local Authority: 
 
“The inertia in verifying the exact amount of its liabilities − at least until an initial 
reconnaissance in 2013 −, mismanagement of the debt exposure, the failure to ascertain 
off-budget debts and the passive acceptance of procedures to protect third-party 
creditor claims, such as injunctions, revaluations, foreclosures and formal notices, have 
led to the Municipality’s insolvency status” (Public Official #5, 2019). 
 
The Administration could have put a brake on the progressive aggravation of its 
financial equilibrium “by preparing an appropriate legal defence on certain debt assumptions 
and exploiting certain financial opportunities for certified debts provided by the decree-law no. 
35/201342” (Public Official #5, 2019). It emerges how there has been a “general lack of sense 
of responsibility and institutions, as well as a poor managerial culture” (Public Official #5, 
2019) that have been added to the lack of professionalism, thus generating underperforming 
governance structure over time. 
At this regard, a first effect was the stigmatisation of certain bureaucratic requirements 
and formal duties. Notably, 
 
“public servants are more interested in the proper use of management software 
provided to the PA than in their own purpose; this factor has limited the action of the 
insiders to the margins of manoeuvre dictated by the same software” (Public Official 
#4, 2019). 
 
42 Cf. the decree-law 8 April 2013, no. 35, published in the Italian Official Journal no. 82 of 08-04-2013, bearing 
“Urgent provisions for payment of overdue debts of public administration, for financial rebalancing of local 
authorities, as well as for payment of taxes of local authorities. Provisions for the renewal of the Presidency 
Council of Tax Court”, and converted into the law 6 June 2013, no. 64, published in the Italian Official Journal 
no. 132 of 07-06-2013. 




Secondly, even though the local Government has a formal code of organisational 
conduct, it seems difficult to carry internal controls out in practice, since 
 
“some civil servants have total rejection and distrust of these kinds of tools. Besides, 
personal relations with colleagues may slow down any possible reporting to the 
relevant Authorities. The most recent law43 imposed the formulation of the Triennial 
Plans for the Prevention of Corruption and Transparency (TPPCTs), which mainly 
implies formal internal controls of the organisational system through a post-facto 
evaluation. As a result, they are not completely effective” (Public Official #4, 2019). 
 
5.5.3 Theme 3:  Local political-administrative paradigm and level of citizen satisfaction 
Despite the significant levels of tax evasion, the prevailing perception of the local citizens is 
that “PA is run by incompetent civil servants” (Public Official #2, 2019). Such a culture, 
combined with a greater proximity to the territory, has exacerbated the poor perception of the 
local Government by the community. 
 
“A vision focused on control rather than service to citizens, but also a certain degree 
of political improvisation, have resulted in an administrative short-circuit at the 
expense of a virtuous governing model” (Public Official #3, 2019) 
 
which has finally impacted on the economic and financial equilibrium of the 
Municipality. As a result, 
 
“The inability of the Municipality to address the needs of the community and the 
perception of an inefficient administrative machine have led to the disconnection of 
citizens from the political life and the actual problems of the territory, as well as to the 
loss of trust in public institutions” (Public Official #4, 2019). 
 
As pointed out by the Public Official #3 (2019) and the Public Official #4 (2019), a 
sound PA should approach the served community through a broad involvement of its 
stakeholders in the formulation of local policies and the creation of a strong, stable and 
widespread sense of institutions. Indeed, unlike the 1980s, “the local PA is no longer a 
reference point for citizens, but an obstacle to overcome” (Public Official #4, 2019). 
 
43 Cf. the legislative decree 14 March 2013, no. 33, published in the Italian Official Journal no. 80 of 05-04-2013. 




5.6 Finding a matching between wrongdoings and bankruptcy in the retrieved data 
The relationship between mismanagement and the current crisis of the Municipality of Cerda 
is reflected by four main sources: 
- the City Council’s deliberation of financial distress; 
- the report of the auditing Board; 
- the judgments; 
- the interviews with the five Public Officials. 
Noting that the first two do not show an in-depth analysis of the substantial causes that 
generated the financial insolvency and that the judgments delve into the context from which 
the facts considered crimes were born, this paragraph places particular emphasis on the 
interviews conducted during the fieldwork in the summer of 2019. 
It is possible to highlight a pattern being common to all interviews. In particular, during 
the first phase, in which the Public Officials were free to express themselves on the financial 
distress of the Municipality, their narratives focused on the primary causes being exogenous to 
the organisation, due to the ease that relates them to their formal causes. That confirmed their 
general tendency to ascribe the financial instability of the Municipality, on the one hand, to the 
considerable non-compliance by citizens with the payment of local taxes and, on the other 
hand, to the introduction of harmonised public accounting. 
However, in the second part, the respondents, thanks to the probing questions aimed at 
deepening the existence of endogenous primary causes, ended up admitting, almost 
spontaneously and although each to a different extent, the origin of the formal causes in the 
inadequate management that has protracted over time. 
Firstly, it should be pointed out that the entry into force of the harmonised public 
accounting, rather than to be one of the causes, highlighted a modus operandi that was not in 
line with the public accounting provisions in force at the time of the investigated events. As 
previously pointed out, the Italian Judiciary was able to detect the recurrence of illicit 
accounting practices, such as false claims concerning financial coverage for local spending and 
payment attributed to budget chapters different from those of relevance that were instead found 
to be insufficient. 
The research also showed a tendency to incur expenditures, the amount of which was 
higher than the actual budgetary commitment, with the burden of covering the excess part with 
resources arising from future transfers from the State. 
That included arbitrary management of public resources in breach of the statutory 
constraint of budget which, together with the considerable delays in approving accounting 




documents, facilitated the use of frequent off-budget practices, sometimes violating the process 
of admitting debts that must be carried out by the City Council44. This has, on the one hand, 
made management of incomes increasingly uncertain and random and, on the other hand, 
increased the debt of the public Body exponentially over time. 
Secondly, the drastic reduction in state transfers revealed the Municipality’s lack of 
financial autonomy caused by the endemic tax evasion, which has never been adequately faced. 
The local Government’s inertia on tax collection has made the budget manoeuvres increasingly 
rigid because of the gradual increase in the FCDE to obviate the certified bad credits by 
constraining a share of administrative surpluses45. It emerges that not only the Municipality 
could not implement public policies to enhance local tax collection, but also that it actually 
employed unavailable administrative surpluses to compensate for the certified bad credits, 
provided that such surpluses also represented an outcome of the mismanagement practices that 
were not in line with the accounting principles in force before 2016, thus generating real 
deficits. 
Therefore, it is clear that the introduction of the harmonised public accounting has, in 
fact, made clear management practices, whose negative effects have reverberated on the 
economic and financial equilibrium of the public Body. Based on the second part of the 
interviews, these practices also gave rise to several legal disputes that, in the medium-long 
term, further increased the Municipality’s outstanding debt. 
The vicious circle highlighted by the five Public Officials is an outcome of the poor 
management that has been made evident by: the absence of planning; the frequent use of out-
of-budget debts; the inappropriate use of spoils system on the basis of fiduciary logics; the lack 
of effective internal communication processes between offices; an organisational inconsistency 
resulting from a short-sighted managerial vision based on watertight compartments; the low 
levels of accountability and sense of the institutions; the inadequate level of transparency of 
political and managerial choices. 
In summary, the prevalence of logics of inappropriate political and directional control 
on the spirit of service to the community disconnected the Municipality of Cerda from a 




44 As required by the article no. 194 of the TUEL. See footnote 29 of this chapter. 
45 See footnote 36 of this chapter. 





The sources used here consistently corroborate the existence of some links between past 
pathological management routines and the declaration of financial bankruptcy of Cerda 
Municipality. 
As non-governable primary causes, the change of accounting regime and the 
contraction of state transfers have certainly had the major effect on the Institution's state of 
crisis. Thanks to the use of technical-accounting opportunities, the actual financial condition 
remained hidden until its explicit manifestation in the economic and financial imbalances that, 
ultimately, forced the public Body to formally declare its insolvency status. In fact, together 
with the reduction in state transfers, the entry into force of the harmonised public accounting 
made the financial distress of the Municipality no longer delayed. 
To some extent, the historical causes of the local Authority’s debt plight are attributable 
to practices of mismanagement, some of which were clearly linked to private purposes. 
However, as demonstrated by the Italian Magistrates and according to the interview outputs, 
the cases underlying misconducts showed the unequivocable existence of governance structure 
and cultural proneness to recur to or simply ignore inappropriate expedients for satisfying 
interests diverging from the collective needs. As such, beyond the legal aspects of the 
investigated episodes − which do not fall within the scope of this research work −, ethical, 
economic and social incentives of the system under scrutiny, which dynamically enabled their 
occurrence, deserve attention under the performance management perspective, in order to 
frame and deal with their impacts over time. 
Accordingly, the following parts of this research project deepen the cause-and-effect 
relationships identified in this chapter under a systemic and dynamic point of view of PMSs, 
so as to support the key policy- and decision-makers of the local Government to formulate and 
implement adequate and feasible anti-corruption strategies for the future. However, given the 
representativeness of the case under analysis, the present study is largely valid for several other 






ANALYSING OUTCOMES OF CORRUPTION IN PUBLIC PROCUREMENT 





The case of Cerda is a typical example of how inappropriate management of public resources, 
mainly linked to enabling governance structures and cultural premises, increases local 
governments’ spending and worsens their debt position, thus reducing their capability of delivering 
essential public services in the course of time. Inevitably, the served communities suffer the 
economic losses resulting from the bad administration of collective resources and, under a broader 
point view, miss development opportunities which could have otherwise exploited (Liu et al., 
2017: 681). In fact, the redefinition of expenditure priorities stemming from inappropriate 
practices causes an enormous dispersion of public budgets, the disregard of collective needs and 
the shift of significant part of spending charge onto who cannot have access to the relative goods 
or services privately (Robinson, 2006: XIV). 
In the literature, the relationship between wrongdoings for private benefit in public 
procurement and local government performance has mainly been explored statically through 
efficiency-based proxy measures. The preeminent focus on economic efficiency may have been a 
consequence of the fracture between economic and ethical values in the most widespread 
managerial and academic mindsets, which have favoured the understanding of efficiency as a 
standard excluding any ethical consideration (Borgonovi, Monteduro, & Mussari, 2018: 121). 
Searching for blurred malfeasances by relying on procurement prices, thresholds in public 
contracting, competition degree in tendering, level of public servants’ discretion is unavoidable in 
terms of efficiency and quality of public purchasing (Domberger & Jensen, 1997). Nevertheless, 
statically investigating these elements may abstract data from the process in which it is found, so 
 
1 In compliance with the Copyright Transfer Agreement, submitted by the author on the 1st of February 2021, this 
chapter is based on the article: Gnoffo, S. 2021a. A Dynamic Performance Management Approach to Frame 
Corruption in Public Procurement: A Case-Study. Journal of Public Procurement, 21(1): 75-96. © 2021, Emerald 
Publishing Limited. 
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that its value can change over time, but the relationships under investigation are assumed to remain 
more or less stable over the considered time lapse (Bianchi, 2016: 3). As such, there is a possibility 
that the causes underlying changes of investigated variables may not be linked to corruption, and 
that some others may be disregarded. 
In the light of its complexity and context-dependent features, to fight corruption effectively 
requires even an approximate knowledge of the feedback structure of the investigated problems 
under a dynamic perspective. Also, the use of relevant performance indicators may help local 
public managers to detect possible illicit behaviours and trigger system changes pushing away 
from either extant or potential corrupt practices. 
The prevalent research does not seem to provide any causal and systemic framework of 
possible relationships involving local government performance and wrongdoings in public 
procurement. Exploring the possible underlined dynamic mechanisms of corruption in such a field 
systemically may help policy- and decision-makers to investigate their impacts on the broader 
organisational performance and get an insight into the possible trade-off between change and 
resistance (Schweiger et al., 2018), especially where cultural interventions and better performance 
are needed (Bianchi, 2016: 149). 
Based on the Cerda case, an outcome-based DPM approach (Bianchi, 2016) is here 
proposed to explain the causal relationships between past corruption in public procurement and 
local government performance. With this aim, this chapter makes use of both the results of the 
thematic analysis carried out in the previous chapter and secondary data extrapolated by: the 
official documents of the mentioned judgements; the Municipality’s available budgets and 
financial statements; the ISTAT’s and SIOPE’s open-access repositories; and informal 
conversations with both the municipal staff and the President of the Special Management 
Commission of Cerda Municipality bankruptcy2. 
It is important to bear in mind that, according to the DPM view, outcomes are considered 
as end-results measuring the performance of a given organisation in a synthetic way, and are 
modelled as flows modifying stocks being not purchasable as other strategic endowments of 
resources (Bianchi, 2016: 73). In addition, knowledge about community outcomes of corruption 
may enable policy- and decision-makers to: deploy resources to intervene in risk areas; evaluate 
public sector effectiveness; increase efficiency in procurement budgeting; clearly define 
 
2 Appointed with d.P.R. 16 June 2017. Cf. http://www.comune.cerda.pa.it/cls_componenti.htm. 
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accountabilities of civil servants; and foster institutional trust among citizens (Hatry, 2003: 142-
143). 
Two main sub-questions are here addressed: What are the possible causal relationships 
allowing corruption in public procurement to generate its impacts on local government 
performance? To what extent can an outcome-based dynamic view in performance management 
reduce the causal ambiguity of corruptive phenomena and enhance the endeavour of preventing 
and repressing them? 
After a literature overview of the impacts of procurement corruption on the performance 
of local authorities, based on the analysed case-study, a DPM framework of the relationships 
between corruption and outputs of the procurement process is proposed. Then, the model is 
amplified to depict the process outcomes and how they feedback to the procuring organisation 
over time. The chapter concludes with some policy suggestions tested through model simulation. 
 
6.2 A literature overview of outcomes of corruption in public procurement and 
performance levers at local level 
In this section, a literature overview of the main findings related to the outcomes of public 
procurement corruption on local government performance and the fundamental managerial levers 
to deal with unethical behaviours is provided. International findings were separated from the 
Italian ones, in order to give both a broad and a narrow perspective on the relevant body of 
literature where this research project is actually located. Findings are disparate and multi-faceted, 
so that this section does not pretend to be an exhaustive review of the literature in the public 
management field. 
 
6.2.1 International research findings 
Empirical research works on the impacts of corruption in public procurement on local government 
performance are limited (Basheka, 2009: 1), as country − e.g., Sargiacomo et al. (2015) − and 
cross-country-based studies − e.g., D'Souza and Kaufmann (2013) − prevail. Furthermore, every 
study is logically context-dependent. 
Coherently with what was stated by Robinson (2006: XIV), Basheka et al. (2013) and 
Odeku (2018) argued that procurement corruption in African local governments excludes less-
wealthy people from quality services. Likewise, Basheka et al. (2015) highlighted the threatening 
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nature of wrongdoings in public procurement for poor citizens in Uganda and posited collaborative 
solutions between citizens and local governments through social accountability. 
Previously, Basheka (2009) analysed some forms of malfeasance to investigate their 
negative impacts on the service delivery to Ugandan citizens and emphasised the role played by 
good governance in curbing illicit practices in public procurement for personal advantage. To 
similar conclusions came Fourie (2018), who discussed ethical behaviour in procurement and 
supply chain of local governments in South Africa and its impacts on the citizens’ daily lives, 
pointing out the unsuccess of the regulation on financial management and accountability of 
politicians and municipal staffs. 
Other Authors focused on the role of specific organisational performance levers in 
favouriting or hindering wrongdoings for private gain, disclosing what kinds of impact they may 
produce on particular aspect of public performance and governance. 
Within the PMS field, through a case-study, Kajimbwa (2018) suggested that using 
benchmarking indicators in public procurement in Tanzanian local governments may improve the 
authorities’ accountability. Indeed, as it was found by Basheka and Bisangabasaija (2010), who 
investigated institutional framework and management systems of a Ugandan local government to 
understand their deterministic effect on procurement activity, communication and monitoring and 
evaluation processes have some kind of correlation with relevant unethical practices. 
Tabish and Jha (2012), by means of data retrieved from interviews, verified the existence 
of positive interrelationships between anti-corruption strategies and corruption-free performance 
in Indian public construction projects, emphasising the importance of managers’ leadership, staff’s 
training, law and probability to be caught in setting appropriate anti-corruption efforts fostering 
accountability, transparency, efficiency and quality projects. At this regard, Osei-Tutu, Badu, and 
Owusu-Manu (2010), by exploring corruption practices in procurement of infrastructural projects, 
posited a healthy procurement system for Ghana being able to elicit good governance, efficient 
public expenditure, transparency and accountability. 
Ottou, Baiden, and Nani (2019) adopted a multiple case-study strategy to discover how 
some gaps in record management related to public procurement in Ghana reduced tendering 
process transparency, accountability, integrity and, as a result, fostered corrupt practices. Their 
findings support those of Neupane, Soar, and Vaidya (2014), who suggested the use of e-
procurement to develop adequate anti-corruption strategies, as well as those of Lusuli and Rotich 
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(2014), who posited the significance of using information and communication technologies (ICTs) 
for boosting stakeholder involvement and long-standing relationships with suppliers to improve 
the Kenyan public procurement performance. Just with regard to the relational aspect of the 
procurement process, Sharma, Sengupta, and Panja (2019) identified some risk factors linked to 
social interrelationships among the involved actors. 
Finally, through some interviews, Dza, Gapp, and Fisher (2015) detected the dominance of 
politically-driven decision-making processes in procurement in Africa and the need of 
improvements of public managers’ expertise to get a better involvement in procurement choices, 
so as to enhance their accountability, authority and, therefore, reduce opportunities for corruption. 
Interestingly, the role played by politics in public procurement corruption was also explored by 
Broms, Dahlström, and Fazekas (2019), who pointed out the damaging effects on procurement 
outcomes of poor political competition in Swedish municipalities. 
 
6.2.2 Italian research findings 
The Italian research on public procurement corruption has mainly measured the overall weight of 
the phenomenon at macro level and part of it satisfy the common expectations about the related 
outcomes. For instance, it has been found that, in infrastructural procurements, a higher level of 
corruption is associated with a lower efficiency degree in the executions of public works 
(Finocchiaro Castro, Guccio, & Rizzo, 2014). Research results also support the existence of a 
causal relationship between politicians’ tenure and procurement outcomes, according to which the 
longer the former is the worse detectable outcomes are, because of a progressive collusion with 
local firms (Coviello & Gagliarducci, 2017). 
However, the actual effects of corruption in public procurement are not always clear, 
especially at local level. If, on the one hand, high complexity of projects and low institutional 
quality degree imply longer delays in work executions, a higher probability for local businesses to 
obtain contracts and a greater preference for direct negotiations, on the other hand, project 
complexity itself might even be more significant in contexts with low corruption risk (Baldi, 
Bottasso, Conti, & Piccardo, 2016). Moreover, as it was pointed out in Chapter 3, lower efficiency 
of procurements may not only be related to abuses, misuses or omissions of public office, but also 
to other objective causes linked, for instance, to regulatory burden, which may increase the average 
procurement price (Kelman, 1990, 2005). Actually, Bandiera et al. (2009: 1304) came to the 
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conclusion that Italian public authorities incur a high procurement cost in purchasing standard 
goods mainly because of waste excluding any private advantage for civil servants. 
The distinction between ‘active’ and ‘passive’ waste (Bandiera et al., 2009) demonstrated 
its usefulness in other studies. Notably, Cavalieri et al. (2019: 27-28) analysed the impact of some 
pillars of institutional quality on the efficiency of transportation supplies and found that corruption 
and government effectiveness result the main channels routing the effects of the institutional 
quality. Also, Guccio, Lisi, and Rizzo (2019) empirically explored the opposite relationship and 
found that incentives to engage public purchasing officers in corrupt behaviour within Italian 
municipalities increase in presence of poor institutional governance, which generally implies a low 
degree of accountability and, as a result, a scarce performance in public works execution. 
Some other studies emphasised the effects of relevant levers in the procurement process 
and came to surprising conclusions that might support the ideas of Leff (1964) and Huntington 
(1968) about the positive outcomes of corruption. For instance, Coviello, Guglielmo, and Spagnolo 
(2018) estimated the impact of the Italian PAs’ discretion on public procurement in terms of ex 
ante and ex post procurement outcomes. According to the Authors, civil servants’ discretion is not 
always a threat in open auctions, but it may rather allow local governments to overcome costly 
bureaucracy and regulatory burdens through dynamic and informal governance mechanisms, such 
as long-term trust relationships and reputation (2018: 2). Likewise, Finocchiaro Castro et al. 
(2018), by investigating the competition effect on public contracts’ efficiency due to corruption, 
unexpectedly found that the greater competition is the higher corruption in public works execution 
becomes. 
Based on what above, it is possible to state that unforecastable and unidentifiable 
circumstances do not exclude the presence of corruption in spite of desirable procurement settings. 
This requires to develop an in-depth understanding of such a complex phenomenon and of its 
causations in practice on a case-by-case basis (Yin, 2018). 
 
6.3 Problem statement: Debt procurement and corruption 
The case of the Municipality of Cerda was already described in Chapter 5. However, in order to 
better understanding the development of the model, a reference to the problem under analysis and 
further clarifications are actually needed. 
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Cerda Municipality is currently facing a financial distress because of a certified and serious 
financial shortage, which has undermined its capability to deliver the essential local services to the 
households and plan its future action strategically. As the Sole Auditor of Cerda Municipality 
(2017, February) highlighted at the time, reviewing and re-calibrating the overall local expenditure 
system and defining the actual amount of the municipal incomes and debts are the most significant 
issues that the Municipality has faced. 
The outstanding debt of the local Government did not benefit from any financial coverage, 
and derived from both ascertained and potential liabilities related to essential services to the 
community, such as garbage collection, water service, disparate procurements and professional 
design commissions. The mismanagement of liabilities, the passive acceptance of foreclosure 
proceedings, the accumulation of procedural expenditures, interests, monetary re-evaluations, 
legal expenditures, injunctions and formal notices contributed to the current financial situation. In 
addition, delays in the collection of local taxes exacerbated the consequential incapability of the 
Municipality to pay the current expenditures, as well as the further rise of controversies and the 
linked costs (Sole Auditor of Cerda Municipality, 2017, February). 
The debt plight mainly formed during the period 2002-2013 (Sole Auditor of Cerda 
Municipality, 2017, February: 7). Just in the early 2000s, Cerda was overwhelmed by a political 
and administrative scandal concerning “forms of influences by the local organised crime” 3, which 
compromised the good administration of Cerda and caused the dissolution of the City Council in 
2006 for mafia infiltrations. The City Council was already disbanded in the late 1991 because of 
the same motivations4. 
Some years ago, the judicial Authority verified some behaviours concerning the mistaken 
execution of activities linked to procurements, the related negotiations and accounting procedures, 
such as competitive biddings, good purchases and professional assignments. Judgements were 
delivered by the Italian penal Magistrates, which concerned episodes of ideological forgery in 
public act and abuse of office5, and unjustified enrichment of the Municipality connected to 
professional assignments6. Some defendants were exonerated, as either they were judged innocent 
 
3 See. the d.P.R. 12 December 2006, published in the Italian Official Journal no. 301 of 29-12-2006, p. 1. 
4 See the d.P.R. 30 September 1991, published in the Italian Official Journal no. 231 of 02-10-1991. 
5 Cf. Criminal Collegiate Section of the Court of Termini Imerese of 04-05-2011, no. 296/11, procedure no. 757/2007. 
6 Cf. Civil Section of the Court of Termini Imerese of 05-06-2013, no. 291/13, procedure no. 581/2009; of 11-06-
2014, no. 576/14, procedure no. 580/2009; of 11-06-2014, no. 577/14, procedure no. 1225/2009; of 16-03-2015, no. 
253/15, procedure no. 423/2009. 
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or the violation was not prosecutable any more, while some accusations were confirmed in the in-
second-instance judgements and some others were partially reduced7, even though the following 
appeals to the in-third-instance Court were stated inadmissible8. 
Wrongdoings were concerned with several public domains, such as garbage collection, 
construction, maintenance works for educational and urban infrastructures and water supply. In 
particular, the unethical behavior regarded: limitations in tendering participation consisting in the 
complete non-existence of adequate calls for bid, despite they were required by the law by virtue 
of the sizeable amount of the supplies; alterations of the rational succession of procedural acts; 
usage of specific or too vague evaluation criteria to favour some tenderers; anticipated payments 
for neither formally-assigned nor performed public works9. 
Compared to the financial distress of the Municipality, the relevance of those events was 
identified by the Italian Magistrates themselves, who noticed that the investigation conducted by 
the Italian Authorities on the contractual activity of the local administration was in conjunction 
with the inspection activity resulted in the dissolution for mafia-like infiltrations in 200610. At this 
regard, the face-to-face interviews with the five Public Officials discussed in Chapter 5 
corroborated such a relationship. 
Although those episodes sometimes kept out wilful negligence, in line with the broad 
meaning of ‘corruption’ adopted in this research project, they disclosed irresponsible managerial 
practices linked to unlawful acts and the related unjust outcomes11. 
Figure 6.1 and Table 6.1 show the annual and cumulative debt of the insolvency assets that 
was recently certified by the Special Management Commission of Cerda Municipality bankruptcy 
(pers. comm.). 
The level of debt starts to increase between 2006 and 2007 − immediately after the 
dissolution of the City Council −, and it keeps going to grow for the following years. The 
correspondence between these amounts and what it was ascertained by the Sole Auditor of Cerda 
Municipality (2017, February), as well as the period to which most of the debt arose is evident and 
immediate. 
 
7 Cf. Second Penal Section of the Court of Appeal of Palermo of 06-02-2014, no. 592/14, procedure no. 891/2009. 
8 Cf. Supreme Court of Cassation's ordinance of 07-01-2015, procedure no. 891/2009. 
9 Cf. Criminal Collegiate Section of the Court of Termini Imerese of 04-05-2011, no. 296/11, procedure no. 757/2007; 
of 11-05-2012, no. 312/12, procedure no. 891/2009. 
10 Cf. Criminal Collegiate Section of the Court of Termini Imerese of 04-05-2011, no. 296/11, procedure no. 757/2007. 
11 Idem, pp. 57-58. 




Figure 6.1. Accumulation over time (solid line) and trendline (dotted line) of the debt of Cerda Municipality. Source: Gnoffo 
(2021a: 77), based on the non-structured interviews with the Public Officials and the Special Management Commission of Cerda 
Municipality bankruptcy (pers. comm). 
 
Table 6.1. Annual and cumulative certified debt of the insolvency assets. Source: Gnoffo (2021a: 77), based on the non-structured 
interviews with the Public Officials and the Special Management Commission of Cerda Municipality bankruptcy (pers. comm.). 
 
Year Annual debt (in EUR) Cumulative debt (in EUR) 
1991 181,911.18 181,911.18 
1997 56,056.00 237,967.18 
2001 36,155.07 274,122.25 
2002 2,315.20 276,437.45 
2005 14,037.10 290,474.55 
2006 166,305.40 456,779.95 
2007 572,627.26 1,029,407.21 
2010 168,527.09 1,197,934.30 
2011 135,663.36 1,333,597.66 
2012 134,488.01 1,468,085.67 
2013 35,920.98 1,504,006.65 
2014 93,491.53 1,597,498.18 
2015 182,683.88 1,780,182.06 
2016 15,550.46 1,795,732.52 
2017 12,384.00 1,808,116.52 
2019 385,131.78 2,193,248.30 
 
6.4 Framing procurement corruption through DPM: The chart and model findings 
Coherently with the conceptual starting point of the DPM modelling approach, the model-building 
process originates from the main end-result, constituted by the Municipality’s debt, and focuses 
on the typical stages of procurement showed in Chapter 3. The model includes risk performance 







Debts of the insolvency assets
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corruption risk factor that incorporates a parameter of structural conditions of corruption and the 
individualistic probability and weight of specific forms of malfeasances in procurement (Heggstad 
& Frøystad, 2011: 6-7). In formula: 
 
[1] 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑑𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟 𝑖 = (1 − 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑑𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟 𝑖) ∗ 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝑥
′ ′
𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑢𝑚 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒
 
[2] 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝑥′ ′ = 𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 ∗  𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 ′𝑥′ ∗ 𝑊𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡 ′𝑥′ 
 
where: 
- ‘x’ = a specific form of corruption event; 
- ‘i’ = the i-th performance driver given by the comparison between the actual and the desired 
value of a particular procurement-related performance measure; 
- ‘Structural Corruption Conditions’ = a normalised stock variable incorporating social, 
political and cultural factors influencing corruption occurrences; 
- ‘Maximum score of corruption risk range’ = the multiplication between the highest scores of 
likelihood and weight of the scale used to evaluate the risk of corruption occurrence. It 
represents the benchmark of the corruption risk factor. 
Performance drivers, integrated by a corruption risk component, give an indication of the 
extent to which the deployment of strategic resources impacting on specific end-results is 
characterised by gaps between the actual and desired levels of performance that are ascribable to 
corruption. Notably, as the corruption risk factor gradually reaches the maximum range score, the 
possible performance gap is likely to be attributable to corruption, and vice versa. In such a way, 
possible variations of specific outputs and outcomes may be better understood by considering, on 
the one hand, the individualistic proneness to assume corrupt behaviour along the stages of the 
procurement process and, on the other hand, context-specific factors shaping the level of structural 
corruption over time. 
To some extent, the logic underlying the equation [2] is similar to that of probabilistic risk 
assessment (PRA) (Stamatelatos, 2000), according to which undesirable consequences − i.e., 
impacts or weights − of an action, behaviour, activity or process are multiplied by their occurrence 
likelihoods. Indeed, the concept of risk is here referred to uncertain and negative events, and not 
even to positive ones. Also, probabilities and weights are quantified through the civil servants’ 
perceptions of corruption being available in the Municipality’s TPPCTs − see Appendix B. 
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In each phase of the procurement process, the corruption risk is the result of intimate 
decisions of public officials in engaging in corrupt practices or not, after considering the net 
personal advantage obtainable. Indeed, the way to model risk of corruption within a DPM chart, 
here proposed, includes economic, legal and cultural aspects underlying such decisions. 
Below, the feedback structure of performance related to the case-study is described by, 
firstly, stressing on the organisational and individualistic factors enabling corruption opportunities 
along the procurement process and, secondly, on how the process itself contributes to impact on 
structural conditions favouriting corruption, feeding back to the Municipality. That is made 
coherently with the neo-institutional political-administrative approach that explains individuals’ 
expectations on being involved in corrupt practices as a result of the systemic and dynamic features 
of their choices − i.e., multiple interactions with other actors over time −, by including moral 
preferences, economic incentives and social outcomes (Vannucci, 2012: 73). 
 
6.4.1 Post-awarding and awarding phases 
In relation to the investigated case, not all the debt plight derived from illegitimate practices (Public 
Official #2, 2019). Accordingly, the model considers two co-flows of material delays (Sterman, 
2000) depicting both regular and non-regular processes in procurement, based on the relevant 
intermediate-results. In particular, providers’ proposals are processed regularly or irregularly 
based on the risk degrees of each phase; which, therefore, work as sorting rules between the two 
kinds of procurement flow. Hence, ‘Change in Debt Procurement’ depends on how many regular 
and non-regular tenders are awarded, considering the current ‘Procurement Cost’. 
The end-results ‘Change in Debt Procurement’ and ‘Awarding of (non)-regular proposals’ 
are identified as outputs of the post-awarding and awarding phases, respectively. ICTs are here 
considered strategic as they boost organisational transparency and accountability (Klitgaard et al., 
2000: 133; Neupane et al., 2014; Pina et al., 2007) and work as deterrent for offences in record 
management. 
With this respect, in the early 2000s, since there was no computerised system in the 
Municipality and the purchasing procedures in Consip were adopted only a couple of years ago, 
supplies were bought locally at high costs and there were not rotations of companies in the 
awarding procedures (Public Official #4, 2019). Albeit it is quite normal in a small municipality 
with very limited endowment of resources, the overall informative system turned out to be 
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neglected in the local Government. Coherently with the judgements, it meant the existence of an 
inadequate ICT endowment that allowed for non-conforming documental arrangements, issuing 
of orders for payment related to liquidations non-compliant with regular accounting procedures 
and the use of direct purchasing to favourite specific enterprises in public works. 
Therefore, the strategic resource ‘ICT Endowment’, compared to a benchmark represented, 
for instance, by the endowment of a virtuous municipality with the same characteristics, shapes 
the second-level performance driver ‘ICT endowment ratio’, which impacts on two risk ratios – 
i.e., first-level performance drivers – linked to the post-awarding and awarding phases, that is 
‘Accounting and record noncompliance risk ratio’ and ‘Selective awarding risk ratio’ − Loops R1 
and B1, Figure 6.2 and Table 6.2. 
 
 
Figure 6.2. The CLD of the causal relationships of corruption along the procurement process. Source: Author’s elaboration. 
 
6.4.2 Evaluation phase 
A part of the investigated events disclosed particular behaviours linked to the evaluation phase of 
procurement. Despite some procedural steps simultaneously belong to multiple stages, for the sake 
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Table 6.2. Main feedback loops of corruption in the procurement process. Source: Gnoffo (2021a: 84). 
 
The mentioned episodes relate to: lack of certifications of regular execution of works; work 
procurement and payment proposals for public works attributable to the local Administration, 
whose requirements were unfounded12; legitimisation of provisions related to evident and unfair 
patrimonial advantages to specific companies and professionals by means of formal documents 
and acts13; unreliable funding certifications for some executive decisions, which implied payments 
of amounts owed to third parties by the Municipality and, later, resulted in the connected orders 
for payment resulting as assigned to non-relevant budget chapters14; non-formalised contractual 
relationships due to omissions15. 
 
12 Cf. Criminal Collegiate Section of the Court of Termini Imerese of 11-05-2012, no. 312/12, procedure no. 891/2009. 
13 Cf. Criminal Collegiate Section of the Court of Termini Imerese of 04-05-2011, no. 296/11, procedure no. 757/2007. 
14 Cf. Criminal Collegiate Section of the Court of Termini Imerese of 11-05-2012, no. 312/12, procedure no. 891/2009. 
15 Cf. Civil Section of the Court of Termini Imerese of 05-06-2013, no. 291/13, procedure no. 581/2009; of 11-06-
2014, no. 576/14, procedure no. 580/2009; of 11-06-2014, no. 577/14, procedure no. 1225/2009; of 16-03-2015, no. 
253/15, procedure no. 423/2009. 
Causal loop Variables involved Explanation of the loop 
 
Municipality Liquidity→+ ICT 
Endowment→+ ICT endowment ratio→- 
Accounting and record noncompliance risk 
ratio→+ Debt Procurement→- 
Investments in ICTs reduce irregularities in the 
post-awarding phase and debt procurement, and 
vice versa. 
 
Municipality Liquidity→+ ICT 
Endowment→+ ICT endowment ratio→- 
Selective awarding risk ratio→- Regular 
Tenders Agreed→+ Contracts Executed→+ 
Debt Procurement→- 
Investment in ICTs counteract the risk of 
corruption in the awarding phase, increasing the 
regular contracts executed, and vice versa. 
 
Municipality Liquidity→+ Training 
Capacity→+ Trained PEs→+ Trained PEs 
ratio→- Evaluation bias risk ratio→- Regular 
Tenders Accepted→+ Regular Tenders 
Agreed→+ Contracts Executed→+ Debt 
Procurement→- 
Investments in personnel training counteract 
corruption both in the evaluation phase and in the 
following steps, and vice versa. 
 
Municipality Liquidity→+ Training 
Capacity→+ Trained Mgrs→+ Trained Mgrs 
ratio→- Tailored specifications risk ratio→- 
Competing Providers→+ Competition ratio→- 
Procurement Cost→+ Debt Procurement→- 
Investments in managerial training foster 
competition and decrease procurement cost, and 
vice versa (physiological effect of competition). 
 
Municipality Liquidity→+ Training 
Capacity→+ Trained Mgrs→+ Trained Mgrs 
ratio→- Tailored specifications risk ratio→- 
Competing Providers→+ Tenders Received→+ 
Regular Tenders Accepted→+ Regular Tenders 
Agreed→+ Contracts Executed→+ Debt 
Procurement→- 
Investments in managerial training balance 
irregularity in pre-tendering and decision-making, 
fostering competition and counteracting 
irregularities in the following steps (pathological 
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Analogously to the previous phase, the end-result ‘Applying evaluation criteria’ − and, as 
a result, ‘Bypassing evaluation criteria’ − is influenced by the risk to exclude adequate proposals 
during the evaluation phase. 
The level of personnel’s training and integrity has a considerable significance at this stage 
as in the overall procurement process in terms of corruption likelihood (Hauser, 2018; Klitgaard 
et al., 2000; Shick & Weikart, 2009). Accordingly, in applying evaluation criteria, risks of 
competitive disorders in direct assignments, excess of evaluative discretion of bids and evasion of 
assignment rules in public tendering through direct purchasing procedures to favourite specific 
individuals, were influenced by the professionalism level (Public Official #5, 2019) of the 
Municipality’s public employees (PEs) − i.e., ‘Trained PEs ratio’ −, being a second-level 
performance driver linked to individualistic causes of corruption. These process weaknesses are 
measured by the first-level performance driver ‘Evaluation bias risk ratio’ − Loop B2, Figure 6.2 
and Table 6.2. 
 
6.4.3 Pre-tendering and decision-making phases 
Just like in the evaluation stage, in budget execution, evidence of bureaucratic corruption (Søreide, 
2002: 2) can be identified in the pre-tendering and decision-making phases of procurement, which 
usually involve the assessment of existent needs, the consequential definition of purchase 
requirements and the choice of the procedure to adopt (Heggstad & Frøystad, 2011: 3). 
At this stage, managers (Mgrs.) make decisions on how to spend the resources allocated at 
political level during the budget preparation. In relation to the case-study, bidding and purchasing 
procedures suffered from poor competition level as, on the one hand, the lack of procedural 
transparency created barriers to entry and, on the other hand, there were serious record 
management issues and poor administrative controls. In particular, the regulation in force during 
the period when the events occurred required an explorative market sounding involving a variable 
number of possible tenderers16, but no track of the claimed ‘informal tenders’ was actually 
discovered, as no documental evidence existed about them; such that the involved public officials 
 
16 Cf. Law 2 August 2002, no. 7, published in the Official Journal of the Sicilian Region no. 37 of 10-08-2002. 
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proceeded into the most complete arbitrariness with the market soundings and provide pre-selected 
private companies with unfair patrimonial advantages17. 
As it is possible to read from one sentence: 
 
“the resulting scenario, dispiriting in any case, is all too clearly that of a public official that 
to favour a third part, with whom [he/she] clearly had a relationship, in addition to 
familiarity, of hanging out […], abused of [his/her] public office, by violating innumerable 
regulatory requirements, at the fundamental aim to charge the Municipality of the costs of 
a project of a single private interest and anyway not recognised as a public interest, so 
advantaging the private by relieving [him/her] from the related expenditures and allowing 
the [project] realisation”18. 
 
Hence, analogously to the evaluation stage, as intermediate-result linked to individualistic 
causes of corruption at top hierarchical levels, the professionalism degree of Mgrs. − i.e., the 
second-level performance driver ‘Trained Mgrs. ratio’ − affects the first-level performance driver 
‘Tailored specifications risk ratio’, which measures the degree of ‘over-’ or ‘lock-out’ specification 
in the identification and publicization phase of the needs for goods or services (Klitgaard et al., 
2000: 119). This process weakness negatively influences the average number of competing 
tenderers at the early stage of its process − Loops B3, Figure 6.2 and Table 6.2 − and, as a result, 
increases the average cost of supplies, thus undermining the financial stability of the Municipality 
over time. 
Comparing the number of suppliers having access to public tendering with the total number 
of providers within the local area gives rise to the ‘Competition ratio’. This intermediate-result 
negatively affects ‘Change in Procurement Cost’, such that the higher the cost is, the higher the 
‘Debt Procurement’ and the lower the ‘Municipality Liquidity’ will be; and vice versa − see 
Appendix B. This pattern, in turn, influences decisions on investments in HR training − Loop R2, 
Figure 6.2 and Table 6.2 −, other than in ICTs, thus increasing or decreasing the gaps of the 
performance drivers controlling the procurement-related end-results over time. 
 
17 Cf. Criminal Collegiate Section of the Court of Termini Imerese of 04-05-2011, no. 296/11, procedure no. 757/2007; 
of 11-05-2012, no. 312/12, procedure no. 891/2009. 
18 Cf. Criminal Collegiate Section of the Court of Termini Imerese of 11-05-2012, no. 312/12, procedure no. 891/2009, 
pp. 41-42. 
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Figure 6.3 shows the DPM chart of the relationships described above. As it is showed, the 
strategic resource ‘Civic Morality’ represents the discriminant factor of the regular tenderers’ 
individualistic choice to engage in corruption or to be discarded at the evaluation and awarding 
stages19. It is temporarily isolated from the causal relationships, since it is a direct outcome of the 
procurement process itself and a structural component of corruption, as it is argued in the next 
section. 
It emerges how the causal view of DPM and the adoption of adjusted performance drivers 
allow for better identifying the reasons why red-flags may actually change, but any possible 
presence of corruption must also be searched for by framing dynamics underlying the structural 




19 See the model documentation in Appendix B for further details. 








































































































6.4.4 Outcomes of procurement process on structural conditions allowing for corruption 
A set of outcomes stems from the end-results of the procurement process showed in Figure 6.3. 
More precisely, the mentioned events harmed the public trust, the good performance, the neutrality 
of the Municipality and its reputation20.1In turn, those outcomes may have exacerbated the 
structural level of corruption and, as a result, the procurement activity itself. This last link can be 
argued by adapting the Klitgaard and colleagues’ (2000: 123) metaphorical formula to 
conceptualise the stock variable ‘Structural Corruption Conditions’ as follows: 
 
[3] 𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 = 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑙 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 − 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 −
𝑀𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 − 𝐶𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑐 𝑀𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 
 
where ‘Civic Morality’ captures the cultural proneness to accept/adopt or refuse/fight 
corrupt behaviours in the local environment. 
Provided that corrupt behaviour in procurement typically occurs with some degree of 
misalignment from rules and concealment of its underlined practices, stable dominance of process 
regularity could have worked as a deterrent of corruption within the local Government. In the 
model, the degree of organisational compliance, which is measured by the intermediate result 
‘Regularity ratio’, is the result of a path dependence steered by two information sources that are 
generated by internal routines (Bianchi, 2016: 107) and linked to the, more or less, lasting 
personnel’s tendency to act responsibly and lawfully in procurement, namely the ‘Regular’ and 
‘Non-Regular Tenders Reported’ − Loops R3, R4 and R5, Figure 6.4 and Table 6.3; Figure 6.5. 
In other terms, ‘Regularity ratio’ is a performance driver that captures the habitual ‘way-
to-do-things’, namely the extent to which both the compliance with procurement-related 
procedural protocols and administrative law shapes the organisational culture over time, by making 
civil servants more or less prone to either accept/adopt or refuse/fight wrongdoings and, as a result, 
reducing/increasing the overall probability for corrupter and corrupt to be caught. Indeed, corrupt 
practices emerge if the likelihood to be discovered and the sanction are weak, and incentives are 
attractive (Klitgaard et al., 2000: 31). 
At this regard, it is opportune to highlight that ‘Accounting and record noncompliance risk 
ratio’ does not indirectly impact on the ‘Regularity ratio’. This is because the performance driver 
 
20 Cf. Criminal Collegiate Section of the Court of Termini Imerese of 11-05-2012, no. 312/12, procedure no. 891/2009. 




is not strictly referred to the issues of procurement procedures and protocols and does not shape 
the related organisational routine. Coherently with the case-study, it is, instead, referred to the 
mentioned lack of compliance with the in-force public accounting rules and the insufficient 
technological deterrents to wrongdoings in record management, which are relevant at the extent to 
which they are linked to procurement and impact on the Municipality’s solvency degree. 
 
 
Figure 6.4. The CLD of corruption in the procurement process and the related outcomes. Source: Author’s elaboration. 
It is also opportune to highlight that, since ‘Civic Morality’ works as a simple sorting rule 































































































































are not deliberatively emphasised in Figure 6.4 and Table 6.3, but only its relationship with the 
main system outcome, which is represented by ‘Structural Corruption Conditions’. Besides, the 
effect of ‘Civic Morality’ on the overall system is the same both at structural and individualistic 
level, and the CLD only shows the fundamental causal relationships of the case at hand. Thus, the 
most significant feedback loops involving ‘Structural Corruption Conditions’ are here discussed. 
 
Table 6.3. Main feedback loops of corruption outcomes in the procurement process. Source: Gnoffo (2021a: 85). 
Causal loop Variables involved Explanation of the loop 
 
Structural Corruption Conditions→+ Tailored 
specifications risk ratio→- Competing 
Providers→+ Tenders Received→+ Regular 
Tenders Accepted→+ Regularity ratio→- 
Personnel Discretion→+ 
 
Structural proneness to corruption positively 
influences individual causes of wrongdoings in the 
pre-tendering and decision-making phase, thus 
negatively impacting on the regularity of 
organizational routines, which positively affecting 
the personnel’s discretion. 
 
Structural Corruption Conditions→+ 
Evaluation bias risk ratio→- Regular Tenders 
Accepted→+ Regularity ratio→- Personnel 
Discretion→+ 
Structural proneness to corruption positively 
influences individual causes of wrongdoings in the 
evaluation phase, thus negatively impacting on the 
regularity of organizational routines, which 
positively affecting the personnel’s discretion. 
 
Structural Corruption Conditions→+ Selective 
awarding risk ratio→- Regular Tenders 
Agreed→+ Regularity ratio→+ Municipal 
Accountability→- 
Structural conditions allowing for corruption 
positively affect the individual risk of corruption in 
the awarding phase, thus negatively impacting on 
the regularity of organization’s routines and 
accountability. 
 
Structural Corruption Conditions→+ 
Accounting and record noncompliance risk 
ratio→+ Debt Procurement→- Municipality 
Liquidity→+ Training Capacity→+ Trained 
Mgrs & Trained PEs→+ Organizational 
expertise ratio→- Personnel Discretion→+ 
Structural corruption negatively affects the 
Municipality’s expenditure capacity for the 
managers’ and staff’s training, which positively 
influences the organizational synergies of expertise 
and integrity − i.e., subjective deterrent of 
corruption −, thus negatively impacting on the 
personnel’s discretion. 
 
Structural Corruption Conditions→+ 
Accounting and record noncompliance risk 
ratio→+ Debt Procurement→- Municipality 
Liquidity→+ ICT Endowment→+ ICT 
endowment ratio→+ Municipal 
Accountability→- 
Structural corruption negatively affects the 
Municipality’s ICT endowment − i.e., objective 
deterrent of corruption −, which positively 
influences the Municipality’s accountability. 
 
Structural Corruption Conditions→+ … 
Procurement process… →+ Public 
Reworks→+ Public reworks ratio→- 
Perception of Public Services Quality by 
Community→+ Local Institutional Trust→+ 
Civic Morality→- 
Structural corruption, through the procurement 
process, positively affects public reworks that 
negatively impacts on the perception of service 
quality by the community and trust in the local 
government, which positively influence civic 
morality. 
 
Structural Corruption Conditions→- … 
Procurement process… →+ Contract 
Executed→+ Political credibility ratio→+ 
Local Institutional Trust→+ Civic Morality→- 
Structural corruption, through the procurement 
process, negatively influences the number of 
contracts executed, the political credibility in 
designing and implementing public interventions, 
trust in local government and, as a result, the civic 
morality. 
 
Structural Corruption Conditions→+ … 
Procurement process… →+ Public 
Reworks→+ Resource Dispersion Perceived by 
Community→+ Resource dispersion ratio→- 
Civic Morality→- 
Structural corruption conditions, through the 
procurement process, positively affects public 
reworks and the resulting resource dispersion, 
which provokes inefficiencies that negatively 
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As a first stock variable affecting the structural corruption at local level, ‘Personnel 
Discretion’ involves risk of corrupt practices in the event of poor decision-making transparency or 
when decisions are made by one or a few people, especially in presence of consolidated, unethical 
and blurred relationships (Heggstad & Frøystad, 2011: 14). 
Based on that, organisational synergies stemming from civil servants’ expertise and 
integrity, measured by the ‘Organizational expertise ratio’, constitute a subjective deterrent of 
structural corruption, as they: hinder non-legitimate discretion; boost involvement and internal 
watchdogging in both formal and informal decision-making processes; and enable civil servants 
to recognise blurred wrongdoings for private gain in decision-making − Loop R6, Figure 6.4 and 
Table 6.3; 4th layer, Figure 6.5. At this regard, the Municipality has never budgeted training 
programmes, as it is also certified by the ISTAT (2020b) and SIOPE (2020) databases, and this 
implied the lower staff’s capability to recognise and willingness to report possible malfeasances 
in decision-making, thus missing to counteract the general connivance with some inadequate 
practices (Public Official #4, 2019). 
The same can be stated in terms of expenditure in ICTs − and, as a result, the ‘ICT 
endowment ratio’ −, as objective deterrent of structural corruption that positively impacts on the 
public scrutiny degree of the local government action, therefore promoting a greater public 
accountability − Loop R7, Figure 6.4 and Table 6.3; 4th layer, Figure 6.5. Indeed, transparency is 
a condition of accountability (Bauhr & Grimes, 2014: 291), which is intended as an obligation to 
present account of and answer for the accomplishments of its duties to the community (Gray & 
Jenkins, 1986; Kluvers, 2003: 58). 
In the local area of Cerda, public service disruptions have occurred, because of several 
infrastructural problems, such as potholes, devastated country roads, interruptions in communal 
water supply and garbage collection (Public Official #1, 2019; Public Official #4, 2019; Public 
Official #5, 2019). This has led towards a disconnection between the Municipality and its local 
stakeholders (Public Official #3, 2019) due to their consequential perception of public service 
quality − which is a component of the overall government effectiveness (World Bank, 2019b) − 
that has been negatively influenced by repeated reworks in public interventions (Public Official 
#4, 2019) − Loop R8, Figure 6.4 and Table 6.3; 4th layer, Figure 6.5. 
Based on what above, ‘Public reworks ratio’ is a production quality conformity driver 
(Bianchi, 2016: 77) that directly depends on the overall procurement process. The consequential 
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perception of service quality by users have played a significant role in influencing the general trust 
in the local Government − Loop R8, Figure 6.4 and Table 6.3; 3rd layer, Figure 6.5. 
Trust can be either diffuse (March & Olsen, 1989) or specific (Easton, 1965). The former 
is linked to the general believe that pursuing collective interests and aims matters, while the latter 
can be divided into process-related and output-related: if, on the one hand, the output-related trust 
depends on what is obtained by recipients, regardless of the process, on the other hand, the process-
related trust independently grows from the output, but outcomes matter (Christensen & Lægreid, 
2005). At this regard, stakeholders have a specific confidence in the impartiality of the public 
processes, which strongly affects their willingness to accept its outcomes (Letki, 2006; Lind & 
Tyler, 1988; Murphy, 2004; Tyler, 2006). 
Accordingly, the actual number of realised public interventions out of the budgeted ones 
is here considered as a common political lever − and a performance driver as well − to gain public 
consensus (Public Official #3, 2019), by guaranteeing organisational outputs to the served 
community. More precisely, ‘Political credibility ratio’ − Loop R9, Figure 6.4 and Table 6.3; 3rd 
layer, Figure 6.5 − measures the politicians’ capability to design and implement relevant public 
policies able to provide the community with demanded services, as a fundamental component of 
the overall government effectiveness (Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2010). 
In turn, poor citizens’ trust in the Municipality − modelled with the stock variable ‘Local 
Institutional Trust’ − may have reduced taxpayers’ propensity to comply with their fiscal 
obligations, thus exacerbating the overall local tax avoidance (Murphy, 2004) − 2nd layer, Figure 
6.5 − and further making worse the structural Municipality’s insolvency status. 
Overall, this indicates that procurement outputs and outcomes have, therefore, an intrinsic 
content of institutional legitimacy, which is intended the psychological feature of a government to 
be perceived as befitting by who establish some kind of relationship with it (Tyler, 2006: 375). 
Agreeing with irregular contracts does not automatically mean that public works are badly 
executed, since successful public interventions strongly depend on the providers’ consciousness 
of the public duty which they are called for. Hence, provided that civic morality and truthfulness 
become visible within communities as their institutions are more transparent, efficient and stable 
(Letki, 2006: 321), in conjunction with ‘Change in Municipal Accountability’ and ‘Resource 
dispersion ratio’ − Loop R10, Figure 6.4 and Table 6.3 −, ‘Change in Local Institutional Trust’ 
affects ‘Change in Civic Morality’ of the local area − 2nd layer, Figure 6.5. 
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Finally, by including ‘Competition ratio’, ‘Personnel Discretion’, Municipal 
Accountability’ and ‘Civic Morality’ together impact on ‘Change in Structural Corruption 
Conditions’ − 1st layer, Figure 6.5 −, which feeds back to the procurement process as component 
of each of the corruption risk performance drivers − Figures 6.3, 6.4 and 6.5; equation [2] −, thus 
impacting on the financial condition of the public Body. 
Table 6.4 shows the described performance drivers and their individualistic or structural 
dimension, based on whether they are related to individual/group choices or to cultural, political, 
historical and other factors characterising the system. Moreover, the kind of measure, either 
preventive or repressive, they are generally related to is also emphasised, even though they 
contemporary support both diagnostical and interactive management control. However, they may 
further be detailed and tailored based on specific information objectives and data availability. 
 
Table 6.4. Performance drivers linked to corruption in public procurement. Source: Gnoffo (2021a: 88). 
Performance 
driver 
Type Measure Ideal equation 
Trained Mgrs. 
ratio 





(1 - Trained Mgrs. ratio) * (Structural Corruption Conditions * Corruption 
probability in the pre-tendering and decision-making phase * Weight of corruption 








(1 - Trained PEs ratio) * (Structural Corruption Conditions * Corruption probability 
in the evaluation phase * Weight of corruption in the evaluation phase) / Maximum 
score of corruption risk range 
ICT endowment 
ratio 





(1 - ICT endowment ratio) * (Structural Corruption Conditions * Corruption 
probability in the awarding phase * Weight of corruption in the awarding phase) / 






(1 - ICT endowment ratio) * (Structural Corruption Conditions * Corruption 
probability in the post-awarding phase * Weight of corruption in the post-awarding 
phase) / Maximum score of corruption risk range 
Competition 
ratio 
Structural Preventive Competing Providers / Total number of local providers 
Public reworks 
ratio 
Structural Repressive Public Reworks / Contracts Executed 
Political 
credibility ratio 
Structural Preventive Contracts Executed / Public interventions requirement 
Resource 
dispersion ratio 




(Trained PEs + Trained Mgrs) / (High-specialized public positions + Low- and 
medium-specialized public positions) 
Regularity ratio Structural Preventive 
Regular Tenders Reported / (Regular Tenders Reported + Non-Regular Tenders 
Reported) 
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6.5 Probing the cumulative impacts of corruption risks through model simulation 
The SFD of the dynamic hypotheses outlined above is showed in Figure 6.6. The model is divided 
into four sectors: corruption risk sector; procurement process sector; outcomes sector; accounting 
sector. The related equations and documentation are exhibited in the Appendix B. 
In order to probe the impact over time of the identified risk performance drivers on the 
problem at hand, four model simulations are here carried out by cumulatively activating, step by 
step, probabilities and weights of each form of corruption along the procurement process. More 
precisely, four experiments are performed with the following conditions: 
- probability and weight of corruption risk in the 1st phase enabled and zero probability and 
weight in the other phases; 
- probability and weight in the 1st and 2nd phase enabled and zero probability and weight in the 
3rd and 4th phase; 
- probability and weight in the 1st, 2nd and 3rd phase enabled and zero probability and weight 
in the 4th phase; 
- probability and weight enabled in all the phases − i.e., the basic run. 
The model is based on some assumptions, the most important of which are: 
- the execution of regular proposals is always assumed effective and efficient; 
- coherently with the case at hand, procurement is mainly referred to professional assignments, 
in order to guarantee model consistency; 
- proposals are all of the same quality and valued at the same average price; 
- the procurement cost increases when competition is low, and vice versa; 
- the risk ratios of the first-level performance drivers are assumed to be exogenous to the 
model, as they refer to likelihoods and weights that depend on the normal individualistic 
proneness to engage in corrupt practices and the related impacts on the investigated system, 
according to the Municipality’s TPPCTs available in its institutional website; 
- for the sake of simplicity, the stock variable ‘Local Institutional Trust’ − i.e., trust in the local 
Government − is here assumed as a proxy measure of the government stability, by virtue of 
the fact that citizens have faith on the Municipality at the extent to which it is able to deliver 
a good administration, and this requires a local government being able to recover from 
possible executive and political crises. 
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6.5.1 Experiment 1: Enabling risk of corruption at the pre-tendering stage 
Assuming presence of corruption in the pre-tendering and decision-making phase only, the 
‘Tailored specifications risk ratio’ is enabled and the other risk performance drivers are 
deactivated. The most significant effect is the moderate increase in the ‘Procurement Cost’ because 
of a lower competition. The firms having had access to the procurement process win all the 
budgeted assignments. There are not ‘Public Reworks’, since all the agreed contracts are evaluated 
according to correct criteria and awarded regularly. Finally, there is no room for wrongdoings in 
the post-awarding stage. Therefore, ‘Resource dispersion’ just depends on the difference between 
the higher ‘Procurement Cost’ and its average level. It follows that the ‘Regularity ratio’, the 
quality of public services and the ‘Political credibility ratio’ are satisfying for citizens. 
‘Resource dispersion ratio’ results low as the waste related to the higher ‘Procurement 
Cost’ is perceived small compared to the ‘Debt Procurement’, which actually grows due to unfair 
supply prices. At this regard, Lambsdorff (2001a: 6) states that people may perceive low levels of 
corruption by comparing its outcomes to other more pressing problems. It may also be so in the 
case where there are not particular issues and a local administration works successfully. 
Accordingly, especially if the public services quality and political credibility satisfy the citizens’ 
expectations, stakeholders may even justify the resource dispersion by virtue of the incremental 
budgeting practice, which is typical of highly-bureaucratised contexts. In other terms, the echo of 
the inefficiencies caused by corruption is weak to awaken the community stakeholders about 
possible public corruption and overshadows the unsustainability of such governance mechanisms. 
Therefore, the satisfying ‘Local Institutional Trust’, which is only undermined by a low 
level of ‘Organizational expertise ratio’ due to lack of relevant investments, and the acceptable 
‘Resource dispersion’ by community may have guaranteed a level of ‘Civic Morality’ able to 
reduce structural corruption in the local area, even in presence of high ‘Personnel Discretion’ − 
stemming from low organisational expertise − and poor accountability. 
The simulation results of the first experiment are showed in Table 6.5 and Table 6.6, which 
are respectively related to the main stocks and performance drivers. In order to avoid information 
redundancies, the behaviour of ‘Trained Mgrs.’, ‘Trained PEs’, ‘Training Capacity’, ‘ICT 
Endowment’ and ‘Competing Providers’ can be deducted through the related performance drivers 
‘Trained Mgrs. ratio’, ‘Trained PEs ratio’, ICT endowment ratio’ and ‘Competition ratio’, 
respectively. 
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year tender EUR/tender EUR dimensionless 
0 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.0000 17,000.0000 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 6.0000 0.3150 0.5000 0.1000 0.4717 0.4821 
1 106.8115 41.5552 0.3164 8.8711 0.3164 2.0273 0.2227 17,007.9319 1,895.2979 30,533.4468 2,035,260.3564 5.5137 0.3996 0.4924 0.1119 0.4736 0.4823 
2 139.4206 98.7521 0.1001 50.7452 0.1001 18.8961 0.1406 17,057.8623 2,973.8404 336,038.9689 2,732,514.9839 5.6810 0.4400 0.4339 0.1721 0.4772 0.4701 
3 148.6668 130.1941 0.0317 84.3394 0.0317 53.4867 0.0664 17,132.0429 4,439.1743 993,377.7155 2,991,965.2283 5.8848 0.4920 0.3932 0.2035 0.4870 0.4500 
4 150.6372 143.6624 0.0100 95.0763 0.0100 78.7042 0.0278 17,207.5597 9,655.8808 1,524,579.3516 3,129,235.4216 5.9606 0.5588 0.3728 0.2203 0.5015 0.4338 
5 150.4518 148.4326 0.0032 98.4549 0.0032 91.1950 0.0109 17,275.5216 17,310.3590 1,824,575.4571 3,230,771.5879 5.9866 0.6164 0.3684 0.2316 0.5187 0.4228 
6 149.6935 149.5869 0.0010 99.5160 0.0010 96.5659 0.0041 17,335.1506 25,119.2394 1,974,729.2305 3,307,222.6029 5.9955 0.6548 0.3758 0.2407 0.5367 0.4158 
7 148.8281 149.3867 0.0003 99.8487 0.0003 98.7106 0.0015 17,388.0956 32,047.2912 2,046,731.1960 3,358,296.2732 5.9984 0.6752 0.3919 0.2487 0.5538 0.4122 
8 147.9793 148.7341 0.0001 99.9528 0.0001 99.5286 0.0005 17,436.1746 37,992.5555 2,081,593.1427 3,387,041.1391 5.9995 0.6825 0.4140 0.2560 0.5691 0.4111 
9 147.1704 147.9598 0.0000 99.9853 0.0000 99.8311 0.0002 17,480.8289 43,176.9127 2,099,625.2869 3,398,961.6393 5.9998 0.6816 0.4402 0.2628 0.5821 0.4121 
10 146.3982 147.1739 0.0000 99.9954 0.0000 99.9404 0.0001 17,523.0881 47,844.1046 2,110,207.2507 3,399,611.7500 5.9999 0.6758 0.4689 0.2691 0.5927 0.4148 
11 145.6552 146.4070 0.0000 99.9986 0.0000 99.9792 0.0000 17,563.6322 52,174.2101 2,117,508.6782 3,393,418.2606 6.0000 0.6676 0.4990 0.2750 0.6013 0.4188 
12 144.9356 145.6641 0.0000 99.9996 0.0000 99.9928 0.0000 17,602.8621 56,281.0839 2,123,344.0352 3,383,485.6604 6.0000 0.6583 0.5295 0.2806 0.6080 0.4237 
13 144.2363 144.9436 0.0000 99.9999 0.0000 99.9975 0.0000 17,640.9675 60,229.2664 2,128,492.4715 3,371,820.7572 6.0000 0.6488 0.5598 0.2857 0.6131 0.4293 
14 143.5569 144.2439 0.0000 100.0000 0.0000 99.9992 0.0000 17,677.9912 64,050.4067 2,133,283.3302 3,359,644.6536 6.0000 0.6396 0.5895 0.2906 0.6169 0.4353 
15 142.8981 143.5645 0.0000 100.0000 0.0000 99.9997 0.0000 17,713.8836 67,755.4839 2,137,850.6198 3,347,660.4137 6.0000 0.6309 0.6180 0.2951 0.6196 0.4416 
16 142.2620 142.9063 0.0000 100.0000 0.0000 99.9999 0.0000 17,748.5472 71,343.3165 2,142,243.1702 3,336,246.8620 6.0000 0.6229 0.6453 0.2993 0.6215 0.4479 
17 141.6504 142.2708 0.0000 100.0000 0.0000 100.0000 0.0000 17,781.8679 74,806.3603 2,146,472.8582 3,325,587.3070 6.0000 0.6154 0.6712 0.3032 0.6227 0.4541 
18 141.0655 141.6600 0.0000 100.0000 0.0000 100.0000 0.0000 17,813.7369 78,134.5681 2,150,536.2407 3,315,750.8261 6.0000 0.6086 0.6956 0.3069 0.6234 0.4602 
19 140.5090 141.0758 0.0000 100.0000 0.0000 100.0000 0.0000 17,868.4669 81,623.2716 2,154,732.1391 3,306,741.9584 6.0000 0.6024 0.7184 0.3104 0.6237 0.4661 
20 139.9819 140.5197 0.0000 100.0000 0.0000 100.0000 0.0000 17,979.1346 88,525.9462 2,162,515.9459 3,298,530.3982 6.0000 0.5968 0.7397 0.3136 0.6237 0.4717 
21 139.4852 139.9931 0.0000 100.0000 0.0000 100.0000 0.0000 18,104.0529 98,876.3764 2,174,307.4358 2,607,474.6642 6.0000 0.5917 0.7594 0.3166 0.6235 0.4769 
22 139.0189 139.4965 0.0000 100.0000 0.0000 100.0000 0.0000 18,227.7852 110,700.2574 2,188,116.0558 2,384,413.7978 6.0000 0.5871 0.7777 0.3194 0.6229 0.4819 
23 138.5827 139.0302 0.0000 100.0000 0.0000 100.0000 0.0000 18,345.5761 122,725.4898 2,202,447.1378 2,309,847.2903 6.0000 0.5830 0.7945 0.3221 0.6221 0.4866 
24 138.1757 138.5938 0.0000 100.0000 0.0000 100.0000 0.0000 18,456.1370 134,356.6168 2,216,497.7027 2,282,645.6464 6.0000 0.5792 0.8101 0.3246 0.6210 0.4911 
25 137.7966 138.1864 0.0000 100.0000 0.0000 100.0000 0.0000 18,559.3072 145,360.2336 2,229,900.0279 2,270,775.8194 6.0000 0.5758 0.8243 0.3269 0.6198 0.4952 
26 137.4442 137.8069 0.0000 100.0000 0.0000 100.0000 0.0000 18,655.2789 155,665.1363 2,242,510.7811 2,264,070.0290 6.0000 0.5727 0.8374 0.3290 0.6185 0.4991 
27 137.1173 137.4540 0.0000 100.0000 0.0000 100.0000 0.0000 18,744.3427 165,265.8183 2,254,291.2342 2,259,281.5301 6.0000 0.5699 0.8494 0.3310 0.6170 0.5027 
28 136.8145 137.1266 0.0000 100.0000 0.0000 100.0000 0.0000 18,826.8117 174,181.3141 2,267,509.9499 2,255,356.0612 6.0000 0.5674 0.8603 0.3329 0.6156 0.5060 
29 136.5349 136.8234 0.0000 100.0000 0.0000 100.0000 0.0000 18,903.0042 182,439.2454 2,293,981.5184 2,251,935.5415 6.0000 0.5651 0.8703 0.3347 0.6142 0.5091 
30 136.2770 136.5433 0.0000 100.0000 0.0000 100.0000 0.0000 18,973.2417 190,070.2246 2,336,750.4841 2,248,884.4491 6.0000 0.5630 0.8795 0.3363 0.6128 0.5119 
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0 1.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.2000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.5000 0.0100 
1 0.9215 0.0144 0.9047 0.0000 0.2047 0.0000 0.0000 0.9950 0.1099 0.0506 0.9055 0.8765 0.0202 
2 0.8599 0.0251 0.8190 0.0000 0.2148 0.0000 0.0000 0.9850 0.0074 0.0206 0.8211 0.9895 0.1887 
3 0.8057 0.0333 0.7417 0.0000 0.2242 0.0000 0.0000 0.9754 0.0012 0.0063 0.7449 0.9979 0.5345 
4 0.7571 0.0402 0.6718 0.0000 0.2331 0.0000 0.0000 0.9672 0.0004 0.0053 0.6762 0.9994 0.7868 
5 0.7135 0.0462 0.6087 0.0000 0.2413 0.0000 0.0000 0.9602 0.0001 0.0073 0.6140 0.9998 0.9119 
6 0.6740 0.0517 0.5516 0.0000 0.2490 0.0000 0.0000 0.9541 0.0000 0.0100 0.5579 0.9999 0.9656 
7 0.6384 0.0568 0.5001 0.0000 0.2563 0.0000 0.0000 0.9485 0.0000 0.0129 0.5072 1.0000 0.9871 
8 0.6062 0.0617 0.4535 0.0000 0.2630 0.0000 0.0000 0.9433 0.0000 0.0157 0.4613 1.0000 0.9953 
9 0.5771 0.0664 0.4114 0.0000 0.2693 0.0000 0.0000 0.9384 0.0000 0.0182 0.4199 1.0000 0.9983 
10 0.5508 0.0710 0.3734 0.0000 0.2752 0.0000 0.0000 0.9336 0.0000 0.0205 0.3825 1.0000 0.9994 
11 0.5271 0.0755 0.3390 0.0000 0.2807 0.0000 0.0000 0.9290 0.0000 0.0226 0.3486 1.0000 0.9998 
12 0.5056 0.0799 0.3079 0.0000 0.2859 0.0000 0.0000 0.9245 0.0000 0.0246 0.3181 1.0000 0.9999 
13 0.4862 0.0841 0.2799 0.0000 0.2907 0.0000 0.0000 0.9202 0.0000 0.0265 0.2904 1.0000 1.0000 
14 0.4687 0.0882 0.2545 0.0000 0.2952 0.0000 0.0000 0.9160 0.0000 0.0283 0.2655 1.0000 1.0000 
15 0.4528 0.0921 0.2316 0.0000 0.2994 0.0000 0.0000 0.9119 0.0000 0.0300 0.2429 1.0000 1.0000 
16 0.4385 0.0959 0.2108 0.0000 0.3033 0.0000 0.0000 0.9080 0.0000 0.0317 0.2225 1.0000 1.0000 
17 0.4256 0.0994 0.1921 0.0000 0.3070 0.0000 0.0000 0.9042 0.0000 0.0333 0.2041 1.0000 1.0000 
18 0.4139 0.1028 0.1752 0.0000 0.3105 0.0000 0.0000 0.9006 0.0000 0.0348 0.1874 1.0000 1.0000 
19 0.4033 0.1060 0.1599 0.0000 0.3137 0.0000 0.0000 0.8972 0.0000 0.0363 0.1724 1.0000 1.0000 
20 0.3938 0.1090 0.1461 0.0000 0.3167 0.0000 0.0000 0.8941 0.0000 0.0382 0.1588 1.0000 1.0000 
21 0.3851 0.1118 0.1336 0.0000 0.3195 0.0000 0.0000 0.8911 0.0000 0.0415 0.1465 1.0000 1.0000 
22 0.3773 0.1144 0.1223 0.0000 0.3222 0.0000 0.0000 0.8883 0.0000 0.0458 0.1354 1.0000 1.0000 
23 0.3703 0.1168 0.1121 0.0000 0.3246 0.0000 0.0000 0.8857 0.0000 0.0507 0.1254 1.0000 1.0000 
24 0.3639 0.1191 0.1029 0.0000 0.3269 0.0000 0.0000 0.8832 0.0000 0.0557 0.1163 1.0000 1.0000 
25 0.3582 0.1212 0.0946 0.0000 0.3291 0.0000 0.0000 0.8810 0.0000 0.0606 0.1081 1.0000 1.0000 
26 0.3530 0.1231 0.0871 0.0000 0.3311 0.0000 0.0000 0.8789 0.0000 0.0651 0.1007 1.0000 1.0000 
27 0.3483 0.1249 0.0803 0.0000 0.3330 0.0000 0.0000 0.8770 0.0000 0.0693 0.0940 1.0000 1.0000 
28 0.3440 0.1265 0.0741 0.0000 0.3347 0.0000 0.0000 0.8752 0.0000 0.0732 0.0879 1.0000 1.0000 
29 0.3402 0.1280 0.0686 0.0000 0.3364 0.0000 0.0000 0.8735 0.0000 0.0766 0.0825 1.0000 1.0000 
30 0.3367 0.1294 0.0635 0.0000 0.3379 0.0000 0.0000 0.8720 0.0000 0.0792 0.0775 1.0000 1.0000 
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6.5.2 Experiment 2: Enabling risk of corruption at the pre-tendering and evaluation stages 
The ‘Tailored specifications risk ratio’ and ‘Evaluation bias risk ratio’ are the only first-level 
performance drivers enabled. It means that, as in the previous stage, ‘Procurement Cost’ increases 
due to a moderately lower competition and, in addition, submitted tenders can be both regular and 
non-regular, according to the system level of ‘Civic Morality’. Indeed, tenderers may not accept 
to corrupt or to be corrupted in order to continue towards the awarding phase if the alternative is 
to be thrown out from the process. However, the ‘Selective awarding risk ratio’ is null, which 
means that bids being not in line with procurement requirements and bypassing evaluation criteria 
cannot be awarded, thus being discarded. 
By virtue of low entry barriers and a moderate level of noncompliance with evaluation 
criteria, the number of ‘Competing Providers’ is such that all the planned contracts are executed 
and regular, which also implies absence of ‘Public Reworks. This situation still depicts the 
capability of the Municipality to carry all the budgeted public interventions out, thus keeping 
‘Political credibility ratio’ and, as a result, the ‘Local Institutional Trust’ satisfying for citizens. 
Also, as in the previous stage, ‘Resource dispersion ratio’ is low, since the waste related to the 
higher ‘Procurement Cost’ is perceived small compared to the ‘Debt Procurement’ by citizens. 
In comparison to the previous experiment, ‘Organizational expertise ratio’ and ‘ICT 
endowment ratio’ do not vary, but the main difference is that, seeing as corruption also occurs in 
the evaluation stage, ‘Regularity ratio’ − i.e., the measure of the quality of organisational routines 
− is impoverished, thus exacerbating governance mechanisms, increasing the ‘Personnel 
Discretion’ and reducing the ‘Municipal Accountability’. The latter negatively affects ‘Civic 
Morality’, which boosts structural corruption together with slightly lower ‘Competition ratio’ and 
higher ‘Personnel Discretion’ than the previous phase. This process, finally, impacts on ‘Tailored 
specifications risk ratio’ and ‘Evaluation bias risk ratio’ themselves over time. 
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year tender EUR/tender EUR dimensionless 
0 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.0000 17,000.0000 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 6.0000 0.3150 0.5000 0.1000 0.4717 0.4821 
1 106.8115 41.0812 0.5664 8.8114 0.3164 2.0243 0.2227 17,007.9319 1,895.2979 30,481.6251 2,035,260.3564 5.5137 0.3996 0.4925 0.1118 0.4736 0.4823 
2 139.4205 96.3119 1.3818 49.8415 0.1001 18.6568 0.1406 17,057.8633 2,972.2121 331,830.4857 2,732,501.5696 5.6802 0.4399 0.4347 0.1713 0.4772 0.4702 
3 148.6663 125.3808 2.5324 83.7961 0.0317 52.7724 0.0664 17,132.0711 4,402.1168 979,952.0797 2,991,654.3095 5.8844 0.4913 0.3950 0.2020 0.4870 0.4504 
4 150.6345 136.7608 3.5251 94.9044 0.0100 78.2490 0.0278 17,207.7045 9,578.8410 1,514,977.2180 3,128,149.0925 5.9604 0.5575 0.3758 0.2181 0.5013 0.4347 
5 150.4445 139.8033 4.2771 98.4005 0.0032 90.9785 0.0109 17,275.9202 17,246.7587 1,819,426.1076 3,229,231.5989 5.9866 0.6152 0.3724 0.2287 0.5184 0.4241 
6 149.6787 139.4972 4.8324 99.4988 0.0010 96.4744 0.0041 17,335.9561 25,105.2391 1,972,297.4188 3,305,723.5169 5.9954 0.6539 0.3809 0.2370 0.5362 0.4177 
7 148.8032 138.0125 5.2514 99.8432 0.0003 98.6744 0.0015 17,389.4538 32,097.9605 2,045,706.1587 3,357,094.0936 5.9984 0.6746 0.3978 0.2443 0.5532 0.4145 
8 147.9421 136.1896 5.5846 99.9511 0.0001 99.5149 0.0005 17,438.2048 38,114.4510 2,081,263.8197 3,386,179.9323 5.9995 0.6821 0.4207 0.2510 0.5683 0.4139 
9 147.1194 134.3220 5.8686 99.9847 0.0000 99.8260 0.0002 17,483.6125 43,374.4437 2,099,653.4273 3,398,386.5047 5.9998 0.6813 0.4475 0.2572 0.5811 0.4153 
10 146.3326 132.4979 6.1278 99.9953 0.0000 99.9386 0.0001 17,526.6658 48,120.5318 2,110,443.1067 3,399,244.6372 5.9999 0.6756 0.4766 0.2630 0.5916 0.4184 
11 145.5749 130.7367 6.3770 99.9985 0.0000 99.9786 0.0000 17,568.0086 52,531.0413 2,117,888.2050 3,393,190.7683 6.0000 0.6675 0.5070 0.2684 0.6000 0.4226 
12 144.8410 129.0385 6.6240 99.9995 0.0000 99.9926 0.0000 17,608.0146 56,717.7017 2,123,839.1892 3,383,347.4124 6.0000 0.6582 0.5376 0.2734 0.6065 0.4278 
13 144.1282 127.4008 6.8722 99.9999 0.0000 99.9975 0.0000 17,646.8567 60,743.1364 2,129,089.2269 3,371,737.8149 6.0000 0.6488 0.5680 0.2781 0.6114 0.4337 
14 143.4361 125.8229 7.1222 100.0000 0.0000 99.9991 0.0000 17,684.5695 64,637.6481 2,133,972.7294 3,359,595.3082 6.0000 0.6396 0.5976 0.2824 0.6151 0.4399 
15 142.7656 124.3063 7.3730 100.0000 0.0000 99.9997 0.0000 17,721.1023 68,411.5192 2,138,625.5037 3,347,631.2158 6.0000 0.6309 0.6261 0.2864 0.6176 0.4463 
16 142.1186 122.8536 7.6227 100.0000 0.0000 99.9999 0.0000 17,756.3600 72,063.4142 2,143,097.1830 3,336,229.6458 6.0000 0.6229 0.6532 0.2901 0.6193 0.4528 
17 141.4969 121.4678 7.8692 100.0000 0.0000 100.0000 0.0000 17,790.2333 75,586.0019 2,147,400.2451 3,325,577.1782 6.0000 0.6154 0.6789 0.2936 0.6204 0.4592 
18 140.9025 120.1519 8.1106 100.0000 0.0000 100.0000 0.0000 17,822.6185 78,969.6430 2,151,531.8502 3,315,744.8754 6.0000 0.6086 0.7031 0.2968 0.6209 0.4654 
19 140.3371 118.9078 8.3450 100.0000 0.0000 100.0000 0.0000 17,901.8011 83,276.4207 2,156,578.0249 3,306,738.4654 6.0000 0.6024 0.7257 0.2997 0.6211 0.4714 
20 139.8016 117.7367 8.5709 100.0000 0.0000 100.0000 0.0000 18,023.9784 91,753.9716 2,166,123.0533 3,298,528.3489 6.0000 0.5968 0.7467 0.3025 0.6209 0.4771 
21 139.2970 116.6388 8.7879 100.0000 0.0000 100.0000 0.0000 18,153.9794 103,144.1044 2,179,199.4278 2,607,473.4623 6.0000 0.5917 0.7662 0.3050 0.6204 0.4825 
22 138.8231 115.6131 8.9969 100.0000 0.0000 100.0000 0.0000 18,280.7054 115,564.8666 2,193,806.1937 2,384,413.0930 6.0000 0.5871 0.7842 0.3074 0.6197 0.4876 
23 138.3795 114.6571 9.1988 100.0000 0.0000 100.0000 0.0000 18,400.7925 127,957.2022 2,208,644.9096 2,309,846.8771 6.0000 0.5830 0.8008 0.3095 0.6186 0.4925 
24 137.9653 113.7680 9.3941 100.0000 0.0000 100.0000 0.0000 18,513.3974 139,852.1173 2,223,054.7027 2,282,645.4042 6.0000 0.5792 0.8161 0.3116 0.6173 0.4970 
25 137.5793 112.9427 9.5828 100.0000 0.0000 100.0000 0.0000 18,618.4945 151,074.8463 2,236,744.4679 2,270,775.6774 6.0000 0.5758 0.8301 0.3134 0.6158 0.5012 
26 137.2202 112.1778 9.7642 100.0000 0.0000 100.0000 0.0000 18,716.3100 161,578.0921 2,249,607.0836 2,264,069.9457 6.0000 0.5727 0.8430 0.3152 0.6143 0.5052 
27 136.8867 111.4703 9.9378 100.0000 0.0000 100.0000 0.0000 18,807.1392 171,365.0907 2,261,619.4665 2,259,281.4813 6.0000 0.5699 0.8547 0.3168 0.6126 0.5089 
28 136.5778 110.8170 10.1029 100.0000 0.0000 100.0000 0.0000 18,891.2946 180,457.7270 2,281,235.3689 2,255,356.0326 6.0000 0.5674 0.8654 0.3183 0.6110 0.5124 
29 136.2923 110.2151 10.2591 100.0000 0.0000 100.0000 0.0000 18,969.0941 188,884.4743 2,317,190.5536 2,251,935.5248 6.0000 0.5651 0.8752 0.3197 0.6094 0.5155 
30 136.0289 109.6615 10.4057 100.0000 0.0000 100.0000 0.0000 19,040.8579 196,676.1911 2,371,367.0929 2,248,884.4392 6.0000 0.5630 0.8841 0.3209 0.6078 0.5185 
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0 1.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.2000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.5000 0.0100 
1 0.9215 0.0144 0.9047 0.0187 0.2047 0.0000 0.0000 0.9950 0.1100 0.0506 0.9055 0.8735 0.0202 
2 0.8599 0.0251 0.8190 0.0347 0.2148 0.0000 0.0000 0.9850 0.0075 0.0207 0.8211 0.9826 0.1863 
3 0.8057 0.0334 0.7417 0.0474 0.2242 0.0000 0.0000 0.9754 0.0013 0.0064 0.7449 0.9882 0.5274 
4 0.7571 0.0402 0.6718 0.0581 0.2331 0.0000 0.0000 0.9672 0.0004 0.0054 0.6762 0.9869 0.7823 
5 0.7135 0.0463 0.6087 0.0676 0.2413 0.0000 0.0000 0.9601 0.0001 0.0073 0.6140 0.9846 0.9097 
6 0.6740 0.0519 0.5516 0.0763 0.2490 0.0000 0.0000 0.9539 0.0000 0.0100 0.5579 0.9823 0.9647 
7 0.6384 0.0571 0.5001 0.0844 0.2563 0.0000 0.0000 0.9483 0.0000 0.0130 0.5072 0.9803 0.9867 
8 0.6062 0.0621 0.4535 0.0921 0.2630 0.0000 0.0000 0.9430 0.0000 0.0157 0.4613 0.9785 0.9951 
9 0.5771 0.0670 0.4114 0.0995 0.2693 0.0000 0.0000 0.9379 0.0000 0.0183 0.4199 0.9770 0.9983 
10 0.5508 0.0716 0.3734 0.1067 0.2752 0.0000 0.0000 0.9331 0.0000 0.0206 0.3825 0.9756 0.9994 
11 0.5271 0.0762 0.3390 0.1138 0.2807 0.0000 0.0000 0.9284 0.0000 0.0228 0.3486 0.9743 0.9998 
12 0.5056 0.0806 0.3079 0.1206 0.2859 0.0000 0.0000 0.9238 0.0000 0.0248 0.3181 0.9731 0.9999 
13 0.4862 0.0849 0.2799 0.1272 0.2907 0.0000 0.0000 0.9194 0.0000 0.0267 0.2904 0.9719 1.0000 
14 0.4687 0.0891 0.2545 0.1335 0.2952 0.0000 0.0000 0.9151 0.0000 0.0285 0.2655 0.9707 1.0000 
15 0.4528 0.0931 0.2316 0.1396 0.2994 0.0000 0.0000 0.9110 0.0000 0.0303 0.2429 0.9694 1.0000 
16 0.4385 0.0969 0.2108 0.1455 0.3033 0.0000 0.0000 0.9070 0.0000 0.0320 0.2225 0.9682 1.0000 
17 0.4256 0.1005 0.1921 0.1510 0.3070 0.0000 0.0000 0.9032 0.0000 0.0336 0.2041 0.9669 1.0000 
18 0.4139 0.1040 0.1752 0.1563 0.3105 0.0000 0.0000 0.8995 0.0000 0.0352 0.1874 0.9657 1.0000 
19 0.4033 0.1072 0.1599 0.1612 0.3137 0.0000 0.0000 0.8961 0.0000 0.0367 0.1724 0.9645 1.0000 
20 0.3938 0.1103 0.1461 0.1659 0.3167 0.0000 0.0000 0.8929 0.0000 0.0391 0.1588 0.9633 1.0000 
21 0.3851 0.1131 0.1336 0.1702 0.3195 0.0000 0.0000 0.8898 0.0000 0.0429 0.1465 0.9621 1.0000 
22 0.3773 0.1157 0.1223 0.1743 0.3222 0.0000 0.0000 0.8870 0.0000 0.0476 0.1354 0.9610 1.0000 
23 0.3703 0.1182 0.1121 0.1780 0.3246 0.0000 0.0000 0.8843 0.0000 0.0528 0.1254 0.9600 1.0000 
24 0.3639 0.1205 0.1029 0.1815 0.3269 0.0000 0.0000 0.8819 0.0000 0.0579 0.1163 0.9589 1.0000 
25 0.3582 0.1226 0.0946 0.1848 0.3291 0.0000 0.0000 0.8796 0.0000 0.0628 0.1081 0.9579 1.0000 
26 0.3530 0.1246 0.0871 0.1878 0.3311 0.0000 0.0000 0.8774 0.0000 0.0674 0.1007 0.9570 1.0000 
27 0.3483 0.1264 0.0803 0.1906 0.3330 0.0000 0.0000 0.8754 0.0000 0.0717 0.0940 0.9560 1.0000 
28 0.3440 0.1281 0.0741 0.1932 0.3347 0.0000 0.0000 0.8736 0.0000 0.0756 0.0879 0.9551 1.0000 
29 0.3402 0.1297 0.0686 0.1955 0.3364 0.0000 0.0000 0.8719 0.0000 0.0788 0.0825 0.9543 1.0000 
30 0.3367 0.1311 0.0635 0.1977 0.3379 0.0000 0.0000 0.8704 0.0000 0.0812 0.0775 0.9535 1.0000 
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6.5.3 Experiment 3: Enabling risk of corruption at the pre-tendering, evaluation and awarding 
stages 
In this experiment, ‘Tailored specifications risk ratio’, ‘Evaluation bias risk ratio’ and ‘Selective 
awarding risk ratio’ are enabled, but not the ‘Accounting noncompliance risk ratio’. This 
reproduces a slightly worse situation than the previous ones, as there is now the possibility to 
award non-regular tenders. 
Each risk ratio divides tenders between regular and non-regular ones and ‘Civic Morality’ 
acts as a further sorting rule in the 2nd and the 3rd phase, by discarding those proposals that are both 
not compliant with procurement requirements and for which the related tenderers do not want to 
engage in corruption to go ahead with the procurement process. 
In particular, in the evaluation phase, tenderers whose proposals are not in line with supply 
requirements can either accept blurred agreements with civil servants or be discarded. Likewise, 
in the awarding phase, losing regular bidders may decide to either corrupt or be corrupted, thus 
passing through the ‘Award-rigging of regular tenders’ and filling the ‘Non-Regular Tenders 
Agreed’ stock up, according to the ‘Selective awarding risk ratio’ and the actual level of ‘Civic 
Morality’. Finally, even the non-regular proposals carry on along the procurement process 
according to the ‘Selective awarding risk ratio’. 
In such an experiment, competition is nearly at the same level as the two previous ones, 
but, other than in the 2nd phase, the ‘Civic Morality’ now works in the 3rd phase as well, thus 
increasing the rate of discarded tenderers along the overall procurement process. More precisely, 
the ‘Selective awarding ratio’ increases the number of ‘Non-regular Tenders Agreed’ and, 
contemporary, reduces the ‘Regular Tenders Agreed’, increasing the ‘Public Reworks’ needed. 
Since the number of non-regular contracts becomes higher, the role of ‘Civic Morality’ becomes 
more evident as more tenderers are called to make a choice, so that more bids are likely to be 
discarded. Hence, ‘Contracts Executed’ are lower than the budgeted interventions and, therefore, 
‘Debt Procurement’ is insignificantly reduced. This also means a lower ‘Political credibility ratio’. 
Considering that the ‘Procurement Cost’ is higher than its average level and ‘Public 
reworks ratio’ is now positive due to presence of non-regular contracts, ‘Resource dispersion ratio’ 
is more evident. Public reworks mean lower ‘Perception of Public Services Quality by 
Community’ which, together with a low ‘Political credibility’ and ‘Organizational expertise ratio’, 
exacerbates the ‘Local Institutional Trust’, with consequences on tax incomes rate too. 
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The quality of internal routines, namely the ‘Regularity ratio’, is lower than in the previous 
experiment, thus making the ‘Municipality Accountability’ worse and increasing the ‘Personnel 
Discretion’. Since ‘Civic Morality’ deteriorates too, ‘Structural Corruption Conditions’ 
impoverishes as a result, and impacts on the single stages of the procurement process over time. 
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year tender EUR/tender EUR dimensionless 
0 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.0000 17,000.0000 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 6.0000 0.3150 0.5000 0.1000 0.4717 0.4821 
1 106.8115 41.0812 0.5664 7.4466 1.1090 1.9928 0.2795 17,007.9319 2,001.8990 29,957.9962 2,035,261.0728 5.4896 0.3995 0.4929 0.1114 0.4736 0.4823 
2 139.4204 96.3110 1.3824 41.9996 4.3368 17.3661 0.9711 17,057.8690 6,702.4623 308,924.3669 2,732,011.3472 5.4919 0.4380 0.4375 0.1689 0.4769 0.4707 
3 148.6643 125.3714 2.5402 71.8831 6.9583 49.2185 2.3644 17,132.1787 23,036.7334 913,765.6983 2,987,519.5944 5.6288 0.4833 0.4012 0.1971 0.4856 0.4521 
4 150.6247 136.7256 3.5539 82.9881 7.6245 73.8946 3.3085 17,208.2404 48,098.7779 1,429,384.0899 3,116,175.7610 5.6920 0.5413 0.3851 0.2115 0.4981 0.4379 
5 150.4176 139.7215 4.3435 87.2512 7.6180 86.9216 3.6375 17,277.3883 69,847.9305 1,736,053.7611 3,207,839.2517 5.7245 0.5924 0.3841 0.2212 0.5127 0.4289 
6 149.6256 139.3512 4.9495 88.9467 7.4058 92.9208 3.6226 17,338.8500 84,180.7044 1,897,344.7557 3,276,551.8934 5.7467 0.6273 0.3939 0.2292 0.5279 0.4239 
7 148.7174 137.7908 5.4266 89.6005 7.1534 95.4321 3.4651 17,394.1245 92,374.6853 1,976,959.9585 3,323,060.3414 5.7651 0.6465 0.4117 0.2363 0.5423 0.4219 
8 147.8206 135.8875 5.8194 89.8070 6.9224 96.3427 3.2706 17,444.8261 96,831.3620 2,014,504.7863 3,349,830.8966 5.7814 0.6538 0.4348 0.2429 0.5553 0.4222 
9 146.9618 133.9407 6.1602 89.8141 6.7349 96.5547 3.0870 17,492.1990 99,449.7543 2,031,468.7226 3,361,331.1193 5.7955 0.6532 0.4615 0.2491 0.5664 0.4243 
10 146.1409 132.0430 6.4709 89.7307 6.5964 96.4811 2.9326 17,537.1118 101,397.4991 2,038,830.3968 3,362,255.5373 5.8073 0.6479 0.4903 0.2548 0.5756 0.4278 
11 145.3524 130.2165 6.7653 89.6072 6.5049 96.3066 2.8121 17,580.1316 103,293.2244 2,042,011.3643 3,356,503.9103 5.8168 0.6400 0.5202 0.2600 0.5830 0.4324 
12 144.5917 128.4625 7.0514 89.4677 6.4553 96.1120 2.7239 17,621.5949 105,418.5357 2,043,618.5148 3,346,926.5999 5.8240 0.6309 0.5503 0.2649 0.5888 0.4378 
13 143.8564 126.7785 7.3334 89.3246 6.4412 95.9311 2.6641 17,661.6692 107,868.5627 2,044,864.0528 3,335,444.9228 5.8292 0.6214 0.5800 0.2694 0.5933 0.4438 
14 143.1455 125.1630 7.6127 89.1843 6.4564 95.7766 2.6281 17,700.4046 110,642.9654 2,046,277.8249 3,323,279.7703 5.8328 0.6121 0.6090 0.2736 0.5965 0.4500 
15 142.4596 123.6162 7.8892 89.0505 6.4948 95.6518 2.6118 17,737.7781 113,696.8666 2,048,059.4268 3,311,167.9980 5.8349 0.6033 0.6368 0.2774 0.5988 0.4565 
16 141.7998 122.1393 8.1619 88.9251 6.5512 95.5557 2.6112 17,773.7269 116,968.0760 2,050,251.2951 3,299,529.6824 5.8358 0.5949 0.6633 0.2808 0.6003 0.4629 
17 141.1676 120.7342 8.4295 88.8093 6.6212 95.4857 2.6230 17,808.1734 120,391.0991 2,052,823.7429 3,288,585.3322 5.8357 0.5873 0.6884 0.2840 0.6011 0.4693 
18 140.5644 119.4024 8.6905 88.7035 6.7007 95.4385 2.6444 17,861.8917 124,087.4057 2,055,895.1720 3,278,433.5079 5.8349 0.5802 0.7120 0.2869 0.6014 0.4755 
19 139.9912 118.1450 8.9435 88.6079 6.7866 95.4111 2.6730 17,979.2935 131,368.3861 2,062,846.0326 3,269,100.4024 5.8336 0.5738 0.7341 0.2896 0.6014 0.4815 
20 139.4490 116.9623 9.1877 88.5222 6.8765 95.4003 2.7071 18,114.7640 142,650.1358 2,074,477.6149 3,260,570.7264 5.8318 0.5679 0.7546 0.2920 0.6010 0.4872 
21 138.9380 115.8539 9.4235 88.4460 6.9692 95.4037 2.7456 18,250.1017 155,800.5862 2,088,709.0263 2,569,212.7542 5.8296 0.5626 0.7736 0.2942 0.6002 0.4927 
22 138.4580 114.8177 9.6521 88.3790 7.0643 95.4198 2.7879 18,379.6388 169,388.5867 2,103,908.0890 2,345,871.2010 5.8272 0.5578 0.7912 0.2963 0.5990 0.4978 
23 138.0083 113.8512 9.8743 88.3209 7.1615 95.4476 2.8338 18,501.7677 182,731.2334 2,119,179.4603 2,271,048.3445 5.8246 0.5535 0.8074 0.2982 0.5976 0.5027 
24 137.5878 112.9513 10.0900 88.2712 7.2601 95.4863 2.8828 18,616.2039 195,551.3542 2,134,097.3343 2,243,615.7667 5.8218 0.5496 0.8222 0.2999 0.5960 0.5073 
25 137.1953 112.1149 10.2987 88.2295 7.3590 95.5347 2.9341 18,723.0829 207,751.8999 2,148,474.7301 2,231,540.6561 5.8188 0.5460 0.8359 0.3015 0.5942 0.5116 
26 136.8298 111.3389 10.4997 88.1954 7.4572 95.5914 2.9871 18,822.6634 219,306.6010 2,162,232.3884 2,224,655.0568 5.8157 0.5428 0.8484 0.3029 0.5922 0.5157 
27 136.4900 110.6203 10.6923 88.1681 7.5537 95.6549 3.0409 18,915.2374 230,214.3290 2,175,336.0043 2,219,711.7425 5.8125 0.5399 0.8598 0.3042 0.5903 0.5195 
28 136.1748 109.9561 10.8757 88.1470 7.6476 95.7235 3.0947 19,001.1082 240,482.4951 2,187,769.8737 2,215,655.6290 5.8093 0.5373 0.8702 0.3054 0.5883 0.5230 
29 135.8830 109.3433 11.0497 88.1313 7.7380 95.7957 3.1479 19,080.5869 250,122.0984 2,199,527.3360 2,212,127.4341 5.8060 0.5350 0.8797 0.3066 0.5864 0.5263 
30 135.6136 108.7791 11.2138 88.1203 7.8245 95.8699 3.1999 19,153.9928 259,146.7563 2,210,607.9243 2,208,990.0755 5.8029 0.5329 0.8884 0.3076 0.5845 0.5293 
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0 1.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.2000 0.1609 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.5000 0.0100 
1 0.9215 0.0144 0.9047 0.0187 0.2047 0.1600 0.0000 0.9950 0.1403 0.0512 0.9055 0.8641 0.0199 
2 0.8599 0.0251 0.8190 0.0347 0.2148 0.1542 0.0000 0.9850 0.0559 0.0303 0.8211 0.9590 0.1720 
3 0.8057 0.0335 0.7417 0.0476 0.2242 0.1463 0.0000 0.9753 0.0480 0.0230 0.7449 0.9569 0.4808 
4 0.7571 0.0405 0.6718 0.0585 0.2331 0.1401 0.0000 0.9670 0.0448 0.0285 0.6762 0.9537 0.7153 
5 0.7135 0.0469 0.6087 0.0683 0.2413 0.1358 0.0000 0.9598 0.0418 0.0352 0.6140 0.9516 0.8387 
6 0.6740 0.0527 0.5516 0.0774 0.2490 0.1328 0.0000 0.9534 0.0390 0.0405 0.5579 0.9500 0.8967 
7 0.6384 0.0582 0.5001 0.0859 0.2563 0.1309 0.0000 0.9475 0.0363 0.0441 0.5072 0.9487 0.9224 
8 0.6062 0.0634 0.4535 0.0939 0.2630 0.1298 0.0000 0.9420 0.0339 0.0464 0.4613 0.9476 0.9329 
9 0.5771 0.0684 0.4114 0.1017 0.2693 0.1293 0.0000 0.9367 0.0320 0.0479 0.4199 0.9466 0.9366 
10 0.5508 0.0733 0.3734 0.1092 0.2752 0.1294 0.0000 0.9317 0.0304 0.0489 0.3825 0.9455 0.9373 
11 0.5271 0.0780 0.3390 0.1164 0.2807 0.1298 0.0000 0.9268 0.0292 0.0497 0.3486 0.9443 0.9367 
12 0.5056 0.0825 0.3079 0.1234 0.2859 0.1304 0.0000 0.9221 0.0283 0.0506 0.3181 0.9430 0.9356 
13 0.4862 0.0869 0.2799 0.1301 0.2907 0.1313 0.0000 0.9175 0.0278 0.0516 0.2904 0.9416 0.9344 
14 0.4687 0.0912 0.2545 0.1366 0.2952 0.1323 0.0000 0.9131 0.0274 0.0528 0.2655 0.9400 0.9332 
15 0.4528 0.0952 0.2316 0.1428 0.2994 0.1334 0.0000 0.9089 0.0273 0.0541 0.2429 0.9384 0.9322 
16 0.4385 0.0991 0.2108 0.1488 0.3033 0.1345 0.0000 0.9049 0.0273 0.0556 0.2225 0.9366 0.9312 
17 0.4256 0.1028 0.1921 0.1544 0.3070 0.1357 0.0000 0.9010 0.0275 0.0571 0.2041 0.9348 0.9305 
18 0.4139 0.1062 0.1752 0.1597 0.3105 0.1368 0.0000 0.8973 0.0277 0.0587 0.1874 0.9330 0.9298 
19 0.4033 0.1095 0.1599 0.1647 0.3137 0.1379 0.0000 0.8938 0.0280 0.0607 0.1724 0.9311 0.9293 
20 0.3938 0.1126 0.1461 0.1694 0.3167 0.1389 0.0000 0.8906 0.0284 0.0643 0.1588 0.9293 0.9289 
21 0.3851 0.1155 0.1336 0.1738 0.3195 0.1399 0.0000 0.8875 0.0288 0.0692 0.1465 0.9275 0.9285 
22 0.3773 0.1182 0.1223 0.1779 0.3222 0.1408 0.0000 0.8846 0.0292 0.0748 0.1354 0.9257 0.9283 
23 0.3703 0.1207 0.1121 0.1817 0.3246 0.1416 0.0000 0.8819 0.0297 0.0805 0.1254 0.9240 0.9282 
24 0.3639 0.1230 0.1029 0.1853 0.3269 0.1425 0.0000 0.8794 0.0302 0.0862 0.1163 0.9223 0.9281 
25 0.3582 0.1252 0.0946 0.1886 0.3291 0.1432 0.0000 0.8771 0.0307 0.0915 0.1081 0.9206 0.9281 
26 0.3530 0.1272 0.0871 0.1917 0.3311 0.1439 0.0000 0.8749 0.0312 0.0966 0.1007 0.9190 0.9282 
27 0.3483 0.1291 0.0803 0.1945 0.3330 0.1446 0.0000 0.8729 0.0318 0.1013 0.0940 0.9175 0.9283 
28 0.3440 0.1308 0.0741 0.1972 0.3347 0.1452 0.0000 0.8710 0.0323 0.1057 0.0879 0.9160 0.9285 
29 0.3402 0.1324 0.0686 0.1996 0.3364 0.1457 0.0000 0.8693 0.0329 0.1098 0.0825 0.9145 0.9287 
30 0.3367 0.1338 0.0635 0.2018 0.3379 0.1462 0.0000 0.8677 0.0334 0.1136 0.0775 0.9132 0.9290 
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6.5.4 Basic run: Enabling risk of corruption along the overall procurement process 
The explanatory model is now set with all the corruption risks enabled. Figure 6.7 exhibits the 
behaviour over time of the main strategic resources, performance drivers and end-results of the 
explanatory model, which reproduces the decreasingly increase path of the Municipality’s debt 
over the last 30 years exhibited in Figure 6.1. Furthermore, tables 6.11 and 6.12 show the model 
simulation results of the basic run. 
At the beginning, as ‘Debt Procurement’ increases increasingly and, then, decreasingly, the 
‘Municipality Liquidity’ decreasingly increases. Both remain almost steady until 2010 − time 20 
in ‘Financial levels’ box. Between 2000-2006 − i.e., time 10-16 −, period during which the 
investigated events occurred, the local Government's financial status does not signal any anomaly 
and the Municipality results solvent. In 2010, the state transfers begin to decrease according to the 
national austerity regulation, and the solvency margin decreases as well, becoming negative in 
time 2014 − compare ‘Municipality Liquidity’ to ‘Debt Procurement’ in Table 6.11. 
Overall, the non-regular bids are a small part of the overall proposals received, accepted 
and agreed with over the considered time span. This is coherent with the fact that a few identified 
and judged episodes only were actually referred to the Municipality’s debt growth (Public Official 
#2, 2019). Their impact can be understood through the performance driver ‘Regularity ratio’: even 
if high, ‘Regularity ratio’ does not equal its maximum level, and this means the possible existence 
of corruption vulnerabilities in the procurement process. Given this possibility, the lack of 
preventive measures linked to professional and integrity training enabled inappropriate practices, 
either for cultural acceptance or for lack of awareness of the local Authority’s civil servants, which 
impacted on the ‘Personnel Discretion’. The latter starts to grow up decreasingly between time 
2000-2006 − time 10-16, ‘Structural conditions levels’ box. 
More precisely, ‘Personnel Discretion’ becomes higher than ‘Civic Morality’ in time 14 − 
i.e., 2004 −, as a result of the gradual prevalence of the cultural acceptation/ignorance of 
inappropriate practices that allowed for poor governance along the overall procurement process. 
Indeed, the two risk performance drivers ‘Tailored specifications risk ratio’ and ‘Evaluation bias 
risk ratio’ increase decreasingly over the investigated time lapse, as a result of the total neglect of 
individualistic and group professionalism, whose reduction for both executive and non-executive 
charges led to a holistic impoverishment of expertise. 
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year tender EUR/tender EUR dimensionless 
0 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.0000 17,000.0000 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 6.0000 0.3150 0.5000 0.1000 0.4717 0.4821 
1 106.8115 41.0812 0.5664 7.4466 1.1090 1.9928 0.2795 17,007.9319 2,001.8990 31,970.9852 2,035,261.0728 5.4896 0.3995 0.4929 0.1114 0.4736 0.4823 
2 139.4204 96.3110 1.3821 41.9997 4.3357 17.3660 0.9707 17,057.8688 6,701.6441 329,238.2464 2,732,011.3506 5.4919 0.4380 0.4375 0.1689 0.4771 0.4706 
3 148.6644 125.3718 2.5389 71.8834 6.9548 49.2171 2.3624 17,132.1742 23,024.7139 971,463.3972 2,987,519.7992 5.6289 0.4833 0.4012 0.1971 0.4859 0.4520 
4 150.6250 136.7265 3.5516 82.9879 7.6194 73.8913 3.3049 17,208.2237 48,062.4838 1,516,083.4661 3,116,176.8374 5.6922 0.5413 0.3851 0.2115 0.4984 0.4378 
5 150.4182 139.7232 4.3400 87.2504 7.6117 86.9164 3.6327 17,277.3543 69,785.2098 1,837,757.7695 3,207,841.8321 5.7248 0.5924 0.3840 0.2212 0.5131 0.4288 
6 149.6266 139.3538 4.9447 88.9453 7.3984 92.9137 3.6168 17,338.7954 84,094.2957 2,005,400.4418 3,276,555.9227 5.7470 0.6273 0.3939 0.2292 0.5283 0.4238 
7 148.7189 137.7945 5.4203 89.5987 7.1448 95.4233 3.4584 17,394.0461 92,267.2014 2,087,130.5938 3,323,065.2041 5.7655 0.6465 0.4117 0.2363 0.5428 0.4218 
8 147.8225 135.8924 5.8115 89.8049 6.9125 96.3323 3.2631 17,444.7199 96,704.3905 2,125,033.6301 3,349,835.8700 5.7818 0.6538 0.4348 0.2429 0.5558 0.4220 
9 146.9643 133.9468 6.1506 89.8118 6.7238 96.5428 3.0788 17,492.0616 99,304.3413 2,141,815.0341 3,361,335.6297 5.7959 0.6532 0.4615 0.2491 0.5670 0.4241 
10 146.1440 132.0505 6.4596 89.7283 6.5842 96.4679 2.9238 17,536.9407 101,234.5911 2,148,993.7304 3,362,259.2013 5.8078 0.6479 0.4903 0.2548 0.5763 0.4276 
11 145.3562 130.2254 6.7524 89.6046 6.4917 96.2921 2.8027 17,579.9257 103,113.7934 2,152,198.5355 3,356,506.4931 5.8173 0.6400 0.5201 0.2601 0.5837 0.4322 
12 144.5962 128.4728 7.0369 89.4650 6.4411 96.0963 2.7139 17,621.3543 105,223.5079 2,154,088.1884 3,346,927.9716 5.8246 0.6309 0.5503 0.2650 0.5896 0.4376 
13 143.8614 126.7902 7.3173 89.3218 6.4262 95.9143 2.6535 17,661.3946 107,658.6968 2,155,858.9517 3,335,445.0302 5.8298 0.6214 0.5800 0.2695 0.5940 0.4436 
14 143.1511 125.1759 7.5951 89.1813 6.4404 95.7588 2.6171 17,700.0975 110,418.7607 2,157,998.9100 3,323,278.6173 5.8334 0.6121 0.6089 0.2736 0.5973 0.4498 
15 142.4658 123.6303 7.8701 89.0473 6.4780 95.6329 2.6002 17,737.4398 113,458.5226 2,160,659.5927 3,311,165.6288 5.8355 0.6032 0.6368 0.2774 0.5996 0.4562 
16 141.8066 122.1546 8.1414 88.9218 6.5335 95.5357 2.5991 17,773.3585 116,715.4983 2,163,837.6869 3,299,526.1654 5.8365 0.5949 0.6633 0.2809 0.6011 0.4627 
17 141.1749 120.7506 8.4075 88.8058 6.6026 95.4646 2.6103 17,807.7759 120,123.9364 2,167,463.4709 3,288,580.7448 5.8364 0.5873 0.6884 0.2841 0.6020 0.4691 
18 140.5722 119.4199 8.6670 88.6998 6.6812 95.4164 2.6311 17,860.6880 123,794.2439 2,171,620.9837 3,278,427.9243 5.8357 0.5802 0.7120 0.2870 0.6024 0.4753 
19 139.9996 118.1635 8.9185 88.6039 6.7661 95.3878 2.6591 17,977.3151 130,985.9699 2,179,803.5449 3,269,093.8860 5.8344 0.5738 0.7340 0.2896 0.6023 0.4812 
20 139.4578 116.9820 9.1611 88.5179 6.8550 95.3757 2.6924 18,112.4441 142,191.4244 2,192,924.1055 3,260,563.3256 5.8326 0.5679 0.7545 0.2921 0.6020 0.4869 
21 138.9474 115.8746 9.3952 88.4414 6.9465 95.3778 2.7301 18,247.5751 155,286.0683 2,208,788.2781 2,569,204.5090 5.8305 0.5626 0.7736 0.2943 0.6012 0.4924 
22 138.4679 114.8396 9.6218 88.3741 7.0403 95.3924 2.7715 18,376.9410 168,828.2805 2,225,655.6872 2,345,862.1609 5.8282 0.5578 0.7911 0.2964 0.6001 0.4975 
23 138.0188 113.8743 9.8416 88.3155 7.1359 95.4185 2.8163 18,498.8972 182,126.9318 2,242,566.7334 2,271,038.5769 5.8256 0.5535 0.8073 0.2982 0.5988 0.5024 
24 137.5990 112.9759 10.0546 88.2653 7.2326 95.4552 2.8639 18,613.1429 194,900.0623 2,260,725.8039 2,243,605.3445 5.8228 0.5496 0.8222 0.3000 0.5972 0.5070 
25 137.2074 112.1412 10.2604 88.2232 7.3294 95.5012 2.9138 18,719.8066 207,048.1541 2,304,918.9165 2,231,529.6311 5.8199 0.5460 0.8359 0.3015 0.5955 0.5113 
26 136.8427 111.3671 10.4579 88.1884 7.4252 95.5553 2.9650 18,819.1446 218,543.5474 2,380,764.9057 2,224,643.4406 5.8169 0.5428 0.8484 0.3030 0.5937 0.5153 
27 136.5039 110.6508 10.6453 88.1604 7.5181 95.6155 3.0164 18,911.4361 229,381.4710 2,489,445.7821 2,219,699.5664 5.8138 0.5399 0.8598 0.3043 0.5920 0.5191 
28 136.1901 109.9898 10.8204 88.1384 7.6063 95.6795 3.0665 18,996.9346 239,558.6957 2,634,751.5049 2,215,643.1370 5.8107 0.5373 0.8702 0.3055 0.5905 0.5225 
29 135.9004 109.3821 10.9811 88.1213 7.6876 95.7446 3.1137 19,075.8557 249,066.3062 2,821,926.7204 2,212,115.2684 5.8078 0.5350 0.8797 0.3067 0.5891 0.5257 
30 135.6341 108.8257 11.1253 88.1083 7.7604 95.8078 3.1567 19,148.3902 257,890.0576 3,057,418.7688 2,208,979.2965 5.8050 0.5329 0.8884 0.3077 0.5881 0.5285 
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0 1.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.2000 0.1609 0.0672 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.5000 0.0100 
1 0.9215 0.0144 0.9047 0.0187 0.2047 0.1600 0.0669 0.9950 0.1403 0.0480 0.9055 0.8641 0.0199 
2 0.8599 0.0251 0.8190 0.0347 0.2148 0.1542 0.0644 0.9850 0.0559 0.0284 0.8211 0.9590 0.1720 
3 0.8057 0.0335 0.7417 0.0476 0.2242 0.1463 0.0611 0.9753 0.0480 0.0216 0.7449 0.9570 0.4808 
4 0.7571 0.0405 0.6718 0.0585 0.2331 0.1401 0.0585 0.9670 0.0447 0.0268 0.6762 0.9538 0.7153 
5 0.7135 0.0468 0.6087 0.0683 0.2413 0.1357 0.0567 0.9598 0.0418 0.0332 0.6140 0.9516 0.8387 
6 0.6740 0.0527 0.5516 0.0774 0.2490 0.1328 0.0555 0.9534 0.0389 0.0382 0.5579 0.9500 0.8967 
7 0.6384 0.0581 0.5001 0.0858 0.2563 0.1309 0.0547 0.9475 0.0362 0.0417 0.5072 0.9488 0.9223 
8 0.6062 0.0634 0.4535 0.0939 0.2630 0.1298 0.0542 0.9420 0.0339 0.0439 0.4613 0.9477 0.9329 
9 0.5771 0.0684 0.4114 0.1016 0.2693 0.1293 0.0540 0.9367 0.0319 0.0453 0.4199 0.9466 0.9366 
10 0.5508 0.0732 0.3734 0.1091 0.2752 0.1293 0.0540 0.9317 0.0303 0.0463 0.3825 0.9456 0.9373 
11 0.5271 0.0779 0.3390 0.1163 0.2807 0.1297 0.0542 0.9268 0.0291 0.0471 0.3486 0.9444 0.9367 
12 0.5056 0.0825 0.3079 0.1233 0.2859 0.1304 0.0545 0.9221 0.0282 0.0479 0.3181 0.9431 0.9356 
13 0.4862 0.0869 0.2799 0.1301 0.2907 0.1313 0.0548 0.9176 0.0277 0.0489 0.2904 0.9417 0.9343 
14 0.4687 0.0911 0.2545 0.1365 0.2952 0.1323 0.0553 0.9132 0.0273 0.0500 0.2655 0.9402 0.9332 
15 0.4528 0.0952 0.2316 0.1428 0.2994 0.1334 0.0557 0.9090 0.0272 0.0512 0.2429 0.9385 0.9321 
16 0.4385 0.0990 0.2108 0.1487 0.3033 0.1345 0.0562 0.9049 0.0272 0.0525 0.2225 0.9368 0.9312 
17 0.4256 0.1027 0.1921 0.1543 0.3070 0.1356 0.0567 0.9010 0.0273 0.0540 0.2041 0.9350 0.9304 
18 0.4139 0.1062 0.1752 0.1596 0.3105 0.1367 0.0571 0.8974 0.0276 0.0554 0.1874 0.9332 0.9297 
19 0.4033 0.1095 0.1599 0.1646 0.3137 0.1378 0.0576 0.8939 0.0279 0.0574 0.1724 0.9313 0.9292 
20 0.3938 0.1125 0.1461 0.1693 0.3167 0.1388 0.0580 0.8906 0.0282 0.0607 0.1588 0.9295 0.9288 
21 0.3851 0.1154 0.1336 0.1737 0.3195 0.1398 0.0584 0.8875 0.0286 0.0652 0.1465 0.9277 0.9284 
22 0.3773 0.1181 0.1223 0.1778 0.3222 0.1407 0.0588 0.8847 0.0291 0.0705 0.1354 0.9260 0.9282 
23 0.3703 0.1206 0.1121 0.1816 0.3246 0.1416 0.0591 0.8820 0.0295 0.0759 0.1254 0.9242 0.9280 
24 0.3639 0.1229 0.1029 0.1852 0.3269 0.1424 0.0595 0.8795 0.0300 0.0812 0.1163 0.9226 0.9280 
25 0.3582 0.1251 0.0946 0.1885 0.3291 0.1431 0.0598 0.8771 0.0305 0.0859 0.1081 0.9209 0.9280 
26 0.3530 0.1271 0.0871 0.1916 0.3311 0.1438 0.0601 0.8750 0.0310 0.0893 0.1007 0.9193 0.9280 
27 0.3483 0.1290 0.0803 0.1944 0.3330 0.1444 0.0604 0.8730 0.0315 0.0913 0.0940 0.9178 0.9282 
28 0.3440 0.1307 0.0741 0.1970 0.3347 0.1450 0.0606 0.8711 0.0320 0.0916 0.0879 0.9163 0.9283 
29 0.3402 0.1322 0.0686 0.1994 0.3364 0.1455 0.0608 0.8694 0.0325 0.0903 0.0825 0.9149 0.9285 
30 0.3367 0.1336 0.0635 0.2015 0.3379 0.1460 0.0610 0.8678 0.0329 0.0876 0.0775 0.9137 0.9288 
 
Analysing Outcomes of Corruption in Public Procurement through Dynamic Performance Management 
151 
 
As such, ‘Personnel Discretion’ represents the main component that exacerbates the 
general conditions for structural corruption. In addition, ‘Organisational expertise ratio’ affects the 
‘Local Institutional Trust’, with important consequences on tax incomes and ‘Civic Morality’. In 
particular, despite an almost sufficient service quality, ‘Local Institutional Trust’ decreasingly 
decreases between 2000-2006 − time 10-16, correspondent box − due to bad citizens’ perception 
of civil servants’ skills for competence. 
On the other hand, the positive effect of the 'Municipal Accountability' on ‘Civic Morality’ 
is not significant, because of the lack of investments in ICTs. Coherently with what emerged in 
Chapter 5, the structural dearth of ICTs makes ‘Municipal Accountability’ low, and blurred and 
not-detectable relevant accounting and record management irregularities possible. These 
anomalies work as catalysts of the Municipality’s financial plight through the rise of out-of-budget 
debts. As such, in the model simulation, they generate an expansive effect on ‘Debt Procurement’, 
which is the most deleterious effect of corrupt practices on the overall system. Indeed, as the 3rd 
experiment shows, by activating the risks of corruption in the first three procurement stages only, 
‘Debt Procurement’ grows more slowly than in the basic run, such that the gap with ‘Municipality 
Liquidity’ − i.e., ‘Solvency margin’ − remains positive over the considered run time. 
In relation to the previous three experiments, this additional effect makes the people’s 
perception of resource waste and the related impact on ‘Civic Morality’ less serious − i.e., lower 
‘Resource dispersion ratio’ − for the echoes of incremental budgeting practices explained in 
section 6.5.1. However, the ‘Political credibility ratio’ does not benefit from it, since debts increase 
without parallel public interventions. 
The model is simplistic, as it is not possible to exactly determine the moment when these 
dynamics of cultural change actually started. Nevertheless, according to the Public Official #5 
(2019) − see Appendix A −, after the first dissolution in 1991, the municipal administration was 
commissioned for mafia infiltrations and steered by external authorities and professionals. No 
glaring illicit episode actually occurred, by virtue of strict internal controls and a virtuous 
managerial paradigm. This is here modelled as a temporary ‘status quo’ situation in which 
inappropriate behaviours gradually resurfaced due to resilience of the local organised crime’s 
influence in the early 2000s. 
Resuming, the debt plight is the main outcome of the described poor governance 
mechanisms, especially related to accounting and record management. In particular, the reduction 
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of state transfers highlighted the tendency of the local Authority to incur expenditures higher than 
the actual budgetary commitments, hence causing the pathological unpayable debt that has led 
Cerda to declare its instability condition. As argued in Chapter 5, this tendency visibly manifested 
itself with the introduction of the new rules of public accounting in 2016. 
 
6.6 Reducing ambiguity of corruption in procurement by framing ‘civic morality’ 
An outcome-based DPM approach contributes to improve the signalling capability of common 
red-flags and reduce ambiguity of performance measures, so as to better understand the actual 
responsibilities for phase performance and reduce the likelihood to blame officials in charge 
erroneously. 
Integrating the equations [3] and [2] to the [1] opportunely, it results in the following: 
 
[1] 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑑𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟 𝑖 = (1 − 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑑𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟 𝑖) ∗
𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 ∗ 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑥′ ′ ∗ 𝑊𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡′𝑥′
𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑢𝑚 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒
= (1 − 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑑𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟 𝑖) ∗
(𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑙 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛−𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜−𝑀𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦−𝑪𝒊𝒗𝒊𝒄 𝑴𝒐𝒓𝒂𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒚)∗𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑥′ ′∗𝑊𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡′𝑥′
𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑢𝑚 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒
 
 
Framed within the DPM chart, ‘Civic morality’ may be the discriminant factor that better 
explains the possible presence or absence of corruption in the system by isolating its possible 
impacts for each phase. To underpin this statement, a general discussion of what said in the 
previous section is needed.  
As it has been showed, in the case where the pre-tendering phase only is likely to be subject 
to corruption, a lower number of competitors may be involved due to entry restrictions. No other 
weakness is present along the procurement process and this means that, on the one hand, proposals 
are evaluated according to the correct criteria and supply requirements and, on the other hand, 
there are no irregularities at the awarding and the post-awarding stages. As such, the executed 
contracts are all regular and this, in principle, excludes any resource waste due to ‘Public 
Reworks’, but only a partial resource dispersion that may stem from the lower competition in terms 
of ‘Procurement Cost’. Therefore, ‘Perception of Public Service Quality by Community’ is 
satisfying just like the degree of political credibility, positively impacting on the ‘Local 
Institutional Trust’ and, as a result, on tax incomes and ‘Civic Morality’. Nevertheless, despite a 
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high ‘Regularity ratio’, inadequate professionalism and an ineffective ICT system, may negatively 
affect ‘Structural Corruption Conditions’. 
A high ‘Procurement Cost’ exponentially increases ‘Reported Debt Procurement’ and 
reduces the resulting ‘Resource dispersion ratio’, indicating to what extent the community’s 
perception of corrupt practices is overshadowed and justified by a high indebtedness. Indeed, 
incremental budgeting (Hood, 1991) is typically a proxy of political efforts for local communities 
(Public Official #3, 2019) and people cannot discern the extent to which ‘Debt Procurement’ is 
linked to resource waste due to corruption, as it is naturally clandestine. This leads citizens to 
underestimate the real impact of possible malfeasances and, if public services quality is ensured, 
the public spending growth is not checked out by the community, at least until incomes can ensure 
adequate debt coverage. 
In relation to the case at hand, what above outlines the unsustainable decision-making 
pattern of ‘informal tenders’211driven by accepted favouritism practices at local level (Public 
Official #3, 2019), whose outcomes appeared immediately after the reduction of state transfers and 
the introduction of the new rules of cash basis of accounting. Under this point of view, what 
Coviello et al. (2018) stated about the positive effect of discretion to overcome costly bureaucracy 
and regulatory burdens may be justified only if public authorities, on the one hand, do not exceed 
the budgeted expenditure and, on the other hand, guarantee service quality, transparency and 
legitimate civil servants’ discretion. 
Interestingly, when tendering competition is ensured and corruption occurs at the last three 
stages only, evaluation criteria are bypassed and irregular proposals are awarded. This situation 
may be the same as that depicted by Søreide (2002: 4): when several suppliers are involved in a 
public contract assignment, in conditions of high profile of corruption, providers may think that 
their competitors are inclined to pay kickbacks to get a contract, so that they may accept to corrupt 
as well. In some cases, expedients and criminal acts may even configure situations with high 
profile of corruption through the formation of cartels among tenderers (World Bank, 2007: 11). 
Moreover, public officials may obtain kickbacks in the case they accept lower or different quality 
standards with respect to those requested by law (Lambsdorff, 2006: 8). Finally, in case of 
unsatisfying environmental honesty, thanks to a high competition level, resources released by 
 
21 Cf. Criminal Collegiate Section of the Court of Termini Imerese of 04-05-2011, no. 296/11, procedure no. 757/2007; 
of 11-05-2012, no. 312/12, procedure no. 891/2009. 
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reductions in the average cost of procurements may paradoxically leave room for efficient 
corruption opportunities, for instance, by awarding multiple procurements at average market prices 
with amounts that do not exceed budgeted investments. 
It follows that the particular hidden nature of corruption may elude both red-flags and 
common MCSs, actually existing despite no performance exception arises. Specifically, although 
competition may enhance openness and transparency degrees of bidding (Heggstad & Frøystad, 
2011: 3), there is no guarantee on whether or not it is able to ward corruption off. However, high 
competition may allow for a lower procurement prices, political reliability and trust in local 
government, thus curbing tax avoidance, fostering ‘Civic Morality’ and mortifying structural 
corruption. 
In relation to the case where corruption may occur in the first two phases only, some further 
experiments led to simulation results that, even though non-exhibited here as non-relevant in terms 
of basic run, it may be interesting to mention just for the simplicity of the underlying reasoning. 
In such a situation, the involved competitors may be less than the actual local providers and 
irregular proposals may bypass evaluation criteria, according to the level of ‘Civic Morality’. 
However, they might not be awarded, thanks to factors curbing possible corruption opportunities 
at the last stages. 
It means that all the executed contracts may be regular, but less than in the previous 
situation, since irregular proposals are discarded in the awarding phase. In particular, when 
‘Evaluation bias risk ratio’ is enough high, regular ‘Contracts Executed’ may be below the actual 
budgeted interventions, and all of them be regular. This situation depicts an incomplete capability 
of the Municipality to carry the budgeted public interventions out, thus undermining the local 
politicians’ credibility and trust in local government. In other terms, by using the useful distinction 
made by Christensen and Lægreid (2005), the output-related trust may be low despite a good 
perceived service quality that positively impacts on the process-based trust. 
Therefore, despite a poorer quality of organisational routines, the local debt may be covered 
without particular issues, but it may result such as to reduce the community’s perception of 
politicians’ credibility, hence negatively affecting ‘Local Institutional Trust’, ‘Civic Morality’, the 
citizens’ proneness to pay local taxes and, together with low ‘Municipal Accountability’ and high 
‘Personnel Discretion’, boosting ‘Structural Corruption Conditions’. 
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It emerges that a local government may be efficient thanks to the fact that budgeted 
interventions are not completely realised because of corruption at the evaluation stage and, 
paradoxically, the impossibility to award non-regular bids, hence resulting ineffective. Under these 
particular conditions, one may consider a trade-off between fairness and government inertia. 
Obviously, in the reality, the dynamics highlighted above may occur at the same time and 
with different scopes and weights. Overall, keeping under control the main levers of ‘Civic 
Morality’ allows public managers to detect possible cultural alignments to corrupt practices at 
system level, as well as to signal the existence of stable governance mechanisms that provide 
individuals with high economic incentives and low ethical barriers, steered by certainty of 
favourable internal routines and opportunities. As such, disrupting path dependences supporting 
opportunities for corruption is, therefore, feasible by neutralising possible symptoms of 
malfeasances through the ‘cognitive radars’ represented by risk performance drivers. 
In the case of Cerda, the community’s perception of the government stability represents a 
first challenge to win through the promotion of a decisive cultural change, led by local politics, 
towards a sound public management. Indeed, the current situation of financial distress call for a 
substantial intervention in the administrative apparatus to enhance internal communication and 
routines. In particular, the Municipality requires adequate investments in ICTs and HR training 
aimed at guaranteeing a continuous information-sharing flow and strengthening the civil servants’ 
expertise, accountability and, ultimately, ethics, thus creating physiological internal routines able 
to avert individualistic and structural likelihoods of corruption in procurement. 
Pervasive managerial culture plays a fundamental role. Although politicians and public 
managers are fundamental to boost supportive organisational climate and mutual control, 
encouragement to a broader inclusiveness of the personnel should be incentivised, in order to 
maintain a physiological degree of discretion and decision-making autonomy based on self-
knowledge about the negative outcomes of procurement corruption. 
 
6.7 Fostering professionalism and e-procurement: A policy suggestion 
In principle, environments being culturally susceptible to inappropriate practices and historically 
characterised by social scourges, such as organised crime, are not necessarily doomed to suffer as 
a result of unfavourable heritage. In other terms, it is absolutely false to claim that corruption and 
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the belief that it cannot be subdue are unavoidable in specific cultural legacies (Ferrante & 
Vannucci, 2017: 17). 
Restoring a physiological economic and financial equilibrium in the local Body is just the 
final step of the overall intervention to put in place. As primary endogenous causes of the financial 
distress of Cerda Municipality, the investigated behaviours were allowed by poor knowledge 
dissemination and internal communication due to the lack of an integrated information system and 
sustained learning processes, as well as a myopic management view based on isolated 
compartments of organisation. 
Considering that knowledge is dynamic and learning is non-linear (Baets, 2005: 21), 
especially in a complex environment, policy- and decision-making cannot be left to improvisation. 
Under a holistic perspective, the intervention should be designed in terms of knowledge 
management, which underlies an intentional and systematic approach that selects, synthetises, 
archives, organises and transfers relevant information (Bergeron, 2003: 8-9), in order to add value 
to the organisational mission by integrating people, content, processes and technology (American 
Productivity & Quality Center, 2003). 
Knowledge is also for innovating. Innovation management lies on the capability of an 
organisation to capture even weak endogenous or exogenous signals and use creativity to trigger 
the needed change, whose effect usually results in new kinds of output and/or process. Specifically, 
innovation represents a discontinuous change and, as such, a visible break with the past (Osborne 
& Brown, 2005: 5). This, of course, calls policy- and decision-makers for, firstly, understanding 
and critically evaluating the current environmental and organisational situation and, secondly, 
triggering the needed change through hard technologies, mainly represented by organisational 
structures and equipment, and soft ones, which include processes, professional and managerial 
skills and accountability (2005: 19). Above all, change in beliefs, ideas, value bases, expectations 
and inclinations take on great importance in the overall compromise between institutional, 
governance, political and administrative arrangements (2005: 75-76). 
Based on what above, some worldwide experiences may inspire effective and feasible 
policy suggestions to enhance professionalism and e-procurement. 
As a part of the ‘Zero-Tolerance for Corruption’ policy programme adopted by the mayor 
of La Paz, in Bolivia, a significant cultural change was made possible by promoting initiatives 
aimed to: create sense of institution and pride in public officials; restore the Municipality’s image, 
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transparency and accountability; and establish clean governance (Zúñiga & Heywood, 2015: 2). 
In particular, the Del Granado’s administration created a ‘Transparency Unit’ to deal with anti-
corruption through a series of tools for whistleblowing, a ‘Continuous Improvement Units’ to 
catalyse bureaucratic procedures and, in order to get back its credibility, adopted a series of 
measures to guarantee competition in public contracting and tendering, so as to ensure supervision 
of public works in terms of material quality and deadlines and set out to appoint public officials 
by considering their performance instead of clientelist practices (2015: 2-4). 
Likewise, the city management of Šal’a, in Slovakia, gave particular emphasis to e-
procurement and online publication of: forms; in-force regulation; contracts; accounting 
documents; information about costs related to municipal employees; the personnel and managers’ 
contact details; a system for requesting any kind of information relevant to procurement activity 
of the local Government (Jacko, 2016: 122-123). 
Of course, to shock a challenging system requires adequate expertise, and policy- and 
decision-makers of Cerda Municipality are not expected to react alone. As the Ukrainian mayor 
did in the Municipality of Lviv, two consultants were taken on to instruct the city government 
employees in integrity, in a way to hinder some ‘short circuits’ within the bureaucratic machinery 
and reduce the risk of anomalies within the local Government (Lozovsky, 2015: 6). 
In this perspective, the Municipality also needs to strengthen its financial management 
system and counteract tax avoidance for restoring a physiological economic-financial equilibrium. 
Tax collection was disregarded in Cerda over the last 30 years, and this has contributed to 
compromise its capability to financially cover the essential public service expenditures. Indeed, 
the Municipality has never designed effective public policies aimed at recovering its receivable 
credits (Public Official #4, 2019). 
To support a possible fiscal recovery programme as that promoted in La Paz (Zúñiga & 
Heywood, 2015: 2), an improvement of local tax collection can be found in SMART technologies. 
Some experiences around the world are witnesses of solving proposals against tax avoidance. For 
instance, some municipalities in Ecuador improved by 80% their tax collection by adopting such 
technologies (URAIA, 2017: 21). 
A coercive procedure may guarantee a successful tax collection in Cerda, but it may reduce 
the trust in local politics by citizens. Hence, to implement a strategy of external communication of 
value for money creation may result useful to boost citizens’ trust in the local Government by 
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ensuring higher transparency and accountability. Notably, promoting a balanced involvement of 
expertise from different fields of knowledge and citizen participation, building trust through 
communication with citizens may strengthen the municipal planning and development (URAIA, 
2017: 22). 
Resuming, in order to improve the accounting system, internal controls and tax collection, 
the policy here suggested is to the modernise tax administration by means of system integration of 
accounting, treasury and purchase making use of ICTs − see POLICY_1, Appendix B. In addition, 
in line with a research conducted by Kwon (2014), to budget training and integrity programmes 
may promote intrinsic motivation, best practices, a renewed sense of institutions and pride for the 
office held, as deterrent of unruly use of entrusted public power − see POLICY_2, Appendix B. 
The policy model simulation results are showed in Figure 6.8, Table 6.13 and Table 6.14. 
 
6.8 Concluding remarks 
Corruption is clandestine and strongly related to socio-cultural structures of communities. 
Informational quality provided by red-flags may benefit from the integration of dynamic indicators 
constituting transient signals of possible illegal insinuations within a systemic and comprehensive 
framework. 
Accordingly, by means of a representative case-study of an Italian municipality, an 
outcome-based DPM approach allowed to explain the causal relationships between past corruption 
in public procurement and local government performance over time. Framing KPIs adjusted by a 
risk component within a systemic cause-and-effect structure of performance management enables 
policy- and decision-makers: 
- to isolate heterogeneous causes of corruption along the procurement process and enhance the 
explicative capability of red-flags; 
- to identify what strategic resources to deploy in order to control risk of corruption and 
elucidate relevant internal responsibilities in a logic of prevention; 
- to keep track of the effects on organisational systems of uncontrollable environmental 
‘shocks’ and possible cultural distortions undermining the regularity of procurement. 
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year tender EUR/tender EUR dimensionless 
30 135.6341 108.8257 11.1253 88.1083 7.7604 95.8078 3.1567 19,148.3902 257,890.0576 3,057,418.7688 2,208,979.2965 5.8050 0.5329 0.8884 0.3077 0.5881 0.5285 
31 136.0296 109.1163 10.9228 92.0369 5.7634 96.2331 3.0301 19,040.6600 265,833.9770 3,320,103.7484 2,206,796.7753 5.8033 0.5370 0.8896 0.4666 0.5876 0.5223 
32 142.5805 116.7648 8.6406 97.3942 2.8001 98.1610 2.1648 18,032.5769 219,188.7812 3,565,902.0047 2,223,236.1007 5.8248 0.5754 0.8492 0.6953 0.5938 0.4682 
33 148.7686 129.8905 5.3869 99.8136 1.1347 99.8705 1.2092 17,489.3775 140,608.6094 3,754,091.2275 2,275,749.9182 5.8740 0.6392 0.7682 0.8356 0.6139 0.3999 
34 152.2260 140.9616 2.8524 100.4051 0.4176 100.5935 0.5735 17,235.8079 79,261.9385 3,866,114.5028 2,352,439.9240 5.9240 0.7042 0.6684 0.9127 0.6457 0.3373 
35 153.8825 147.6088 1.4616 100.3642 0.1456 100.6507 0.2439 17,124.9224 41,919.6742 3,888,590.7900 2,429,967.5510 5.9597 0.7541 0.5709 0.9545 0.6832 0.2834 
36 154.6570 150.8787 0.8508 100.2179 0.0492 100.4711 0.0962 17,076.1950 21,998.1263 3,822,890.0631 2,491,829.3792 5.9805 0.7854 0.4877 0.9767 0.7214 0.2384 
37 155.0418 152.3433 0.5978 100.1098 0.0163 100.2817 0.0360 17,053.1649 12,105.4503 3,679,127.3484 2,533,055.7473 5.9912 0.8018 0.4218 0.9880 0.7569 0.2019 
38 155.2570 153.0424 0.4678 100.0501 0.0053 100.1498 0.0130 17,040.7886 7,313.4070 3,467,961.4542 2,556,594.9566 5.9963 0.8089 0.3709 0.9936 0.7881 0.1730 
39 155.3936 153.4662 0.3746 100.0214 0.0017 100.0735 0.0046 17,033.1341 4,941.5352 3,195,552.8776 2,568,237.8233 5.9985 0.8114 0.3314 0.9962 0.8147 0.1503 
40 155.4893 153.7909 0.2977 100.0087 0.0006 100.0339 0.0016 17,027.8586 3,686.3398 2,862,046.2917 2,573,286.6864 5.9994 0.8121 0.3001 0.9976 0.8369 0.1325 
41 155.5602 154.0629 0.2352 100.0034 0.0002 100.0150 0.0005 17,023.9716 2,953.3287 2,463,649.9423 2,575,311.8528 5.9998 0.8124 0.2746 0.9983 0.8552 0.1183 
42 155.6148 154.2905 0.1865 100.0013 0.0001 100.0064 0.0002 17,020.9933 2,478.5227 2,219,713.4823 2,576,217.4721 5.9999 0.8127 0.2536 0.9987 0.8702 0.1068 
43 155.6577 154.4766 0.1499 100.0005 0.0000 100.0026 0.0001 17,018.6533 2,143.4159 2,122,851.6567 2,576,794.9570 6.0000 0.8131 0.2363 0.9990 0.8825 0.0974 
44 155.6920 154.6263 0.1228 100.0002 0.0000 100.0011 0.0000 17,016.7827 1,892.1674 2,084,313.0739 2,577,269.1670 6.0000 0.8134 0.2220 0.9992 0.8926 0.0898 
45 155.7198 154.7461 0.1028 100.0001 0.0000 100.0004 0.0000 17,015.2698 1,696.3534 2,068,917.0048 2,577,657.0396 6.0000 0.8136 0.2103 0.9994 0.9009 0.0835 
46 155.7424 154.8423 0.0878 100.0000 0.0000 100.0002 0.0000 17,014.0378 1,540.1434 2,062,715.1404 2,577,940.8471 6.0000 0.8137 0.2007 0.9995 0.9077 0.0783 
47 155.7608 154.9200 0.0766 100.0000 0.0000 100.0001 0.0000 17,013.0314 1,413.8868 2,060,175.2574 2,578,122.6156 6.0000 0.8138 0.1929 0.9996 0.9132 0.0741 
48 155.7759 154.9831 0.0680 100.0000 0.0000 100.0000 0.0000 17,012.2089 1,311.1697 2,059,101.5338 2,578,224.3096 6.0000 0.8138 0.1866 0.9996 0.9177 0.0707 
49 155.7883 155.0346 0.0613 100.0000 0.0000 100.0000 0.0000 17,011.5370 1,227.3815 2,058,621.0867 2,578,274.0135 6.0000 0.8138 0.1814 0.9997 0.9214 0.0679 
50 155.7983 155.0767 0.0562 100.0000 0.0000 100.0000 0.0000 17,010.9886 1,158.9930 2,058,385.8125 2,578,295.4063 6.0000 0.8138 0.1772 0.9997 0.9244 0.0656 
51 155.8065 155.1111 0.0521 100.0000 0.0000 100.0000 0.0000 17,010.5413 1,103.1874 2,058,255.9528 2,578,303.9812 6.0000 0.8138 0.1738 0.9998 0.9269 0.0637 
52 155.8132 155.1391 0.0489 100.0000 0.0000 100.0000 0.0000 17,010.1766 1,057.6680 2,058,174.6225 2,578,307.8818 6.0000 0.8138 0.1710 0.9998 0.9289 0.0622 
53 155.8187 155.1621 0.0464 100.0000 0.0000 100.0000 0.0000 17,009.8793 1,020.5488 2,058,118.0385 2,578,310.4443 6.0000 0.8138 0.1687 0.9998 0.9305 0.0610 
54 155.8231 155.1807 0.0444 100.0000 0.0000 100.0000 0.0000 17,009.6368 990.2824 2,058,075.7579 2,578,312.5854 6.0000 0.8138 0.1669 0.9998 0.9318 0.0600 
55 155.8268 155.1960 0.0428 100.0000 0.0000 100.0000 0.0000 17,009.4391 965.6025 2,058,042.8101 2,578,314.3480 6.0000 0.8138 0.1653 0.9998 0.9329 0.0591 
56 155.8297 155.2084 0.0415 100.0000 0.0000 100.0000 0.0000 17,009.2779 945.4764 2,058,016.5477 2,578,315.6428 6.0000 0.8138 0.1641 0.9998 0.9338 0.0585 
57 155.8321 155.2185 0.0405 100.0000 0.0000 100.0000 0.0000 17,009.1464 929.0626 2,057,995.3699 2,578,316.4764 6.0000 0.8138 0.1631 0.9998 0.9345 0.0579 
58 155.8341 155.2268 0.0397 100.0000 0.0000 100.0000 0.0000 17,009.0391 915.6760 2,057,978.1934 2,578,316.9469 6.0000 0.8138 0.1623 0.9998 0.9351 0.0575 
59 155.8357 155.2335 0.0390 100.0000 0.0000 100.0000 0.0000 17,008.9516 904.7583 2,057,964.2225 2,578,317.1803 6.0000 0.8138 0.1616 0.9998 0.9356 0.0571 
60 155.8370 155.2390 0.0384 100.0000 0.0000 100.0000 0.0000 17,008.8803 895.8545 2,057,952.8436 2,578,317.2833 6.0000 0.8138 0.1611 0.9998 0.9360 0.0568 
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30 0.3367 0.1336 0.0635 0.2015 0.3379 0.1460 0.0610 0.8678 0.0329 0.0876 0.0775 0.9137 0.9288 
31 0.8863 0.0226 0.2081 0.1684 0.7905 0.0456 0.0191 0.9030 0.0315 0.0839 0.2429 0.9146 0.9340 
32 0.9490 0.0091 0.5091 0.0936 0.9337 0.0129 0.0054 0.9600 0.0221 0.0762 0.5316 0.9287 0.9608 
33 0.9522 0.0073 0.7404 0.0423 0.9790 0.0035 0.0015 0.9818 0.0121 0.0577 0.7513 0.9510 0.9868 
34 0.9524 0.0061 0.8563 0.0197 0.9934 0.0009 0.0004 0.9896 0.0057 0.0375 0.8613 0.9710 1.0002 
35 0.9524 0.0051 0.8872 0.0130 0.9979 0.0002 0.0001 0.9929 0.0024 0.0223 0.8906 0.9844 1.0041 
36 0.9524 0.0043 0.8772 0.0119 0.9993 0.0001 0.0000 0.9945 0.0010 0.0126 0.8810 0.9918 1.0037 
37 0.9524 0.0037 0.8572 0.0117 0.9998 0.0000 0.0000 0.9955 0.0004 0.0071 0.8621 0.9954 1.0025 
38 0.9524 0.0031 0.8419 0.0111 0.9999 0.0000 0.0000 0.9962 0.0001 0.0041 0.8475 0.9971 1.0014 
39 0.9524 0.0027 0.8341 0.0102 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.9968 0.0000 0.0026 0.8402 0.9979 1.0007 
40 0.9524 0.0024 0.8321 0.0091 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.9972 0.0000 0.0018 0.8382 0.9984 1.0003 
41 0.9524 0.0021 0.8327 0.0081 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.9976 0.0000 0.0014 0.8388 0.9988 1.0001 
42 0.9524 0.0019 0.8340 0.0072 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.9978 0.0000 0.0013 0.8401 0.9990 1.0001 
43 0.9524 0.0018 0.8350 0.0065 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.9980 0.0000 0.0011 0.8411 0.9992 1.0000 
44 0.9524 0.0016 0.8356 0.0060 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.9982 0.0000 0.0010 0.8416 0.9994 1.0000 
45 0.9524 0.0015 0.8357 0.0056 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.9984 0.0000 0.0009 0.8417 0.9995 1.0000 
46 0.9524 0.0014 0.8357 0.0052 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.9985 0.0000 0.0008 0.8416 0.9996 1.0000 
47 0.9524 0.0013 0.8356 0.0050 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.9986 0.0000 0.0008 0.8416 0.9996 1.0000 
48 0.9524 0.0013 0.8355 0.0047 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.9986 0.0000 0.0007 0.8415 0.9997 1.0000 
49 0.9524 0.0012 0.8355 0.0045 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.9987 0.0000 0.0006 0.8415 0.9997 1.0000 
50 0.9524 0.0012 0.8355 0.0044 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.9988 0.0000 0.0006 0.8415 0.9998 1.0000 
51 0.9524 0.0012 0.8355 0.0043 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.9988 0.0000 0.0006 0.8415 0.9998 1.0000 
52 0.9524 0.0011 0.8355 0.0042 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.9988 0.0000 0.0005 0.8415 0.9998 1.0000 
53 0.9524 0.0011 0.8355 0.0041 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.9989 0.0000 0.0005 0.8415 0.9998 1.0000 
54 0.9524 0.0011 0.8355 0.0040 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.9989 0.0000 0.0005 0.8415 0.9998 1.0000 
55 0.9524 0.0011 0.8355 0.0040 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.9989 0.0000 0.0005 0.8415 0.9998 1.0000 
56 0.9524 0.0011 0.8355 0.0039 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.9989 0.0000 0.0005 0.8415 0.9998 1.0000 
57 0.9524 0.0011 0.8355 0.0039 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.9989 0.0000 0.0005 0.8415 0.9998 1.0000 
58 0.9524 0.0010 0.8355 0.0039 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.9989 0.0000 0.0005 0.8415 0.9998 1.0000 
59 0.9524 0.0010 0.8355 0.0038 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.9990 0.0000 0.0004 0.8415 0.9998 1.0000 
60 0.9524 0.0010 0.8355 0.0038 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.9990 0.0000 0.0004 0.8415 0.9998 1.0000 
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Coherently with what emerged in Chapter 3, capturing the dynamics and effects of the 
environmental civic morality may help key-actors to promptly recognise hardly-identifiable 
context-dependent malfeasances, to single them out from passive waste cases and react to them 
timely in a logic of prevention. This may also intervene where mechanistical control fails to capture 
actual presence of corrupt dynamics in public procurement and provide decision-makers with 
prompt alerts arising from the emergent but clandestine corrupt practices. 
In particular, fostering civic morality by leveraging on ICT and personnel training to 
enhance efficiency, governmental stability and transparency is the key to: 
- reduce resource dispersion; 
- persuade providers to refuse corruption; 
- increase procurement process regularity; 
- improve service quality; 
- foster physiological political consensus; 
- enhance trust in government and restore normal tax chargeability. 
In the Cerda case, poor managerial culture created fertile ground for the maladministration 
events of the early 2000s, which, impacting on the regular execution of the procurement process, 
contributed to the current financial distress. The enhancement of digital procurement, accounting 
technologies and personnel training may foster the organisational performance in terms of better 
expertise, accountability, internal communication, as well as reciprocal and self-control against 
corruption risks in procurement. 
Albeit to fix lack of adequate structural digitalisation through ICT updates does not 
encounter insurmountable difficulties, skills for competence and integrity are also a matter of value 
system, cultural beliefs, personal expectations on the retrievable benefits and motivations. They 
are not stand alone and often represent the result of specific path dependencies to take into account 
in arranging interventions in such a sense. 
In Chapter 5, some information emerged in relation to the HRM practices and their 
significant reflections on the second dissolution for mafia infiltrations of the city Council of Cerda 
in 2006. Indeed, the total inexistence of professional and integrity training fostered the discussed 
dormient and unruly internal routines, which manifested themselves as the Municipality was 
getting out of its first commissarial management. Thus, the following chapter deepens those 
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As it was argued in Chapter 2, corruption always reflects context-specific characteristics and 
dynamics (Lambsdorff & Schulze, 2015). However, even though its impacts are rather evident, 
the underlined cause-and-effect relationships are not always clear in particular areas of public 
administration, and side effects may even stem from practices being compliant with law. This 
makes more difficult to single ‘active’ waste out from the ‘passive’ one. 
As it was corroborated in Chapter 5 and stressed in Chapter 6, the poor financial status 
certified for Cerda Municipality disclosed past inherent managerial and operational issues 
linked to its personnel’s expertise, which led to underperforming routines along the 
procurement process in the early 2000s. In fact, those issues were found by the Authorities on 
the occasion of both the two dissolutions for mafia-like infiltrations and, finally, confirmed by 
the convergent interviews with the five Public Officials held in 2019. 
More precisely, the dearth of skills for competence have roots that are previous to the 
second disbandment of the local Authority in 2006 (Public Official #5, 2019), and this may 
better explain the events linked to public procurement analysed in Chapter 6. 
Coherently with the neo-institutional point of view (Vannucci, 2012, 2015), specific 
governance structures and mechanisms of local governments may facilitate political fiduciary 
practices in HRM which, enabled by rooted cultural values that neutralise moral barriers and 
exploit opportunities of regulatory provisions over time, do not consider long-term impacts on 
public performance. 
To better operationalise the critical policy lever related to the municipal training 
capacity suggested in Chapter 6, this part the thesis aims to explain the dynamic relationships 
between some legal practices in HRM and underperformance at local government level over 
time, by means of an outcome-based DPM approach (Bianchi, 2016). 
 
1 This chapter is based on the conference paper titled: ‘Political Patronage in a Small Italian Local Government: 
A Dynamic Performance Management Approach on Fiduciary Practices’, presented during the thirty-eighth 
International System Dynamics (virtual) Conference (ISDC) 2020, held between the 19th and the 24th of July. 




Two sub-questions are here addressed: To what extent did the events of the first 
dissolution for mafia-like infiltrations influence the HR endowment of Cerda Municipality? 
What are the related outcomes and how to deal with them? 
After a recall of the relevant information of this part of the problem, a literature 
overview on patronage is provided. Then, the dynamic hypotheses of the mentioned issue lay 
the foundations for a DPM chart, which is supported by a CLD and a model simulation through 
an SFD. Differently from the previous chapter, the approach in building the DPM chart is here 
not bottom-up, but top down, in order to guarantee a better clarity of explanation in emphasising 
its complementarity with the model of Chapter 6. Indeed, the following formal model is 
intended to probe the magnitude of those facts in relation to the main problem at hand. 
 
7.2 Problem statement: The resilience of political fiduciary practices 
Between the end of the ‘80s and the beginning of the ‘90s, “the clear proximity of the 
administrators with the organised criminality [caused] a serious prejudice to the public safety 
status”2, provoking the first dissolution of the Municipality in 1991. More precisely, it emerged 
that 
 
“the city council [… experienced] direct and indirect links between part of the 
members of the assembly and the organised criminality [… which exposed] the 
administrators themselves to pressing conditioning, by compromising the self-
determination of the elected body, the sound administration of Cerda, and the regular 
functioning of the services entrusted to it”3. 
 
The first dissolution had strict political reasons, but its echo affected the following 
ruling class (Public Official #3, 2019; Public Official #5, 2019). Legal precautionary measures 
were adopted, especially internal rotations of managerial roles, and “some politicians were left 
out by [local] politics, but this paradoxically created the lack of an able ruling class that led to 
the events of the early 2000s” (Public Official #5, 2019). 
Coherently with that, as it emerges from the judgements and the interviews discussed 
in the previous chapters, the Municipality has suffered lack of professionalism since before the 
dissolution of 2006. 
 
2 D.P.R. 30 September 1991, published in the Italian Official Journal no. 231 of 02-10-1991, p.1. 
3 Ibidem. 




Moreover, some top duties have been gradually emptied of holders over time due to 
retirements, and disparate national reforms on public employment4 have made personnel 
turnover impossible for the local Body, because of the passing of some limits linked to the 
employed personnel: 
 
“In some municipal areas, there were high titled and qualified people as managers, but 
it was not possible to make a turnover and the Municipality could just appoint those 
who it already had in its staff, by using the so-called ‘spoils system’. The lack of 
coverage of managerial roles through competitive procedures implies that politics 
periodically manages and decides who has to be in charge in certain areas.” (Public 
Official #5, 2019). 
 
With this regard, as stated by the Public Official #3 (2019): 
 
“It all started between the late 90s and the early 2000s. Politics made a mistake and 
began to make patronage. Politics became convinced that it could administer the public 
thing as if it was it’s a private company. So, some roles were given in the PA without 
any requirement of skills for competence. Some civil servants were inadequate, as they 
were legitimised not by meritocracy, skills and adequacy to the role, but rather by the 
legitimacy of pleasure of politics according to a fiduciary relation.” 
 
As in many other small realities, the local politics has appointed from its own staff by 
means of the ‘spoils system’ (Public Official #3, 2019; Public Official #4, 2019; Public Official 
#5, 2019). This mechanism is a legitimate practice, provided by the Italian law5, which allows 
political powers to appoint apical public officials with the aim to guarantee a harmonious 
administration with pro tempore politicians. 
However, the officials appointed by politics had acquired ruling supremacy over time, 
allowing for the facts of the early 2000s (Public Official #5, 2019). 
 
4 For the Italian regional and local governments, the most important regulatory provisions were: the law 27 
December 2006, no. 296, published in the Italian Official Journal no. 299 of 27-12-2006; the decree-law 24 June 
2014, no. 90, published in the Italian Official Journal no. 144 of 24-06-2014; the law 28 December 2015, no. 208, 
published in the Italian Official Journal no. 302 of 30-12-2015. 
5 The mechanism of ‘spoils system’, introduced by the law 25 March 1993, no. 81, published in the Italian Official 
Journal no. 72 of 27-03-1993, and regulated by the law 15 July 2002, no. 145, published in the Italian Official 
Journal no. 172 of 24-07-2002, allows Italian mayors to directly appoint individuals, also belonging to the existing 
municipal staff, for the coverage of executive positions. 




In addition, the impasse created in public hiring due to austerity of national reforms 
may somehow be linked to past unsustainable practices in HRM. Indeed, with reference to the 
dissolution of 1991, some individuals were “well-inserted in the political and administrative 
context [such that, in the local elections, they got] a significant number of votes that [allowed 
them] to arbitrarily steer within the administration”6. Bridging this fact with the dissolution of 
2006, from the related decree it emerges that: 
 
“the existence of contamination factors of the administrative action of the public body 
due to the influence of the organized criminality [highlighted] how, over time, the 
distorted use of the public thing materialised in favouriting individuals directly or 
indirectly linked to criminal environments. [… Also, the] interference in the affairs of 
the public body and the manipulation of the administrative choices result[ed] 
favourited by an impenetrable and complex network of family, kin and friendships 
relations, and frequentations which connect[ed] some members of the City Board and 
Council, as well as of the bureaucratic apparatus to exponents of the local criminal 
factions or to individuals close to them”7. 
 
7.3 A literature overview of fiduciary practices: Italy at a glance 
Patronage is “the giving of help or a job to someone in return for their support” (Oxford English 
Dictionary, 2012e: 526). It is commonly considered as a dyadic exchange characterised by a 
particularistic and private relationship between actors of unequal power and status, based on a 
self-regulated principle of reciprocity (Kaufman, 1974). 
Its meaning is straightforward and extremely similar to those of clientelism8, nepotism 
and cronyism. Contrarily, knowledge about the functions of patronage is little (Bearfield, 2009: 
64) and, because of lack of data, the general tendency is to give for granted its conventional 
suppositions, based on political folklore, professional consensus and personal judgement 
(Sorauf, 1960: 28). 
Although it was questioned the absolute negativity of patronage (Sorauf, 1956) and 
emphasised its capacity to trigger desirable outcomes, such as achieving egalitarian goals and 
 
6 D.P.R. 30 September 1991, published in the Italian Official Journal no. 231 of 02-10-1991, Attachment no. 1, 
p. 1. 
7 D.P.R. 12 December 2006, published in the Italian Official Journal no. 301 of 29-12-2006, Attachment no. 1, p. 
1. 
8 On the definition of ‘clientelism’, cf. Goodin, R. E. & Stokes, S. C. 2013. Political Clientelism: Oxford 
University Press. 




bridging political divisions (Bearfield, 2009), most of the literature on patronage considers it 
undesirable. 
According to an anthropological perspective, public administration studies have mainly 
labelled patronage as a socio-economic evil, hinged on political mechanisms and dynamics 
(Bearfield, 2009: 66) characterised by mutuality between ‘patron’ and ‘client’ (Boissevain 
1966; Roniger, 2004). 
Since the 1960s, the Italian political system has been characterised by resilient 
clientelism (Arloff, 2012) and restricted powerful circles at any territorial level (Breccia & 
Focardi, 2019: 479-480). Albeit clientelist recruitment is not allowed by the national 
regulation, political appointing for fulfilling executive roles is part of changes in public 
management during periods of retrenchment of public expenditure (Raudla et al., 2013: 24) 
and it has been recently reinterpreted as a resource for good governance (Ferri & Zan, 2019). 
Moreover, as a strategy of crisis management (Boin, 't Hart, Stern, & Sundelius, 2005), this 
practice is adopted by governments with the aim to advocate decision-making powers and 
strengthening political control (Peters & Pierre, 2004), especially when organisational 
departments are not prone to implement them voluntarily (Behn, 1978; Heffron, 1989; Levine, 
1985). 
Nevertheless, in many realities, political appointing may give birth to forms of 
patronage (Flinders & Matthews, 2010), as it has been argued by some scholars, such as Di 
Mascio (2014), Grzymala-Busse (2008) and Kopecký and Scherlis (2008). Very often, 
fiduciary practices allow politics to hand out public jobs in order to gain consensus among 
citizens in view of elections (Weingrod, 1968: 379), thus causing the employment and 
promotion of incompetent civil servants (Stillman, 1977: 507) and causing a visible gap in the 
levels of clerical competence and professionalism (Sorauf, 1960: 28). 
Emphasising myopic and individualistic benefits, political favouritism mortifies 
broader categorial interests (Kaufman, 1974: 303) and exacerbates proneness of specific 
environments to further corrupt actions (Minkova, 2018: 6). In particular, it is commonly 
recognised that forms of cronyism, clientelism or nepotism may drastically impact on HRM of 
local governments, such that poor public outputs and outcomes, especially the high-value ones, 
may stem from lack of expert administrative personnel (Minkova, 2018: 7). 
Since patronage and other forms of favouritism are able to change markedly in terms 
of magnitude, scope, length of time and resources deployed, a system view may help to include 
factors being not directly linked to it, but whose consideration is essential in the analysis of the 
phenomenon (Kaufman, 1974: 289, 293). 




7.4 The dynamic hypotheses and the model structure 
Because of record management issues and statistical insignificancy of job replacement and 
turnover indicators provided by ISTAT (2020b), the insiders of the municipal Personnel Office 
(pers. comm.) constituted the main historical quantitative data source on HR. Accordingly, the 
municipal personnel gradually decreased over the last decades and, nowadays, the overall staff 
is composed by 84 public employees, covering low- and medium-specialised public positions, 
and four heads of department, representing the executive team. Moreover, the Municipality 
registers a dozen of redundancies and the investments in the personnel’s training programmes 
appear inadequate − see ISTAT (2020b) and SIOPE (2020). 
Based on what above, building on the relevant variables of the procurement model of 
Chapter 6, the categories of Mgrs. and PEs are here divided into trained and non-trained, where 
only the former group identifies public workers with proved skills for competence. 
Nonetheless, the overall workforce can either improve or make worse its professionalism over 
time, thus modifying the internal composition of both the categories in function of the 
Municipality’s training capacity and the time that competence itself takes to fade, respectively. 
On the concepts of ‘trained’ and ‘non-trained’ Mgrs. and PEs, as well as on the degree 
of complexity that they imply, some clarifications are needed, especially in order to emphasise 
the fundamental link with the model discussed in Chapter 6. 
In line with the Simons’ conceptualisation of ‘diagnostic’ and ‘interactive control’ 
systems  (2007a, 2007b), leveraging critical performance drivers and wisely attempting to face 
strategic uncertainty that they perceive, managers should prove to own demiurge-like stance, 
which enables them to identify and interpret both the outstanding and the possible evolutionary 
paths of the environment where they actually operate, in order to steer the organisational action 
sustainably towards a better holistic performance. 
Pragmatically, it means for them to be able to acquire relevant knowledge and sufficient 
awareness about what is proved to be effective in relation to the problem they are dealing with, 
which requires continuous practice, re-thinking of their beliefs and adaptation of their 
management capabilities (Forrester, 1992; Pfeffer & Sutton, 2006). Moreover, under a system 
view, it implies to guarantee integrity in organisational operations and personnel’s behaviour, 
as well as to cope with deriving risks appropriately (Minkova, 2018: 7). 
Therefore, managers’ competences should not just be bounded to apply and enforce 
regulation accurately, so as to make them look like mere bureaucrats. Contrarily, they ought to 
activate personal dialogue, foster internal debate and enable information sharing within the 




organisation for which they are accountable beyond the typical communication channels 
(Simons, 2007b: 6). 
For such reasons, organisational culture, governance structures and underlying routines 
are at the base of their decision-making activity for achieving better results. These elements 
constitute the fundamental knowledge, on the one hand, to detect extant and possible system 
vulnerabilities to inappropriate behaviours throughout the organisation and, on the other hand, 
to intervene effectively where needed, both in a preventive and in a repressive prospect. 
In other terms, managers are asked to own and capitalise marked leadership qualities to 
set feasible strategies up in line with a clear − often highly-political − vision (Behn, 1998: 209-
212), especially when resource availability does not result such as to fully address the citizens’ 
needs properly (Morgan & Watson, 1992: 438); even more where consolidate governance 
mechanisms may allow for unfair practices. 
Likewise, municipal staff is not just asked to strictly respect protocols and top-down 
newsletters, neither to accomplish its public duty without any thoughtful consideration of the 
likely outcomes of its work. As pointed-out by the Public Official #4 (2019): 
 
“civil servants are no longer formed or do not want to form. Civil servants are no longer 
interested in training, but rather in well-using management software for PAs. 
Employees now operate according to what the software commands.” 
 
Of course, as already seen in the previous chapters, highly-bureaucratised contexts − 
such as the Italian one − may limit the action scope and the discretion of civil servants. 
Nevertheless, significant levels of bureaucracy may create chances for inappropriate 
behaviours, exactly as excessive discretionary power (Minkova, 2018: 7), which leads to 
corruption risks in the case of scarce transparency and staff’s involvement in decision-making 
processes (Heggstad & Frøystad, 2011: 14). 
It emerges how a possible trade-off between bureaucracy and discretion should be 
sought, on the one hand, in a better social integration and organisational − internal and external 
− communication, as well as in an increased personnel’s participation in decision-making 
processes (Hellweg & Phillips, 1982). 
As showed in the previous chapter, this requires an improvement of their 
professionalism and integrity to recognise possible anomalies and engage themselves in 
reciprocal formal and informal control. Of course, this is also crucial in regard to managers and 




between managers themselves, according to an approach going beyond mere hierarchical 
public charges and, instead, triggering the widest inclusion mechanisms aimed at either 
warding off or preventing risk of corruption within public realities promptly. 
Closing this opportune digression, the dynamic hypotheses underlying the model 
structure of this sub-part of the main problem are described below. 
The feedback structure related to the creation and fulfilment of job vacancies9 are 
essentially inspired to the Sterman’s (2000: Chapter 19) model on the labour supply chain. 
Therefore, for the sake of simplicity, the related feedback loops are here ignored, since their 
contribution to the model behaviour does not provide for interesting insights on the most 
important dynamics linked to the problem at hand. 
As for the previous model, inspired to the PRA10, the dynamic hypotheses of the 
problem are revolved around the concept of corruption intended as the gap between the actual 
and a desired situation and, with respect to a system or a process, it is modelled as a risk 
measured by the multiplication between the occurrence probability and its impact (McDevitt, 
2011: 1). As such, provided that performance drivers are essentially given by the comparison 
between the actual level of stocks and opportune benchmarks (Bianchi, 2016), multiplying 
performance drivers linked to fiduciary practices by risk factors − thus bringing about first-
level performance drivers − provides for insights on the extent to which their variations are 
attributable to corruption. As the risk factor equals its maximum score, a considered 
performance gap is likely to be ascribable to corrupt behaviours, and vice versa. 
Accordingly, the ‘Clientelism risk ratio’ acts as a sorting rule along the recruitment 
process that shapes the internal composition of the PE category. It is a dimensionless multiplier 
representing a first-level performance driver linked to political trust of community. Indeed, 
public employment constitutes an important opportunity for local politicians to boost their 
public consensus and, as a result, a possible gap in the perceived political trust is likely to push 
them to create pressure for over-employment (Cosenz, 2010), and vice versa. If the second-
level performance driver ‘Political trust ratio’, measuring the cognitive process of awareness 
of public consensus by politicians, equals ‘1’ there is no reason to recur to cronyism to gain 




9 These are enclosed by the two sectors ‘Managerial Endowment’ and ‘Personnel Endowment’ of Figure 7.3. 
10 Cf. Stamatelatos, M. 2000. Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA). In NASA (Ed.), vol. 00-002: Office of Safety 
and Mission Assurance (OSMA), NASA Headquarters. 





[1] 𝐶𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑚 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 = (1 − 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜) ∗
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑖𝑛 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 ∗ 𝑊𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑖𝑛 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔
𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑢𝑚 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘
 
 
Clientelist practices contribute to shape professionalism, motivation and integrity of 
personnel and have a significant repercussion on government effectiveness (Cosenz, 2010). 
The latter embeds community perceptions of the quality of public institutions and credibility 
of governments in policy design and implementation (World Bank, 2019b). Where local 
politics recurs to clientelism to enlarge its electoral pool, trust takes advantage − Loop B1, 
Figure 7.1; Table 7.1 −, considering that institutional legitimacy is a psychological aspect of 
an authority leading who is someway linked to it to consider such an authority as suitable and 
correct (Tyler, 2006: 375). Furthermore, local politicians are pushed to create job placement 
opportunities until they do not achieve their desired consensus, and vice versa − Loop B2, 
Figure 7.1; Table 7.1. 
Intuitively, these two processes depict the typical myopic political choices leading to 
mortification of the effectiveness and efficiency of public action just to gain short-term 
consensus, but undermining the long-term one. Indeed, trust is also built by providing the 
community with high civil service quality (CSQ) − here measured by the ‘CSQ ratio’ −, at the 
aim to improve their satisfaction with the local quality of life. In general, considering that the 
quality of civil service is part of the government effectiveness (World Bank, 2019b), trust is 
socially constructed through the concrete long-term experience with the institutional structures, 
rules, roles, as well as with the local government’s action (Christensen & Lægreid, 2005), other 
than by a diffuse confidence in public institutions (Easton, 1965). 
Therefore, a gradual deterioration of the PEs’ professionalism − i.e., ‘Non-trained PEs 
ratio’ − due to clientelism affects CSQ and the community’s satisfaction with the local quality 
of life − 4th and 3rd layer outcomes, Figure 7.2 −, thus reducing political trust and encouraging 
politicians to recur to fiduciary practices (Cosenz, 2010) − 2nd layer outcomes, Figure 7.2 −; 
and vice versa − Loop R1, Figure 7.1; Table 7.1. 
More in particular, when the number of ‘Non-Trained PEs’ starts to increase, the level 
of CSQ begins to decreasingly decrease, since the professionalism deterioration makes PEs 
more prone to provide citizens with poor service quality, but slowly, because of a higher 
presence of ‘Trained’ PEs. For the sake of simplicity, when ‘Trained’ and ‘Non-Trained PEs’ 
are the same, the negative impact on the public service quality is a halved. Finally, the CSQ 




increasingly decreases when ‘Trained PEs’ are less than the ‘Non-Trained’ ones, since the 
negative effect of ‘Non-trained PEs ratio’ starts to gain force thanks to a widespread lack of 











11 In the model exhibited in Chapter 6, the variable stemming from the overall professional synergies within the 
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Table 7.1. Main feedback loops of fiduciary practices in HRM. 
Causal loop Variables involved Explanation of the loop 
 
Trust in Local Politics→+ Perception of 
Trust in Local Politics by Politicians→+ 
Political trust ratio→- Clientelism risk 
ratio→+ 
Political trust counteracts politicians’ willingness 
to recur to clientelism. 
 
Political trust ratio→- Effect of Political trust 
ratio on PE vacancies→+ Actual low- and 
medium-specialized public positions→- Non-
trained PEs ratio→- Civil Service Quality→+ 
CSQ ratio→+ Community Life Satisfaction 
→+ Trust in Local Politics→+ Perception of 
Trust in Local Politics by Politicians→+ 
Creating PE vacancies balances the politicians’ 
desire to gain consensus through job placement 
opportunities. 
 
Clientelism risk ratio →+ Non-Trained 
PEs→+ Non-trained PEs ratio→- Civil 
Service Quality→+ CSQ ratio→+ 
Community Life Satisfaction →+ Trust in 
Local Politics→+ Perception of Trust in 
Local Politics by Politicians→+ Political 
trust ratio→- 
Clientelism deteriorates the expertise of the PEs 
endowment and political trust. 
 
Clientelism risk ratio→+ Non-Trained 
PEs→+ Non-trained PEs appointing→+ Non-
Trained Mgrs→+ Non-trained mgrs. ratio→- 
Civil Service Quality→+ CSQ ratio→+ 
Community Life Satisfaction →+ Trust in 
Local Politics→+ Perception of Trust in 
Local Politics by Politicians→+ Political 
trust ratio→- 
Clientelism undermines the managerial quality 
through spoils system. 
 
Non-trained PEs appointing→+ Non-Trained 
Mgrs→+ Non-trained mgrs. ratio→- Civil 
Service Quality→+ CSQ ratio→+ 
Community Life Satisfaction →+ Trust in 
Local Politics→+ Perception of Trust in 
Local Politics by Politicians→+ Political 
Control over the Administrative 
Apparatus→+ Political administrative control 
ratio→- Patronage risk ratio→+ 
Appointing under-specialized PEs reinforces 
patronage risk. 
 
Actual low- and medium-specialized public 
positions→+ Expenditure for public 
wages→- Personnel Budget→+ Training 
Capacity→+ Training capacity ratio→- Non-
Trained PEs→+ Non-trained PEs ratio→- 
Civil Service Quality→+ CSQ ratio→+ 
Community Life Satisfaction →+ Trust in 
Local Politics→+ Perception of Trust in 
Local Politics by Politicians→+ Political 
trust ratio→- Effect of Political trust ratio on 
PE vacancies→+ 
Over-employment distracts resources from PEs’ 
training, and vice versa. 
 
Actual low- and medium-specialized public 
positions→+ Expenditure for public 
wages→- Personnel Budget→+ Training 
Capacity→+ Training capacity ratio→- Non-
Trained Mgrs→+ Non-trained mgrs. ratio→- 
Civil Service Quality→+ CSQ ratio→+ 
Community Life Satisfaction →+ Trust in 
Local Politics→+ Perception of Trust in 
Local Politics by Politicians→+ Political 
trust ratio→- Effect of Political trust ratio on 
PE vacancies→+ 
Over-employment distracts resources from Mgrs. 
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The local politics’ decisions concerning vacancy replacement take into account both 
the austere national regulation limiting the degree of leeway in public hiring121and their desire 
to increase its control over the bureaucratic machinery. As such, on the managerial side, local 
mayors may overcome the shortage of managerial vacancies by outsourcing from outside 
specifically-selected experts, hiring through competitive procedure or directly appointing 
trusted individuals who are already available in the organisational human endowment. 
In the case of internal appointing, environments characterised by legal origins (Glaeser 
& Schleifer, 2002) and cultural traditions (Hofstede, 1991) fostering poor governance may 
persuade local politics to exercise its legitimate power and increase its administrative control 
by choosing inadequate PEs for significant public charges. This possibility is in contrast to 
more appropriate public integrity paradigms, which are made of value systems, mindsets and 
routines enabling behaviours compliant with regulation, ethics codes and best organisational 
practices (Minkova, 2018: 5).  
Accordingly, the ‘Patronage risk ratio’ alerts on the possible room for corruption in 
career progression: 
 
[2] 𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 = (1 − 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑑𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜) ∗
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑖𝑛 𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑟 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 ∗ 𝑊𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑖𝑛 𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑟 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑢𝑚 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘
 
 
where the second-level performance driver ‘Political administrative control ratio’ stems 
from the politicians’ perception of supremacy on bureaucracy. The latter constitutes a second-
order information process (Forrester, 1992), put into place by politicians, recognising the 
approximative degree of trust in the local politics and the subsequent legitimacy to command 
the public Body in line with their goals. 
As it is possible to notice, the equations [1] and [2] are different from those used in the 
previous chapter for the absence of the component ‘Structural Corruption Conditions’. This is 
due to the fact that the second-level performance drivers ‘Political trust ratio’ and ‘Political 
administrative control ratio’ already consider the relevant cultural and social aspects laying 
underneath the local political willingness to gain consensus through favouritism practices. 
Therefore, excluding such a stock variable avoided model redundancy. 
 
121On the topic, cf. Kickert, W., Randma-Liiv, T., & Savi, R. 2013. Fiscal consolidation in Europe: A comparative 
analysis, COCOPS deliverable 7.2, September. 




During periods of retrenchment, in contexts with poor governance structures, 
clientelism in personnel recruitment is such as to undermine the executive performance by 
means of spoils system mechanisms − see the ‘Non-trained mgrs. ratio’ −, thus influencing the 
‘CSQ ratio’132and reinforcing the political incentive to adopt clientelist practices − Loop R2, 
Figure 7.1; Table 7.1. Likewise, patronage without meritocracy brings about the same effect, 
thus exacerbating the political control over bureaucracy and increasing the patronage risk due 
to low political trust − Loop R3, Figure 7.1, Table 7.1; 2nd and 1st layer outcomes, Figure 7.2. 
Finally, rule-misaligned choices in HRM aimed at gaining political consensus affects 
the Municipality’s training capacity. Notably, low-level vacancies − i.e., ‘Actual low- and 
medium- specialized public positions’ − are positively influenced by fiduciary practices, so as 
to provoke losses of public resources (Cosenz, 2010). The opportunity to invest in training is 
not a priority of the local political agenda, thus negatively influencing the CSQ and pushing 
politicians to reinforce this strategy, according to the local trust that they enjoy; and vice versa 
− Loops R4 and R5, Figure 7.1; Table 7.1. 
The following section shows the model simulation results, according to the equations 
exhibited in Appendix B. 
 
7.5 Explanatory model simulation: Basic run 
Figure 7.3 transposes the DPM chart into an SFD, which is based on some assumptions that 
require some opportune clarifications. 
- Time 0 corresponds to year 1990, as no official, legal and reliable information about the 
actual dynamics in HRM within the Municipality before the ‘90s is available. For this 
reason, the impacts of favouritism are here assumed to manifest immediately before the 
first disbandment for mafia infiltrations, which occurred in 1991. 
- For the sake of simplicity, each of the four stocks referred to the municipal HR 
endowment includes both permanent and fixed-term contract public workers. Indeed, 
according to the Personnel Office of the Municipality (pers. comm.), the half of the 
current public employees are precarious workers. 
- In order to simplify the model, the hiring rates include the choice of outsourcing, that of 
hiring through competitive procedure and whatever other manner to acquire mgrs. 
externally. It follows that the ‘appointing’ rates are only referred to the internal selection 
of PEs for executive roles through spoils systems mechanism. 
 
132The same considerations of the negative impact of ‘Non-trained PEs ratio’ on the CSQ apply here. 
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- The choice between external hiring of mgrs. and internal appointing depends on both the 
politics’ willingness and the restrictions provided by the national cutback policies on 
turnover. This is modelled by change the ‘Vacancy replacement fraction’ in time 10 and 
20 − i.e., 2000 and 2010, years in which “Politics made a mistake and began to make 
patronage” (Public Official #3, 2019) and the significant block of public turnover came 
into force, respectively − through the use of two step functions. 
- The attrition rates of the stocks include all the possible solutions for the end of the labour 
relationship with the Municipality – i.e., retirements, layoffs, resignations, selections-out 
due to legal provisions, etc. 
- In general, the decision to engage in clientelist practices also depends on a set of 
heterogeneous structural factors, which are not explicitly modelled, but captured by the 
‘soft’ variables of the section labelled ‘Outcomes’. 
- Since politicians’ mandates are short-term, it is reasonable to assume that, if they have 
the opportunity to assign significant charges to people from outside the public body 
through outsourcing or public hiring, they will guarantee to themselves a higher 
probability to be re-elected in the future, so that the fraction devoted to internal 
appointment is always lower than the former. 
- In any case, if present, the level of favouritism in HRM is assumed as a system condition 
in the model, so that clientelism and patronage exist contemporary, even though with 
different probabilities of occurrence and magnitudes. 
- As regards the last point, it is opportune to precise that, if there is a possibility to have 
the one but not the other form of fiduciary practice, two possible scenarios may occur. In 
the case where: a) there are strict national employment provisions; b) the ‘Clientelism 
risk ratio’ is at its maximum level; c) the ‘Patronage risk ratio’ is at its minimum; d) there 
are not ‘Trained PEs’; then, there will be no appointment by politicians, as it is here 
assumed that, in such a situation, politicians are not prone to assign important public 
charges to poorly-trained PEs and, as a result, managerial vacancies remain not-fulfilled. 
On the contrary, in the case where − ceteris paribus − the ‘Clientelism risk ratio’ is at its 
minimum level and the ‘Patronage risk ratio’ is at its maximum, it is reasonable to assume 
that politicians are not prone to appoint people who are not ‘in-line’ with their private 
interests, such that they prefer to avoid any troublesome appointment. 




Based on the SFD showed in Figure 7.3, the model simulation results are showed in 
Figure 7.4 and Table 7.2 under the DPM view. The model equations and documentation and 
the validation tests are consultable in Appendixes B and C, respectively. 
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year dimensionless person dimensionless person dimensionless person dimensionless 
0 1.0000 0.0000 73.0000 1.0000 0.0135 74.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 3.0000 1.0000 0.2500 0.1200 0.4687 9.3749 4.6875 10.0000 
1 0.8086 0.0479 67.8651 4.3000 0.0571 75.2557 1.8349 1.0000 0.0000 2.9013 0.9995 0.2499 0.0843 0.4687 9.2332 4.6875 6.6504 
2 0.5634 0.1092 64.0982 7.2307 0.0881 82.0527 5.0953 0.6650 0.0209 2.8044 1.0427 0.2607 0.0447 0.4587 8.8343 4.6697 4.9158 
3 0.4407 0.1398 62.2311 10.2436 0.1159 88.3473 9.9251 0.4916 0.0318 2.7071 1.1110 0.2777 0.0292 0.4405 8.3989 4.5653 4.0427 
4 0.3777 0.1556 62.2153 13.5126 0.1479 91.3336 12.1300 0.4043 0.0372 2.6167 1.1856 0.2964 0.0213 0.4199 7.9869 4.3939 3.5799 
5 0.3429 0.1643 62.6642 16.8840 0.1825 92.5209 11.2527 0.3580 0.0401 2.5331 1.2607 0.3152 0.0165 0.3992 7.5656 4.1965 3.3092 
6 0.3212 0.1697 62.5395 20.1340 0.2159 93.2590 9.6206 0.3309 0.0418 2.4552 1.3341 0.3335 0.0134 0.3784 7.1598 3.9909 3.1297 
7 0.3058 0.1735 61.7422 23.1767 0.2471 93.7816 8.2386 0.3130 0.0429 2.3824 1.4044 0.3511 0.0114 0.3587 6.8215 3.7846 2.9943 
8 0.2936 0.1766 60.4019 26.0643 0.2771 94.0656 7.2623 0.2994 0.0438 2.3105 1.4748 0.3687 0.0025 0.3417 6.5285 3.5922 2.8814 
9 0.2831 0.1792 58.6404 28.8752 0.3065 94.2053 6.5018 0.2881 0.0445 2.2359 1.5488 0.3872 0.0006 0.3267 6.2490 3.4226 2.7837 
10 0.2740 0.1815 56.6914 31.4991 0.3339 94.3268 5.9993 0.2784 0.0451 2.1652 1.6191 0.4048 0.0001 0.3127 5.9974 3.2704 2.6983 
11 0.2659 0.1835 54.6896 33.9258 0.3593 94.4336 5.6981 0.2698 0.0456 2.0888 1.6838 0.4210 0.0000 0.3004 5.7964 3.1310 2.6226 
12 0.2588 0.1853 52.7282 36.1683 0.3826 94.5291 5.5246 0.2623 0.0461 2.0223 1.7434 0.4359 0.0000 0.2903 5.6308 3.0094 2.5548 
13 0.2524 0.1869 50.8515 38.2422 0.4042 94.6142 5.4233 0.2555 0.0465 1.9634 1.7984 0.4496 0.0000 0.2819 5.4840 2.9078 2.4951 
14 0.2468 0.1883 49.0792 40.1614 0.4241 94.6880 5.3613 0.2495 0.0469 1.9104 1.8490 0.4623 0.0000 0.2745 5.3678 2.8217 2.4438 
15 0.2421 0.1895 47.4175 41.9379 0.4426 94.7514 5.3203 0.2444 0.0472 1.8623 1.8957 0.4739 0.0000 0.2688 5.2800 2.7490 2.3997 
16 0.2380 0.1905 45.8659 43.5824 0.4597 94.8055 5.2911 0.2400 0.0475 1.8184 1.9388 0.4847 0.0000 0.2642 5.2042 2.6911 2.3625 
17 0.2346 0.1913 44.4204 45.1045 0.4755 94.8506 5.2686 0.2363 0.0477 1.7781 1.9786 0.4947 0.0000 0.2603 5.1357 2.6444 2.3318 
18 0.2319 0.1920 43.0756 46.5130 0.4902 94.8877 5.2501 0.2332 0.0479 1.7411 2.0154 0.5038 0.0000 0.2569 5.0730 2.6047 2.3065 
19 0.2296 0.1926 41.8257 47.8161 0.5038 94.9183 5.2343 0.2307 0.0481 1.7070 2.0493 0.5123 0.0000 0.2538 5.0195 2.5697 2.2854 
20 0.2276 0.1931 40.4538 48.9709 0.5158 94.9443 5.4826 0.2285 0.0482 1.6756 2.0806 0.5202 0.0000 0.2511 4.9773 2.5387 2.2673 
21 0.2259 0.1935 38.3493 49.8124 0.5245 94.9668 6.7583 0.2267 0.0483 1.6248 2.1081 0.5270 0.0000 0.2490 4.9450 2.5124 2.2517 
22 0.2245 0.1939 36.6170 50.5827 0.5325 94.9861 7.7379 0.2252 0.0484 1.5845 2.1328 0.5332 0.0000 0.2473 4.9189 2.4912 2.2383 
23 0.2232 0.1942 35.1791 51.2893 0.5399 95.0024 8.4862 0.2238 0.0485 1.5517 2.1552 0.5388 0.0000 0.2460 4.8960 2.4744 2.2272 
24 0.2222 0.1944 33.9749 51.9384 0.5466 95.0157 9.0562 0.2227 0.0486 1.5244 2.1755 0.5439 0.0000 0.2448 4.8754 2.4606 2.2181 
25 0.2214 0.1946 32.9570 52.5354 0.5528 95.0267 9.4897 0.2218 0.0486 1.5012 2.1940 0.5485 0.0000 0.2438 4.8567 2.4488 2.2107 
26 0.2207 0.1948 32.0887 53.0848 0.5586 95.0358 9.8191 0.2211 0.0487 1.4810 2.2110 0.5527 0.0000 0.2429 4.8395 2.4383 2.2044 
27 0.2202 0.1950 31.3413 53.5910 0.5639 95.0435 10.0692 0.2204 0.0487 1.4634 2.2265 0.5566 0.0000 0.2420 4.8238 2.4288 2.1990 
28 0.2197 0.1951 30.6925 54.0574 0.5687 95.0502 10.2592 0.2199 0.0488 1.4476 2.2409 0.5602 0.0000 0.2412 4.8094 2.4202 2.1942 
29 0.2192 0.1952 30.1247 54.4875 0.5732 95.0562 10.4035 0.2194 0.0488 1.4335 2.2540 0.5635 0.0000 0.2405 4.7961 2.4122 2.1900 
30 0.2188 0.1953 29.6243 54.8842 0.5774 95.0616 10.5132 0.2190 0.0488 1.4208 2.2662 0.5665 0.0000 0.2398 4.7839 2.4050 2.1861 
 




The impact of political pressure for public job creation is reflected by the initial increase 
in the ‘Actual low- and medium-specialized public positions’ and ‘Vacancies - PEs’, passing 
the standard number of available job positions − see ‘PEs endowment’ box, Figure 7.4. 
During the overall investigated period, the category of ‘Non-Trained PEs’ increases at 
a low rate, according to the initial decreasing growth of clientelism risk and the prevalence of 
the related hiring and competence evanescence rates compared to its attrition one − see ‘PEs 
endowment’, ‘PEs variations’ and ‘Corruption performance drivers’ boxes, Figure 7.4. 
Differently, the stock ‘Trained PEs’, at the beginning, decreases decreasingly and, in 
time 3, stabilises for approximatively three years before to follow a continuous decreasing 
pattern. More in depth, the initial impact of clientelism on the personnel’s professionalism is 
counteracted by the other lever of political consensus, represented by the increase in low-
specialised job vacancies. This leaves room for hiring skilled-people, such as to allow the 
trained PEs’ hiring rate to increase and, jointly with the ‘PEs assimilation rate’, endure the 
effects of both attrition and competence evanescence rates over the three-year period 
mentioned above, even though faintly − see ‘PEs endowment’ and ‘PEs variations’ boxes, 
Figure 7.4. It follows that, in environments with poor levels of governance, political pressure 
may be susceptible to realistically favour unemployed skilled people at the beginning of its 
adoption. 
At time 10 − i.e., 2000 −, the activation of the first step function in the variable 
‘Vacancy replacement fraction’ captures the use of ‘spoil system’ tool to appoint internal 
individuals for managerial charges. Coherently with what stated by the Public Official #3 
(2019) and Public Official #5 (2019), based on the level of the ‘Patronage risk ratio’ and the 
personnel’s professionalism, the consolidated presence of cultural traditions and routines in 
carrier progression allows for designation of individuals lacking of required managerial 
capabilities. In the model, on the one hand, the reduction in the replacement fraction reduces 
the portion of public hiring of mgrs. through either competitive procedures or outsourcing; on 
the other hand, patronage risk works as a trailblazer for underqualified individuals. 
Over the entire investigated period, the internal composition of mgrs. changes such that 
the trained group decreases decreasingly, as the related attrition and competence evanescence 
rates are higher than the hiring rate. Contrarily, the non-trained group of mgrs. increases, since 
its hiring and the competence evanescence rates are together higher than its attrition rate. 
Interestingly, the non-trained group overtakes the trained one between time 14 and 15 
− i.e., 2004-2005. Likewise, the stock ‘Trained PEs’ decreases decreasingly, while the ‘Non-




Trained PEs’ keep going on about increasing decreasingly until they do not overtake the former 
in time 16 – i.e., 2006. 
At the 20th year – correspondent to 2010 –, the harsh national austere policies visibly 
discourage public hiring of trained individuals for occupying both high- and low-level job 
positions. On the contrary, the hiring rates of both the non-trained categories are low and, as 
such, withstand the blow − see ‘PEs variations’ and ‘Mgrs. variations’ boxes, Figure 7.4. 
The number of managerial vacancies is kept low as, overall, the category is not subject 
to the national cutback policies, by virtue of the adoption of ‘spoils system’ mechanisms. At 
this regard, the appointment of PEs is decided according to the best possible choice, such that 
‘Trained PEs appointing’ is higher than the ‘Non-trained PEs appointing’, but the risk of 
political patronage in the system leaves room for the appointment of individuals with poor 
skills for competence, both in time 10 and in time 20 − see ‘PEs appointing’ box, Figure 7.4. 
Despite their controllable levels, the second-level performance drivers ‘Clientelism’ 
and ‘Patronage’ risk ratios find fertile ground in the lack of formal professional and integrity 
training programmes for the municipal staff. More precisely, the Municipality did not allocate 
adequate resources in personnel training during the last 30 years, so as to increase the risk to 
appoint non-trained PEs and make difficult to enhance the personnel’s expertise. This 
reverberates on the CSQ, the ‘Community Life Satisfaction’ and, therefore, on the ‘Trust in 
Local Politics’, which decrease over time according to the internal composition of the mgrs. 
and the PEs endowment − see ‘Professionalism performance drivers’ and ‘CSQ, life 
satisfaction and trust in the local politics’ box, Figure 7.4. 
Although, as the model shows, political pressure for public job creation may have 
created opportunities for unemployed skilled people at the beginning of its adoption, this 
strategy unveils unsustainable in the long-term. Indeed, on the one hand, it inflated the number 
of adequate civil servants hireable and, on the other hand, inevitably invalidated the average 
level of expertise, because of disregarding of training programmes in the political agenda. In 
this picture, the competence dissipation assumes the most significant role in explaining the 
growth of the non-trained category of PEs over time and, in so doing, enabling the probability 
of new forms of inappropriate practices at managerial level. 
Finally, cutback national reforms may have not generated any appreciable effect on 
reversing the over-employment trend in the Municipality. On the contrary, they may have just 
limited the access to skilled people through competitive procedures, without adequately 
hindering clientelist practices. 




7.6 Dealing with the past with an eye to the future: A composite policy package 
The policy package suggested in this research is aimed at enhancing the municipal workforce’s 
expertise and, if necessary, integrate it by giving fresh blood access. It is the result of the 
combination of four fundamental levers − see Figure 7.5 and Table 7.3 −, that is: 
- as it was already suggested in the previous chapter, allocating the adequate budget share 
to the personnel’s training programmes; 
- limiting or even banning any kind of ‘spoils system’ mechanism; 
- unblocking the personnel turnover; 
- curbing political hegemony on recruitment. 
Public officials have both the right and the duty to undertake training (Kuyumdzhieva, 
Dell, & Földes, 2015). It may significantly slow down the gradual dissipation of the staff’s 
capabilities and integrity, and reduce opportunities for resource waste linked to unfair practices 
in any local public activity. Even in administrative contexts that guarantee properly-trained and 
upright PEs and Mgrs., lack of training programmes can markedly downgrade the satisfying 
professional quality of municipal staff and foster pathological routines resulting in an 
uncontrollable level of personnel discretion. 
Although people’s creativity and cultural roots may make useless any effort in this 
sense, strengthening both formal and informal monitoring along the recruiting process and in 
career progressions through high-level professionalism could enhance the organisational 
integrity and reactivity in detecting possible anomalies. Therefore, a sustained and continuous 
effort aimed at keeping the civil servants’ expertise sufficiently high to guarantee an 
appropriate level of public service may be effective in moving away from deleterious path 
dependencies, which result “in a non-action towards citizens” (Public Official #3, 2019). 
By virtue of the reduction of possible gaps in trust in the local politics by citizens, 
improving civil service through renewed integrity paradigms and expertise may counteract 
consensus-gaining logics that provoke over-employment and push myopic politicians to recur 
to favouritism practices. In other terms, it would mean to restore a physiological trust in the 
local politicians, in a way to discourage the key-actors to appoint inadequate individuals. 
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year dimensionless person dimensionless person dimensionless person dimensionless 
30 0.2188 0.1953 29.6243 54.8842 0.7417 74.0000 10.5132 0.2190 0.0488 1.4208 2.2662 0.5665 0.0000 0.2398 4.7839 2.4050 2.1861 
31 0.2184 0.1954 36.0336 48.3137 0.6529 74.0000 -5.0919 0.2186 0.0488 1.7364 1.9950 0.4987 0.4386 0.2327 4.3710 2.3983 2.1826 
32 0.2181 0.1955 52.4013 26.9881 0.3647 74.0000 -4.0755 0.2183 0.0489 2.6050 1.1504 0.2876 0.7174 0.2259 4.8868 2.3095 2.1754 
33 0.2165 0.1959 64.1041 11.3841 0.1538 74.0000 -1.1597 0.2175 0.0489 3.2521 0.5163 0.1291 1.0242 0.2562 6.5258 2.3176 2.1535 
34 0.2150 0.1963 68.8110 4.2611 0.0576 74.0000 1.0101 0.2153 0.0490 3.5644 0.2111 0.0528 1.4840 0.3389 8.9351 2.6761 2.1624 
35 0.2202 0.1950 69.6238 2.0644 0.0279 74.0000 2.3323 0.2162 0.0490 3.6734 0.1059 0.0265 2.1584 0.4468 10.8309 3.4804 2.2752 
36 0.2385 0.1904 69.4949 1.4253 0.0193 74.0000 3.0850 0.2275 0.0483 3.7091 0.0723 0.0181 2.7880 0.5318 11.7498 4.4579 2.5270 
37 0.2690 0.1827 69.2358 1.2638 0.0171 74.0000 3.5017 0.2527 0.0467 3.7186 0.0638 0.0160 2.9067 0.5793 12.1203 5.2421 2.8624 
38 0.3030 0.1742 68.8653 1.4056 0.0190 74.0000 3.7295 0.2862 0.0446 3.7121 0.0710 0.0178 2.4035 0.6013 12.2303 5.7221 3.1856 
39 0.3322 0.1669 68.3272 1.8195 0.0246 74.0000 3.8534 0.3186 0.0426 3.6914 0.0920 0.0230 1.7050 0.6088 12.1859 5.9658 3.4381 
40 0.3533 0.1617 67.6442 2.4352 0.0329 74.0000 3.9206 0.3438 0.0410 3.6603 0.1233 0.0308 1.2201 0.6075 12.0246 6.0588 3.6082 
41 0.3666 0.1584 66.9711 3.0719 0.0415 74.0000 3.9570 0.3608 0.0399 3.6280 0.1557 0.0389 0.9912 0.6000 11.7904 6.0552 3.7073 
42 0.3735 0.1566 66.4774 3.5459 0.0479 74.0000 3.9767 0.3707 0.0393 3.6039 0.1798 0.0450 0.9118 0.5891 11.5540 5.9875 3.7516 
43 0.3758 0.1561 66.2213 3.7913 0.0512 74.0000 3.9874 0.3752 0.0391 3.5914 0.1923 0.0481 0.9018 0.5781 11.3766 5.8865 3.7561 
44 0.3748 0.1563 66.1579 3.8489 0.0520 74.0000 3.9932 0.3756 0.0390 3.5885 0.1953 0.0488 0.9207 0.5697 11.2799 5.7841 3.7353 
45 0.3720 0.1570 66.2057 3.7980 0.0513 74.0000 3.9963 0.3735 0.0392 3.5911 0.1927 0.0482 0.9485 0.5649 11.2514 5.7044 3.7032 
46 0.3687 0.1578 66.2942 3.7078 0.0501 74.0000 3.9980 0.3703 0.0394 3.5957 0.1880 0.0470 0.9750 0.5632 11.2646 5.6570 3.6714 
47 0.3658 0.1586 66.3797 3.6214 0.0489 74.0000 3.9989 0.3671 0.0396 3.6002 0.1836 0.0459 0.9948 0.5636 11.2951 5.6385 3.6468 
48 0.3638 0.1590 66.4424 3.5582 0.0481 74.0000 3.9994 0.3647 0.0397 3.6034 0.1803 0.0451 1.0065 0.5649 11.3264 5.6394 3.6318 
49 0.3628 0.1593 66.4785 3.5218 0.0476 74.0000 3.9997 0.3632 0.0398 3.6053 0.1785 0.0446 1.0110 0.5663 11.3503 5.6500 3.6252 
50 0.3624 0.1594 66.4924 3.5078 0.0474 74.0000 3.9998 0.3625 0.0398 3.6060 0.1777 0.0444 1.0107 0.5674 11.3648 5.6627 3.6245 
51 0.3625 0.1594 66.4916 3.5084 0.0474 74.0000 3.9999 0.3624 0.0398 3.6060 0.1778 0.0444 1.0079 0.5681 11.3709 5.6734 3.6269 
52 0.3629 0.1593 66.4836 3.5165 0.0475 74.0000 3.9999 0.3627 0.0398 3.6056 0.1782 0.0445 1.0045 0.5685 11.3714 5.6804 3.6302 
53 0.3632 0.1592 66.4737 3.5263 0.0477 74.0000 4.0000 0.3630 0.0398 3.6051 0.1787 0.0447 1.0017 0.5685 11.3688 5.6838 3.6332 
54 0.3634 0.1591 66.4653 3.5347 0.0478 74.0000 4.0000 0.3633 0.0398 3.6047 0.1791 0.0448 0.9999 0.5684 11.3654 5.6846 3.6353 
55 0.3636 0.1591 66.4597 3.5403 0.0478 74.0000 4.0000 0.3635 0.0398 3.6044 0.1794 0.0449 0.9990 0.5683 11.3623 5.6839 3.6364 
56 0.3637 0.1591 66.4569 3.5431 0.0479 74.0000 4.0000 0.3636 0.0398 3.6042 0.1795 0.0449 0.9988 0.5681 11.3601 5.6826 3.6368 
57 0.3637 0.1591 66.4563 3.5437 0.0479 74.0000 4.0000 0.3637 0.0398 3.6042 0.1796 0.0449 0.9990 0.5680 11.3590 5.6813 3.6367 
58 0.3637 0.1591 66.4568 3.5432 0.0479 74.0000 4.0000 0.3637 0.0398 3.6042 0.1796 0.0449 0.9993 0.5680 11.3586 5.6803 3.6363 
59 0.3636 0.1591 66.4578 3.5422 0.0479 74.0000 4.0000 0.3636 0.0398 3.6043 0.1795 0.0449 0.9997 0.5679 11.3588 5.6797 3.6360 
60 0.3636 0.1591 66.4589 3.5411 0.0479 74.0000 4.0000 0.3636 0.0398 3.6043 0.1794 0.0449 0.9999 0.5679 11.3591 5.6795 3.6357 
 




Refresher courses for the PA’s personnel are very differentiated in terms of time and 
topic. They can require days or even months to be successfully concluded. Leveraging on the 
‘Training capacity ratio’ means to provide the Municipality with suitable tools for knowledge 
improvement and cultural change. As it was seen in the previous chapter, cultural change may 
be possible by creating sense of the institutions and pride in public officials, so as to re-establish 
a clean governance structure. 
Fostering the resilience of Cerda Municipality may require the involvement of external 
consultants to guide the local Body’s employees in: gradually adopting sustainable integrity 
models; fixing possible communicative ‘short circuits’ between internal departments and 
politics, as well as between one department and another; boosting inclusion of the municipal 
personnel in decision-making processes, in order to enhance internal accountability and mutual 
watchdogging. Ultimately, this approach may conduct to a visible regeneration of the citizens’ 
public trust in the local Government justified by a reinvented Municipality’s image − POLICY 
1a, Appendix B. 
Assuming that the Municipality’s decision-makers want to undertake an investment 
with own resources, a possible initial strategy to cover the financial sacrifice of training 
programmes may be that of reallocating part of the Municipality’s incomes from doubtful 
receivables generated by the credit recovery activity triggered by the Special Management 
Commission of Cerda Municipality’s bankruptcy, according to the normal spending for 
training of a best-in-class municipality with the same characteristics of Cerda − POLICY 1b 
and POLICY 1c, Appendix B. Deepened researches on SIOPE (2020) allowed to quantify an 
approximate average yearly expenditure for training of EUR 1,500 per person, which may be 
adjusted according to the Municipality’s necessities. 
Nonetheless, funding personnel training should not be a one-time event, since learning 
requires continuous efforts, especially in a turbulent environment like the public one. 
Accordingly, as claimed by Levine (1978), the crisis status of a local government requires 
productivity and creativity from public officials, affects the organisational morale and implies 
the adaptation of basic strategies to design organisational structures with new growth prospects. 
Therefore, the Municipality might take into account the possibility to rationalise the local 
spending for personnel, in order to invest in training and integrity programmes sustainably. 
This may be done in different manners, such as by means of simple fund-reallocation solutions, 
by resorting to national and supranational subsidies, or to other types of social shock-absorber. 




Intuitively, enabling training programmes only may guarantee the improvement of the 
overall staff’s expertise and integrity, but may not also deal with the legal side-effects of the 
spoils systems, remove the entry barriers to people with high professionalism and the tendency 
of politics to inflate the number of public positions. In particular, for the latter issue, the result 
may be a marked and unsustainable loss of financial resources due to both an increase in the 
training budget share and in personnel expenses due to possible politically-driven over-
employment. 
Therefore, a joint action with the upper governmental institutions is firstly needed with 
the aim to unblock public turnover and, contemporary, limit the scope and capacity of the 
political discretion deriving from the adoption of ‘spoils systems’ mechanisms − POLICY 2, 
Appendix B. In so doing, it could give capable and competent people access to the bureaucratic 
machine, so that even a limited replacement may gradually trigger a cultural change being 
hinged on a meritocratic ethos and, if combined with adequate training programmes, producing 
positive knowledge spillover throughout the public Body. 
Finally, and most importantly, the suggested policy package may not produce the 
expected results without the crucial support of the local politics and an endorsing change in the 
community’s culture aimed to prevent unsustainable public job redundancies. Accordingly, a 
continuous effort to sensitise the external stakeholders to refuse any kind of blurred agreement 
is also required − POLICY 3, Appendix B. In the knowledge that this kind of process requires 
time and resources − intangible especially −, asking the relevant stakeholders to make a 
vigorous effort jointly with the Municipality is needed to prevent ‘active’ waste of resources 
and improve the overall public performance at local level. 
 
7.7 Concluding remarks 
This chapter gives an insight of how ‘passive’ waste, coming from legal opportunities in public 
administration, may lay the foundations for ‘active’ waste over time. The case of Cerda is 
representative of several Italian local realities, where the presence of non-meritocratic 
patronage in a culturally-predisposed environment and the insufficient budgeting in favour of 
personnel training programmes, contributed, in different ways and moments, to the change in 
its HR endowment. 
Preferential practices in job placement temporarily guaranteed politicians to reach 
public consensus, legitimation and control power over bureaucracy, but it condemned the 




public Body to equip itself with low-expertise individuals for a long-time lapse and, as a result, 
to jeopardise its performance over time. 
Furthermore, the national austere reforms on public employment aimed at cutting 
public personnel costs off may have not exercised any appreciable effect on reversing the over-
employment trend. Contrarily, they may have only excluded skilled individuals from access to 
the bureaucratic apparatus through competitive procedures. 
Training programmes, limitation of the opportunities for using ‘spoils system’ and 
unblock of public hiring are essential to improve the overall degree of organisational expertise, 
the civil servants’ accountability and promote reciprocal control over possible internal 
vulnerabilities enabling unfair political choices. 
Nevertheless, the original low attitudes to clientelist practices do not ensure corruption-
free environments. Especially when national reforms provoke an abrupt freeze of the public 
employment turnover, public organisations are asked to maintain personnel skills and ethics at 
the levels that ensure high public performance and adequately address collective needs, thus 
balancing the gradual degradation of professionalism and remedy to past myopic and unfair 
choices. 
The levers suggested in this research can improve their success probability if supported 
by the parallel implementation of an adequate DPM system. As it was argued in Chapter 6, 
performance drivers, enabled by means of specific organisational strategic resources, constitute 
short-term signals of possible unethical behaviours at system level and, therefore, may 
contribute to guide policy- and decision-makers in rationalising the Municipality’s HRM in the 
long-run, without compromise the organisational success. Such an approach may foster 
professional and ethical learning, as well as virtuous community trust-building processes. 
Finally, as in whatever local reality, political willingness is the key for a purposefully 
change in the local culture of Cerda. In the light of this consideration, the final chapter 
experiments with a collaborative strategy by assuming a comprehensive view of the case-study 
that involves the capability of the relevant stakeholders of the local area in collaborating with 
the Municipality to prevent corruption, namely according to an outside-in (Bianchi et al., 2019) 




EXPERIMENTING WITH A COLLABORATIVE GOVERNANCE STRATEGY TO 





In public corruption, private gains incentive civil servants to take actions displacing community 
interests, often colluding with one or more actors external to the public context. Any possible 
consequence is neither limited to a single public or private entity nor to a specific time horizon. 
Wicked problems − such as corruption − cannot be completely fixed, because of their 
intricacy, variation over time, multi-actor, -sector and -level features (Bianchi, 2016). 
Nevertheless, it does not mean to stop the effort to eradicate them. Even on grounds of 
disheartening failures of well-arranged, whole-one-sided public initiatives, by taking into account 
levels of viability, sacrifice and expected benefits, the endeavour in this direction calls for aware 
and deliberated decision-making processes based on a joint and committed intervention, which 
might be able to ensure an inclusion as broad as the key-interlocutors’ interests pragmatically 
involved. 
Public agencies have to comply with national and supranational anti-corruption 
regulations, which are naturally pivoted on legal and economic aspects of the problem at hand. 
Due to their abstraction and generalisation, they often disregard the cultural factors of the 
environments where they find application, which are instead crucial for enhancing the likelihood 
of good response to public reforms at any territorial level, especially where regional or even local 
cultural configurations sensibly differ one from another. Accordingly, designing anti-corruption 
strategies should be carefully conducted by means of narrow-scope lens for economic, political 
and, especially, cultural analyses of recipient communities, bearing in mind that any kind of 
verbose statement or promise of miraculous solutions should be avoided. 
Under this point of view, the collective action theory (Marquette & Peiffer, 2015; Mungiu-
Pippidi, 2015; Olson, 1971; Ostrom et al., 1992; Persson et al., 2013; Rothstein & Varraich, 2017) 
moves from the consideration that an individual corrupts or is corrupted on the basis of the general 




proneness within the system which he/she belongs to (Jancsics, 2019). Within such a system, 
coherently with the neo-institutional approach of corruption rooting in governmental contexts 
(Pizzorno, 1992b; Vannucci, 2012, 2015), the co-evolution processes between economic 
convenience, legal opportunities and cultural basis explain how corruption produces growing 
rewards over time, annihilates ethical constraints and creates barriers from exogenous 
interferences. 
Given their capability to directly affect the daily lives of citizens, local governments are 
the most evident form of public governance systems (Masters & Graycar, 2016) and, as such, they 
are able to play a role of frontline in hindering public corruption. Nonetheless, the active 
commitment of public bodies based on a unilateral approach may result appropriate for temporary 
control of corruption and lead the considered system to an acceptable equilibrium where levels of 
wrongdoings are kept provisionally ‘frozen’. In other terms, disturbances and shocks deliberately 
provoked by local policy-makers to curb corrupt practices may turn out to be ineffective in the 
long-run, due to the resilience of pathological patterns that have rooted in communities or 
organisations characterised by favourable governance structures and legacy. 
Adopting an outside-in perspective (Bianchi et al., 2019: 2) in policy design may allow 
local governments to understand the extent to which possible collaborative settings with strategic 
interlocutors may enable key-actors to affect the shared community resources that are considered 
decisive to make an anti-corruption strategy successful, by emphasising the underlying feedback 
structure of relevant cause-effect relationships. Therefore, even though empirical evidence on 
collaborative governance in anti-corruption agendas is rather scarce (Poocharoen, 2014), this 
chapter experiments with a collaborative strategy as a policy suggestion for preventing corruption 
in Cerda Municipality through a DPG approach (Bianchi et al., 2019; Xavier & Bianchi, 2019). 
The following questions will be addressed: What are the causal interdependencies and the 
main decisional levers enabling a potential anti-corruption collaborative governance strategy 
based on the dynamic performance governance approach? What are the roles played by the policy-
network participants in designing and implementing such a strategy? 
In the first part of the chapter, a literature overview of collaborative governance and 
stakeholder engagement strategies in anti-corruption is proposed. In the second part of the chapter, 
a stakeholder identification and analysis (Bryson, 2004; Mitchell, Agle, & Wood, 1997) is meant 
to identify roles, powers, tools, possible incentives and disincentives in a collaboration-based anti-




corruption policy for the case of Cerda Municipality. Later, supported by some empirical cases of 
cities having implemented successful anti-corruption agendas, possible causal relationships 
underlying a collaborative governance scenario are framed through a CLD and a DPG chart. The 
chapter concludes by arguing likely feasibility and concerns regarding such a policy and the 
reasons to rely on academia to facilitate design and implementation of collaborative anti-
corruption policies. 
It is opportune to highlight that the policy is here exclusively proposed as a preventive 
measure aimed at reducing future risks of inappropriate behaviours in the local area of Cerda, in 
which every local government should consider to engage actively, with no regards to the actual 
likelihood of corruption. Albeit not currently present in Cerda Municipality, corruption may 
silently insinuate in every moment of the public activity, just like in whatever other local authority. 
Collaboration-based projects may, thus, represent integrative strategies strengthening the already-
in-use anti-corruption tools provided by national regulations or selected at organisational level. 
 
8.2 Collaborative governance: An overview 
The concept of ‘good governance’ can be generally understood as a set of social rules and facts 
related to accepted ways to behave (Offe, 2009: 553). The principles to which it is inspired are, 
therefore, essential to reduce risk of corruption (United States Institute of Peace, 2010). These 
focus on: individuals’ participation; transparency of decisions and information; institutional 
effectiveness and efficiency; responsiveness of institutions; governmental institutions, private 
sector and civil society’s accountability; consensus-oriented approach; equity and inclusiveness of 
society’s members; fair legal frameworks (UNESCO, 2005). 
Each of the elements listed above becomes as more significant as corruption represents a 
problem with a bigger and bigger complexity and systematicity, such that simplistically designing 
policies and make rules operating is not sufficient to successfully cope with it. For similar reasons, 
organisations usually collaborate with each other when the effort of a single public institution is 
not sufficient to reach a collective objective alone (Agranoff & McGuire, 2001; Bryson, Crosby, 
& Stone, 2006; Hudson, Hardy, Henwood, & Wistow, 1999; Roberts, 2001; Weisel & Shalvi, 
2015). Especially in presence of uncontrollable environmental − both cultural and political − 
elements and unforecastable outcomes of public action, such as in corruption issues, to align 
visions and intents of multiple key-actors who have different and, sometimes, contrasting stakes, 




requires an approach able to foster broad inclusiveness in decision-making and accountability of 
all the parties concerned. 
Especially in the last 20 years, many studies stressed on the need of shared accountability 
and outcomes of public action, offering different definitions and conceptualisations of possible 
settings of multi-stakeholder engagement, such as: network model (Löffler, 2003); joined-up 
government (Bogdanor, 2005; Christensen, Fimreite, & Lægreid, 2014); whole-of-government 
(Christensen & Lægreid, 2007; OECD, 2005); horizontal management (Peters, 2015); and so forth. 
All of them are driven by multi-dimensional and multi-level arrangements features of societal 
issues requiring a collaborative and systemic approach of intervention (Halligan, Sarrico, & 
Rhodes, 2012). 
At this regard, Hemmati (2002: 2) mainly focused on the significance of dialogue between 
primary stakeholders in relation to a specific problem and, by using the terms ‘multi-stakeholder 
process’, referred to a complex of actions finalised to engage key-stakeholders in communicative 
settings, which allow for mutual accountability and fairness, hence supporting decision-finding 
and -making processes on the basis of precepts of participation and transparency, as well as 
boosting partnerships and reinforce stakeholder networks. 
Solid communicative foundations are the prerequisite of an effective and enduring 
collaboration. It can be understood as a gradual process through which all the parties involved 
share tangible and intangible resources, risks, responsibilities and rewards to plan, realise and 
evaluate together a series of programmed activities aimed at reaching a common purpose or solving 
a common issue, thus reciprocally improving their own abilities and mutual trust (Camarinha-
Matos & Afsarmanesh, 2006: 3-4). A similar definition was adopted by Bryson et al. (2006: 44) 
to define ‘cross-sector collaboration’, highlighting the possibility to only ‘link’ rather than also 
‘share’ resources, abilities and activities between entities that belong to different sectors, as well 
as stressing the necessity to recur to it when a given outcome might not be attained if each 
organisation worked alone within its sectorial boundaries. 
Although through a different term, Byrne, Arnold, and Nagano (2010) substantially 
provided the same concept by talking about coalitions, considered as formal collaboration 
structures able to involve a broad range of organisational, group and individual key-actors who, 
guided by a unique vision, put in place joint activities to reach common objectives by sharing 




intangible and tangible resources, boosting a participatory approach and relying on networking, 
lobbying and community involvement. 
Very close to the broad concept of ‘multi-stakeholder process’ conceived by Hemmati 
(2002) is the framework provided by Ansell and Gash (2007), who appreciably emphasised the 
significance of communication between participants and their crucial role as active decision-
makers, as well as fixed the boundaries between what is collaboration in the public domain and 
what is not. In particular, triggered by public sector’s gaps − e.g., considerable regulation costs 
and politicisation, and failures of public policy implementation − or opportunities − e.g., 
knowledge and institutional capacity enhancements −, collaborative governance is an explicit and 
formal strategy implying the non-merely-consultative engagement of non-state parties in joint 
decision-making processes with public agencies (Bingham & O’Leary, 2008; Koliba, Meek, & 
Zia, 2011), in order to reach consensus on public policies and issues, based on dyadic and 
harmonious communication flows (Ansell & Gash, 2007). 
Typically, the stakeholder arrangement of a collaborative approach includes heterogeneous 
voices, such as state staff, politicians, representatives of third-sector organisations − i.e., NGOs −, 
civil, entrepreneurial and scientific communities, and so on (Søreide & Truex, 2011). The initiative 
launched by public sector organisations; the presence of nonstate organisations being truly 
engaged in consensus-oriented decision-making processes and, therefore, accountable for policy 
outcomes; the existence of formal collaborative arrangements underlying a clear strategy to rule 
the reciprocal influences between stakeholders and agencies; and the locus on public management 
or policies (Ansell & Gash, 2007: 544-547) are the mainstream elements of this kind of interactive 
governance, which relies on shared resources, joint structures and activities (Walter & Petr, 2000). 
In short, multi-stakeholder participation is aimed to foster discussion, bargaining and mutual 
learning, in a way to “bridge the gap between grass-roots action and top-down policy” (Søreide & 
Truex, 2011: 4). 
Collaborative governance should not be confused with other forms of joint action between 
public and private actors. With this regard, Camarinha-Matos and Afsarmanesh (2006) single 
collaboration out from networking, coordination and cooperation. In this order, each of them is 
progressively included in the following configuration, so as to increase its content and scope until 
to shape the broad concept of collaboration. Accordingly, on the one hand, networking only 
includes communicative processes and exchange of information for members’ reciprocal 




advantage and coordination − identifiable, for instance, in public-private partnerships (PPPs), 
where joint decision-making is put on the back burner (Ansell & Gash, 2007: 548) − is exclusively 
an exchange of information, alignment or modification of activities to reach more efficient results; 
on the other hand, cooperation includes activity adaptation, exchange of information, as well as 
resource sharing for the attainment of compatible objectives (Camarinha-Matos & Afsarmanesh, 
2006: 3). What is lacking in the latter definition to shape collaboration is the joint effort, identity 
and decision-making to reach not compatible, but common goals. 
Finally, the ‘formality’ criterion distinguishes collaborative governance from any other 
kind of policy network, where collaboration remains implicit and informal (Ansell & Gash, 2007: 
547-548). Also, managerialism is not at the core of collaborative governance (2007: 547), but it 
may be still be present in what is called ‘co-production’ (Alford, 2014; Bovaird, 2007; Nabatchi 
et al., 2017; Nabatchi, Steen, Sicilia, & Brand, 2016; Osborne, Radnor, & Nasi, 2012; Radnor, 
Osborne, Kinder, & Mutton, 2014) or ‘value co-creation’ (Osborne, 2018; Osborne, Radnor, & 
Strokosch, 2016). Indeed, co-production is usually kept distinct from other offshoots of the NPG 
paradigm, since any form of interactive governance which does not directly involve lay actors is 
automatically excluded from it (Nabatchi et al., 2017; Sancino & Jacklin-Jarvis, 2016). In spite 
this conceptual difference, however, existent co-production processes may disclose some critical 
leverage-points able to trigger collaboration initiatives, where they are needed and feasible. 
 
8.3 Stakeholder engagement modes in anti-corruption initiatives 
Anti-corruptionism constitutes a controversial topic because of the fluidity in defining corruption 
itself and, despite too little attention has been paid to it by scholars and practitioners, global 
morality has made corruption less tolerable everywhere (Sampson, 2015). This renewed spirit of 
justice, fair economic and social equality is ascribable to the set of movements of collective action 
arisen throughout the world. 
Collective action is “a process of cooperation between various stakeholders with the aim 
of jointly countering corruption” (United Nations Global Compact, 2013: 2). The reaction to the 
worldwide scourge of corruption has led social movements to demand greater accountability by 
politicians and economic powers (della Porta, 2017). Throughout the world, public interest groups, 
such as Transparency International (TI), and social movements in the form of anti-austerity 
protests and direct actions, such as Anonymous (Jarvis, 2014) and WikiLeaks (McCarthy, 2015), 




have represented, with different narratives, the main forms of organised anti-corruption and for-
transparency engagement of civil society (della Porta, 2017). 
Political opportunities (della Porta, 1995; Kriesi, Koopmans, Duyvendak, & Giugni, 1995; 
Tarrow, 1989); tangible and cultural resources made ready for action (della Porta & Diani, 2006); 
enabling processes; structural elements affecting the interaction between public and private 
sectors; were highlighted as critical reinforcing factors of civil mobilization (della Porta, 2017). In 
particular, especially in the case of rampant corruption, a purposeful reaction requires coordination 
(Marquette & Peiffer, 2015: 10), which is not an individual’s isolated action, as it is based on 
accurate planning and collective decision-making on mobilization of resources and structures 
finalised to interlink heterogeneous kinds of stakeholder operating within complex networks, such 
as citizen associations, trade unions, movements and political parties (della Porta, 2017: 668-669). 
Confirming the emphasis on reorganisation of bureaucracy structures, educational 
campaigns, international agreements and so on, given by scholars from different disciplinary fields 
(Gans-Morse, Borges, Makarin, Mannah-Blankson, Nickow, & Zhang, 2018), top-down anti-
corruption policies consisting of monitoring, regulating and imposing of penalties, such as staff 
whistle-blowing and community monitoring, have been explored more than bottom-up initiatives 
launched by category associations and citizens in the corruption discourse (Jancsics, 2019). 
Despite the increasing requirement of multi-stakeholder joint efforts against corruption, the 
practice seems to have mainly favoured co-production practices. In fact, with the aim to encourage 
individuals to report corruptive practices safely, worldwide governmental institutions and public 
agencies have increasingly made available whistleblowing systems to allow individuals to report 
personal or third-parts experiences of corruptive practices anonymously. Interestingly, in the 
typology provided by Nabatchi et al. (2017), such a kind of tool can be considered as the typical 
form of individual co-production, which may imply positive spillover effects to specific groups of 
interests or overall communities. 
Although with a minor diffusion and frequency, anti-corruption initiatives have also 
involved whole-of-government (Christensen & Lægreid, 2007) strategies for specific forms of 
misconduct or public sectors being particularly struck at all territorial levels. They have assumed 
different labels, such as multi-stakeholder processes (Søreide & Truex, 2011), coalitions (Byrne 
et al., 2010) and collective actions (United Nations Global Compact, 2010). 




Recognising the need of a multi-stakeholder approach in place of alternative solutions that 
suffer from weaknesses in boosting sector governance and reducing risk of corruption (Søreide & 
Truex, 2011), institutionalism has acquired a growing importance to respond to such challenges in 
specific contexts due to the general failure of politics as relevant frontline-actor (Fritzen, 2005). 
The national anti-corruption agencies (ACAs) represent the result of this recognition over 
the last decades. Theoretically speaking, these agencies are recognised for their political 
independence, permanency, position in the national political and legal network, scope of authority, 
accountability, transparency, investigatory powers, preventive and repressive action against 
corruptive phenomena (Anechiarico, 2010; Charron, 2008). In addition, ACAs are not stand-alone 
public organisations (Byrne et al., 2010) and, as such, they have been advocated by international 
bodies, such as the OECD, TI and the UN to promote collaboration with civil society (Poocharoen, 
2014) and enhance public confidence and legitimacy of reforms (Søreide & Truex, 2011). 
Typically, public agencies either start or trigger a multi-stakeholder joint intervention, 
having a primary role of leadership in collaborative governance (Ansell & Gash, 2007), thus 
representing central reference points that make easier starting joint efforts to cope with corruption 
issues (Poocharoen, 2014: 17). Besides, as ‘backbone organisations’, their presence allow for 
setting a neutral collaborative environment, coaching participating actors and adding legitimacy 
to the collaboration process (Dubow, Hug, Serafini, & Litzler, 2018). In other terms, public 
agencies are ‘starters’ and ‘catalysts’ of anti-corruption joint initiatives, whose cornerstone, as well 
as critical success factor, is to ensure purposeful levels of stakeholder engagement being based on 
the dialogue dimensions of inclusion, openness, tolerance, empowerment and transparency 
(Pederson, 2006). 
Nevertheless, most of the relevant literature has been sceptical about the national ACAs’ 
effectiveness (Gans-Morse et al., 2018), as  their work seems to have not generated appreciable 
outcomes in controlling corruption (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2015). In particular, risks of loss of trust in 
the anti-corruption NGOs are mainly due, on the one hand, to possible compromises and conflicts 
of interest that may arise in coalition-building strategies, and, on the other hand, to a bounded 
approach based on negotiation and cooperation, which does not allow for any open confrontation 
with critical stakeholders of the civil society, if not sporadically at domestic level (de Sousa, 
Larmour, & Hindess, 2009; della Porta, 2017). Moreover, voluntary involvement of unconvincing 
actors waving the anti-corruption flag may actually question the ACAs’ credibility (Sampson, 




2015). Finally, the general scarce information available online and the lack of responsiveness to 
recent research surveys, which attempted to assess the ACAs’ and related networks’ performance 
(Schütte, 2020), cannot be considered positive signals of their reliability and effectiveness. 
 
8.3.1 Main frameworks enabling collaboration against corruption 
Multi-stakeholder initiatives aimed at warding corruption off trace − sometimes partially − the 
main characteristics and contents of the Ansell and Gash’s (2007) collaborative governance 
framework. Interestingly, in their original meanings, the terms ‘collaboration’ and ‘corruption’ are 
exactly at the opposite extremes, provided that the former is “derived from the Latin ‘collaborare’, 
meaning ‘to work together’, and can be seen as a process of shared creation” (Camarinha-Matos 
& Afsarmanesh, 2006: 3), while the latter derives from the Latin cum and rumpere, which mean 
‘to break together’ (Ferrante & Vannucci, 2017: 33). 
As it was previously highlighted, corruption has always context-dependent specifications 
(Davis, 2009; Lambsdorff & Schulze, 2015) and, therefore, dealing with such a phenomenon 
necessarily requires a special focus on intensity, dynamicity and cyclicity of wrongdoings, which 
often relying on avantgarde mechanisms and intricate gears (de Sousa et al., 2009). Framing 
interrelationships among key-actors belonging to specific institutional settings appear, therefore, 
to be essential to boost good governance and, in so doing, increase organisational stability, 
counteract environmental uncertainty and complexity, as well as reduce transactional costs 
(Bryson et al., 2006). 
Coherently with the nature of corruption, the collaborative anti-corruption frameworks are 
multiple, various and variable in time and space. The approaches, perspectives, models and tools 
that have mainly been adopted by practitioners in projects of joint anti-corruption effort are 
characterised by different degrees of: stakeholder inclusion; formality; orientation to consensus of 
the audience; communication and information sharing among participants; alignment of 
compatible and/or complementary intents for achieving reciprocal benefits; joint policy- and 
decision-making processes; joint implementation of the designed policies; and so forth. As such, 
this sub-section mainly touches on frameworks that have produced a significant echo in the 
literature and in the practice, and whose features are easily recognisable in each of them, often 
differing from one another in terms of label used to identify them only. 




Poocharoen (2014) defined a general framework for designing collaborative anti-
corruption initiatives, which is comprehensive of five dimensions: kind of corruption; typology of 
anti-corruption work; object of collaboration; nature of collaboration; actors involved. 
Accordingly, in relation to the kind of anti-corruption work, specific agencies should be involved 
in the collaboration. For instance, in the case of a punishment-and-persecution purpose, 
collaboration is suggested between key government agencies, while in the case of prevention 
objects private sector should be involved by virtue of the focused sectorial knowledge and 
expertise (Poocharoen, 2014). 
Søreide and Truex (2011) made a distinction between ‘multi-stakeholder forums for 
dialogue’, ‘platforms’ and ‘groups with a mandate’, according to the purpose to respectively 
provide participants with: opportunities for joint learning and understanding of the problem at 
hand; a scene where negotiating, generating and, possibly, agreeing upon specific policies; a joint 
action and decision-making to implement and oversee the selected policies. 
Collective Actions (CAs) have mainly been adopted for engaging companies, governments 
and civil society organisations in ensuring transparency in public procurement (United Nations 
Global Compact, 2010). It is possible to distinguish between ‘pure’ CAs models, which 
exclusively involve businesses, and ‘hybrid’ ones, formed by either private-public or private-civil 
society partnerships (United Nations Global Compact, 2015). CAs move from the recognised need 
of a broad participation of different actors involved in the public procurement process, being they 
either belonging to the ‘demand side’ − i.e., civil servants − or to the ‘supply-side’ − i.e., private 
sector organisations −, and follow three fundamental principles: the formal agreement involves 
multiple stakeholders; public agencies are parties and/or promoters of the agreement; third parties, 
being usually represented by civil society organizations, assume the role of facilitators (2015). 
The World Bank (2008) identified four kinds of CAs having different degree of 
complexity, according to timeframe − i.e., short-term or long-term − and engagement level − 
ethical commitment or external enforcement −, that is to say: anti-corruption declarations; 
principle-based initiatives; integrity pacts (IPs); certifying business coalitions. The first two groups 
are ethics-based and respectively include short- and long-run principle-binding signatories and 
commitment steered by mutual pressure, but the latter can also imply cooperation with government 
bodies (2008). Diversely, IPs are formal agreements between the parties involved, which imply 
external monitoring of the procurement process and penalties for violations; while ‘certifying 




business coalitions’ involve companies that obtain membership and certification only if compliant 
with particular requirements that are endorsed externally (2008). 
A similar model is provided by the Center for Private Enterprise (CIPE). The main 
differences are about the parameters of classification − simpler/more complex for the commitment 
degree and transaction-specific/long-term for the timeframe − and the broader ‘multi-stakeholder 
coalition’ perspective instead of the simple ‘certifying business coalition’ (Morrell & Bettcher, 
2013). 
IPs are noteworthy to be deepened more in detail, as the practice has greatly recurred to 
them, most probably for the significancy of the corruption form to which they relate. IPs focus on 
public procurement and contracting (United Nations Global Compact, 2015). They outline rights 
and obligations in formal contracts between a governmental authority and tenderers, as well as 
between the same bidders, providing for no-bribery agreements; so as to enable governments to 
contain costly and distorting impact of public procurement corruption and, as a result, guarantee 
citizens adequate public services (Olaya Garcia, 2013: 8). Within this framework, involvement of 
different audiences throughout the procurement process; political will; arrangement of an external 
monitoring activity; human and financial resources; time and knowledge; ‘lead implementer’ 
skills; commitment; credibility; are all considered as critical success factors of an IP (2013). 
Each of the CA solutions can be adopted progressively within a single project, depending 
on the level of awareness and willingness of participants. For instance, to begin with a certifying 
business coalition should be considered for contexts with high proneness to corruptive practices in 
public procurement. Later, a gradual reduction of commitment may be practiced if made possible 
by a significant and detectable enhancement in civic morality among participants over time. 
Nevertheless, in spite of several and unique features of every stakeholder-inclusive 
approach in anti-corruption initiatives, two elements need to be always present: firstly, to guarantee 
transparency to citizens through free access to the relevant information; secondly, to define 
operational standards being not specifically intended for anti-corruption scopes, but significant to 
address it (Søreide & Truex, 2011). 
 
8.3.2 Failure factors of collaboration in anti-corruption projects 
In line with a network-based approach (Rhodes, 1997), anti-corruption efforts have usually 
regarded prosecution and prevention of corrupt phenomena, social campaigns and educational 




programmes (Doig, Watt, & Williams, 2007; Meagher, 2005; Poocharoen, 2014). Nevertheless, 
albeit the majority of governments has created tailored ACAs and issued ad hoc regulation, 
academics and practitioners have unexpectedly failed to frame collaborative governance settings 
to hinder corruption (Poocharoen, 2014: 2). 
A possible explanation may be that the implementation of joint-action approaches always 
shows some limitations (Halligan et al., 2012; Huxham, 2000; Newman, Barnes, Sullivan, & 
Knops, 2004), which may have disincentivised collaboration initiatives. These may be sought in 
particular configurations of one or more variables, singled out by Marquette and Peiffer (2015), 
exerting a significant influence on the success of collaborations, namely: group size; group 
heterogeneity; face-to-face communication; repeated interaction; trust/good reputations; 
interdependence; voluntary group membership; heuristics/norms; monitoring/transparency; long 
time horizons; salience of collective good. 
Issues that may challenge whatever collaborative initiative are also traced in anti-
corruption efforts, such as: the risk of low commitment and scarce expectations on the 
collaboration-based initiative; the possible existence of conflicts of interest; the lack of information 
to support the multi-stakeholder process; the lack of authority and participants’ motivation; 
difficulties in achieving group consensus; imbalances in negotiation power, duties and resources 
(Søreide & Truex, 2011). Furthermore, other criticalities may arise from inadequate attention on 
the elements identified within the Ansell and Gash’s (2007) framework, such as: mismanagement 
of managerial interdependences; scarce trust building; goal misalignment; poor communication; 
insufficient resource gathering; modest collaborative process legitimacy; and so forth. 
Fighting corruption by means of collaborative networks may create further specific 
problems in terms of corruption detection, information collection and commitment by corrupters, 
corrupted individuals (Poocharoen, 2014). Initial commitment may lose momentum and conflict 
among upholders may arise as soon as the initial agreement gets started the collaboration due to 
internal conflicts of interest (Abubakar et al., 2017). In addition, there might be some other 
deterrent factors, such as: agencies’ resistance in sharing sensitive information among participants; 
changes in regulations, laws and codes of conduct; and the low profile that the civil society 
organisations (CSOs) may prefer to keep in place of an active decision-maker role (Poocharoen, 
2014). 




Critical factors are also: the role of media outlets in shaping people’s perception 
(Lambsdorff, 2001a); the opportunity to produce evidence of the mutual and blurred agreement 
between corrupter and corrupt; the ACAs’ risk of seeing their efforts to go up in smoke because 
of specific parties’ intentions to undermine their work, with the consequence for ACAs to not only 
to be labelled as untrustworthy, but also to distrust TV, radio, journals and the same civil society 
(Gilman, 2010: VII). Indeed, the participants’ mutual perceptions of the behaviour assumed in 
carrying out their tasks within the joint structures − which shape the group trust − is a fundamental 
factor affecting the stakeholders’ will to contribute to a collaborative anti-corruption project 
(Elster, 1985; Marquette & Peiffer, 2015; Ostrom, 1990; Seabright, 1993). 
At this regard, the amount/quality of information released by the key-actors involved 
reveals to be crucial for the success of the overall process: uncertainty of the success of an anti-
corruption collaborative effort is especially on the real intentions and incentives of group members 
and, as a result, on the extent to which they want to genuinely operate in line with the collaborative 
process or, contrarily, destabilise it (Søreide & Truex, 2011). In this last case, “for political reasons, 
collective action problems can be carefully crafted or maintained, as a way of undermining the 
effectiveness of institutions meant to challenge corruption” (Marquette & Peiffer, 2015: 10). 
Despite anti-corruption initiatives should come “in fear and moral indignation, not in 
calculated efforts at personal gain” (Jasper, 1997: 3), government departments involved may hide 
critical information about poor performance to maintain electoral consensus and resist to power 
sharing that derives from multi-stakeholder initiatives, scared by the possibility of uncontrollable 
deviations from their policy agenda (Søreide & Truex, 2011). 
For the private sector, hiding information on damaging operations may result as much 
important as profit maximization (Søreide & Truex, 2011). Disregarding social responsibility, 
there might also be room for pre-existent agreements with the public one finalised to maintain the 
status quo, without benefits − or even with dangers − for the multi-stakeholder process (2011). 
Likewise, CSOs’ representatives may not be enough active and lead to unpleasant side-effects 
(2011). In particular, depending on a given context, one may even imagine situations where CSOs’ 
representatives take advantages from to make their voices heard and affect the group process for 
personal gain, by exploiting the acquired visibility. 
Effectiveness of collaboration increases as members of collaborations are aware of the 
form of corruption they are trying to cope with and the desired outcomes to reach (Poocharoen, 




2014). Accordingly, transparency is fundamental to enhance citizens’ policy understanding and, 
as a result, compliance (Porumbescu, Lindeman, Ceka, & Cucciniello, 2017), but insufficient 
political goodwill and existent quality of governance may constraint it (Søreide & Truex, 2011). 
Political willingness is also crucial to enforce legal framework and, as such, it should be considered 
as an endogenous element of collective action (Marquette & Peiffer, 2015). 
Finally, poor facilitative skills for collaborative leadership, such as communication 
capabilities supporting stakeholder engagement and psychological conditions; strategies lacking 
of trajectory, clear responsibilities and measurable objectives; the influence of the upholders’ 
institutional design on operational interdependence, can strongly affect collaboration (Abubakar 
et al., 2017; Ansell & Gash, 2007). 
Hindering corruption implies the adoption of ad hoc strategies. As such, to fail in 
diagnosing the correct form of corruption and, consequentially, designing curbing policies may 
explain the heterogeneity of outcomes related to several anti-corruption initiatives (Jancsics, 
2019). Sometimes, multi-stakeholder initiatives may reduce their effectiveness just because of the 
pretension to cope with several challenging issues together at once, when a narrower and better 
focused approach may reveal to be more desirable, even where corruption constitutes a significant 
cause of poor sectorial governance (Søreide & Truex, 2011: 7). 
Under a totally different point of view, not only collaboration may not be a panacea, but it 
may even favourite corruption occurrences (Weisel & Shalvi, 2015). In the public domain, poor 
governance contexts lay the foundations of this kind risk when the proximity with the private sector 
and communities becomes greater and greater (Minkova, 2018). As some studies showed, blurred 
relationships between governments and nonstate institutions involved in anti-corruption initiatives 
may be susceptible to invalidate significant premises of their own success due to, for instance, 
internal sabotages, mutual undercuts, preventive controls on members and the exclusion of 
undesirable NGOs or the civil society itself (Zaloznaya, Reisinger, & Claypool, 2018). 
It emerges the need of a credible, reliable, independent and capable champion for starting 
and guiding stakeholder coalitions in anti-corruption initiative, namely an individual or a group of 
people being assertive, intelligent organiser/organisers and change agent/agents (Crosby & 
Bryson, 2010: 219). That, recognising the superior capability of collaboration arrangements to 
represent powerful tools devoted to this aim, often higher than stand-alone individual efforts 
(Byrne et al., 2010: 25). 




8.4 Local anti-corruption initiatives from the world 
With different levels of autonomy, local governments are endowed with authority and direct 
interaction stemming from the greatest closeness with the served communities (Halligan et al., 
2012: 230). They represent the direct link between citizens and public officials and, as the most 
evident form of public governance systems, assume a critical role in curbing any form of corruption 
(Masters & Graycar, 2016). 
Local governments involve several of the multi-sector functions of a national government 
and councils deal with the totality of public services as a whole, so that it is possible to consider 
them as a discrete sector (Pyman et al., 2018). Bearing in mind that every kind of reaction to 
repress/prevent corrupt trends should strictly focus on the specific form of the problem faced 
(Klitgaard et al., 2000), the local governments’ multisectoral settings may enable them to specify 
a unique anti-corruption agenda impacting on different public sectors contemporary, where 
national or worldwide anti-corruption programmes only concentrate on a particular sector at a time 
(Søreide & Truex, 2011). 
As a possible approach to reduce corruption at local level, any multi-stakeholder 
configuration must take the view that, to hinder it concretely, common recognition of the problem 
and sincere pressure for a purposeful counteraction are extremely needed. Empirical research 
focusing on collaborative anti-corruption strategies at local level is scarce (Poocharoen, 2014), 
probably not because of academic indolence, but rather of lack of policy- and decision-makers’ 
‘soul-searching’. That constitutes a thunderous signal for practitioners and scholars, who should, 
therefore, pay more attention on this particular topic and put their expertise at the service of 
recidivistic societies. 
Most of the literature contributions focused on the effectiveness of ACAs in either single 
(Chan, 2001; Seidman, 1941) or cross-city analyses (Anechiarico, 2010; Huberts, Anechiarico, & 
Six, 2008) of anti-corruption initiatives. However, some evidences exist about who to get involved 
and how to enhance the likelihood of success of anti-corruption projects at municipal level. More 
precisely, regarding the ‘who’, citizens and policy-makers play a primary role in tackling 
corruption, followed by other possible agents, such as public officers, private companies and 
academia (URAIA, 2017: 20-21). Obviously, the inclusion of other parts of the civil society is 
welcomed, especially of media outlets, whose involvement in anti-corruption projects may further 
constitute a key-factor for detecting some tangible result, as Mungiu-Pippidi (2015: 173) 




emphasised in relation to 471 civil society initiatives launched in sixteen Eastern Europe over the 
first decade of 2000s. Concerning the ‘how’, instead, taking into account that citizens need to be 
empowered and their passivity on the issue reduced, politics should guarantee active leadership, 
expertise, honesty and trust-building in governmental institutions through citizenship mechanisms 
and young people’s involvement in public life (URAIA, 2017: 20). 
Administrative transparency, good governance, public officers’ accountability and 
citizens’ participation in policy-making and budgeting are key-drivers of any local anti-corruption 
effort (URAIA, 2017: 21). Above all, citizens’ participation in planning − and decision-making as 
well − of public services might be appropriate for supporting local politicians’ credibility of 
engaging in such initiatives and improving public scrutiny; even more in the case where 
participation assumes the larger connotation of what Vaillancourt (2009) and Pestoff (2012) 
respectively called ‘co-construction’ and ‘co-governance’, which also involves NGOs and private-
sector agents. 
Nonetheless, as it was discussed in the previous section, there might be some inherent 
subjective incentives and deterrents that, without a suitable debate forum and facilitation, may 
undermine any joint endeavour to tackle corruption, such as low political consensus, scarce social 
responsibility of involved firms and information-sharing avoidance from any sides (Søreide & 
Truex, 2011: 9-11). In addition, objective factors, such as mayor-council form of government in 
municipalities (Nelson & Afonso, 2019) and hyper-regulation may also create opportunities for 
exploiting administrative and political vulnerabilities that favourite the diffusion of misconducts, 
especially in contexts endowed with limited resources (URAIA, 2017: 21). 
Glimmers for corruption, such as shortage of skilled public officials, high proximity with 
communities and inexistent external monitoring (Minkova, 2018: 6-7), may endure and show clear 
signals of resilience, in spite of actions based on tested sets of counteracting measures. 
Furthermore, there might be room for some contradictions between citizens’ perception and their 
factual experience of corruption that may challenge any attempt of diagnosis and/or exert a friction 
force in consequential interventions. This phenomenon was detected in some local governments 
of Latin America, where citizens tend to detach themselves from the political life and refuse to be 
active in democratic governance if they perceive their governments as corrupt, although their 
participation to the local governance is positively related to their corruption experience (Neshkova 
& Kalesnikaite, 2019). This mismatch recalls the Argyris and Schon’s (1978) discrepancy between 




theory espoused − i.e., individuals’ view and values they believe their behaviour is anchored to − 
and theory-in-use − i.e., individuals’ values and view actually descending by their behaviour −, 
which may also be interesting to verify within organisational contexts, where, on the other hand, 
this theoretical elaboration actually originated1. 
However, civil monitoring and action are still significant key-factors for enhancing local 
civil servants’ accountability and transparency, which require a strong attention on indigenous 
political and administrative mindsets. The importance of this kind of emphasis is corroborated by 
some successful local government collaboration-based initiatives from some parts of the world, 
where policy- and decision-makers overturned the existent infamous pro-corruption models into a 
severe and example anti-corruption paradigms. These experiences provide appreciable insights in 
envisaging possible policies being based on citizenship mechanisms and collaborative governance. 
 
8.4.1 Overturning political culture and promoting citizen participation in La Paz, Bolivia 
In La Paz, Bolivia, the mayor Juan Del Granado, on a par with his predecessor Ronald MacLean-
Abaroa2, continued the repressive campaign to curb the endemic corruption within the local 
government immediately after his election in 1999, by means of a harsh agenda and positive 
incentives for good administrative practices. It is possible to distinguish both an inside-out and an 
outside-in point of view (Bianchi et al., 2019: 2) of such a programme, where the former focuses 
on the institutional perspective of performance − in this case, to eradicate corruption from the local 
government −, while the latter stresses on the Del Granado and his staff’s capabilities to adopt 
collaboration-based policies that impacted on shared community resources considered strategic for 
the agenda goals. 
Under an inside-out approach, Del Granado made a radical cultural change in the local 
administration by means of the ‘Zero-Tolerance for Corruption’ policy programme, which 
completely overturned the existent tendency to accept briberies on the basis of three pillars: the 
mandatory persecution of wrongdoings, supported by codes of conduct and accompanied by the 
 
1 For more details, see also Argyris, C. 1985. Strategy, change and defensive routines. Boston: Pitman, Edmondson, 
A. C. 1996. Three Faces of Eden: The Persistence of Competing Theories and Multiple Diagnoses in Organizational 
Intervention Research. Human Relations, 49(5): 571-595. 
2 On the government experience of MacLean-Abaroa, cf. Klitgaard, R., Maclean-Abaroa, R., & Parris, H. L. 2000. 
Corrupt cities: a practical guide to cure and prevention: 180. California: Institute for Contemporary Studies: Institute 
for Contemporary Studies. It is interesting to highlight that, as in the Cerda case, the rooted corrupt culture brought 
again La Paz to the previous pathological political and administrative models. 




launch of initiatives aimed at, on the one hand, creating feeling for the institution and pride in 
public officials and, on the other hand, reconstructing the municipality’s good image; the 
restoration of clean governance, transparency and accountability of the public institution; a fiscal 
recovery programme finalised to collect due taxes (Zúñiga & Heywood, 2015: 2). More in 
particular, the Del Granado’s administration, firstly, created the ‘Transparency Unit’ to deal with 
corruption through a series of tools for whistleblowing and the ‘Continuous Improvement Units’ 
to catalyse bureaucratic procedures and, in addition, adopted a series of measures to: guarantee 
competition in public contracting and tendering; ensure supervision of public works in terms of 
material quality and deadlines; set out to appoint public officials by considering their performance 
instead of clientelist reasons; and get back the administration’s credibility (2015: 2-4)3. 
Under an outside-in perspective, the Del Granado’s agenda envisaged building citizens’ 
trust in the local government through participative mechanisms (Zúñiga & Heywood, 2015: 2). 
Such an approach implied the resort to pertinent discussion forums and enabled the same citizens 
to actively engage in careful policy examinations, such as to concretely foster their accountable 
participation in the City management and, finally, creating genuine social trust. Notably, the La 
Paz’s citizens: 
- were allowed to access the city’s control room by moving proposals and submitting 
complaints to the local authorities through the ‘District Neighborhood Hearings’ − formally 
called ‘audiencias vecinales distritales’; 
- were emboldened to get involved actively in budgeting processes of municipal projects; 
- acquired a more significant control over the city public management by means of the ‘Citizen 
Planning Councils’ − formally labelled as ‘consejos ciudadanos de planificación’ −, 
representing a place for policy discussion arranged and steered by a mayor’s representative; 
- by means of a citizen entity called ‘La Paz Assembly’, were enabled to closely examine 
medium- and long-term municipal policies; 
- were actively involved in multiple forums for discussion − formally called ‘mesas de 
diálogo’ −, such as the Municipal Development Plan and other similar bodies, in order to 
address particularly strategic issues together with municipal servants (Zúñiga & Heywood, 
2015: 5). 
 
3 As it is possible to notice, such political agenda pillars and measures were already discussed in Chapter 6 on the 
occasion of the policy suggestions for the case of Cerda Municipality. 




The success of the Del Granado’s strategy relied on the cultivation of a value basis pivoted 
around the principles of institutional holism and culture; a-politization and fairness of anti-
corruption leadership; accountability; self-respect; solidarity; public appreciation; personal 
accomplishment; institutional dignity; civic pride; and integrity; which, on the one hand, proved 
to be together more effective than the rhetorical anti-corruption national campaigns in Bolivia and, 
on the other hand, triggered the subsequent political reaction that has promoted the greater 
awareness of the municipal government to work with major proximity alongside schools and other 
fundamental entities of the future local community (Zúñiga & Heywood, 2015: 6-8). 
 
8.4.2 Involving citizens in decision-making in urban development processes in 
Guadalajara, Mexico 
Another interesting experience was that of Guadalajara, which is a metropolitan area with nine 
municipalities and around 4.5 million people. In order to curb corruption in permits issuing and 
urban planning, local politics implemented an anti-corruption strategy including: accessibility to 
local government data; availability of infrastructural and performance indicators; multiple 
participation mechanisms aimed to involve citizens in local decision-making; and the 
implementation of the ‘Integral City Management Platform’ for improving the local management 
systems and guaranteeing citizen and governmental scrutiny over the local urban development 
processes (URAIA, 2017: 18). 
Despite the Guadalajara’s experience seems to be mostly ascribable to a co-production 
phenomenon, it is worthy of attention not only for the adherence of some policies to collaborative 
settings of public governance − with particular reference to the citizens’ involvement in public 
decision-making −, but also for the challenges that emerged to implement its strategy, which may 
call for a greater adoption of collaboration-based tools, such as: gaps in public service 
digitalisation; change resistance; and issues in approaching and dialoguing with citizens (URAIA, 
2017: 19). 
 
8.4.3 Active citizenship against endemic corruption in Lviv, Ukraine 
In Lviv, a local civil organisation with no formal links with politics known as Samopomich − 
meaning ‘self-reliance’ or ‘self-help’ −, was born in 2004 to mobilise the Ukrainian community to 
requalify the city neighbourhoods, and became a political movement in 2012, starting to promote 




responsible active citizenship against the opulent and endemic state corruption (Lozovsky, 2015: 
2-3). 
After having demonstrated to get concrete improvement of neighbourhoods done, the 
political party won the election of 2006 and a continuous collaboration with the original NGO 
started, albeit Andriy Sadovyi, the new mayor and political leader of Samopomich, refused to carry 
near the NGO to avoid polluting the direct connection with the local community and, in so doing, 
guarantee independent feedbacks by its city hall advisers (2015: 3). 
Sadovyi’s administration totally renewed the previous lifeless political culture, based on 
corruption and patronage, with integrity of civil servants and government transparency; got into 
youth involvement in the local government; sponsored the ‘Youth Entrepreneurship Incubator’; 
promoted tourism by modernising the most culturally-attractive urban areas; increased pedestrian 
zones and English-language signs around the city; and, as a result, boosted new opportunities for 
businesses (Lozovsky, 2015: 4-5). Furthermore, Sadovyi took on two consultants to instruct the 
city government employees in integrity, in a way to hinder some short-circuits within the 
bureaucratic machinery and, thus, ward corruption off from the Municipality of Lviv (2015: 6). 
Exactly like the experience of La Paz, that of Lviv put a huge attention on the principle of 
governmental integrity, accountability and transparency, which increased the Sadovyi’s credibility 
and public consensus, especially when he published his own income and incited all the city council 
to follow his example (Lozovsky, 2015: 5). 
 
8.4.4 Bottom-up local governance in Šaľa, Slovakia 
The Šaľa public administration’s experience, in Slovakia, is another example of how to involve 
anti-corruption activists according to an approach “bottom-up local governance” (Jacko, 2016: 
119). Similar to the case of Lviv, the initiative started with Lepsia Šaľa, an NGO driven by 
professionals with no experience in anti-corruption. Since 2002, it has been aimed to: foster higher 
transparency in local governance; enable citizens to better control the local government’s decision-
making process, especially through participative mechanisms; as well as hinder clientelist 
practices and other inappropriate deployment of public resource endowment (2016: 122). 
Supported by a broad political control room constituted by both the city Council majority 
and opposition − which was the main critical success factor of the bottom-up governance initiative 
−, the city management adopted a series of anti-corruption measures including: publishing of rules, 




official files − e.g., supply contracts and accounting documents −, municipal public servants’ 
contact details, data about the staff’s expenditure and other information provided by means of an 
on-demand system; arranging an e-procurement structure ensuring fair processes (Jacko, 2016: 
122-123). Moreover, e-democracy and similar e-government initiatives had the major role in the 
Šaľa’s experience thanks to empowering tools for the benefit of citizens, such as opinion polls, 
forums for discussion, e-forms and e-petitions (2016: 124). 
An interesting feature − probably the most significant one − of the case of Lviv is the 
refusal of adopting pre-packaged solutions and mechanistic administrative processes adherent to 
the NPM paradigm in supporting policy-design, which were replaced by the renowned Klitgaard’s 
(1991) work titled ‘Controlling Corruption’ (Jacko, 2016: 127). Ultimately, both the good 
governance initiatives of the anti-corruption agenda of Lviv and the organisation of propaganda 
events − e.g., information campaigns and open days − led to: the UN’s Public Service Award; 
several institutional endorsements, even from abroad; a more efficient public procurement activity, 
thanks to a new e-procurement infrastructure and a higher competition; and, most importantly, the 
positive example to the other Slovakian local governments, which chose to engage in similar 
projects autonomously (2016: 128). 
 
8.5 Outlining a collaborative anti-corruption strategy for Cerda through a DPG approach 
8.5.1 Stakeholder identification and analysis 
As it emerged in chapters 5, 6 and 7, the main criticalities faced in the past by Cerda Municipality 
concerned with the political, managerial and administrative paradigm, characterised by scarce 
accountability, transparency and non-legitimate personnel discretion. The resulting losses of 
effectiveness and efficiency in public services delivery have gradually undermined the financial 
equilibrium of the public Body and the perception of credibility of bureaucracy and politics by 
citizens, thus reducing their trust in the local government and increasing the general proneness to 
tax avoidance. Besides, lack of managerial culture and feeling for the institutions have provoked 
an administrative inertia consisting of the absence of concrete efforts in soliciting tax contributors 
to restore local revenues. 
Through the research findings on the case-study discussed in the chapters mentioned above, 
a stakeholder analysis can be here outlined. It provides information useful to evaluate the viability 
of possible policy lines, make easier decision-making, organisational goals, project 




implementation, as well as elaborate strategies aimed at steering key-stakeholders (Varvasovszky 
& Brugha, 2000: 338). The latter are entities who, firstly, have an interest in the issue at hand and, 
secondly, can either be affected by or affect − actively or passively − decision-making and 
implementation processes linked to a policy issue (2000: 341) or, in general, to an organisation’s 
goals (Freeman, 1984: 46). It other terms, their influence capability might not necessarily imply 
that they have legitimate claims in relation to the problem, nor that they want to exercise this 
influence, but it simply means that they can influence it somehow (Mitchell et al., 1997: 859). 
Accordingly, although referred to the private domain, by suggesting a typology to better 
identify and analyse the stakes to which managers should focus on, Mitchell et al. (1997) made a 
distinction between four groups of stakeholders, whose significancy is based on the presence of 
either one or more of three main variables, that is to say: their power to influence organisations; 
the legitimacy relationship that they establish with them; and the urgency of their claims. Based 
on that, they classify stakeholders in: latent, comprehensive of dormant, discretionary and 
demanding stakeholders; expectant, including those dominant, dangerous and dependent; 
definitive; and, as a residual category, non-stakeholder (1997: 872-879) 4. 
According to such a typology, in order to better outline the relevant stakeholders’ profiles 
(Varvasovszky & Brugha, 2000: 341), the stakeholder analysis makes possible to identify the 
fundamental components of a possible anti-corruption programme. Later, by means of a DPG 
approach, not only this process allows for a better understanding of what tangible and intangible 
resources should be considered as strategic for reaching the related project goals, but it also allows 
to identify the main performance drivers of collaboration to leverage. Thus, taking into account 
the relevant information about the case under scrutiny, the main programme components may be: 
citizens’ sensitization and empowerment; politicians’ active leadership, expertise and honesty; 
administrative transparency; skills and accountability of public managers and staff; simplified 
regulation; participation in policy-making and budgeting of citizens; building trust in government; 
youth entrepreneurship; mass media involvement. 
 
4 In particular, stakeholders being: dormant own power; discretionary have legitimacy; demanding have urgency. 
Stakeholders that are: dominant have power and legitimacy; dangerous own power and urgency; dependent have 
legitimacy and urgency. Finally, definitive stakeholders have all the three characteristics, while non-stakeholder none. 
Cf. Mitchell, R. K., Agle, B. R., & Wood, D. J. 1997. Toward a Theory of Stakeholder Identification and Salience: 
Defining the Principle of Who and What Really Counts. The Academy of Management Review, 22(4): 853-886., 
Figure 2, p. 874. 




Thanks to the insights deriving from the theoretical and empirical literature on 
collaborative anti-corruption initiatives at local level and on the basis of the typology of Mitchell 
et al. (1997), the stakeholders to involve for a possible anti-corruption agenda in Cerda are: the 
Mayor; the City Council Majority; the City Council Opposition; the City Board; the Heads of 
Departments and the municipal Staff; the local Entrepreneurs; the Citizens; the media Outlets. 
Possible positions in relation to the problem and the contributions to the programme may 
be expected by considering the criticalities in implementing anti-corruption projects, outlined in 
the previous section, which reveal to be relevant for the case of Cerda Municipality. Obviously, 
the perspective of the analysis is from the Mayor, the City Council Majority and the City Board, 
which are basically expected to lead the design and the implementation of a possible anti-
corruption programme and, as such, they are supposed to be supportive, highly motivated, diriment 
of possible frictions between participant, apolitical, fair and, ultimately, determining in ensuring 
good performance of the overall initiative. 
The City Council Opposition may turn out to be a ‘dominant’ stakeholder, as it may 
deliberately attack and blame the Majority to distract public resources for covering the 
expenditures caused by the project realisation, or even to accuse it for a possible failure of such an 
initiative. By virtue of its power and legitimacy, the influence of this body may further constitute 
a disincentive for the Mayor to engage in any collaborative anti-corruption effort. 
The Heads of Departments and the municipal Staff may, instead, be considered as 
‘discretionary’, as they possess a claim/duty of working and, contemporary, guaranteeing the 
levels of transparency and accountability required by law and community within the administrative 
system, but they have no significant power, nor urgent claims in relation to the problem at hand. 
As such, they are expected to be supportive compared to a possible anti-corruption initiative. 
Local Enterprises are considerable as more ‘dangerous’ than ‘dependent’, since they have 
significant power and urgency for influencing decisions in collaborative settings, especially in 
terms of transparency, fairness and competitiveness in the Municipality’s public procurement 
activities. Diversely, citizens are considered the ‘definitive’ stakeholder, since they have the power 
to oblige political power to pursue and realise credible policies, based on community well-being 
and equality. Together with enterprises, the citizens’ role in a possible anti-corruption intervention 
within collaborative settings is uncertain, since it mostly depends on the level of their sensitisation 




and willingness to refuse and actively fight illicit practices, which may differ from a sub-category 
to another − e.g., young people might be more motivated and sensitive than the elderly. 
Finally, media Outlets are considered as ‘dormant’ stakeholder by virtue of their power to 
strongly influence a collaborative effort by shaping public opinion, without any legitimacy or 
urgency in relation to the considered wicked issue. Therefore, they are expected to be supportive. 
Although this is just a first approximation analysis, it can lay the foundations for a future, 
more detailed stakeholder study finalised to develop a collaboration-based anti-corruption 
strategy. Enlargement of the scope through the inclusion of further categories of stakeholders, who 
will deserve particular attention at the moment in which the deepened analysis will be carried out, 
and differences in possible positions assumed by all the participants are expected. 
Table 8.1 exhibits the results of this short analysis. 
 







likely impact on 
the problem 
Legitimacy in 
relation to the 
problem 
Impact of the 




City Council Opposition Opposed Medium-High High Medium Dominant 
Heads of Departments and 
Municipal Staff 
Supportive Low Medium Low Discretionary 
Local Entrepreneurs Uncertain Medium Medium-Low Medium Dangerous 
Citizens Uncertain High High High Definitive 
Media Outlets Supportive High Low Low Dormant 
 
Basing on this picture, it follows DPG perspective representing a collaborative governance 
strategy which may help to foster broad interest and participation by each of the considered 
stakeholders. 
 
8.5.2 Framing a possible anti-corruption policy through a DPG chart 
The local experiences showed in section 8.4 own a common virtuous denominator being 
constituted by the frontline position of wise “political entrepreneurs” who, creating a supportive 
anti-corruption systems, leveraged on the promotion of integrity values and the reinforcement of 
public servants and community’s civic morality (Vannucci, 2019: 115). 
Anti-corruption projects always need to be totally embedded into a formal political agenda, 
in order to purposefully translate any initial − either top-down or bottom-up − enthusiasm into a 




substantial change in the political and managerial mindsets being capable to avoid vacuous and 
implausible interventions. As such, given the overt success of the outlined local experiences and 
the similarities in terms of typologies of corruption crimes that the reformers dealt with, a possible 
collaboration-based policy is here suggested by also taking into consideration the certified past 
events occurred in Cerda. 
The case at hand presented a set of enabling informal rules that Vannucci (2019: 110) 
outlined as ‘macular corruption’. According to this paradigm, agents perceive law and penalties 
as limitations and search for opportunities for undue private advantages in vulnerabilities of 
specific decision-making processes, because of the fact that they own modest social and regulatory 
barriers, thus gradually broadening their blurred network with complaisant individuals and, as a 
result, reinforcing the shield against external controls and sanctions, as well as consolidating 
inappropriate practices in those particular public activities (113). 
Based on the successful initiatives discussed above, the dynamic hypotheses underlying a 
possible collaborative anti-corruption agenda are showed in the CLD − Figure 8.1 − and in the 
DPG chart − Figure 8.2 −, with a particular emphasis on the resources shared by the identified 
stakeholders and the essential performance drivers, from the Municipality’s outside-in perspective. 
The feedback loops are highlighted in Table 8.2. 
The local community’s sensitisation on corruption constitutes a first crucial element on 
which leveraging. Sensitisation is linked to the concept of ‘citizenship’, which goes beyond strictly 
binding legal norms and implies that every part of a given societal context, being united by 
common objectives, value basis and cultural belief, shares a widespread feeling of community 
(Bianchi, 2021: 335), thus boosting civic engagement (Cooper & Gulick, 1984; Cooper, Bryer, & 
Meek, 2006) and actual willingness to be involved in dealing with tangled socio-economic issues. 
It is reasonable to affirm that the less the community is sensitised and reduce its control 
over the public officials’ action, the broader the potential range of local clientelist network will be, 
and vice versa. Theoretically, this network could cover all the possible relationships favouriting 
private interests at the expense of the public one; so that, if citizens and local businesses accept 
corruption because of low contextual moral barriers, no formal/informal control occurs and 
favouritism, for instance, in public hiring and/or contracting can spread, and vice versa. 
Therefore, the high or low pathological political proximity with the community (Minkova, 
2018: 6-7) may respectively cause or prevent citizenry overlooks the more general collective 




interests and problems. In turn, the following degradation or enhancement of the related strategic 
resource ‘Watchdog Citizens’ may result in a narrower or broader clientelist network, which is 
controlled by the intermediate result ‘Individuals sensitised ratio’, measuring the rejection feeling 
of favouritism practices in public activities − Loop R1. In other terms, opportunities for hidden 
exchanges feed the general connivance with clientelist practices, such that there is no interest to 
generate a ‘shock’ that moves away from a convenient status quo; and vice versa. 
 
 
Figure 8.1. The CLD of the collaboration-based anti-corruption agenda for Cerda Municipality. Source: Author’s elaboration. 
 
Community’s willingness to monitor the local public action may show up through 
collateral active citizenship mechanisms aimed at demanding civil servants for the respect of good 
practices, internal monitoring and adequate treatment of possible misconducts. Sensitised citizens 



















































































































may also solicitate an enduring, robust and clear agreement between all the political parties on 
each point of the anti-corruption programme, so as to corroborate their actual credibility. 
Measured by the intermediate result ‘Anti-corruption programme agreement ratio’, the 
degree of political consensus on the anti-corruption agenda proposed by the City Council Majority 
positively affects the public officials’ accountability and transparency, thus impacting on the 
‘Individuals sensitised ratio’ positively − Loop R2 −, as well as the ‘City Government Stability’; 
and vice versa. The latter positively impacts on ‘Civic Morality’ (Letki, 2006: 231), which 
negatively influences the performance driver ‘Local corruption risk ratio’ by impacting on 
‘Structural Corruption Conditions’, hence improving integrity within the local Authority, 
mortifying clientelist circuits stemming from ‘pathological’ political proximity with citizens and, 
finally, increasing the sensitised part of the community − Loop R3 −; and vice versa. 
 
Table 8.2. Main feedback loops of the possible collaboration-based anti-corruption initiative in the Cerda’s local area. 
Causal loop Variables involved Explanation of the loop 
 
Watchdog Citizens→+ Individuals sensitised 
ratio→- Pathological Local Government 
Proximity with the Community→- Interest of 
citizens in community problems→+ 
Citizens’ sensitisation negatively affects clientelist 
networks, reinvigorating the public interest in local 
socio-economic issues; and vice versa. 
 
Watchdog Citizens→+ Political Agreement on 
Anti-corruption Agenda →+ Anti-corruption 
programme agreement ratio→+ Local 
Government Accountability and 
Transparency→+ Individuals sensitised ratio→- 
Pathological Local Government Proximity with 
the Community→- Interest of citizens in 
community problems→+ 
Sensitised citizens solicitate political agreement on 
anti-corruption programme, thus fostering the local 
Authority’s accountability and transparency, 
counteracting clientelist networks, strengthening 
the public interest on community issues and 
citizens’ sensitisation; and vice versa. 
 
Watchdog Citizens→+ Political Agreement on 
Anti-corruption Agenda →+ Anti-corruption 
programme agreement ratio→+ City 
Government Stability→+ Civic Morality→- 
Structural Corruption Conditions→+ Local 
corruption risk ratio→- Local Government 
Accountability and Transparency→+ 
Individuals sensitised ratio→- Pathological 
Local Government Proximity with the 
Community→- Interest of citizens in 
community problems→+ 
Sensitised citizens solicitate political agreement on 
anti-corruption programme, thus boosting the city 
Government’s stability and local civic morality, as 
well as reducing local corruption risk, triggering the 
local Authority’s accountability and transparency, 
counteracting clientelist networks, strengthening 
the public interest on community problems and 
citizens’ sensitisation; and vice versa. 
 
Watchdog Citizens→+ Political Agreement on 
Anti-corruption Agenda→+ Anti-corruption 
programme agreement ratio→+ Deliberative 
Democracy Structure and Decision-making 
Tools→+ Deliberative democracy structures 
and decision-making tools ratio→+ 
Sensitised citizens solicitate political agreement on 
anti-corruption programme, thus demanding for 
more effective deliberative democracy structures 
and decision-making tools and sustaining 
watchdogging; and vice versa. 
 
Watchdog Citizens→+ Individuals sensitised 
ratio→- Pathological Local Government 
Proximity with the Community→- Interest of 
citizens in community problems→+ Mass 
Media Involved→+ Mass media involved 
ratio→+ 
Citizens’ sensitisation negatively affects clientelist 
networks, reinvigorating public interest in local 
socio-economic issues and soliciting media outlets’ 


















Civic Morality→- Local corruption risk ratio→- 
Local Government Accountability and 
Transparency→+ 
Local civic morality reinforces public Authority’s 
accountability and transparency, reinvigorating 
citizens’ perception of transparent and fair 
administration; and vice versa. 
 
Local Government Accountability and 
Transparency→+ Strict respect of formal rules 
ratio→+ Bureaucratic Complexity→+ Local 
corruption risk ratio→- 
Accountable civil servants consistently work with 
law and protocols, but an excess of compliance with 
formal rules exasperates bureaucratic complexity, 
thus increasing risk of corruption at local level and 
reducing the local Authority’s accountability and 
transparency; and vice versa. 
 
Pathological Local Government Proximity with 
the Community→- Strict respect of formal rules 
ratio→+ Bureaucratic Complexity→+ Local 
corruption risk ratio→- Local Government 
Accountability and Transparency→+ 
Individuals sensitised ratio→- 
Clientelist networks reduce civil servants’ 
compliance with formal rules which, in turn, 
exasperates bureaucratic complexity, increasing 
local risk of corruption, reducing the local 
Authority’s integrity that fosters individuals’ 
sensitisation and reduces pathological proximity of 
the local Government with the community; and vice 
versa. 
 
Civic Morality→- Local corruption risk 
ratio→+ Collective Resource Diverted→- 
Civic morality negatively affects local corruption 
risk which, in turn, positively affects dispersion of 
collective resources, which, finally, negatively 
influences civic morality as index of local 
government inefficiency. 
 
Public Resources→+Deliberative Democracy 
Structures and Decision-making Tools→+ 
Deliberative democracy structures and decision-
making tools ratio→- Government Stability→+ 
Civic Morality→- Local corruption risk 
ratio→+ Collective Resources Diverted→- 
Investments in deliberative democracy structures 
and decision-making tools negatively affects the 
City Government’s stability, which positively 
influences civic morality, which negatively impacts 
on local corruption risk, which, finally, positively 
affects dispersion of collective resources. 
 
Civic Morality→- Local corruption risk 
ratio→+ Collective Resources Diverted→- 
Public Resources→+ Local Infrastructures 
Upgrading Interventions→+ Local 
infrastructures upgrading ratio→+ Public 
Services Quality→+ Local Quality of Life→+ 
Social Trust in Local Government→+ Interest 
of citizens in community problems→+ 
Watchdog Citizens→+ Political Agreement on 
Anti-corruption Agenda→+ Anti-corruption 
programme agreement ratio→+ City 
Government Stability→+ 
Civic morality reduces risk of corruption and the 
consequential dispersion of public resources that, in 
turn, foster investments in the modernisation of the 
local area, thus enhancing public services, quality of 
life, trust in the local Government and increasing 
citizens’ interest in the local socio-economic issues, 
who, then, demand for a better political anti-
corruption programme agreement which, finally, 
increases the City Government’s stability and the 
community’s civic morality; and vice versa. 
 
Public Resources→+ Local Infrastructures 
Upgrading Interventions→+ Local 
infrastructures upgrading ratio→+ Local Area 
Competitiveness and Attractiveness→+ 
Using collective resources to improve 
competitiveness and attractiveness of the local area 
through urban modernisation increases the local 
GDP and, as a result, incomes stemming from the 
new taxable wealth; and vice versa. 
 
Public Resources→+ Youth Entrepreneurs 
Sponsorships→+ Youth entrepreneurs ratio→+ 
Local Area Competitiveness and 
Attractiveness→+ 
Using collective resources to improve youth 
entrepreneurship increases the local GDP, thanks to 
higher degrees of competitiveness and 
attractiveness of the local area, and, as a result, 
incomes stemming from the new taxable wealth; 
and vice versa. 
 
Public Resources→+ Local Infrastructures 
Upgrading Interventions→+ Local 
infrastructures upgrading ratio→+ Public 
Services Quality→+ Local Quality of Life→+ 
Social Trust in Local Government→- Tax 
avoidance→- 
Investments in urban modernisation of the local area 
increase public service quality, thus improving 
quality of life, social trust in the local Government 
which, finally, counteracts tax avoidance and 
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In order to support community sensitisation and active intervention, in the spirit of 
collaborative governance, formal deliberative democratic structures and decision-making tools 
− such as discussion forums, opinion polls and e-petitions (Jacko, 2016: 124) − should be 
sketched out, so as to improve citizen participation and responsibility, community 
consciousness and control over the local ruling class. Accordingly, the performance driver 
‘Deliberative democracy structures and decision-making tools ratio’ − Loop R4 − measures 
the related critical success programme component, representing a common lever of any 
collaborative governance project. 
External support of mass media may help to empower citizens through the improvement 
of, on the one hand, their awareness about the general corruption issue and, on the other hand, 
their monitoring activity on the local government’s system. Media outlets’ involvement may 
originate spontaneously or be promoted by citizens, firms or even the same local politics, often 
depending on the way through which a collaborative effort arises. 
As mentioned above, the empirical research found that media outlets’ inclusion proved 
to be decisive in conducting anti-corruption projects successfully (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2015: 173), 
probably thanks to their capability to shape people’s perception of corruption (Lambsdorff, 
2001a) and ensure project disclosure. It follows that controlling the intermediate result ‘Mass 
media involved ratio’ opportunely may mean allowing local journals, radio, televisions and 
Internet platforms to boost credibility of the initiative, thus reinforcing watchdogging 
mechanisms, the citizens’ interest on the local socio-economic issues and, finally, media 
outlets’ involvement itself − Loop R5. 
As argued in Chapter 6, civic morality represents a significant variable to repress and 
prevent corrupt behaviours within a given community, and this means to positively impact on 
the local civil servants’ accountability and transparency, hence improving civic morality itself 
− Loop R6 −; and vice versa. Interestingly, a higher public officials’ integrity also means a 
stricter focus on the set of legal rules and protocols. Given the Italian hyper-regulated public 
context (Fantini & Simonetti, 2017: 28), the degree of compliance required to civil servants, 
here measured by the performance driver ‘Strict respect of formal rules ratio’, may exasperate 
‘Bureaucratic Complexity’ and, as a result, create opportunities for corruption (Ades & Di 
Tella, 1997; Lambsdorff, 2006; Minkova, 2018); and vice versa, where law is less constraining 
− Loop B1. 
However, fiduciary practices may paradoxically counteract this side effect − Loop B2. 
As it is argued in Chapter 6, bypassing formal rules and procedures may even be justified by 
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the presence of informal governance mechanisms that allow public organisations to overcome 
unsustainable legal and bureaucratic burdens (Coviello et al., 2018: 2), albeit an adequate level 
of ‘Civic Morality’ is required to compensate a possible insufficient citizen watchdogging due 
to weak loops R1, R4 and R5; and vice versa. 
Hindering resources diversion caused by local corruption risk improves the 
community’s civic morality, reducing the structural corruption itself − Loop R7 −; and vice 
versa. This may increase the general availability of collective resources, being fundamental to 
support deliberative democracy tools finalised to anti-corruption collaboration. Nevertheless, 
an unintended effect may arise from an excessive emphasis on deliberative democracy: it may, 
in fact, produce a balancing effect on the normal functioning of the local political machinery, 
by undermining its stability over time − Loop B3. 
Corruption drains money, but whatever project aimed at curbing it needs it as well. At 
this regard, ‘Public Resources’ released by virtue of a less corrupt local system may positively 
feedback to ‘Public Service Quality’, ‘Local Quality of Life’ and, therefore, to ‘Social Trust in 
Local Government’, driven by new investments in infrastructural modernisation measured by 
the intermediate result ‘Local infrastructures upgrading ratio’, so as to improve the citizens’ 
care of local issues, the Government’s stability, ‘Civic Morality’ and reduce the local 
corruption risk − Loop R8 −; and vice versa. 
Moreover, to sustain public investments aimed at improving local infrastructures may 
enhance the ‘Local Area Competitiveness and Attractiveness’, compared to the nearby 
localities, so as to increase the local gross domestic product (GDP) and the ‘Public Resources’ 
that stem from new taxable wealth − Loop R9 −; and vice versa. Accordingly, given the Cerda’s 
enormous economic makings and potential, significant public efforts may be concerned with 
revamping tourism through the modernisation of the urban fabric. Furthermore, inspired by the 
strategy adopted in Lviv (Lozovsky, 2015: 4-5), reinvigorating the City’s youth entrepreneurial 
network through local government sponsorships should also be a crucial programme 
component, measured by the performance driver ‘Youth entrepreneurs ratio’ and aimed to 
sustain the local area’s competitiveness, attractiveness and taxable wealth − Loop R10. 
Finally, the Municipality’s fight against tax avoidance may rely on coercive measures 
to increase tax collection, even though it may result costly for the local government in terms 
of public consensus, especially if recurring to the tool of enforced collection5.1Building ‘Social 
 
5 In Italy, local governments can collect taxes in two ways: through spontaneous payments by tax-payers or by 
enforced collection. Tax regulation is provided by the d.P.R. 29 September 1973, no. 602, published int the Italian 
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Trust in Local Government’ may counteract tax avoidance − Loop R11 −, reduce the recourse 
to such tools and restore the local Authority’s financial equilibrium, thus making it possible to 
reinvest the released public resources in the local area and trigger a sustainable development 
based on a radical and permanent cultural change. 
This simplistic feedback structure is not immune by flaws, because of dynamic 
hypotheses that were not possible to test on the field. However, they result credible as long as 
accurately rest on the interviews − see Chapter 5 and Appendix A − and the related research 
findings showed in the previous chapters. Based on that, also considering what could ‘go 
wrong’ in leveraging on the specific performance drivers identified above, in the context of a 
possible collaborative governance endeavour to elicit the general anti-corruption feeling in 
Cerda, seems to be necessary. 
 
8.5.3 Implementation feasibility and concerns 
In addition to the failures factors of collaboration highlighted in paragraph 8.3.2, some 
additional problems, being specifically related to the case-study − even if, in general, 
recognisable in most of the Italian municipalities −, may arise in implementing the suggested 
anti-corruption project. 
Firstly, as far as factors conflicting with collaboration are concerned, watchdogging 
seems to be arduous in Cerda, given the long-standing citizens’ inertia in complaining with the 
local Authority’s poor performance, steered by a visible detachment from the local problems 
(Public Official #4, 2019). Furthermore, the effect of a possible toxic political proximity might 
threat any effort in restoring a proper community’s interest for the local socio-economic life, 
fomenting lack of awareness about the detrimental long-run effects of inappropriate practices, 
people’s poor systemic vision of the problem and their general carelessness. 
As Vannucci (2019: 114) pointed out, the inclination to assume corrupt behaviours is 
not congenital, but derives from a decision-making process in which institutional aspects, 
social and cultural relationships, values and rules shape the agents’ personal and collective 
choices. Provided that there exist a trade-off between the agents’ convenience and mindset and 
institutional opportunities (115), the role of politics in triggering and sustaining the cultural 
change that shapes individuals’ choices is as much crucial as community sensitisation itself. 
 
Official Journal no. 268 of 16-10-1973 and the decree-law 22 October 2016, no. 193, published in the Italian 
Official Journal no. 282 of 02-12-2016. 
Experimenting with a Collaborative Governance Strategy to Curb Corruption in Local Areas 
221 
 
Therefore − and secondly −, as in the case of Šaľa, the best expectation of a political 
intervention is that the Mayor and the City Board could enjoy both the City Council Majority’s 
and Opposition’s support, in the general recognition that a strong and stable political consensus 
and administrative cohesion are purposeful to contain corruption risks, as well as to renew the 
common sense of the institutions and responsibility towards the res publica. However, 
although, in the perspective of a joint action, a government majority supported by all parties 
may appear desirable, if there was not room for assembling a broad alliance within the 
municipal Council − just like in the case of La Paz − the Mayor, the City Board and the Council 
Majority could always sustain an anti-corruption programme alone, so that an unconditional 
non-tolerance approach may be the only chance to reach an appreciable success of the project. 
Based on what above, a broad direction room might be not feasible because of frictions 
characterising the political life of small municipalities, such that the success of an anti-
corruption agenda may only rely on the political stability of the majority, it being understood 
that ambitious − sometimes interest-conflicting − policies hardly find sure consensus, even 
inside the government majority itself. As such, the effort of some valiant champions for a 
successful collaboration may be mortified because of rooted political competitive − and not 
collaborative − dynamics, thus provoking insufficient community’s consensus on the project 
and poor external support from key-stakeholders. 
On the other hand, factors enabling collaboration actually exist. Firstly, the normal 
functioning of the local political machinery may find a friction element in the deliberative 
democracy and decision-making tools finalised to increase citizen participation and oversight 
over the public action. Nevertheless, despite this tractable inconvenient, consistent and 
broadly-agreed decisions and action paths on anti-corruption are unavoidable to overturn the 
community’s mindset towards a corruption-refusing paradigm. As such, media may play a 
strategic role as catalyst factor of this process. 
Secondly, growing levels of innovation and entrepreneurship were discovered to be 
associated with a high corruption control, provided that illicit practices for private benefit 
pollute trade and undermine both productivity and innovative investments (Anokhin & 
Schulze, 2009). Moreover, as the OECD (2020) recognised, young people have both the power 
and the responsibility to make a clean break with corruption. Accordingly, in Cerda, innovative 
entrepreneurial initiatives from the youth may prove to be decisive in naturally triggering the 
needed cultural change and snatching the local area from its old mindset. 
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Finally, restoring public resources and diminishing the endemic tax avoidance may be 
possible as soon as the number of sensitised individuals is kept at the level at which the range 
of pathological networks is inoffensive for the public trust and wealth. This can be done by 
means of the programme components identified above, but with particular emphasis on: 
availability of deliberative democracy tools; media outlets’ involvement; government stability; 
and youth entrepreneurship. 
 
8.6 Academia as a ‘backbone organisation’ to enable anti-corruption collaborative 
governance 
Anti-corruption collaborative governance arises for addressing more evident socio-political 
crises of legitimacy concerning government accountability, “which is perceived as having 
failed to protect deeply rooted citizenship rights at the social, political and civic levels” (della 
Porta, 2017: 675). As such, the endeavour of political leaders and managers to “inspire, 
mobilize, and sustain their own agencies” (Crosby & Bryson, 2010: 211) may be harder than 
in other collaborative arrangements, especially if they are at the origin of the problem to cope 
with. 
Collaborative strategies are expected to build citizens’ trust in governments, which 
mostly depends on credibility of policies and governments’ capability to implement them 
effectively (Kaufmann et al., 2010). Therefore, not only legitimacy becomes a critical success-
factor in terms of who promotes and guides relevant projects, but also in terms of modes 
through which these are put in place. For this reason, integrative leadership in cross-sector 
collaborative settings (Crosby & Bryson, 2010) may improve levels of legitimacy of public 
sector and prevent failures of anti-corruption efforts thanks to a shared and opportunely-
distributed guidance of collaboration. 
At this regard, ‘backbone organisations’ try to enhance social outcomes of collaboration 
initiatives through the support and facilitation of the underlined interactive and iterative 
dynamics between cross-sector groups of partners, in order to make the desired impacts 
possible by clarifying visions and strategies, providing shared measurement practices, boosting 
public will, proposing policy and managing collaboration funds  (Turner, Merchant, Kania, & 
Martin, 2012). In other terms, ‘backbone organisations’ work to ensure cross-sectoral players’ 
coherence with joined goals and compliance with common rules of interaction, by sending 
opportune signals stemming from the guides of collaborative initiatives (Kania & Kramer, 
2011). 
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In the light of the influence that it can exercise on both politics and socio-economic 
structures, academia has gained a growing significance in boosting anti-corruption collective 
strategies, by providing good leadership and effectively triggering change (Di Palma, 2014). 
As such, it probably represents the most suitable and valuable ‘backbone organisation’ in 
supporting collaborative efforts against public corruption. 
In principle, there are a plenty of good reasons why collaborative governance initiatives 
to curb corruption at local level may take advantage from involving scholars. First of all, 
academia can guarantee a better understanding of the nature of corruption, its origins, its 
management and governance implications. It can provide participants with high-level teaching 
and research, policy recommendations and strategic measures to fight it effectively and 
efficiently (Di Palma, 2014). It follows that, especially if coming from heterogenous fields of 
study enabling useful knowledge contamination, academic engagement may be supportive in 
moderating local political dynamics and promoting greater willingness and broader agreement 
regarding if and how to set a collective action. Moreover, academic action may result in a better 
control and citizen participation, by designing tailored e-government tools and structures for 
deliberative democracy. 
Secondly, academia can naturally exercise a function of information and knowledge 
dissemination and make public awareness campaigns more effective, by writing on corruption 
problems and attracting public attention − more or less − freely and without suffering harmful 
political influences or constraints (Di Palma, 2014). Actually, it could orient collaborative 
processes towards a greater transparency and knowledge sharing, not only to increase the 
chances of a successful collaboration, but also to improve the trust-building endeavour between 
participants. This may contribute to further improve the degree of sensitisation of civil servants, 
citizens, entrepreneurs and, as a result, reduce opportunities for inappropriate practices. 
Thirdly, scholars may constitute reliable consultants for administrative procedural 
simplification, reduce uncertainty of bureaucratic rules and clarifying the content of in-force 
regulation. This is very important when several law sources have to be taken into consideration 
at the same time in administrative procedures and rule modifications occur at a faster and faster 
rate over time, as it happens in Italy. 
Finally, academia may boost innovation, inclusiveness and entrepreneurship by 
inserting and disseminating knowledge through more fluid transfer processes, driven by the 
high-specialised structures, networks and human capital of the reference universities and 
research institutes. The highest-level education institutes can better understand societal needs 
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and explain reasons and ways through which communities are likely to be threaten. That, 
thanks to the theoretical knowledge that they develop and its concrete application through 
complex and in-depth analytical tools. This is meant to support sustainable development of 
local areas and enhance the level of preparedness of key-actors in facing unexpected and 
uncontrollable environmental − i.e., economic, social and political − shocks, thus favouring the 
cultural change of society. 
Accordingly, on the one hand, scholars may allow for creative and productive 
utilisation of knowledge, revealing themselves as interfacing platforms between enterprises 
and community to create new opportunities for skilled job, further spread transparent practices 
in workplaces (Di Palma, 2014) and support youth entrepreneurship by applying research and 
fostering innovation. On the other hand, by placing themselves side by side to local 
governments in modernisation of local areas, scholars may provide their expertise for 
ameliorating public performance and triggering municipal attractiveness and external 
competition. 
Resuming, academia’s contribution may find several entry points in a collaborative 
action against corruption risk, thus assuming a critical role in: facilitating consensus-oriented 
decision-making; fostering possible synergies among participants; settling existent 
disagreements, by virtue of its independency and legitimation; creating new opportunities for 
sustainable development of local areas. In other terms, academia may turn out to be an effective 
catalyst of collective actions and, as such, the most suitable candidate for becoming the 
champion of any anti-corruption collaboration project. 
Academia’s intervention can go beyond anti-corruption collaborative projects and 
constitute the bridge for the natural prosecution of collaborative arrangements for other 
initiatives, hence promoting further synergies between key-stakeholders. 
 
8.7 Conclusions 
Coherently with the collective action theory, collaborative governance for anti-corruption 
initiatives may remedy to the principal-agent theory’s gap related to the undefined principal’s 
willingness to actually react to the agent’s abuse of the entrusted power due to private benefits. 
Empirical cases from all parts of the world were taken into consideration in the attempt 
to shape a hypothetical preventive collaboration-based anti-corruption project for Cerda 
Municipality, which should be considered by any local public entity, regardless of the actual 
corruption levels. Citizens’ sensitisation, broad political agreement, reduction of strict focus 
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on regulation, youth entrepreneurship, urban modernization and media involvement may, in 
different manners, shape the socio-economic and cultural change in the local community. 
The mayor, his/her political majority and the city board play a frontline role in putting 
in place an effective stakeholder engagement, but council opposition, environmental 
complexity and systemic uncertainty may undermine any possible endeavour in such a 
direction. In addition, they may even discourage the project leader to pursue ambitious goals. 
Thanks to its endowment of strategic tangible and intangible resources, academia can 
exploit its proximity with citizens and businesses to implement collaboration-based anti-
corruption agendas by: providing high-level teaching and research; clarifying visions and 
strategies; enhancing citizens’ participation; disseminating relevant information and 
knowledge; supporting trust-building between participants; creating job opportunities; 
fostering entrepreneurial innovation and attractiveness of local areas; and triggering an 








Public corruption is a ‘wicked’ problem with ancient roots. It will always threaten society due 
to its capability to continuously adapt itself to the administrative and environmental contexts 
where it occurs and mould them in turn. Corrupter and corrupt individuals will never end to 
find out new ways and strategies to exploit entrusted public power for their desire and benefit 
at the expenses of public performance. This awareness should stimulate scholars in public 
management to better deepen specific configurations of this phenomenon and counteracting its 
outcomes by perfecting supportive techniques and methodologies. 
The study of corruption requires an intra-organisational focus of public management to 
provide realistic chances to prevent, detect and tackle it. However, especially at local 
government level, a broader inside-out system perspective may allow policy- and decision-
makers to design and implement feasible anti-corruption strategies effectively and efficiently. 
As such, good public governance represents the main lever for reducing resource diversion and 
dispersion, boosting sustainable development of public authorities and enhancing public 
outcomes on living standards of citizens. Appropriate governance structures, indeed, create the 
needed conditions for sustaining and improving financial equilibria, enabling poorest people 
to access essential public services and fighting generational inequality. 
Laws, protocols, formal procedures and rules are not enough to promote change in 
culturally-prone public contexts characterised by poor governance settings. Although 
perceptions, experiences, legal and economic data and information are often the only available 
sources, they may fail to capture environment-dependent factors and dynamics that may 
corroborate, or at least, signal the actual existence of some kind of past, current or future 
misconducts impacting on public performance, especially if used under stand-alone research 
focuses. 
In addition, the fight against all forms of corruption at once is just rhetoric, and every 
decisive endeavour of reaction needs to outline clear boundaries to develop viable and tailored 
preventive and repressive strategies. 
Procurement is an essential activity for fulfilling public action and, because of its 
features, it has always been particularly subject to corruption at any level and degree. Scholars 




the procurement process. This methodological choice may be undermined by some 
shortcomings related to, for instance, the definition of their scope and reliability. KPIs adjusted 
by corruption risk components may reduce such flaws and the uncertainty in ascribing quality 
and efficiency gaps in public performance to either ‘active’ or ‘passive’ resource wastes, 
especially if used in the analysis of dynamic co-evolution of economic, socio-cultural and 
political factors linked to clandestine malfeasances for personal interest. 
Accordingly, a DPM point of view may help politicians and public managers to gain a 
clearer picture of organisational corruption risks and put emphasis on critical sets of 
performance drivers and end-results including multiple layers of community outcomes. In 
particular, intermediate results constitute short-term signals of possible unethical behaviours at 
system level and, therefore, may contribute to guide policy- and decision-makers in supporting 
sustainable development of local governments through professional and ethical learning, as 
well as virtuous community trust-building processes. 
Based on a representative case-study of an Italian small municipality disbanded twice 
for mafia-like infiltrations, the link between pathological management routines and financial 
distress was confirmed by means of a content analysis of face-to-face, unstructured convergent 
interviews with five Public Officials. 
Later, an outcome-based DPM approach allowed for framing the interdependencies 
thus detected between tangible and intangible resources, being critical to ward off possible 
risks of wrongdoings, and end-results, under an inside-out perspective. Focusing on the main 
performance drivers, the relationships between past corruption-related events in public 
procurement and current performance of the local Government under scrutiny were, therefore, 
explored. Notably, framing risk performance indicators within a DPM chart made possible to: 
isolate heterogeneous causes of corruption in procurement; enhance the explicative capability 
of red-flags; identify strategic resources to deploy for controlling corruption risks at 
organisational level; keep track of the effects of uncontrollable environmental shocks and 
possible cultural distortions undermining procurement regularity. Moreover, the combined use 
of DPM and SD modelling showed how to foster ‘Civic Morality’ at the aim to reduce resource 
dispersion and boost cultural change in a logic of prevention. 
Another issue emerged from the interviews with the Public Officials, whose analysis 
allowed to better single ‘passive’ resource waste out from ‘active’ one. The relationship 
between ‘spoils system’ practices for assigning top public offices and performance of the local 
Body over time disclosed, to some extent, political patronage aimed at gaining public 




explanatory power of DPM, it was possible to probe the influence over time of ‘passive’ waste 
in HR, stemming from legal opportunities, and ‘active’ waste in procurement. 
Investments in ICTs and personnel’s training finalised to improve knowledge and 
innovation management, and human capital expertise, respectively; abolition of ‘spoils system’ 
mechanisms; unblock of public turnover; elicitation of long-sighted political mindset and 
institutional pride of bureaucrats to stimulate feeling for the institutions; were suggested and 
tested in a secure virtual environment as possible anti-corruption policies. 
Overall, political willingness and cultural change represent the condictio sine qua non 
of any purposeful anti-corruption strategy. As such, a political agenda based on collaborative 
governance settings may be a wise and credible strategy for preventing eventual possible germs 
of corrupt behaviour within a reference local area, by engaging all political forces at the 
forefront to encourage relevant stakeholders to pursue such an ambitious goal. 
Adopting an outside-in perspective of performance, scholars and practitioners may find 
the DPG approach particularly suitable to support politicians and public managers in 
identifying interconnections and mechanisms underlying possible programme components and 
frame critical success factors of any collaboration-based agenda. Such a perspective allows for 
outlining anti-corruption strategies that involve relevant local stakeholders through community 
collaboration settings and highlights synergies and interdependencies among participants in 
terms of tangible and intangible resources constituting critical levers to hinder systemic risk of 
corruption. 
Given the multiple socio-political factors that may enable or impede such an endeavour, 
and provided that the academia’s ultimate purpose is to put its knowledge, expertise, 
connections with the worldwide scientific network, proximity with every stratum of society 
and potential freedom from any external conditioning at the service of communities, 
contributions of researchers and practitioners is probably the easiest choice for local 
governments to facilitate collaborative governance interventions and trigger effective and long-
lasting cultural changes. 
The present research is not exempt from limits. 
Firstly, as far as the representative case-study is concerned, the clandestineness of 
corruption phenomenon and the ambiguity of its effects did not allow for verifying whether 
other events different from those brought to the public scrutiny contributed to exacerbate the 




Secondly, the impossibility to access to the municipal archive certainly had an impact 
on the value of this research work, which nevertheless benefited from the availability of the 
Civil Servants who voluntarily submitted to the interviews. 
Under a different perspective, this possible research constraint constitutes a strength 
point instead. More precisely, this research is about a single representative case-study, but to 
interview public officials who were all in charge in the same municipality when the certified 
illicit episodes occurred represents the most significant original and valuable aspect of the 
overall research project. Indeed, a few individuals who are in that position would usually lend 
themselves to discuss about past events of such a sensitivity, and this undoubtedly improves 
the value of this research work. 
Thirdly, given the sensitivity of the topic, it is not excluded that the interview 
respondents may have expressed partial ideas, albeit they were guaranteed the utmost 
confidentiality and transparency by giving them an information note on the content covered 
here well in advance − see Appendix A. 
Regarding the SD diagrams developed here, it is opportune to highlight that it is never 
possible to totally validate any mental or formal model, as it is a bounded and oversimplified 
picture of the specific reality under analysis, and only detailed assertions stemmed from closed 
logical-system postulates can be validated (Sterman, 2000: 846). As such, no model is correct 
actually (Sterman, 2002). 
In addition, in relation to the model of Chapter 6, one should bear in mind that, despite 
the use of sophisticated measurement and modelling techniques, corruption remains a 
clandestine and complex phenomenon. As such, leveraging public servants’ accountability, 
government stability and organisational efficiency to boost civic morality, thus reducing the 
overall systemic corruption risk, does not guarantee mathematical precision, but gives to key-
actors a better awareness of what possible governance recalibrations are needed to trigger 
cultural change both inside and outside the boundaries of the reference public entities. 
Similar considerations may be moved for the model discussed in Chapter 7, provided 
that suppressing ‘spoils system’ may not totally avert that inadequate people cover public 
charges implying great responsibilities, nor that unblocking public turnover may be free from 
influences of political favouritism in public hiring or that HR training may completely ensuring 
high level of integrity. Policy suggestions always need a deepened and detailed formulation on 
field, quite often depending on legal and bureaucratic factors being linked to state regulation 




Another limitation is about the difficulty to use a large empirical base for outlining 
more reliable points of strength and weakness of a collaborative anti-corruption agenda, and 
projecting the Municipality in likely scenarios following the implementation of the 
hypothetical preventive policy illustrated here. In spite of the choice to take successful anti-
corruption experiences of local contexts to design a possible collaboration-based anti-
corruption initiative, the features of corruption mentioned here may, in any case, compromise 
any effort since its beginning, because of their inclination to push whole-of-government 
initiatives toward the ‘failure traps’ highlighted in Chapter 8. 
There is not the presumption to propose methodological ‘panaceas’, but just to suggest 
two different approaches that may give an insightful contribution to the current research, being 
aware that to cope with a ‘wicked problem’ primarily means to find neither obvious nor 
ultimate solutions, but just attempting to hinder its negative outcomes on communities. 
This kind of research should be repeated on more areas with similar characteristics, 
even with a bigger number of local populations, so as to identify reliable patterns corroborating 
the links between mismanagement due to inappropriate behaviour and financial distress of local 
governments identified here. 
Future research should also explore the underlying sub-processes more in detail, in 
order to better operationalise the DPM systems here proposed and enhance the effort in 
preventing possible wrongdoings in both procurement and HRM at local level. 
Especially considering the lack of empirical cases, future research should finally put in 
practice the policy suggestions provided here, in a way to verify their actual feasibility and 
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Public Official #1 
Guidelines Answers 
The signals of the 
Municipality’s instability 
status 
The signals of the instability showed up in the period 2013-2014. The situation 
became critical, since budgets were presented with delays in the end of the reference 
year and the possible accounting opportunities before the law no. 118/2012 were 
used. When that law entered into force in 2016, actual assets were much lower than 
the theoretical ones by virtues of the application of different accounting rules. 
Despite the critical situation, the budget was made, and the Municipality’s instability 
was declared with positive opinion of the sole auditor. There was not an agreed 
opinion on declaring the instability status in the municipality, because municipalities 
tend to avoid it. 
Access to budgets and final 
balances previous to 2008 
on the Municipality’s 
institutional website 
On the website one can found budgets and final balance until 2015, since the 
legislation about municipal decaying establishes that, when the instability is declared 
for municipalities, everything is frozen at the last approved final balance. There is a 
paper archive being bad managed. In the past, there was not the informatic system, 
and that has led to the painful situation of today. Thus, it is not possible to reconstruct 
data before 2008 because of issues with the municipal archive. 
Complaints by citizens due 
to disruptions of public 
services 
Citizens usually complain with disruptions of public services. Despite the current 
mayor cares a lot about the city’s status and image, there are still several 
infrastructural problems – e.g. potholes, devastated country roads, interruptions in 
communal water supply, etc. The Municipality cannot increase tariffs, as it is 
subjected to the control Authority in setting the percentages of rates at the last ones 
that the City Council approved. Essential services need to be covered at 100% of 
their expenditures, but the Municipality cannot. Essential services are loss-making, 
since incomes are insufficient – approximatively 50% of the expenditures. That is 
one of the many problems that led to the instability status. 
The extent to which the 
current administration is 
suffering the weight of the 
maladministration events of 
the early 2000s 
Municipality has been strongly influenced by those events. Moreover, national law 
has exacerbated its financial situation. Particularly, all Municipality’s junk debts 
related to fees for essential public services, arisen up to 2010 and not exceeded 1,000 
euros singularly, were cancelled. Consequently, the Municipality lost around 
300,000 euros of bad assets. It was basically due to people who do not want to pay. 
The existence of an actual 
control carried out on the 
organisational transparency 
Civil servants do their best, but an actual control is arduous to implement. 
General level of 
communication and of 
collaboration with local 
businesses 
There has never been that kind of collaboration in Cerda, since there is no the proper 
mindset. Collaboration is desirable, but it takes time and money. 
The interviewee’s opinion 
about the possibility that 
management direction will 
change as soon as the 
Municipality will come out 
of this critical financial 
situation 
Even when the Municipality will have a partially rebalanced balance-sheet, it will 
not able to claim that the Municipality will come out of the substantial instability 
status, since this process is going to take time. Moreover, the Italian State should 
help small municipalities. Except for those that have declared the instability status, 
when municipalities have not approved final balances, the State locks transfers. 
When the Municipality will have a permanently balanced final balance again, this 
rule will also apply to it. The Municipality has to always provide essential services: 
It does tenders, but it does not pay. Thus, companies recur to injunctions and other 






Public Official #2 
Guidelines Answers 
The interviewee’s opinion 
about Cerda Municipality’s 
insolvency status 
Cerda’s case is atypical, as the insolvency status should have not been declared. 
This last is caused by the inability of the Municipality to collect credits and, as a 
result, to replenish its cash and pay off the debts. The budget is in balance, but the 
current incomes are less than payments. Municipality’s debts are frozen at the last 
approved final balance, namely that of 2015, when the debts were about 1 million 
of euros. At that time, there was no accounting insolvency, but only a cash one, 
because the Municipality could not pay its debts compared to the actual incomes. 
Hence, the first motivation of the Municipality’s insolvency status is concerned 
with the fact that the final balance was not balanced according to the accounting 
interpretations of the Law 118/2012. 
The influence produced by 
the behaviour of the 
previous administrations on 
the Municipality’s current 
performance 
It is probable that the most of municipalities in the Centre-South of Italy is 
insolvent. They do not declare the insolvency, because it has negative reflexes, but 
there are many small municipalities in the same critical situation of Cerda. Essential 
public services imply fees and, as such, the related expenses have to be covered 
100% by taxpayers. Nevertheless, not all citizens pay and the Municipality can 
cover around 60-70% of the total expenditure. In the past, there were significant 
transfers from the State and the Sicilian Region that still allowed one to cash and 
pay the uncovered part. Hence, difficulties in tax collection with respect to the 
essential public services represent another reason of the Cerda’s insolvency status. 
The weight of the 
maladministration events of 
the early 2000s on the 
current financial situation of 
Cerda 
The mismanagement essentially depended on the tax collection difficulties. 
Regarding to those facts, mismanagement was simply related to the legitimate 
previous accounting mechanisms. Those events are another aspect of illegitimate 
practices that has furtherly affected the insolvency situation, beyond the rightful 
measures adopted, even though they have created the mismatch between cash in 
and cash out. It would seem that due to professional assignments given through 
clientelist practices or bribery, either with insufficient or without financial 
coverage, further out-of-budget debts were added to debts which arose from 
legitimate obligations, by inevitably creating further losses, especially because of 
design assignments. In addition, until the early 2000s, there existed a clause 
according to which a professional accepted the assignment by getting paid only if 
his or her work had been financed by the procuring entity. The Supreme 
Constitutional Court declared unconstitutional that rule and, therefore, as the 
constitutional illegitimacy retroacts, many of those professionals who had 
submitted projects that the public administration had acquired, applied for getting 
paid their bills. Professional assignments were those weighted the most. 
The probability that citizens 
may take advantage by legal 
opportunities at the 
expenses of the Municipality 
and other possible causes of 
its insolvency status 
There are those who take advantage of it everywhere, especially where such 
mechanisms act as shock absorbers. Citizens who sue municipalities is another 
fundamental reason of Cerda’s off-budget debt. Another reason may be the desire 
or arrogance of politicians who foster and support projects even when they do not 
have sufficient funds, although it affects less and less over time. A further cause is 
the expropriation for public utility before 2000. Particularly, the Supreme 
Constitutional Court has decided that the expropriations for which the executive 
procedure had not been concluded by issuing the expropriation decree within 5 
years from the declaration of public utility would have become illegitimate 
expropriations, so that from cases of expropriation they became cases of 
compensation of damage, which is more costly for local governments. This was 
just because of a procedural mistake. To forget to issue the expropriation decree 







Public Official #3 
Guidelines Answers 
The current financial 
situation of the Municipality 
The law of the last years determined that municipalities are nowadays in difficulty. 
Those that did not have an efficient administrative machine, at the time of the lack 
of financial foraging by the Italian State and Sicilian Region, were found not ready. 
There was a lot of political improvisation and the situation was what everyone saw. 
There was no communication between bureaucracy and politics. There was a short 
circuit and the last ruling class did not understand its role. Media have contributed 
to this social rift. This was the beginning of the Cerda’s management problems. 
‘If’ and ‘how’ the 
maladministration facts of 
the early 2000s affected the 
current performance of the 
Municipality 
It all started between the late 90s and the early 2000s. Politics made a mistake and 
begins to make patronage. Politics became convinced that it could administer the 
public thing as if it was it’s a private company. So, some roles were given in the 
PA without any requirement of skill and competence. Some civil servants were 
inadequate, as they were legitimized not by meritocracy, skills and adequacy to the 
role, but rather by the legitimacy of pleasure of politics according to a fiduciary 
relation. It triggered a series of situations where whoever was allowed to play a role 
in the bureaucratic machine. These paradoxes have determined lack of controls. 
From there, the disaster of Cerda Municipality began. In the early 2000s, the 
Municipality could have changed a lot by giving due credit to those who honestly 
had the qualities and abilities to perform a rigorous work, but, in that period, the 
local system was not citizen-centred. 
The perception of the main 
stakeholders, such as 
citizens and local 
businesses, of those corrupt 
mechanisms 
In the early 2000s, there was a lot of funding from the higher government bodies 
and, as a consequence, there were several public works and economic activity in 
Cerda. In addition to the fact that there was a strong cultural rooting of the way to 
look at the PA as a social welfare warrantor, people had not any reason to complain 
with the Municipality. When the model ended, who came after had big problems 
and failed to reverse the direction. 
The influence level produced 
by the maladministration 
events of the early 2000s on 
the insolvency status of the 
Municipality 
To think about ‘today’ rather than ‘tomorrow’ has led to an exponential public 
expenditure growth. This has resulted in a non-action towards citizens. 
 
 
Public Official #4 
Guidelines Answers 
The interviewee’s opinion 
about the causes of the 
current Municipality’s 
critical financial situation 
The years when the disbandment of the Municipality for mafia infiltrations 
occurred surely count, but there are other causes which have generated the current 
insolvency status. 
Citizens’ perception about 
the maladministration events 
of the early 2000s 
Their perception is generally that the PA is managed by thieves. However, citizens 
sometimes ask for impossible or illegitimate things. Bad culture and the fact that 
within small public realities problems are exacerbated because of a more direct 





A first cause was the system introduced by the harmonised accounting, due to 
which many municipalities have been in trouble because of yearly budgets that are 
not forecast-based any more. When the deficit inevitably came up, one had to do 
the possible to cover it. 
Secondly, citizens do not pay taxes or pay them late. The Municipality has never 
carefully followed all the steps from the issuance of the bill until the payment 
receipt for the essential public services. The possible notification for unpaid sums 
comes to citizens after big delays, and this causes the citizen’s indifference. That 
has caused enormous damage and difficulties, because the Municipality has to pay 
for the services but, on the other hand, it cannot cash in taxes. 
Thirdly, the Italian State and the Sicilian Region no longer give to municipalities 
big contributions as it was in the past. 
Fourthly, the past administrations created budget holes, since there were no funds 
and made an enormous amount of off-budget debts for public works procurement. 
It is an accounting concern, but there was a general connivance with such 
mechanisms everywhere. 
Fifthly, purchasing procedures in Consip have been introduced recently in the 
Municipality. In the past, supplies were bought locally at exorbitant costs, thus 
leaving room for the criminal facts occurred in the early 2000s. In particular, there 
was not rotations in invitations and assignments to companies in the Municipality’s 
procurement, but always the usual ones that obtained small supplies. As a 
consequence, big budget holes, damages, re-working and debts were such that some 
municipal offices are not able to plan their activities nowadays. Since 2008, with 
SIOPE system and other various controls, it has been quite hard to assume that kind 
of behaviour. In the past, there were more opportunities for certain conducts, such 
as to commit resources by charging non-pertinent chapters, what is more, without 
asking the City Council for the approval of the related budget operation and, 
sometimes, by committing more than what actually available, even in case of 
approved expenditure. 
Another important factor is that civil servants are no longer formed or do not want 
to form. Civil servants are no longer interested in training, but rather in well-using 
management software for PAs. Employees now operate according to what the 
software commands. The interviewee highlighted that, sometimes, they do not take 
into account what the law also allows them to do in terms of discretion and justify 
themselves with the fact that computers do not allow them to proceed diversely. 
The influence of the 
maladministration events of 
the early 2000s on the 
current management 
A series of damages were done and ascertained by magistrates regarding the 
malfeasances of the early 2000s. Some employees went to trial and convicted. It is 
all chained up, but there is also a general inactivity of public authorities in taking 
timely action, despite the harmful conduct is ascertained. Since the Municipality 
had to self-regulate with the control systems, because of the so-called ‘spoils 
system’ the risk of that kind of behaviour was even higher. Maladministration is 
not only when one does a damage, but also when one does not do anything – i.e. 
omission of the delegate public power –, since citizens could benefit from adequate 
and better services. Civil servants are paid with public funds and if they do not 
implement law at the aim to improve services an indirect damage to the community 
is caused. 
The citizens’ perception 
about the quality of public 
services provided and their 
satisfaction degree 
Citizens have different cultural level, but they generally care about the fact that 
public services work. However, there is a disconnection between PA and 
community, since the simple citizens, by finding that the PA does not work 
properly, detach themselves from politics and lost confidence in public institutions. 
At the same time, citizens do not pay taxes. Thus, citizenry’s perception lies in the 
fact that PA is not efficient, so that it disconnects from the public life and stays 
away from concrete issues. A good public administration should approach its 
community, by involving private actors and making the sense of the institutions. In 





politicians and civil servants are almost seen as loafers and delinquents by citizens. 
The PA is no longer seen as a point of reference, but like something to fight. 
The effectiveness of 
Triennial Plans for the 
Prevention of Corruption 
and of Transparency in 
disciplining the conduct of 
public officials 
Anti-corruption legislation imposes the formulation of TPPCTs, which imply an 
internal control system through a post-act evaluation. It is in fact ineffective, since 
hard to implement. Theoretically, one should report every time that colleagues 
make mistakes, but it is usually preferable – as effective and efficient – to exhort 
them to do things better and to be more careful the next time. Furthermore, on the 
one hand, computerised procedures have reduced the possibility to behave 
differently from rules, but, on the other hand, some civil servants have complete 
rejection and distrust of the tools provided by the law. The consequence is a low 
success degree of TPPCTs to make public employees aware of risks of corruption, 
as well as to make anti-corruption monitoring activity effective. Basically, the 
fulfilment is seen as a flogging. 
 
 
Public Official #5 
Guidelines Answers 
Story of Cerda from ‘90s to 
the declaration of the 
insolvency status 
In Cerda there were two dissolutions for mafia infiltrations, in 1991 and 2006, and 
a succession of relevant events from which, nevertheless, no dissolution has in fact 
taken place. In particular, after the facts of maladministration investigated that led 
to a commissarial management in 2009, Cerda had a new administration that lasted 
until 2012. Because of some mafia intimidations, the mayor resigned and, as a 
result, a prefectural commission was appointed to investigate on the Municipality 
and shed light on the situation. The third dissolution did not materialise due to a 
change of the national Government. Instead, a new mayor was elected, and some 
civil servants linked to the events of the early 2000s were suspended. 
Human resources 
endowment of the 
Municipality 
In the Municipality, staff lacked capable people and managers had to do their best 
with what they had. Besides, in recent years, management roles have been emptied 
of holders, either because they have retired or because they have moved out from 
the Municipality, as a legal measure of what happened at the beginning of 2000s. 
In some municipal areas, there were high titled and qualified people as managers, 
but it was not possible to make a turnover and the Municipality could just appoint 
those who it already had in its staff, by using the so-called ‘spoils system’. 
The lack of coverage of managerial roles through competitive procedures implies 
that politics periodically manages and decides who has to be in charge in certain 
areas. The interviewee pointed that it does not ensure that the good person be 
assigned to the proper role. Nevertheless, on the other side, public officials may 
have a position of supremacy, such that they may be stronger than politicians, 
especially when their positions are well rooted within a local government. This is 
the basis of the real problems at the origin of those events. In fact, many executives 
appointed who they wanted and chose people who did not have the right skills to 
fulfil certain positions. It is quite ‘normal’ in small municipalities. 
The weight of the 
maladministration events of 
the early 2000s on the 
current insolvency status of 
the Municipality 
Everything that has produced the evident current Municipality’s financial situation 
mostly belongs to that time. The criminal facts that led to the financial failure of 
the Municipality of Cerda do not seem to be linked to the first dissolution, which 
had no direct connection with the administrative life of the local public institution, 
but rather with some figures who affected the political life. Indeed, the dissolution 
of 1991 caused a disaster in the political ruling class of the time, since it was one 
of the first mafia dissolutions in Italy. Thus, some politicians were left out by 
politics, but this paradoxically created the lack of an able ruling class that led to the 
events of the early 2000s. PAs have become a fundamental point in the allocation 





to were precisely arose in those years, that is, during the period from 2003 to 2006. 
Those facts turned into debts, because professionals and companies were not paid. 
Moreover, mismanagement provoked a series of disputes and creditors started legal 
procedures against the Municipality, such as injunctions, revaluations, formal 
notices, etc. 
Professional assignments without financial coverage, or covered by national and 
regional transfers, have had the major impact on the current financial situation, 
especially transfers, which guaranteed an ex post financial coverage with respect to 
the realisation of public works. In particular, the completion of the work took place 
when, with a reallocation of funds, transfers could compensate for the full amount 
of the expenditure. In such a way, off-budget debts could arise without any 
particular concern about the availability of the related coverage that, sooner or later, 
the public Body would have obtained. Having missed this opportunity, as a result 
of the contraction of the sums transferred by the State, the permanence of that logic 
has gradually reduced the level of solvency of the Municipality and generated 
several disputes for professional works which were carried out but not regularised. 
Indeed, the latter highlight design assignments, without or with insufficient 
financial coverage, from which certain debts derived. 
Resuming, at least until the introduction of the harmonised accounting, that 
mechanism allowed Municipality to increase off-budget debts with no financial 
resources aimed at honouring them. Furthermore, the following administrations did 
not care about that, since they considered it as an isolated matter of the past without 
any connection with the present. Thus, debts were not paid and no enforcement 
procedure was avoided or interrupted, despite some legal opportunities. 
The current insolvency 
situation 
Until the early 2013, no recognition of Municipality’s debts had been made. The 
vast majority of the debts came from professional assignments for which no 
payment was made. At the time, the Municipality had about 1.4 million of euros of 
unpaid debts. Since the early 2000s, the mismanagement of liabilities and the 
passive acceptance of foreclosure proceedings created the current financial 
situation. In spite of some statute of limitations, the damage coming from those 
crimes still exists due to that general lack of integrity, sense of responsibility and 
managerial culture that have led Cerda Municipality into an insolvency status. The 
outgoing Extraordinary Commissioner, appointed in 2009 and in charge for 3 years, 
recognised the serious financial situation of Cerda and the necessity to review and 
re-calibrate the overall local expenditure system to guarantee public services to the 
community, to define the actual amount of the local incomes and, especially, of the 
municipal debts, for which issues of record management were also identified. The 
burdensome situation of the municipality was such that it was not possible to draw 
up the budget of 2013 in a way to cover the current, mandatory and essential 
expenditures. Thus, in 2013, a total of EUR 453,780.72 was recognised as the size 
of the municipality’s off-balance-sheet debts and a cumulation of procedural 
expenditures, interests, monetary re-evaluations and legal expenditures of around 
EUR 1,134,688.63 was expected. The tangled situation which would be occurred 
in the following years was exacerbated, firstly, by the contingent reductions of the 
transfers by the National Government, of around EUR 600,000.00 and EUR 
200,000.00 – respectively due to the failure to respect the European Stability and 
Growth Pact in 2012 and to the national spending review – and, secondly, to the 
envisaged yearly reduction of the regional transfers. In summary, also considering 
unpaid credits for the collection of own revenues of around EUR 600.000, the 
instability was declared for an amount higher than EUR 2 million. 
Typologies of public works 
where corrupt behaviour 
mainly occurred 
Infrastructural reinforcement works, assigned by both public tendering and directly, 
were the most important. Millions of euros were spent, for instance, for never-used 
school buildings, incomplete sewage pipeline and related non-working treatment 
plant. All those poor works have created a huge damage to the community, and 





The existence of a municipal 
archive and the opportunity 
to access it 
The accounting documents related to the investigated events are not present in the 
official municipal archive and nobody knows where they are. That has made 
everything blurred and unreadable. It follows that if documents are not there and 
there is no archive access, the events cannot be reconstructed in detail. That has 
also created transversal issues to other Municipality’s areas. Even judiciary and 
judicial police tried to retrieve the documents to ascertain facts, without result. At 
that time, there was no computerised system and those episodes occurred easily. It 
is impossible to understand how much the Municipality has actually paid over time. 
Municipality’s capability to 
collect taxes 
What has played Cerda Municipality a bad shot and created problems has also been 
the inability to manage and collect local taxes. In the general thinking, the 
Municipality is constituted of watertight compartments, so that an area does not 
influence another. The lack of strategies in tax collection and other initiatives in 
this direction have led the Municipality to record an evasion of about 50-60%, 
which cannot be cushioned by transfers from higher territorial governments, being 
no longer available in big amounts. 
Legal opportunities to 
honouring debts 
About 50% of debts could have been covered by the Municipality through the 
financial opportunity made available with the decree-law no. 35/2013, thanks to 
which debts could have been delayed over time, opportunity that the Municipality 
lost. In addition, for several years, budget has come out at the end of the reporting 
year, and that has created further accounting damage. Because of this delay in 
presenting a draft of budget for the approval, the Municipality did not exploit its 
fund for long-term investments. In fact, according to the accounting legislation, 
without a budget approved in time, funds for investments from the Region cannot 
be used. The Municipality could only act in terms of current spending, so that multi-
year spending was inevitably financed by current resources. The result was that the 
Municipality has lost the opportunity to use those destination-bounded funds which 
could have been used to realise useful projects for the community. To use financial 
resources for current expenditures in order to put in place maintenance works has 
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PAPER INFORMATIVO 
SULLE MODALITÀ D’USO DELLE INFORMAZIONI ESTRAPOLATE MEDIANTE INTERVISTE 
CONVERGENTI PER FINI DI RICERCA 
Titolo provvisorio della ricerca: Applying a Dynamic Performance Governance Approach to 
Support Anti-Corruption Strategies in Public Procurement and Enhance Performance in Local 
Governments: An Italian case. 
Doctoral student: Salvatore Gnoffo (da qui in poi, “ricercatore”). 
Il presente form è parte integrante della ricerca condotta nell’ambito in oggetto ed è finalizzato ad 
informare i destinatari dei contenuti e delle modalità d’uso delle interviste condotte nei mesi di 
Giugno e Luglio dell’anno 2019, presso il Comune di Cerda, in provincia di Palermo. Gli 
intervistati hanno gentilmente dedicato il loro tempo al ricercatore, contribuendo all’esplorazione 
del caso-studio e consentendo l’inclusione di dati primari nel suo lavoro di ricerca. Le interviste 
di tipo convergente si sono svolte per mezzo di dialoghi approfonditi non strutturati con alcuni 
funzionari municipali presso i rispettivi uffici. In ragione della tipologia di intervista selezionata e 
della decisione del ricercatore di non registrare le interviste condotte, tutte le informazioni 
disponibili sono state, inzialmente, appuntate manualmente su un personale blocco-note e, 
successivamente, parafrasate e trascritte attraverso un software di videoscrittura. Inoltre, i 
contenuti delle interviste sono stati arricchiti con ulteriori ricerche pertinenti e dettagliate, al fine 
di migliorarne la comprensione. Data la particolare sensibilità del topic trattato, il ricercatore si 
impegna a rispettare i punti che seguono: 
• Le informazioni ed i dati ottenuti non verrano utilizzati per fini differenti da quelli 
strettamente relativi alla presente ricerca (principalmente, tesi di dottorato e pubblicazioni 
accademiche). 
• Non verrà fatto alcun intenzionale, implicito od esplicito, riferimento alle persone degli 
intervistati. 
• Nell’intero lavoro di ricerca, gli intervistati saranno indicati con le etichette “Interviewee 
#...” ovvero “Public official #...” ovvero “Civil servant #...” o simili, dove il simbolo “#” 
significa “numero”, seguito dal relativo progressivo. 
• In qualsiasi momento, gli intervistati avranno la facoltà di chiedere al ricercatore di essere 
esclusi dalla presente ricerca insieme alle informazioni fornite durante le interviste, 
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• Le informazioni e i dati ottenuti mediante le interviste sono resi disponibili a ciascun 
intervistato, per ciò che è di sua pertinenza, in allegato al presente form. Poiché la ricerca 
verrà interamente elaborata in lingua inglese, le interviste parafrasate sono state altresì 
tradotte in lingua italiana e consegnate personalmente agli intervistati, in quanto parte 
integrante di suddetto allegato. Questo permetterà agli intervistati di conoscere, da un lato, 
in che modo le loro informazioni verranno visualizzate nel lavoro finale di ricerca e, 
dall’altro, i contenuti effettivamente utilizzati attraverso una più facile comprensione in 
madrelingua. 
• Qualora gli intervistati lo desiderassero, i risultati della ricerca verranno resi disponibili dal 
ricercatore al termine del suo lavoro. 
• Considerando che le informazioni sono state solamente trascritte manualmente e 
parafrasate, il ricercatore sarà sempre favorevole e disponibile a valutare eventuali 
rettifiche e/o integrazioni che gli intervistati vorranno sottoporre alla sua attenzione, 
qualora dovessero riscontrare che le trascrizioni delle interviste o parti di esse necessitino 
di una revisione, in quanto inesatte dal punto di vista dei contenuti e/o della forma. 
Il presente form e i relativi allegati sono stati presentati brevi manu e in buste chiuse agli intervistati 
nella loro sede istituzionale a Cerda, in modo da dare loro l’opportunità di prenderne visione e di 
richiedere personalmente le rettifiche, modifiche od integrazioni eventualmente necessarie. 
Infine, si ritiene cruciale precisare che, nella presente ricerca, il termine “corruption” ha una portata 
più ampia rispetto a quella della normativa nazionale vigente e, pertanto, non ha carattere 
strettamente legale. Diversamente, in linea con un approccio di carattere manageriale, nonché con 
la letteratura prevalente, il termine “corruption” è inteso nel suo significato primordiale di “bad 
governance” o “maladministration” connesso all’abuso, misuso od omissione del potere delegato 
per scopi privati. Di conseguenza, le informazioni delle interviste sono state utilizzate in coerenza 
con tale ampia portata del termine “corruption”. 
Nei mesi che seguiranno, le interviste verranno impiegate per produzioni accademiche. 
L’elaborato finale di tesi verrà depositato nei mesi di Ottobre-Novembre 2020 negli archivi 
ufficiali dell’Università degli Studi di Palermo. Pertanto, qualora nessun feedback verrà ricevuto 
dal ricercatore da parte degli intervistati, le trascrizioni delle interviste verranno utilizzate secondo 
quanto consegnato in allegato al presente paper informativo a ciascun intervistato. Considerato che 
il lavoro di ricerca subirà delle revisioni in corso d’opera, eventuali modifiche di forma delle 
trascrizioni delle interviste non pregiudicheranno il relativo significato. 
Per contattare il ricercatore, si prega di utilizzare il contatto email istituzionale 
salvatore.gnoffo01@unipa.it. Qualora i destinatari necessiteranno di interloquire in maniera 
tempestiva con il ricercatore per questioni attinenti alla ricerca, potranno altresì utilizzare il 





APPENDIX B. Model equations and documentation 
 
- MODEL OF CHAPTER 6 
aux Accounting and record noncompliance risk ratio 
autotype Real 
def ((1-'ICT endowment ratio')*('Structural Corruption Conditions'*'Probability of corruption in the post-awarding phase'*'Weight of corruption 
in the post-awarding phase'))/'Maximum score of corruption risk range' 
doc The first-level performance driver measuring the risk of wrongdoings in the post-awarding phase. "Typical risks in overseeing order and 
payment and conducting final audits: 
•  False claims are filed, charging for goods and services that have not been delivered. 
• Lack of separation of financial duties and supervision increases opportunities for false accounting, cost misallocations, and false invoicing." 
Source: Heggstad, K. K. & Frøystad, M. 2011. The basics of integrity in procurement, U4 Issue - Public financial management, Development 
cooperation, Procurement. Bergen, Norway: Chr. Michelsen Institute: 24-25. 
aux Adjustment of Civic Morality 
autotype Real 
def ('Local Institutional Trust'+'Perception of Municipal Accountability by Community'+(1-'Resource dispersion 
ratio'))/3 
doc The update of the stock 'Civic Morality'. 
aux Adjustment of Local Institutional Trust 
autotype Real 
def ('Perception of Public Services Quality by Community'/10+'Organizational expertise ratio' + 'Political credibility ratio')/3 
doc The adjustment of the institutional trust by the community. Trust is constructed socially through the concrete experiences with the institutional 
structures, services used, and public professional figures who citizens approach with. In other terms, trust is dependent on the overall government 
effectiveness. The first term is divided by 10 in order to normalise it. 
aux Adjustment of Perception of Public Services Quality by Community 
autotype Real 
def (1-'Public reworks ratio')*'Average level of public services quality' 
doc The update of the Public Services Quality. 
aux Adjustment of Structural Corruption Risk in Procurement 
autotype Real 
def ((1-'Competition ratio')+'Personnel Discretion'+(1-'Municipal Accountability')+(1-'Civic Morality'))/4 
doc The update of the stock 'Structural Corruption Conditions'. This formula takes a cue from four main sources: 
1. the case-study; 
2. the metaphorical corruption formula provided by Klitgaard et al. (2000: 26): C = M + D - A; 
3. the governance indicator of the World Bank (2010) named 'Control of Corruption'; 
4. the literature (Heggstad, K. K. & Frøystad, M., 2011). 
Sources: 
1. Heggstad, K. K. & Frøystad, M. 2011. The basics of integrity in procurement, U4 Issue - Public financial management, Development 
cooperation, Procurement. Bergen, Norway: Chr. Michelsen Institute. 
2. Klitgaard, R., Maclean-Abaroa, R., & Parris, H. L. 2000. Corrupt cities: a practical guide to cure and prevention: 180. California: 
Institute for Contemporary Studies: Institute for Contemporary Studies. 
3. http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/Home/Documents. 
aux Applying evaluation criteria 
autotype Real 
autounit tender/yr 
def 'Tenders Received'/1<<yr>>*(1-'Evaluation bias risk ratio') 
doc The outflow of the Tenders Received and, contemporary, the inflow of the Regular Tenders Accepted, by applying the evaluation and 
exclusion criteria. 




doc The average attrition time in the Italian public sector. National reforms have changed this minimum threshold over time, but the average time 
according to which public employees get out of the job market in Italy stops at around 35 years. 
Source: Italian national retirement reforms over time. 








doc The average budget share annually devoted to the overall personnel training by the Municipality. 
Source: https://www.siope.it/Siope/dispatchSerieStoriche.action. 




doc The average fiscal pressure per capita in Cerda. It was calculated by integrating data retrieved from both ISTAT's and SIOPE's archives. In 
ISTAT, it is possible to obtain the historical series of the fundamental tax revenues in the Sicilian region, from 1993 to 2014. The total data was 
divided by the number of the Sicilian population, which has been approximatively constant at 5 million of people during the last decade. Likewise, 
in SIOPE, it is possible to search for historical series (i.e. Serie Storiche), go through a single public body (i.e. Singolo Ente) and select period, 
time step and category of incomes and/or expenditures. 
Data from 2008 (first data available in SIOPE) and 2014 (last data available in ISTAT) approximatively fit very well each other, so that it has 
been chosen to consider together to calculate this exogenous variable for the model. The value has been approximated at € 250. 
Population of Cerda= 5,300 people 
Calculation= 5300 people*250 EUR/person 
Sources: 




2. SIOPE (TAX INCOMES): https://www.siope.it/Siope/dispatchSerieStoriche.action. 
 
3. ISTAT (DEMOGRAPHY): 
http://seriestoriche.istat.it/index.php?id=1&no_cache=1&L=1&tx_usercento_centofe%5Bcategoria%5D=32&tx_usercento_centofe%5Baction
%5D=show&tx_usercento_centofe%5Bcontroller%5D=Categoria&cHash=04e5a2e51acfa92f173aac082f0d8872. 
const Average level of public services quality 
autotype Real 
init 6 
doc The average quality level of public services quality. Local governments' effectiveness is unavoidably influenced by the suppliers' performance 
and other factors that are not under their control. Public services, such as water supply, electric power distribution and public transport networks, 
are generally under the national quality average in the Sicilian region, as certified by ISTAT. In particular, ISTAT's analysis of public services 
quality considers heterogenous services and, for many indicators used to estimate the equitable and sustainable well-being in Italy (i.e. BES), it 
adopts a scale going from 0 to 10. 
Accordingly, this parameter has been set at 6 to assume a sufficient degree of public service quality as maximum level reachable. 
Source: https://www.istat.it/en/archivio/237012. 




doc The approximate estimation of the average offer cost. It depends on the kind of public work to accomplish or good to acquire. Because of 
the many kinds of procurement that the Municipality can put in place, it was considered an approximative value of 17,000 EUR/offer, by 
considering, one the one hand, the normal fee for a professional assignment related to the technical area (to which the sentences mainly refer to) 
and, on the other hand, the cost related to the supplies that the Municipality received over the last years. 
Sources: 
1. DM n. 140/2012, published in the Italian Official Journal of 22/08/2012 (regulation on fees for technical professions). 












doc The max average number of public contracts agreed upon yearly. This variable depends on the interventions planned and it has been estimated 
















def 2500000<<EUR/yr>>-((STEP (2500000<<EUR/yr>>*0.4, STARTTIME+20<<yr>>))) 
doc The variable shows the average of the historical data of the capital and current transfers from higher government bodies. They were retrieved 
from OpenBilanci for the period 2005-2007 and from SIOPE for the period 2008-2019. OpenBilanci has been used as integrative source, since 





2. SIOPE: https://www.siope.it/Siope/dispatchSerieStoriche.action. 
The step function reflects the reduction of transfers due to the national fiscal federalism reform in 2009. It has been approximatively set at 0.4 of 
the average transfers as they change year by year. 













doc The average legal interest rate for the missed payment of the debt of the Municipality. 
Sources: 
1. Legislative Decree 09 October 2002, no. 231, published in the Italian Official Journal no. 249 of 23-10-2002; 
2. https://www.altalex.com/documents/news/2014/12/16/tabella-del-saggio-di-interesse-legale-dal-1942-ad-oggi. 
aux Award-rigging of regular tenders 
autotype Real 
autounit tender/yr 
def MIN ('Public interventions requirement'/1<<yr>>*'Selective awarding risk ratio'*(1-'Civic Morality'), 'Regular 
Tenders Accepted'/1<<yr>>*'Selective awarding risk ratio'*(1-'Civic Morality')) 
doc The outflow of the Regular Tenders Accepted and, contemporary, an inflow of the Non-Regular Tenders Agreed, according to the Selective 
awarding risk ratio. The risk is linked to the fact that the proposals which do not win the procurement will be inevitably discarded unless the 
provider does not make the decision to engage in corruption. The reciprocal fraction of Civic Morality represents the general proneness to do so 
or not. The MIN function is useful to set a threshold at the budgeted interventions. 
aux Awarding of non-regular tenders 
autotype Real 
autounit tender/yr 
def MIN ('Public interventions requirement'/1<<yr>>*'Selective awarding risk ratio', 'Non-Regular Tenders 
Accepted'/1<<yr>>*'Selective awarding risk ratio') 
doc The outflow of the Non-Regular Tenders Accepted and, contemporary, the inflow of the Non-Regular Tenders Agreed, according to the 
Selective awarding risk ratio. The MIN function is useful to set a threshold at the budgeted interventions. 
aux Awarding of regular tenders 
autotype Real 
autounit tender/yr 
def MIN ('Public interventions requirement'/1<<yr>>*(1-'Selective awarding risk ratio'), 'Regular Tenders 
Accepted'/1<<yr>>*(1-'Selective awarding risk ratio')) 
doc The outflow of the Regular Tenders Accepted and, contemporary, the inflow of the Regular Tenders Agreed.  The MIN function is useful to 
set a threshold at the budgeted interventions. 
aux Bypassing evaluation criteria 
autotype Real 
autounit tender/yr 
def 'Tenders Received'/1<<yr>>*'Evaluation bias risk ratio'*(1-'Civic Morality') 
doc The outflow of the proposals received by the Municipality and, contemporary, the inflow of the non-regular proposals accepted by bypassing 
the evaluation criteria, according to the Evaluation bias risk ratio. The risk is linked to the fact that the proposals which are not compliant with 
the selection criteria will be discarded in the selection phase, unless the provider does not make the decision to engage in corruption. The reciprocal 
fraction of Civic Morality represents the general proneness to do so or not. 
aux Change in Civic Morality 
autotype Real 
autounit yr^-1 
def ('Adjustment of Civic Morality'-'Civic Morality')/'Time to Change Civic Morality' 
doc The net-flow of the stock Civic Morality. 
aux Change in Competing Providers 
autotype Real 
autounit pvd/yr 





doc The net-flow of the stock of local providers involved in the municipal procurement activity. 
aux Change in Local Institutional Trust 
autotype Real 
autounit yr^-1 
def ('Adjustment of Local Institutional Trust'-'Local Institutional Trust')/'Time to change Local Institutional Trust' 
doc The net-flow of the Local Institutional Trust. 
aux Change in Municipal Accountability 
autotype Real 
autounit yr^-1 
def (('Regularity ratio'*'ICT endowment ratio')-'Municipal Accountability')/1<<yr>> 
doc The net-change of accountability of the Municipality’s staff. 
aux Change in Personnel Discretion 
autotype Real 
autounit yr^-1 
def ((1 - ('Organizational expertise ratio'*'Regularity ratio'))-'Personnel Discretion')/5<<yr>> 
doc The net change in the municipal personnel's non-legitimate discretion. 
aux Change in Procurement Cost 
autotype Real 
autounit EUR/(yr*tender) 
def (('Average procurement cost'*'Effect of Competition ratio on Procurement Cost')-'Procurement Cost')/1<<yr>> 
doc The net change in Procurement Cost. 
aux Change in Perception of Public Services Quality by Community 
autotype Real 
autounit yr^-1 
def ('Adjustment of Perception of Public Services Quality by Community'-'Perception of Public Services 
Quality by Community')/1<<yr>> 
doc The net-flow of the Perception of Public Services Quality by Community. 
aux Change in Contracts Executed 
autotype Real 
autounit tender/yr 
def ('Execution of regular contracts'+'Execution of non-regular contracts')-'Contracts Executed'/1<<yr>> 
aux Change in Resource Dispersion 
autotype Real 
autounit EUR/yr 
def ((('Public Reworks'*'Procurement Cost')+('Procurement Cost'-'Average procurement cost')*'Contracts Executed')-'Resource 
Dispersion')/1<<yr>> 
doc The net-flow of the Resource Dispersion. It grows as the non-regular public works executed and the difference between the actual and the 
average procurement price increase. 
aux Change in Structural Corruption Conditions 
autotype Real 
autounit yr^-1 
def ('Adjustment of Structural Corruption Risk in Procurement'-'Structural Corruption Conditions')/1<<yr>> 
doc The net-flow of the change in structural conditions of corruption. 
aux Change in Training Capacity 
autotype Real 
autounit person/yr² 
def ('Expenditure in personnel training'/'Normal training expenditure per person'-'Training Capacity')/1<<yr>> 
doc The net-flow of the Municipality’s training capacity. 
level Civic Morality 
autotype Real 
init 'Adjustment of Civic Morality' 
inflow { autodef 'Change in Civic Morality' } 
doc The stock of the Civic Morality of the overall local community. 
aux Collecting tenders 
autotype Real 
autounit tender/yr 
def 'Total tenders receivable'/1<<yr>> 
doc The inflow of the number of tenders collected yearly by the Municipality according to the submissions of vendors. It includes both to the 
case of direct and that one of public auctions, whatever is the procedure adopted. 




doc The time according to which the organisational and the individualistic knowledge need to be renewed. Although public officials need to 
attend refresher courses, which are mainly due to national compulsory legislation and guidelines, their knowledge take a very long time to 
dissolve. Especially if they are already trained as well as employed in a small municipality, civil servants and public managers usually carry the 
same tasks out in accomplishing their duty, such that learning-by-doing does not need frequent refreshes. 







init 'Total number of local providers' 
inflow { autodef 'Change in Competing Providers' } 
doc The stock of the total number of local providers who are actually involved in the procurement activity of the Municipality. 
aux Competition ratio 
autotype Real 
def 'Competing Providers'/'Total number of local providers' 
doc The performance driver that compares the number of providers involved in the municipal public procurement with the total number of 
suppliers within the local area. 




inflow { autodef 'Change in Regular Contracts Executed' } 
doc  The stock of the contracts executed annually. 
aux Cost on debt 
autotype Real 
autounit EUR/yr 
def 'Debt Procurement'*('Average yearly interest rate'+'Costs due to unfavorable sentences') 
doc The cost on the debt related to procurement for public works. It includes both the average interest rate calculated on the capital and the costs 
deriving from legal procedures aimed at protecting the creditors' rights. 




doc The data is the average expenditure due to compensations, sanctions and other costs related to adverse judgments from 2008 to 2019. 
Source: https://www.siope.it/Siope/dispatchSerieStoriche.action. 




inflow { autodef 'Increase of Debt Procurement' } 
outflow { autodef 'Repayment of Debt Procurement' } 
doc The stock of the debt of the Municipality due to public works. 
aux Depreciation rate 
autotype Real 
autounit EUR/yr 
def 'ICT Endowment'/'Obsolescence time' 
doc The outflow of the municipal ICT endowment expressing the related gradual obsolescence rate. 
aux Discarding non-regular tenders accepted 
autotype Real 
autounit tender/yr 
def 'Non-Regular Tenders Accepted'/1<<yr>>-'Awarding of non-regular tenders' 
doc The rate of the Non-Regular Tenders Accepted being discarded in the award procedure. It is an outflow of the namesake stock. 
aux Discarding regular tenders accepted 
autotype Real 
autounit tender/yr 
def 'Regular Tenders Accepted'/1<<yr>>-'Awarding of regular tenders'-'Award-rigging of regular tenders' 
doc The rate of the Regular Tenders Accepted being discarded in the award procedure. It is an outflow of the namesake stock. 
aux Discarding tenders received 
autotype Real 
autounit tender/yr 
def 'Tenders Received'/1<<yr>>-'Applying evaluation criteria'-'Bypassing evaluation criteria' 
doc The rate of the Tenders Received being not compliant with evaluation and selection criteria. It is an outflow of the namesake stock. 
aux Effect of Competition ratio on Procurement Cost 
autotype Real 
def GRAPH('Competition ratio',0,0.1,{5,4.87,4.7,4.48,3.9,3,2.2,1.7,1.3,1.05,1//Min:1;Max:5//}) 
doc This variable is the effect of competition in public works on the average cost practiced by the local providers. Indeed, in the invitation tender 
phase, "the lack of competition leads to an excessive price" (Heggstad, & Frøystad, 2011). Generally, this parameter does not change a lot in 
relation to the number of providers involved in the procurement activity of the Municipality, since public auctions and direct purchases usually 
follow the price/quality ratio principle in Italy. However, the European and national regulations have allowed PAs to make exceptions, in order 
to ensure the opportune quality degree of the public works. Thus, it has been assumed that the average cost increases when the number of providers 
involved decreases with respect to the total, and vice versa. 
Precisely, when the Competition ratio assumes values within the interval 0-0.5, its effect has been assumed such that the cost tends to triple if the 
competition approximates the value 0 and it decreases increasingly when the competition degree begins to grow up to 0.5. The effect has been 
set by considering a range varying between a minimum of € 15,000 and a maximum of € 75,000, which is mostly referred to an approximative 
range that can be realistically considered for professional assignments in Italy, although it strongly depends on several factors linked to the kind 
of service to provide. 
When the Competition ratio equals 0.5, the price increases according to the median value of the considered range. When the Competition ratio 
assumes values within the interval 0.5-1, its effect is such that the price decreases decreasingly, since businesses want to be competitive at the 





value, it means that the Municipality may approximatively consider the largest set of alternatives and, as such, access to a cost brought in line 
with the quality and the quantity of the specific supply. 
The values of the graph function have been approximatively set according to the data retrieved from the public sentences, as well as according to 









8. Heggstad, K. K. & Frøystad, M. 2011. The basics of integrity in procurement, U4 Issue - Public financial management, Development 
cooperation, Procurement. Bergen, Norway: Chr. Michelsen Institute 
aux Evaluation bias risk ratio 
autotype Real 
def ((1-'Trained PEs ratio')*('Structural Corruption Conditions'*'Probability of corruption in the evaluation 
phase'*'Weight of corruption impact in the evaluation phase'))/'Maximum score of corruption risk range' 
doc The first-level performance driver measuring the risk of corruption in the evaluation phase of procurement. In principle, it is not realistic to 
assume total absence of corruption in the evaluation phase if the overall staff is skilled. Likewise, it is not possible to assume that personnel are 
always prone to corrupt behaviours just because it is not properly trained. However, the main assumption here is that when the number of Trained 
PEs starts to increase, the corruption risk decreases, since the enhancement of organisational expertise and integrity makes PEs less prone to 
offences. Contrarily, the risk should increase where the Trained PEs are less than the Non-Trained ones, because of widespread poor expertise 
and integrity within the Municipality. 
"Typical risks in the evaluation phase: 
• Decision-makers are biased due to corruption in the evaluation process. 
• Unclear definitions of the selection criteria make the selection process subjective instead of objective." 
Sources: 
1. Heggstad, K. K. & Frøystad, M. 2011. The basics of integrity in procurement, U4 Issue - Public financial management, Development 
cooperation, Procurement. Bergen, Norway: Chr. Michelsen Institute. 
2. Shick, R. & Weikart, L. A. 2009. Public Organizations Undergoing Change: A Study in Urban Contracting. Public Administration 
Quarterly, 33(1): 71-117. 
aux Execution of non-regular contracts 
autotype Real 
autounit tender/yr 
def 'Non-Regular Tenders Agreed'/1<<yr>> 
doc The outflow of the non-regular public works executed. 
aux Execution of regular contracts 
autotype Real 
autounit tender/yr 
def 'Regular Tenders Agreed'/1<<yr>> 
doc The outflow of the regular public works executed. 




doc The budget fraction used to improve the overall informative system of the Municipality. As in several small municipalities in the South of 
Italy, the degrees of informatisation and innovation in the overall public informative system has been inadequate in Cerda, and the only updates 
have essentially been due to mandatory procedural fulfilment prescribed by law, such as the recurrence to Consip and the use of SIOPE. There 
were insignificant investments over the past years in technical structures and tools aimed at enhancing the public informative system as a whole. 
The data was retrieved from SIOPE in correspondence to the average expenditure for computer equipment and software. 
Source: https://www.siope.it/Siope/dispatchSerieStoriche.action. 
aux Expenditure in personnel training 
autotype Real 
autounit EUR/yr 
def IF('Municipality Liquidity'/1<<yr>>>='Average budget share to personnel training', 'Average budget share to personnel training', 
MAX('Municipality Liquidity'/1<<yr>>, 0<<EUR/yr>>)) 
doc The yearly expenditure devoted to the personnel training. The MIN function is to set the threshold in the financial resources available to the 
Municipality. 
aux Expenditure in personnel wages 
autotype Real 
autounit EUR/yr 
def ('Average yearly expenditure'*'Fraction of expenditure due to employment relationship with personnel') 
doc The yearly value of the total expenditure devoted to the municipal personnel’s wages. 
const Fraction devoted to the training of PEs 
autotype Real 
init 0.5 
doc The fraction devoted to the training and refresh of medium and low-specialized public officials. It was set at 0.5 to assume an equal allocation 
of the training budget between employees and managers, although the local government’s actual policy is unknown. 







doc The fraction of the total municipal expenditure devoted to employment relationships with the personnel. According to the ISTAT’s database, 
the average fraction during the period 2007-2016 is about 0.5 with respect to both the current and the capital expenditure of the Municipality. 
Since salaries for public jobs are generally assumed as structural costs in Italy, this fraction was assumed constant in the last three decades. 
SIOPE’s database confirms the value of this parameter. 
Sources: 
1. ISTAT: http://dati.istat.it/Index.aspx?QueryId=18425#. 
2. SIOPE: https://www.siope.it/Siope/dispatchProspettiEnti.action. 




doc The standard number of positions for high-specialized public offices in the Municipality. The Municipality has 4 employees who are heads 
of department. 
Source: informal interview with the Personnel Office of the Municipality of Cerda. 




inflow { autodef 'Increase in ICT Endowment' } 
outflow { autodef 'Depreciation rate' } 
doc The stock of the ICT endowment of the Municipality. 
aux ICT endowment ratio 
autotype Real 
def 'ICT Endowment'/'Normal yearly ICT expenditure' 




def 'Average fiscal pressure'*'Local Institutional Trust'+'Average transfers' 
doc The cash-inflow of the Municipality. It is given by transfers and local tax incomes. 
aux Increase in ICT Endowment 
autotype Real 
autounit EUR/yr 
def IF('Municipality Liquidity'/1<<yr>>>='Expenditure in ICT', 'Expenditure in ICT', MAX('Municipality Liquidity'/ 
1<<yr>>, 0<<EUR/yr>>)) 
doc The inflow of the ICT endowment of the Municipality. It depends on the annual allocation of public resources decided by the local politics. 
The MIN function sets the threshold given by the Municipality’s financial resources. 
aux Increase in Public Reworks 
autotype Real 
autounit tender/yr 
def 'Execution of non-regular contracts'*(1-'Civic Morality') 
doc The inflow of Public Reworks. It depends on two factors: firstly, the number of contract executions coming from the non-regular awarding 
phase and, secondly, the degree of Civic Morality of the community, which also includes the local businesses. The assumption is that if a contract 
is awarded irregularly it does not mean the related provided service is poor, since it strongly depends on the individualistic consciousness of the 
supplier about the public duty in which it is involved. For the sake of simplicity, since it is not possible to estimate such an impact, it was assumed 
a proportional effect of the Civic Morality on reworks. 
aux Increase of Debt Procurement 
autotype Real 
autounit EUR/yr 
def (('Execution of regular contracts'+'Execution of non-regular contracts')*'Procurement Cost')*(1+'Accounting and record noncompliance risk 
ratio')+'Cost on debt' 
doc The inflow of the municipal debt for public contracts and the related cost. 
level Local Institutional Trust 
autotype Real 
init 0.315 
inflow { autodef 'Change in Local Institutional Trust' } 
doc The stock of Local Institutional Trust. 




doc The standard number of positions for medium- and low-specialized public offices in the Municipality. The Municipality has 74 public officials 
performing low-specialized tasks. 
Source: informal interview with the Personnel Office of the Municipality of Cerda. 







doc The TPCPTs consider a range of corruption impact going from 1 to 16, since both probabilities and weights are ranged 1-4 (so that, the 




aux Mgrs competence evanescence rate 
autotype Real 
autounit person/yr 
def 'Trained Mgrs'/'Competence evanescence time' 
doc The rate at which managers dissipate their skills for competence, becoming non-trained. 
aux Mgrs professional training rate 
autotype Real 
autounit person/yr 
def MIN(('High-specialized public positions'-'Trained Mgrs')/'Training time', 'Training Capacity'*(1-'Fraction devoted to the training of PEs')) 
doc The inflow increasing the level of Trained Mgrs. The MIN function is to set the variable as dependent on the actual training capacity of the 
Municipality. 
level Municipal Accountability 
autotype Real 
init 'Regularity ratio'*'ICT endowment ratio' 
inflow { autodef 'Change in Municipal Accountability' } 
doc The stock of the municipal personnel's accountability. 




outflow { autodef Payments } 
inflow { autodef Incomes } 
doc The stock of the financial resources of the Municipality. 




inflow { autodef 'Bypassing evaluation criteria' } 
outflow { autodef 'Awarding of non-regular tenders' } 
outflow { autodef 'Discarding non-regular tenders accepted' } 
doc The stock of non-regular tenders for public works accepted. 




outflow { autodef 'Execution of non-regular contracts' } 
inflow { autodef 'Award-rigging of regular tenders' } 
inflow { autodef 'Awarding of non-regular tenders' } 
doc The stock of non-regular tenders for public works agreed upon. 
aux Non-Regular Tenders Reported 
autotype Real 
autounit tender 
def DELAYINF('Non-Regular Tenders Accepted'+'Non-Regular Tenders Agreed',1<<yr>>,1,'Non-Regular 
Tenders Accepted'+'Non-Regular Tenders Agreed') 
doc The total amount of non-regular offers reported or made known to the personnel of the Municipality informally. 




doc The yearly expenditure per capita paid for personnel training. The data was estimated by comparing one representative municipality among 
the best performing ones in Italy with as many residents as Cerda, that is, with residents included in the range 5,000-9,999. In this case, it was 
selected Lignano Sabbiadoro, in the province of Udine, located in the region of Friuli-Venezia Giulia. In that region, there are around 38,000 




In the Udine's province, there are 134, therefore around 15 public employees. Considering that Lignano Sabbiadoro has spent around EUR 25,000 
per year in personnel training, the variable has been estimated at EUR 1,500 per public employee per year. 
Source: https://www.siope.it/Siope/dispatchSerieStoriche.action. 








doc The yearly expenditure per capita paid for ICT. The data was retrieved from the one of the best-in-class municipalities with as many residents 
as Cerda, that is, with residents included in the range 5,000-9,999. In this case, it was selected Lignano Sabbiadoro, in the Udine's province, 
located in the region of Friuli-Venezia Giulia. Lignano Sabbiadoro has spent around EUR 5,000 per year in computer equipment and software. 
Source: https://www.siope.it/Siope/dispatchSerieStoriche.action. 
Hence, by considering a constant depreciation of the same amount of investments, that is € 5,000, the indicated value of the ICT endowment for 
a small municipality can be estimated at € 50,000. The assumption is that this amount is reasonable for a small municipality and that, in order to 
ensure the correct functioning of the computer equipment and software, this amount should be kept constant over time. 




doc The average obsolescence rate of the ICT. Software and other kinds of informative structure have a long-range usage in small municipalities, 
especially in the South of Italy, where this kind of expenditure is marginal with respect to other primary interventions because of the scarcity of 
resources. Thus, the percentage of obsolescence time was reasonably set at 15 years. 
aux Organizational expertise ratio 
autotype Real 
def ('Trained PEs'+'Trained Mgrs')/('High-specialized public positions'+'Low- and medium-specialized public positions') 
doc The ratio of the trained employees up to the total (subjective deterrent). The effect of the HRs' internal composition is such that the more 
trained civil servants are, the higher capability to recognise possible, although blurred, malfeasances in decision-making will be, and this works 




def IF('Municipality Liquidity'/1<<yr>>>='Expenditure in personnel wages'+'Expenditure in personnel training'+ 
'Increase in ICT Endowment'+'Repayment of Debt Procurement', 'Expenditure in personnel wages'+'Expenditure in personnel training'+'Increase 
in ICT Endowment'+'Repayment of Debt Procurement', MAX('Municipality Liquidity'/1<<yr>>, 0<<EUR/yr>>)) 
doc The cash-outflow of the Municipality. 
aux Perception of Municipal Accountability by Community 
autotype Real 
def DELAYINF('Municipal Accountability',1<<yr>>,1,'Municipal Accountability') 
doc The degree of transparency perceived by the local community. The delay corresponds to a 1 administrative year, as the conventional time 
according to which the relevant stakeholders can evaluate the Municipality’s action and accountability. 
level Perception of Public Services Quality by Community 
autotype Real 
init 'Adjustment of Perception of Public Services Quality by Community' 
inflow { autodef 'Change in Public Services Quality' } 
doc The stock of the public services quality perceived by the community. Adopting the same scale used by ISTAT for the BES indicators, this 
variable varies between 0 and 10. 
Sources: https://www.istat.it/en/archivio/237012. 
level Personnel Discretion 
autotype Real 
init 1-('Organizational expertise ratio'*'Regularity ratio') 
inflow { autodef 'Change in Personnel Discretion' } 
doc The stock of the personnel's non-legitimate discretion in public procurement. 
aux PEs competence evanescence rate 
autotype Real 
autounit person/yr 
def 'Trained PEs'/'Competence evanescence time' 
doc The rate at which public employees dissipate their skills competence, becoming non-trained. 
aux PEs professional training rate 
autotype Real 
autounit person/yr 
def MIN(('Low- and medium-specialized public positions'-'Trained PEs')/'Training time', 'Training Capacity'* 
'Fraction devoted to the training of PEs') 
doc The inflow increasing the level of Trained PEs. The MIN function is to set the variable as dependent on the actual training capacity of the 
Municipality. 
aux Political credibility ratio 
autotype Real 
def 'Contracts Executed'/'Public interventions requirement' 
doc The performance driver measuring the number of public interventions realised out of those actually required. It depicts the political credibility 
in designing and implementing public policies related to public works committed to external providers. It is a component of the government 
effectiveness. 
const Probability of corruption in the awarding phase 
autotype Real 
init 2.5 
doc This probability was estimated by calculating the average probabilities indicated by the Municipality's TPPCTs during the years 2017, 2018 








const Probability of corruption in the evaluation phase 
autotype Real 
init 2.44 
doc The probability of corruption in the evaluation phase. It was estimated by calculating the average for the corruption probabilities indicated 
by the Municipality's TPPCTs during the years 2017, 2018 and 2019. They are related to the sub-processes: a) competitive disorders in direct 
assignments; b) excess of evaluative discretion of bids by the Committee; c) evasion of assignment rules in public tendering through direct 




const Probability of corruption in the post-awarding phase 
autotype Real 
init 1.67 
doc The probability of corruption in the post-awarding phase. It was estimated by calculating the average for the corruption probabilities indicated 
by the Municipality's TPPCTs during the years 2017, 2018 and 2019. They are related to the sub-processes: a) non-conforming documental 




const Probability of corruption in the pre-tendering and decision-making phase 
autotype Real 
init 2.43 
doc  The probability of corruption in the pre-tendering and decision-making phase. It was estimated by calculating the average for the corruption 
probabilities indicated by the Municipality's TPPCTs during the years 2017, 2018 and 2019. They are related to the sub-processes: a) definition 
of the object of the assignment to limit number of tenderers; b) identification of the procedure to assign a public work; c) definition of requirements 




level Procurement Cost 
autotype Real 
autounit EUR/tender 
init 'Average procurement cost' 
inflow { autodef 'Change in Procurement Cost' } 
doc The first-order information delay related to the supply cost established by the local providers. Considering a single cost is just for the sake 
of simplicity, since it varies by virtue of the kind of the considered procurement. 




doc The number of offers per provider. For the sake of simplicity, it has been set at 3, since it is reasonable to assume that a single supplier can 
offer more than once its services in a small municipality over a year, by virtue of the proximity with the local PA. 
aux Public interventions requirement 
autotype Real 
autounit tender 
def 'Average public contracts'+'Public Reworks' 
doc The number of public works to put in place according to the usual number of interventions and possible reworks. 




inflow { autodef 'Increase in Public Reworks' } 
outflow { autodef 'Reduction in Public Reworks' } 
doc The stock of the public reworks to realise. 
aux Public reworks ratio 
autotype Real 
def 'Public Reworks'/'Contracts Executed' 
doc The ratio between the resources wasted and the total value of public works executed. 
Source: Kluvers, R. 2003. Accountability for Performance in Local Government. Australian Journal of Public Administration, 62(1): 57-69. 
aux Reduction in Public Reworks 
autotype Real 
autounit tender/yr 
def 'Public Reworks'/1<<yr>> 
doc The outflow of the stock Public Reworks. 




inflow { autodef 'Applying evaluation criteria' } 





outflow { autodef 'Award-rigging of regular tenders' } 
outflow { autodef 'Discarding regular tenders accepted' } 
doc The stock of regular offers for public works accepted. 




inflow { autodef 'Awarding of regular tenders' } 
outflow { autodef 'Execution of regular contracts' } 
doc The stock of regular tenders for public works agreed upon. 
aux Regular Tenders Reported 
autotype Real 
autounit tender 
def DELAYINF('Regular Tenders Accepted'+'Regular Tenders Agreed',1<<yr>>,1,'Regular Tenders Accepted'+'Regular Tenders Agreed') 
doc The total amount of regular offers reported or made known to the personnel of the Municipality informally. 
aux Regularity ratio 
autotype Real 
def 'Regular Tenders Reported'/('Regular Tenders Reported'+'Non-Regular Tenders Reported') 
doc The performance driver indicating the degree of procedural regularity of the procurement process. 
aux Repayment of Debt Procurement 
autotype Real 
autounit EUR/yr 
def IF('Municipality Liquidity'>='Debt Procurement', 'Debt Procurement', MAX('Municipality Liquidity', 0<< 
EUR>>))/1<<yr>> 
doc The repayment of the municipal debt for public contracts and the related cost. 
aux Reported Debt Procurement 
autotype Real 
autounit EUR 
def DELAYINF('Debt Procurement',1<<yr>>,1,'Debt Procurement') 
doc The amount of debt for procurement perceived by the local community. The delay is set at 1 year according to the time taken by the 
Municipality to make its financial statement public. 




inflow { autodef 'Change in Resource Dispersion' } 
doc The stock of resource dispersion due to ‘active’ waste (i.e. corruption). 
aux Resource Dispersion Perceived by Community 
autotype Real 
autounit EUR 
def DELAYINF('Resource Dispersion',1<<yr>>,1,'Resource Dispersion') 
doc The amount of resource dispersion perceived by the local community. The information related to resource dispersion is usually delivered by 
any kind of media to the community, such as newscasts, newspapers, or even direct observation. The delay is set at 1 year according to the time 
taken by the Municipality to make its financial statement public. 
aux Resource dispersion ratio 
autotype Real 
def 'Resource Dispersion Perceived by Community'/'Reported Debt Procurement' 
doc The performance driver is the measure of the inefficiency measured by the incidence of the interventions to rework and the overall local debt. 
This last is usually intended as a measure of the government’s effort in providing citizens with the required public services, as stated by the Public 
Official #5 during the interview. At this regard, paraphrasing Lambsdorff (2001: 6), local people may perceive high/low levels of corruption by 
comparing its outcomes to other less/more pressing problems that the local government is dealing with and, in addition, disapprove/justify it by 
virtue of the fact that perceptions are strongly influenced by the local culture. 
Sources: 
1. Lambsdorff JG. 2001. Framework document. Background paper to the 2001 Corruption Perceptions Index: Transparency International 
(TI) and Göttingen University. 
2. Public Official #5. 2019. Non-standardized, face-to-face convergent in-depth interview with Public Official #5 [In Italian]. In S. 
Gnoffo (Ed.). 
aux Selective awarding risk ratio 
autotype Real 
def ((1-'ICT endowment ratio')*('Structural Corruption Conditions'*'Probability of corruption in the awarding 
phase'*'Weight of corruption in the awarding phase'))/'Maximum score of corruption risk range' 
doc The first-level performance driver measuring the risk of wrongdoings in the awarding phase. "Typical risks in the award phase: 
• Decision makers are biased due to corruption in the award process. 
• Records of the award procedure are not easily accessible. [...] 
Source: Heggstad, K. K. & Frøystad, M. 2011. The basics of integrity in procurement, U4 Issue - Public financial management, Development 
cooperation, Procurement. Bergen, Norway: Chr. Michelsen Institute: 24-25. 
aux Solvency margin 
autotype Real 
autounit EUR 





doc The difference between the local debt and the actual liquidity of the Municipality. 
level Structural Corruption Conditions 
autotype Real 
init 'Adjustment of Structural Corruption Risk in Procurement' 
inflow { autodef 'Change in Structural Corruption Conditions' } 
doc The stock synthetising the cultural, socio-political, and institutional factors shaping the long-term corruption conditions of the system. 
aux Tailored specifications risk ratio 
autotype Real 
def ((1-'Trained mgrs ratio')*('Structural Corruption Conditions'*'Probability of corruption in the pre-tendering and decision-making 
phase'*'Weight of corruption in the pre-tendering and decision-making phase'))/'Maximum score of corruption risk range' 
doc The first-level performance driver measuring the degree of "over-" or "lock-out" specification in the identification and publicisation phase 
of needs for goods or services (Klitgaard, R., Maclean-Abaroa, R., & Parris, H. L., 2000: 119). It includes corruption risks in need assessment, 
planning and budgeting for procurement, definition of requirements, choice of procedure, inviting to tender. This variable embeds some kinds of 
risks related to the pre-tendering and decision-making phases of procurement: 
1. "Typical risks during needs assessment: 
• Assessment of needs is insufficient due to shortage of time and/or a lack of capacity and competence 
on the part of the procurement staff. 
[...] 
2. Typical risks when planning and budgeting for procurement: 
• Planning and budgeting of purchases is insufficient and/or unrealistic. 
[...] 
3. Typical risks in the definition of requirements: 
• Bidding documents or terms of reference are tailored to fit one company, so that competition is either 
restricted or not possible. 
• Selection and award criteria are not defined objectively. 
• Selection and award criteria are not established in advance. 
• Firms are prequalified or shortlisted because they have offered bribes and not because of their qualifications and experience. 
[...] 
4. Typical risks in the choice of procedure: 
• Non-competitive procedures are used without adequate justification or in ignorance of the requirements. 
• Suppliers are evaluated without a prior tender process, possibly because decision makers have a private agenda for choosing a particular firm. 
The risk is that the best potential bidder is overlooked. 
[...] 
5. Risks when inviting to tender: 
• There is no public notice of the bid invitation. 
• Relevant information is not disseminated equitably to all bidders. 
• The criteria for selecting the winner are not made public." 
Sources: 
1. Klitgaard, R., Maclean-Abaroa, R., & Parris, H. L. 2000. Corruption in procurement, Corrupt cities: A practical guide to cure and 
prevention: 117-150. California: Institute for Contemporary Studies. 
2. Heggstad, K. K. & Frøystad, M. 2011. The basics of integrity in procurement, U4 Issue - Public financial management, Development 
cooperation, Procurement. Bergen, Norway: Chr. Michelsen Institute. 




outflow { autodef 'Bypassing evaluation criteria' } 
inflow { autodef 'Collecting tenders' } 
outflow { autodef 'Applying evaluation criteria' } 
outflow { autodef 'Discarding tenders received' } 
doc The stock of offers for public works received. 




doc The time the Civic Morality spends to change. It has been assumed as the same time of a political public mandate, since change in the ruling 
class may be considered as a proxy of the modification in the community's preferences and mindset. 




doc The time to change the trust in local government by the community. World Bank estimates its Governance Indicator every 2 years. That 
means that this time is reasonably considered as sufficient to detect a change over time. 
Source: info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/Home/downLoadFile?fileName=ge.pdf. 




doc The average number of the suppliers located in Cerda operating in the construction sector and professionals. It was used the data between 





- construction: 45 firms; 
- professional, scientific and technical activities (architectural and engineering activities, technical testing 
and analysis): 7 firms. 
Total = 52 firms 
Source: http://dati-censimentoindustriaeservizi.istat.it/Index.aspx?lang=en#. (Path: Data frame -> Units 
and human resources - Municipal level -> Sicilia -> Local units and human resources -> Enterprises). 
aux Total tenders receivable 
autotype Real 
autounit tender 
def 'Competing Providers'*'Proposals per provider' 
doc The total yearly offers per provider. 
level Trained Mgrs 
autotype Real 
autounit person 
init 'High-specialized public positions' 
inflow { autodef 'Mgrs professional training rate' } 
outflow { autodef 'Mgrs competence evanescence rate' } 
doc The stock of managers with high expertise. It includes managers with both executive qualification and managerial office, according to the 
provision of the Legislative Decree 30 March 2001, no.165, published in the Italian Official Journal no. 106 of 09-05-2001. 
aux Trained mgrs ratio 
autotype Real 
def 'Trained Mgrs'/'High-specialized public positions' 
doc The performance driver measuring the level of managers' professionalisation. It is given by the comparison between the Non-Trained 
Managers and the total high specialised public positions. It represents an intermediate-result measuring the quality level of executives in 
procurement. 
level Trained PEs 
autotype Real 
autounit person 
init 'Low- and medium-specialized public positions' 
inflow { autodef 'PEs professional training rate' } 
outflow { autodef 'PEs competence evanescence rate' } 
doc The stock of public employees with skills for competence. 
aux Trained PEs ratio 
autotype Real 
def 'Trained PEs'/'Low- and medium-specialized public positions' 
doc The second-level performance driver measuring the level of the public employees' professionalisation. It is given by the comparison between 
the Non-Trained PEs and the total medium and low-specialised public positions. 




inflow { autodef 'Change in Training Capacity' } 
doc The stock of the training capacity of the Municipality. 




doc The time needed to train the municipal employees and managers. Professional courses for PA are very differentiated in terms of time and 
they, according to the subject to deal with. Indeed, they can both require a couple days and some months to be successfully concluded. However, 
they take no more than a few months generally. 
Source: Italian training courses for PA on the Internet. 
const Weight of corruption impact in the evaluation phase 
autotype Real 
init 2.67 
doc This weight was estimated by calculating the average for the corruption impact weights indicated by the Municipality's TPPCTs during the 
years 2017, 2018 and 2019. They are related to the sub-processes: a) competitive disorders in direct assignments; b) excess of evaluative discretion 




const Weight of corruption in the awarding phase 
autotype Real 
init 2.67 
doc This weight was estimated by calculating the average for the corruption impact weights indicated by the Municipality's TPPCTs during the 












doc This weight was estimated by calculating the average for the corruption impact weights indicated by the Municipality's TPPCTs during the 
years 2017, 2018 and 2019. They are related to the sub-processes: a) non-conforming documental arrangement; b) issuing of orders for payment 




const Weight of corruption in the pre-tendering and decision-making phase 
autotype Real 
init 2.51 
doc This weight was estimated by calculating the average for the corruption impact weights indicated by the Municipality's TPPCTs during the 
years 2017, 2018 and 2019. They are related to the sub-processes: a) definition of the object of the assignment to limit number of tenderers; b) 
identification of the procedure to assign a public work; c) definition of requirements to access for bids; d) distorted use of best offer criterion to 





aux Change in Training Capacity 
def IF(TIME<30<<@yr>>,('Expenditure in personnel training'/'Normal training expenditure per person'-'Training Capacity')/1<<yr>>, 
(POLICY_2/1<<yr>>-'Training Capacity')/1<<yr>>) 
doc The inflow of the Municipality’s training capacity adjusted by the suggested policy. 
aux Increase in ICT Endowment 
def IF(TIME<30<<@yr>>, IF('Municipality Liquidity'/1<<yr>>>='Expenditure in ICT', 'Expenditure in ICT', MAX('Municipality 
Liquidity'/1<<yr>>, 0<<EUR/yr>>)), IF('Municipality Liquidity'/1<<yr>>>=POLICY_1, 
POLICY_1, MAX('Municipality Liquidity'/1<<yr>>, 0<<EUR/yr>>))) 
doc The inflow of the ICT endowment of the Municipality adjusted by the suggested policy. 
aux POLICY_1 
def 'Normal yearly ICT expenditure'/1<<yr>>+'Depreciation rate'-'ICT Endowment'/1<<yr>> 
aux POLICY_2 
def 'High-specialized public positions'-'Trained Mgrs'+'Low- and medium-specialized public positions'-'Trained PEs' 
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aux Actual low- and medium-specialized public positions 
autotype Real 
autounit person 
def 'Standard number of low- and medium-specialized public positions'*'Effect of Political trust ratio on PE 
vacancies' 
doc The actual number of low- and medium-specialized positions depending on the political pressure. 
aux Adjustment in Trust in Local Politics 
autotype Real 
def (('Maximum trust in local politics'*'Community Life Satisfaction'/'Maximum score of Community Life Satisfaction')+('Maximum trust in 
local politics'*'Clientelism risk ratio'))/2 
doc The adjustment of trust in the local government. On the one hand, it depends on the level of effectiveness of the public action, that is, the 
objective degree of civil service quality determined by the level of personnel's professionalization. On the other hand, it depends on the tendency 
of citizens to increase their consensus where local politics recurs to clientelist practices to enlarge its electoral pool. It depends on subjective 
factors being captured by the 'Clientelism impact ratio'. It has been assumed a simple average of the values coming from the multiplication of the 
maximum parameter with the two determinant factors to capture a normal condition of the overall trust in the local politics. 
aux Adjustment of Civil Service Quality 
autotype Real 
def 'Maximum score of organizational and individual performance'*'Effect of Non-trained PEs ratio on CSQ'* 
'Effect of Non-trained mgrs ratio on CSQ' 
doc The update of the level of civil service quality, which is a component of the overall government effectiveness degree. Indeed, according to 
the World Bank Governance Indicators: "Government effectiveness captures perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil 
service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of 
the government's commitment to such policies." It has been assumed a simple average of the effects led by the internal composition of both the 
categories to describe a normal condition of the overall civil service quality. 
aux Adjustment of Community Life Satisfaction 
autotype Real 
def 'Maximum score of Community Life Satisfaction'*'CSQ ratio' 
doc The update of the Community Life Satisfaction. 




doc The annual average wages made by both PEs and Mgrs. in Italy. It is referred to the overall available period 2005-2019 on the ISTAT's 
official website for middle management, white collar, as well as employees referred to the compartment of regional and local bodies. 
Source: http://dati.istat.it/Index.aspx?lang=en&SubSessionId=a39e7ab7-e66a-4a99-916d-7e490d8152cb#. 




doc The average attrition time in the Italian public sector. National reforms have changed this minimum threshold over time, but the average time 
according to which public employees get out of the job market in Italy stops at around 35 years. 
Source: Italian national retirement reforms over time. 
const Average budget share to personnel training 
autotype Real 
autounit EUR/yr 
init 365 <<EUR/yr>> 
doc The average budget share annually devoted to the overall personnel training by the Municipality. 
Source: https://www.siope.it/Siope/dispatchSerieStoriche.action. 




doc The average fiscal pressure per capita in Cerda has been calculated by integrating data retrieved from both ISTAT's and SIOPE's archives. 
In ISTAT, it is possible to obtain the historical series of the fundamental tax revenues (i.e. IMU and TARSU) in the Sicilian region, from 1993 
to 2014. The total data has been divided by the number of the Sicilian population, which has been approximatively constant at 5 million of people 
during the last decade. Likewise, in SIOPE, it is possible to search for historical series (i.e. Serie Storiche), go through a single public body (i.e. 
Singolo Ente) and select period, time step and category of incomes and/or expenditures. 
Data from 2008 (first data available in SIOPE) and 2014 (last data available in ISTAT) approximatively fit very well each other, so that it has 






ISTAT SOURCE (TAX INCOMES): 
http://seriestoriche.istat.it/index.php?id=1&no_cache=1&L=1&tx_usercento_centofe%5Bcategoria%5D=52&tx_usercento_centofe%5Baction
%5D=show&tx_usercento_centofe%5Bcontroller%5D=Categoria&cHash=019e4ab5763e83f77b51ef684c57cd98. 
PATH: "Balance sheets of provincial and municipal local governments" -> "Municipal government tributary assessments by category and region 
- 1993-2014" 
 
SIOPE SOURCE (TAX INCOMES): https://www.siope.it/Siope/dispatchSerieStoriche.action. 
PATH: "Entrate tributarie" -> "Serie Storiche Procapite" -> "Formato tabellare". The data considered is between 2008-2019 
 
ISTAT SOURCE (DEMOGRAPHY): 
http://seriestoriche.istat.it/index.php?id=1&no_cache=1&L=1&tx_usercento_centofe%5Bcategoria%5D=32&tx_usercento_centofe%5Baction
%5D=show&tx_usercento_centofe%5Bcontroller%5D=Categoria&cHash=04e5a2e51acfa92f173aac082f0d8872. 
PATH: "Resident population and demographic dynamics" -> "Resident population at the 1st of January and average by region and geographical 
area - Years 1952-2014" 
See also: https://www.siope.it/Siope/dispatchProspettiEnti.action (indicators for single municipality). 




doc The variable shows the average of the historical data of the capital and current transfers from higher government bodies. They have been 
retrieved from OpenBilanci for the period 2005-2007 and from SIOPE for the period 2008-2019. OpenBilanci has been used as integrative source 




2. SIOPE: https://www.siope.it/Siope/dispatchSerieStoriche.action. 
aux Change in Civil Service Quality 
autotype Real 
autounit yr^-1 
def ('Adjustment of Civil Service Quality'-'Civil Service Quality')/1<<yr>> 
doc The net-flow of the CSQ stock. 
aux Change in Community Life Satisfaction 
autotype Real 
autounit yr^-1 
def ('Adjustment of Community Life Satisfaction'-'Community Life Satisfaction')/1<<yr>> 
doc The change in the community's civil service quality satisfaction. 
aux Change in Training Capacity 
autotype Real 
autounit person/yr² 
def ('Expenditure in personnel training'/'Normal training expenditure per person'-'Training Capacity')/1<<yr>> 
doc The inflow of the Training Program Budget. 
aux Change in Trust in Local Politics 
autotype Real 
autounit yr^-1 
def ('Adjustment in Trust in Local Politics'-'Trust in Local Politics')/'Time to change Trust in Local Politics' 
doc The net change of trust in the local politics. 
level Civil Service Quality 
autotype Real 
init 'Adjustment of Civil Service Quality' 
inflow { autodef 'Change in Civil Service Quality' } 
doc The stock of civil service quality. It resumes the overall personnel's effectiveness and efficiency degrees in performing operational and 
managerial tasks. 
aux Clientelism risk ratio 
autotype Real 
def ((1-'Political trust ratio')*('Probability of corruption in recruiting'*'Weight of corruption in recruiting process'))/'Maximum score of corruption 
risk range' 
doc The performance driver through which the Municipality is enabled to reduce the probability of clientelism in recruiting. It is a dimensionless 
multiplier. 
level Community Life Satisfaction 
autotype Real 
init 'Adjustment of Community Life Satisfaction' 
inflow { autodef 'Change in Community Life Satisfaction' } 
doc The stock of the community's civil service quality satisfaction. 




doc The time according to which the organizational and the individualistic knowledge need to be renewed. Although public officials need to 





dissolve. Especially if they are already trained as well as employed in a small municipality, civil servants and public managers usually carry the 
same tasks out in accomplishing their duty. 
aux CSQ ratio 
autotype Real 
def 'Perception of CSQ by Community'/'Maximum score of organizational and individual performance' 
doc The performance driver capturing the level of managers' professionalization. It is given by the ratio between the Non-Trained Managers and 
the total high specialized public positions. It's a dimensionless multiplier. 
aux Desired mgrs hiring rate 
autotype Real 
autounit person/yr 
def ('Standard number of high-specialized public positions'-'Vacancies - Mgrs'-'Trained Mgrs'-'Non-Trained Mgrs')/'Labor adjustment time' + 
'Trained mgrs attrition' + 'Non-trained mgrs attrition' 
doc The cumulative vacancies of manager defined by the total number of managerial positions in the Municipality net of the current number of 
trained and non-trained managers, plus the integration of outgoing trained and non-trained managers. 
aux Desired PEs hiring rate 
autotype Real 
autounit person/yr 
def ('Actual low- and medium-specialized public positions'-'Vacancies - PEs'-'Trained PEs'-'Non-Trained PEs')/'Labor adjustment time' + 'Trained 
PEs attrition' + 'Non-trained PEs attrition' 
doc The cumulative vacancies of civil servants defined by the total number of medium- and low-specialized positions in the Municipality, net of 
the current number of trained and non-trained civil servants, plus the integration of outgoing trained and non-trained civil servants. 
aux Desired training capacity 
autotype Real 
autounit person/yr 
def ('Non-Trained PEs' + 'Non-Trained Mgrs')/1<<yr>> 
doc The target training capacity of managers who annually need to be engaged in training programs. 
aux Desired Training Capacity Perceived by the Municipality 
autotype Real 
autounit person/yr 
def DELAYINF('Desired training capacity',1<<yr>>,1,'Desired training capacity') 
doc The desired level of training capacity perceived by the Municipality. It is delayed of 1 year, since the assessment of the quality of public 
employees occurs within the allocation phase of public resources, meaning during the activity and the budget planning. 
aux Effect of Non-trained mgrs ratio on CSQ 
autotype Real 
def GRAPH('Non-trained mgrs ratio',0,0.1,{0.8,0.7,0.624,0.568,0.524,0.5,0.484,0.452,0.41,0.332,0.2//Min:0.2; Max:0.8//}) 
doc The tab function assumes that, when the number of Non-Trained Managers is 0 and the number of Trained ones is 4, the probability of 
positive impact on public service quality is 0.8. It cannot be 1, as it is not possible to realistically assume total absence of human factors causing 
losses in public service quality. When the number of Non-Trained Managers starts to increase, the graph function begins to decreasingly decrease, 
since the deterioration of competence makes managers more prone to provide poor service quality, but slowly, because of a higher presence of 
Trained Managers. When the two stocks are equal, the impact is 0.5. Finally, the function increasingly decreases in the second part of the graph, 
where Trained Managers are less than the Non-Trained ones, so that the effect starts to gain force thanks to a broadly widespread lack of 
competence level in the organisation. However, the minimum effect is 0.2, since it is not realistically possible to assume that all people provide 
the community with poor services just because they are not properly trained. 
aux Effect of Non-trained PEs ratio on CSQ 
autotype Real 
def GRAPH('Non-trained PEs ratio',0,0.1,{0.8,0.7,0.624,0.568,0.524,0.5,0.484,0.452,0.41,0.332,0.2//Min:0.2; Max:0.8//}) 
doc The tab function assumes that, when the number of Non-Trained PEs is 0 and the number of Trained ones is 74, the probability of positive 
impact on public service quality is 0.8. It cannot be 1, as it is not possible to realistically assume total absence of human factors causing losses in 
public service quality. When the number of Non-Trained PEs starts to increase, the graph function begins to decreasingly decrease, since the 
deterioration of competence makes PEs more prone to provide poor service quality, but slowly, because of a higher presence of Trained PEs. 
When the two stocks are equal, the impact is 0.5. Finally, the function increasingly decreases in the second part of the graph, where Trained PEs 
are less than the Non-Trained ones, so that the effect starts to gain force thanks to a broadly widespread lack of competence level in the 
organisation. However, the minimum effect is 0.2, since it is not realistically possible to assume that all people provide the community with poor 
services just because they are not properly trained. 
aux Effect of Political trust ratio on PE vacancies 
autotype Real 
def GRAPH('Political trust ratio',0,0.1,{1.3,1.298,1.288,1.27,1.224,1.15,1.085,1.042,1.018,1.006,1//Min:1;Max:1.3//}) 
doc The effect increases the standard number of low- and medium- specialized public positions according to the political pressure conveyed by 
the public trust. Public employment constitutes an important opportunity for local politicians to boost their public consensus. So, if the community 
is satisfied and give trust to the local politics, the public consensus increases and exercises pressure to increase the number of public positions in 
the Municipality. 
The effect varies within a range of 0.1-0.3, since, on the one hand, it is unreal to assume absence of clientelism, even not in presence of cultural 
rooting of such a practice. On the other hand, it cannot be much high due to the cons deriving from adopting this practice. Accordingly, it decreases 
increasingly as the political trust growth, by assuming that clientelist practices imply a trade-off in decision-making in terms of, for instance, 
probability to be caught and political image. After the median value, i.e. 0.2, it decreasingly decreases as the politicians' wish to recur to clientelist 
practices slows down when the incentive is low. 







def ('Standard number of high-specialized public positions' + 'Actual low- and medium-specialized public positions')*'Annual average wages of 
public PEs and Mgrs' 
doc The actual expenditure for public wages calculated according to the actual number of PEs and the standard one of Mgrs. 
aux Expenditure in personnel training 
autotype Real 
autounit EUR/yr 
def IF('Personnel Budget'/1<<yr>>>='Average budget share to personnel training', 'Average budget share to personnel training', MAX('Personnel 
Budget'/1<<yr>>, 0<<EUR/yr>>)) 
doc The expenditure due to personnel's training. 
const Fraction devoted to the training of PEs 
autotype Real 
init 0.5 
doc Fraction devoted to training of medium and low-specialized public officials. It has been set at 0.5 to assume an equal allocation of the 
municipal training budget, although its actual policy is unknown. 
const Fraction of resources allocated to wages 
autotype Real 
init 0.51 
doc The fraction of the local body's resources allocated to its personnel. According to the ISTAT database, the average fraction during the period 
2007-2016 is around 0.51 with respect to the total incomes. Since salaries for public jobs are generally assumed as structural costs in Italy, the 
fraction has been assumed constant in the last three decades. 
Source: http://dati.istat.it/Index.aspx?lang=en&SubSessionId=df9cf5aa-e4c9-4150-93d5-6b03d062a272#. 




doc The time to implement hiring policies. The municipality can update its personnel strategic plan annually, when the city board draws and 
report the yearly budget to the city Council. 
const Maximum score of Community Life Satisfaction 
autotype Real 
init 10 
doc The maximum parameter of people's life satisfaction. ISTAT's analysis of the determinants related to the degree of life satisfaction considers 
several dimensions. Among these, the quality of services captures the level of social expenditure of municipalities. In performing the study, it 
adopts a scale going from 0 to 10. 
Source: https://www.istat.it/en/archivio/237012. 
const Maximum score of corruption risk range 
autotype Real 
init 16 
doc The TPPCTs consider a range of corruption impact going from 1 to 16, since both probabilities and weights are ranged 1-4 (so that, the 




const Maximum score of organizational and individual performance 
autotype Real 
init 20 




const Maximum trust in local politics 
autotype Real 
init 10 
doc The maximum score of the range of the political trust index indicated by the Italian Economic and Social Wealth report (BES). The average 
trust of citizens in the local politics. According to the Italian Economic and Social Wealth report (BES) of the period 2012-2016, the variable 
related to the trust in politics and institutions of citizens equal an average of 3.15 (i.e. 0.315) in Sicily, within a range varying between 0 and 10. 
However, it has been set at 10 to assume a desired environment. It represents the subjective 
component of trust in local politics and institutions, which is rooted in the set of beliefs and values characterizing the local society. 
Source: https://www.istat.it/en/archivio/237012. 
aux Mgrs assimilation rate 
autotype Real 
autounit person/yr 
def 'Non-Trained Mgrs'/'Training time'*'Training capacity ratio'*(1-'Fraction devoted to the training of PEs') 
doc The outflow/inflow carries Not-Trained Managers towards the Trained ones, according to the training capacity of the municipality. 
aux Mgrs competence evanescence rate 
autotype Real 
autounit person/yr 
def 'Trained Mgrs'/'Competence evanescence time' 
doc The rate at which managers' competences and skills become evanescent. 







def 'Trained mgrs hiring' + 'Trained PEs appointing' + 'Non-trained mgrs hiring' + 'Non-trained PEs appointing' 
doc The outflow of the stock 'Vacancies for Managers'. 
aux Mgrs vacancy creation rate 
autotype Real 
autounit person/yr 
def 'Desired mgrs hiring rate' 
doc The inflow of the stock 'Vacancies for Managers'. It depends on the desired hiring rate of Mgrs. 




inflow { autodef 'Non-trained mgrs hiring' } 
outflow { autodef 'Non-trained mgrs attrition' } 
outflow { autodef 'Mgrs assimilation rate' } 
inflow { autodef 'Non-trained PEs appointing' } 
inflow { autodef 'Mgrs competence evanescence rate' } 
doc The stock of managers with poor expertise. It includes managers with both executive qualification and 
managerial office, according to the provision of the Legislative Decree 30 March 2001, no.165, published in the Italian Official Journal no. 106 
of the 9th May 2001. 
Source: https://www.gazzettaufficiale.it/eli/id/2001/05/09/001G0219/sg. 
aux Non-trained mgrs attrition 
autotype Real 
autounit person/yr 
def 'Non-Trained Mgrs'/'Attrition time' 
doc The outflow reducing the level of Not-Trained Managers. 
aux Non-trained mgrs hiring 
autotype Real 
autounit person/yr 
def ('Vacancies - Mgrs'/'Time to hire') * 'Vacancy replacement fraction'*'Patronage risk ratio' 
doc The inflow increasing the level of Not-Trained Managers. It depends on both the national spending review reforms and the occurrence 
probability of patronage practices. 
aux Non-trained mgrs ratio 
autotype Real 
def 'Non-Trained Mgrs'/'Standard number of high-specialized public positions' 
doc The performance driver capturing the level of managers' professionalization. It is given by the ratio between the Non-Trained Managers and 
the total high specialized public positions. It's a dimensionless multiplier. 




inflow { autodef 'Non-trained PEs hiring' } 
outflow { autodef 'Non-trained PEs attrition' } 
outflow { autodef 'PEs assimilation rate' } 
outflow { autodef 'Non-trained PEs appointing' } 
inflow { autodef 'PEs competence evanescence rate' } 
doc The stock of public employees with poor competences and skills. 
aux Non-trained PEs appointing 
autotype Real 
autounit person/yr 
def ('Vacancies - Mgrs'/'Time to appoint') * (1-'Vacancy replacement fraction') * 'Patronage risk ratio' 
doc The flow is an outflow/inflow carrying Non-Trained Civil Servants towards the stock of Non-Trained Managers by means of the spoils 
system mechanism due to national cutback reforms, according to the complementary probability being affected by fiduciary relationships. 
aux Non-trained PEs attrition 
autotype Real 
autounit person/yr 
def 'Non-Trained PEs'/'Attrition time' 
doc The outflow reducing the level of Non-Trained Civil Servants. 
aux Non-trained PEs hiring 
autotype Real 
autounit person/yr 
def IF(TIME>19<<@yr>>, ('Vacancies - PEs'/'Time to hire')*'Vacancy replacement fraction'*'Clientelism risk ratio', ('Vacancies - PEs'/'Time to 
hire')*'Clientelism risk ratio') 
doc The inflow increasing the level of Non-Trained PEs. It depends on both the national spending review reforms and the complementary 
occurrence probability of clientelist practices. The "IF" function serves to neutralise the effect of "Vacancy replacement fraction" in time 10. 
aux Non-trained PEs ratio 
autotype Real 
def 'Non-Trained PEs'/'Actual low- and medium-specialized public positions' 
doc The performance driver capturing the level of civil servants' professionalization. It is given by the ratio between the Non-Trained Civil 









doc The yearly expenditure per capita paid for personnel training. Data estimated by comparing the best performing Italian municipalities with 
as many residents as Cerda, that is, with residents included in the range 5,000-9,999. In this case, it has been selected Lignano Sabbiadoro, in the 
Udine's province, located in the region of Friuli Venezia-Giulia. In that region, there are around 38,000 public employees and 20 provinces, 




In the Udine's province, there are 134, therefore around 15 public employees. Considering that Lignano Sabbiadoro has spent around EUR 25,000 
per year in personnel training, the variable has been estimated at EUR 1,500 per public employee per year. 
Source: https://www.siope.it/Siope/dispatchSerieStoriche.action. 
aux Patronage risk ratio 
autotype Real 
def ((1-'Political administrative control ratio')*('Probability of corruption in career progression'*'Weight of 
corruption in career progression'))/'Maximum score of corruption risk range' 
doc The performance driver through which the Municipality is enabled to reduce the probability of inappropriate patronage by means of the spoils 




def MAX('Expenditure for public wages' + 'Expenditure in personnel training', 0<<EUR/yr>>) 
doc The outflow of the stock 'Personnel Budget'. It decreases the level variable as the Municipality pay for personnel wages and training. 
aux Perception of CSQ by Community 
autotype Real 
def DELAYINF('Civil Service Quality',1<<yr>>,1,'Civil Service Quality') 
doc The first-order information delay of civil service quality. It smooths the perception of local community people. 
aux Perception of Trust in Local Politics by Politicians 
autotype Real 
def DELAYINF('Trust in Local Politics',0.5<<yr>>,1,'Trust in Local Politics') 
doc Perception of the community trust in the local politics by the same politicians. It is a first-order information delay replicating the awareness 
of politicians of their public consensus. 




inflow { autodef 'Resources to HRs' } 
outflow { autodef Payments } 
doc The stock of the Municipality's resources allocated to personnel. 
aux PEs assimilation rate 
autotype Real 
autounit person/yr 
def 'Non-Trained PEs'/'Training time'*'Training capacity ratio'*'Fraction devoted to the training of PEs' 
doc The rate at which the Non-Trained PEs acquire skills for competence, according to the training capacity of the Municipality. 
aux PEs competence evanescence rate 
autotype Real 
autounit person/yr 
def 'Trained PEs'/'Competence evanescence time' 
doc The rate at which public employees' competences and skills become evanescent. 
aux PEs vacancy closure rate 
autotype Real 
autounit person/yr 
def 'Trained PEs hiring' + 'Non-trained PEs hiring' 
doc The outflow of the stock 'Vacancies for Civil Servants'. 
aux PEs vacancy creation rate 
autotype Real 
autounit person/yr 
def 'Desired PEs hiring rate' 
doc The inflow of the stock 'Vacancies for Civil Servants'. It depends on the desired hiring rate of CSs. 
aux Political administrative control ratio 
autotype Real 
def 'Political Control over the Administrative Apparatus'/'Maximum trust in local politics' 
doc The performance driver capturing the level of civil servants' professionalization. It is given by the ratio between the Non-Trained Civil 
Servants and the total medium and low-specialised public positions. It is a dimensionless multiplier. 
aux Political Control over the Administrative Apparatus 
autotype Real 
def DELAYINF('Perception of Trust in Local Politics by Politicians',0.3<<yr>>,1,'Perception of Trust in Local 





doc The perception of control over the bureaucratic machine by politicians. It depends on the degree of political consensus perceived by 
politicians. The recognition of the actual dominant status by the local politics is quite fast, so that the reaction in terms of control over the 
administrative arrangement is equally quick. 
aux Political trust ratio 
autotype Real 
def 'Perception of Trust in Local Politics by Politicians'/'Maximum trust in local politics' 
doc The performance driver capturing the level of civil servants' professionalization. It is given by the ratio between the Non-Trained Civil 





doc The average number of people who have lived in Cerda in the last 10 years. 
Source: http://dati.istat.it/index.aspx?lang=en&SubSessionId=3c6ea7de-6ee6-465e-8428-b2eebea6befb. 
 
However, the data did not vary during the last 20 years as other sources showed (e.g. https://www.tuttitalia.it/sicilia/67-
cerda/statistiche/popolazione-andamento-demografico/, built on ISTAT statistics). 
const Probability of corruption in career progression 
autotype Real 
init 1 
doc The average probability of corruption in the career progression process. It has been estimated at 1 by calculating the average of the 
probabilities of corruption in career progression indicated by the Municipality in its Triennial Plans for Corruption Prevention and Transparency 




const Probability of corruption in recruiting 
autotype Real 
init 2 
doc The average probability of corruption in the recruiting process. It has been initially estimated at 2 by calculating the average of the 
probabilities of corruption in recruiting indicated by the Municipality in its Triennial Plans for Corruption Prevention and Transparency during 




aux Resources to HRs 
autotype Real 
autounit EUR/yr 
def ((Population*'Average fiscal pressure per capita')/1<<yr>>+'Average transfers')*'Fraction of resources allocated to wages' 
doc The inflow of the stock 'Personnel Budget'. It increases the level variable as the Municipality collects local taxes and transfers from the higher 
territorial governments. 




doc The standard number of positions for high-specialized public offices in the Municipality. The Municipality has 4 employees who are either 
heads of department. 
Source: informal interview with the Personnel Office of the Municipality of Cerda. 




doc The standard number of positions for medium- and low-specialized public offices in the Municipality. The Municipality has 74 public officials 
performing low-specialized tasks. 
Source: informal interview with the Personnel Office of the Municipality of Cerda. 




doc The term of office for a mayor in Italy. 




doc The World Bank estimates its Governance Indicators every 2 years. That means that this time is reasonably considered as sufficient to detect 
a change in political trust over time. 
Source: info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/Home/downLoadFile?fileName=ge.pdf. 








doc The time to hire people in the public administration. The parameter is referred to the time spent to obtain the authorization to announce a 
public call and conclude the overall hiring procedure in the public sector, which is rather long in Italy, by virtue of some assessments need to be 
carried out before to start a public call. 




inflow { autodef 'Trained mgrs hiring' } 
outflow { autodef 'Trained mgrs attrition' } 
inflow { autodef 'Mgrs assimilation rate' } 
inflow { autodef 'Trained PEs appointing' } 
outflow { autodef 'Mgrs competence evanescence rate' } 
doc The stock of managers with high expertise. It includes managers with both executive qualification and managerial office, according to the 
provision of the Legislative Decree 30 March 2001, no.165, published in the Italian Official Journal no. 106 of the 9th May 2001. 
Source: https://www.gazzettaufficiale.it/eli/id/2001/05/09/001G0219/sg. 
aux Trained mgrs attrition 
autotype Real 
autounit person/yr 
def 'Trained Mgrs'/'Attrition time' 
doc The outflow reducing the level of Trained Managers. 
aux Trained mgrs hiring 
autotype Real 
autounit person/yr 
def 'Vacancies - Mgrs'/'Time to hire'*'Vacancy replacement fraction'*(1-'Patronage risk ratio') 
doc The inflow increasing the level of Trained Managers. It depends on both the national spending review 
reforms and the complementary occurrence probability of patronage practices. 




inflow { autodef 'Trained PEs hiring' } 
outflow { autodef 'Trained PEs attrition' } 
inflow { autodef 'PEs assimilation rate' } 
outflow { autodef 'Trained PEs appointing' } 
outflow { autodef 'PEs competence evanescence rate' } 
doc The stock of public employees with competences and skills. 
aux Trained PEs appointing 
autotype Real 
autounit person/yr 
def ('Vacancies - Mgrs'/'Time to appoint') * (1-'Vacancy replacement fraction') * (1-'Patronage risk ratio') 
doc The flow is an outflow/inflow carrying Trained Civil Servants towards the stock of Trained Managers by means of the spoils system 
mechanism due to national cutback reforms, according to the complementary probability being not affected by fiduciary relationships. 
aux Trained PEs attrition 
autotype Real 
autounit person/yr 
def 'Trained PEs'/'Attrition time' 
doc The outflow reducing the level of Trained PEs. 
aux Trained PEs hiring 
autotype Real 
autounit person/yr 
def IF(TIME>19<<@yr>>,('Vacancies - PEs'/'Time to hire')*'Vacancy replacement fraction'*(1-'Clientelism risk ratio'), ('Vacancies - PEs'/'Time 
to hire')*(1-'Clientelism risk ratio')) 
doc The inflow increasing the level of Trained PEs. It depends on both the national spending review reforms and the complementary occurrence 
probability of clientelist practices. The "IF" function serves to neutralise the effect of "Vacancy replacement fraction" in time 10. 




inflow { autodef 'Change in Training Capacity' } 
doc The stock of the training capacity of the Municipality. 
aux Training capacity ratio 
autotype Real 
def 'Training Capacity'/'Desired Training Capacity Perceived by the Municipality' 
doc The performance driver of the training capacity of the Municipality. 








doc The time needed to train the municipal employees. Professional courses for PA are very differentiated in terms of time and topic. Indeed, 
they can both require a couple days and some months to be successfully concluded. However, they take no more than a few months generally. 
Source: Italian training courses for PA on the Internet. 
level Trust in Local Politics 
autotype Real 
init 'Maximum trust in local politics' 
inflow { autodef 'Change in Trust in Local Politics' } 
doc The level of trust in the local politics. Political trust may be developed thanks to the politicians’ capability to provide the community with 
high-quality civil services over a specific time lapse. 




inflow { autodef 'Mgrs vacancy creation rate' } 
outflow { autodef 'Mgrs vacancy closure rate' } 
doc The level of vacancies for managers. 




outflow { autodef 'PEs vacancy closure rate' } 
inflow { autodef 'PEs vacancy creation rate' } 
doc The level of vacancies for civil servants. 
aux Vacancy replacement fraction 
autotype Real 
def 1+(STEP(-0.20,STARTTIME+10<<yr>>))+(STEP(-0.35,STARTTIME+20<<yr>>)) 
doc The fraction of replacement of the municipality's vacancies. The first step function captures the reduction of the fraction in favour of internal 
appointing, occurred between the late ‘90s and the early 2000s’ (Public Official #3, 2019). The second step function, instead, represents the 
impact of the austerity measure provided by the national government in 2010, correspondent to time 20 in the model. Accordingly, the turnover 
has been locked until the present day by virtue of several national legal provisions, which differentiated each other in function of heterogeneous 
parameters mainly linked to the local population, to the overall past expenditure and, in general, to specific budgetary results, based on a rewarding 
system to the most virtuous PAs. For the sake of simplicity, considering that the interviewees confirmed that the Municipality experienced a 
decrease in its HR endowment over time, it has been assumed an average of 45% of replacement of the ceased job relationships. This is in 
coherence with the percentage of turnover established by the legal provisions mentioned above. 
Sources: 
1. the law 27 December 2006, no. 296, published in the Italian Official Journal no. 299 of 27-12-2006 
(https://www.gazzettaufficiale.it/atto/serie_generale/caricaDettaglioAtto/originario?atto.dataPubblicazioneGazzetta=2006-12-
27&atto.codiceRedazionale=006G0318); 
2. the decree-law 24 June 2014, no. 90, published in the Italian Official Journal no. 144 of 24-06-2014 
(https://www.gazzettaufficiale.it/eli/id/2014/06/24/14G00103/sg); 
3. the law 28 December 2015, no. 208, published in the Italian Official Journal no. 302 of 30-12-2015 
(https://www.gazzettaufficiale.it/eli/id/2015/12/30/15G00222/sg). 
4. Public Official #3. 2019. Non-standardized, face-to-face convergent in-depth interview with Public Official #3 [In Italian]. Held: June 
26, 2019. In S. Gnoffo (Ed.), Ph. D. research. 
5. Kickert, W., Randma-Liiv, T., & Savi, R. 2013. Fiscal consolidation in Europe: A comparative analysis, COCOPS deliverable 7.2, 
September. 
const Weight of corruption in career progression 
autotype Real 
init 1 
doc The average weight of corruption in the career progression process. It has been estimated at 1 by calculating the average of the weights of 
corruption in career progression indicated by the Municipality in its Triennial Plans for Corruption Prevention and Transparency during the years 




const Weight of corruption in recruiting process 
autotype Real 
init 2 
doc The average weight of corruption in the recruiting process. It has been initially estimated at 2 by calculating the average of the weights of 
corruption in recruiting indicated by the Municipality in its Triennial Plans for Corruption Prevention and Transparency during the years 2017, 





aux Actual low- and medium-specialized public positions 
def IF(TIME<30<<@yr>>, 'Standard number of low- and medium-specialized public positions'*'Effect of Political trust ratio on PE vacancies', 
'Standard number of low- and medium-specialized public positions'*(1+('POLICY 3'*'Effect of Political trust ratio on PE vacancies'))) 






aux Change in Training Capacity 
def IF(TIME<30<<@yr>>, ('Expenditure in personnel training'/'Normal training expenditure per person'-'Training Capacity')/1<<yr>>, 'POLICY 
1a') 




def  IF(TIME<30<<@yr>>, MAX('Expenditure for public wages'+'Expenditure in personnel training', 0<<EUR/yr>>), MAX('Expenditure for 
public wages'+'POLICY 1b', 0<<EUR/yr>>)) 
doc The outflow of the stock 'Personnel Budget' adjusted by the suggested policy. 
aux POLICY 1a 
def ('Desired training capacity'-'Training Capacity')/2<<yr>> 
doc The policy related to the training program. 
const POLICY 1b 
def 'Normal training expenditure per person'*'Training Capacity' 
doc The expenditure for the personnel’s training deriving from POLICY 1a. 
const POLICY 1c 
def 400<<EUR/person>> 
doc The funding of the personnel’s training deriving from POLICY 1a. It represents the higher bad taxes collected by the Special Management 
Commission since the beginning of the financial distress of the local Body’s bankruptcy in 2017. 
const POLICY 2 
autotype Real 
init 0 
doc The policy related to both the annihilation of the ‘spoils system’ and the unblock of the public personnel’s turnover established at national 
level. 
const POLICY 3 
autotype Real 
init 0 
doc The policy related to the political willingness to refuse any clientelist practice. 
aux Resources to HRs 
autotype Real 
autounit EUR/yr 
def  IF(TIME<30<<@yr>>, ((Population*'Average fiscal pressure per capita')/1<<yr>>+'Average transfers')*'Fraction of resources allocated to 
wages', ((Population*'POLICY 1c')/1<<yr>>+'Average transfers')*'Fraction of resources allocated to wages') 
doc The inflow of the stock 'Personnel Budget' adjusted by the suggested policy. 
aux Vacancy replacement fraction 
autotype Real 
def IF(TIME<30<<@yr>>, 1+(STEP(-0.20,STARTTIME+10<<yr>>))+(STEP(-0.35,STARTTIME+20<<yr>>)), 1+((STEP(-
0.20,STARTTIME+10<<yr>>))+(STEP(-0.35,STARTTIME+20<<yr>>)))*'POLICY 2') 





APPENDIX C. Model validation tests 
 
In order to validate the formal structure of the models, the structure-confirmation test (Barlas, 
1996) was performed both empirically and theoretically. In particular, it is based on qualitative 
and quantitative data retrieved from: the in-depth convergent interviews with the Public Officials 
of the Municipality − discussed in Chapter 5 −; personal communications with the Municipality’s 
civil servants; the quoted judgements; the official archives of relevant Italian public institutions − 
mainly the ISTAT’s, SIOPE’s and Municipality’s open-access repositories −; and the prevalent 
literature. 
Regarding the parameter-confirmation test (Barlas, 1996), the model parameters were 
estimated by retrieving pertinent conceptual and numerical information from: the ISTAT’s and 
SIOPE’s websites; the personal communications with some Municipality’s public employees; the 
primary and secondary data obtained through the convergent interviews with the municipal Public 
Officials; and the accounting and administrative documentation available on the institutional 
website of the Municipality of Cerda. The adopted parameter values sufficiently guarantee a 
minimum of reliability and appreciable consistency and accuracy degrees with the relevant 
conceptual and numerical knowledge of the system (Sterman, 2000). 
The following tests were performed in Powersim’s Studio 10 Academic. 
 
- MODEL OF CHAPTER 6 
The direct extreme-condition test (Barlas, 1996) was performed by considering plausible that if 
the ‘Competing Providers’ equals zero, the overall procurement process is cancelled due to the 
absence of tenderers and, as a result, the ‘Debt Procurement’ is zeroed as well, thus exponentially 
increasing the ‘Solvency margin’. This assumption was successfully corroborated by means of 
model simulations. 
Regarding the indirect extreme-condition test (Barlas, 1996), it is realistic to assume that 
the ‘Solvency margin’ is positive as long as all the first-level performance drivers related to the 
risks of corruption along the procurement process are null. Initialising the model in equilibrium, 






There were no error notifications by the used modelling software in terms of consistency 
of the measure units with the reality. The Appendix B corroborates this validation test. 
 









0 3,178,984.00 2,465,801.24 713,182.76 
1 3,179,023.22 2,404,612.37 774,410.84 
2 3,179,497.40 2,439,408.73 740,088.67 
3 3,182,681.01 2,446,457.46 736,223.55 
4 3,187,879.21 2,435,100.65 752,778.56 
5 3,193,127.81 2,422,700.85 770,426.96 
6 3,197,305.74 2,414,571.78 782,733.96 
7 3,200,211.02 2,410,254.77 789,956.25 
8 3,202,072.69 2,408,220.98 793,851.71 
9 3,203,206.55 2,407,334.56 795,871.99 
10 3,203,875.54 2,406,968.66 796,906.88 
11 3,204,262.50 2,406,823.50 797,438.99 
12 3,204,483.57 2,406,767.62 797,715.95 
13 3,204,608.88 2,406,746.60 797,862.28 
14 3,204,679.53 2,406,738.83 797,940.70 
15 3,204,719.19 2,406,736.00 797,983.18 
16 3,204,741.35 2,406,734.98 798,006.36 
17 3,204,753.66 2,406,734.62 798,019.04 
18 3,204,760.44 2,406,734.49 798,025.94 
19 3,204,764.12 2,406,734.45 798,029.67 
20 3,204,766.06 2,406,734.43 798,031.63 
21 3,204,767.05 2,406,734.43 798,032.62 
22 3,204,767.50 2,406,734.42 798,033.08 
23 3,204,767.67 2,406,734.42 798,033.25 
24 3,204,767.68 2,406,734.42 798,033.26 
25 3,204,767.62 2,406,734.42 798,033.20 
26 3,204,767.52 2,406,734.42 798,033.09 
27 3,204,767.40 2,406,734.42 798,032.98 
28 3,204,767.28 2,406,734.42 798,032.86 
29 3,204,767.16 2,406,734.42 798,032.74 






The behavior sensitivity tests (Barlas, 1996) were realised with the aim to corroborate how 
sensitive the most significant stock variables related to the procurement process, the accounting 
area and the outcome sector are compared to variations of significant parameters linked to 
corruption. ‘Latin Hypercube’ was the sampling method adopted, as it ensures the 
representativeness of the samples of the selected parameters for the probability distribution found. 
40 runs were performed, as suggested by the default settings of the software. For the sake of 
simplicity, the identified parameters were considered as normally-truncated distributed, according 
to the range within which they were assumed to vary. The expected values equal the actual ones 
that were used in the model, and the standard deviations were set sufficiently large to corroborate 
their impact on the model, according to the opportune upper and lower limits. 
Structural examinations revealed that the selected stock variables are sensitive to both the 
probabilities and the weights of each form of corruption along the procurement process. More 
precisely, the sensitivity tests were performed in relation to ten key variables – see the Figures A, 
B, C, D, E, F, G below − that is: ‘Civic Morality’, ‘Debt Procurement’, ‘Local Institutional Trust’, 
‘Competing Providers’, ‘Contracts Executed’, ‘Municipal Accountability’, ‘Personnel Discretion’, 










Figure A. Sensitivity test of 'Probability of corruption in the pre-tendering and decision-making phase' (expected value: 2.43; standard deviation: 4; lower limit: 0; upper limit: 4). 
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Figure B. Sensitivity test of 'Weight of corruption in the pre-tendering and decision-making phase ' (expected value: 2.51; standard deviation: 4; lower limit: 0; upper limit: 4). 





Regular Tenders Accepted (5 Percentile) Regular Tenders Accepted (10 Percentile) Regular Tenders Accepted (25 Percentile)
Regular Tenders Accepted (50 Percentile) Regular Tenders Accepted (75 Percentile) Regular Tenders Accepted (90 Percentile)
Regular Tenders Accepted (95 Percentile)
Non-commercial use only!




Regular Tenders Agreed (5 Percentile) Regular Tenders Agreed (10 Percentile) Regular Tenders Agreed (25 Percentile) Regular Tenders Agreed (50 Percentile)
Regular Tenders Agreed (75 Percentile) Regular Tenders Agreed (90 Percentile) Regular Tenders Agreed (95 Percentile)
Non-commercial use only!





Contracts Executed (5 Percentile) Contracts Executed (10 Percentile) Contracts Executed (25 Percentile) Contracts Executed (50 Percentile)
Contracts Executed (75 Percentile) Contracts Executed (90 Percentile) Contracts Executed (95 Percentile)
Non-commercial use only!








Debt Procurement (5 Percentile) Debt Procurement (10 Percentile) Debt Procurement (25 Percentile) Debt Procurement (50 Percentile)
Debt Procurement (75 Percentile) Debt Procurement (90 Percentile) Debt Procurement (95 Percentile)
Non-commercial use only!





Competing Providers (5 Percentile) Competing Providers (10 Percentile) Competing Providers (25 Percentile) Competing Providers (50 Percentile)
Competing Providers (75 Percentile) Competing Providers (90 Percentile) Competing Providers (95 Percentile)
Non-commercial use only!






Resource Dispersion (5 Percentile) Resource Dispersion (10 Percentile) Resource Dispersion (25 Percentile) Resource Dispersion (50 Percentile)
Resource Dispersion (75 Percentile) Resource Dispersion (90 Percentile) Resource Dispersion (95 Percentile)
Non-commercial use only!






Personnel Discretion (5 Percentile) Personnel Discretion (10 Percentile) Personnel Discretion (25 Percentile) Personnel Discretion (50 Percentile)
Personnel Discretion (75 Percentile) Personnel Discretion (90 Percentile) Personnel Discretion (95 Percentile)
Non-commercial use only!






Municipal Accountability (5 Percentile) Municipal Accountability (10 Percentile) Municipal Accountability (25 Percentile) Municipal Accountability (50 Percentile)
Municipal Accountability (75 Percentile) Municipal Accountability (90 Percentile) Municipal Accountability (95 Percentile)
Non-commercial use only!





Local Institutional Trust (5 Percentile) Local Institutional Trust (10 Percentile) Local Institutional Trust (25 Percentile) Local Institutional Trust (50 Percentile)
Local Institutional Trust (75 Percentile) Local Institutional Trust (90 Percentile) Local Institutional Trust (95 Percentile)
Non-commercial use only!





Civic Morality (5 Percentile) Civic Morality (10 Percentile) Civic Morality (25 Percentile) Civic Morality (50 Percentile) Civic Morality (75 Percentile)







Figure C. Sensitivity test of 'Probability of corruption in the evaluation phase' (expected value: 2.44; standard deviation: 4; lower limit: 0; upper limit: 4). 
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Figure D. Sensitivity test of 'Weight of corruption in the evaluation phase' (expected value: 2.67; standard deviation: 4; lower limit: 0; upper limit: 4). 
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Figure E. Sensitivity test of 'Probability of corruption in the awarding phase' (expected value: 2.50.; standard deviation: 4.; lower limit: 0; upper limit: 4). 
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Figure F. Sensitivity test of 'Weight of corruption in the awarding phase' (expected value: 2.67.; standard deviation: 4.; lower limit: 0; upper limit: 4). 
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Figure G. Sensitivity test of 'Probability of corruption in the post-awarding phase' and of 'Weight of corruption in the post-awarding phase' (for both the parameters, expected 
values: 1.67.; standard deviation: 4.; lower limit: 0; upper limit: 4). 
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- MODEL OF CHAPTER 7 
As far as the direct extreme-condition test (Barlas, 1996) is concerned, it was evaluated as plausible 
that, coherently with the reality, most of the overall municipal personnel endowment accumulates 
into the respective trained categories as long as the ‘Training Capacity’ sufficiently covers the 
‘Desired training capacity’. Initialising the model in equilibrium, the assumption was successfully 
verified by linking the ‘Desired Training Capacity Perceived by the Municipality’ to the ‘Training 
Capacity’ level, in quality of target of the related first-order information delay. 
The indirect extreme-condition test (Barlas, 1996) was performed by assuming the variable 
‘Competence evanescence time’ to be very short, namely one year. Initialising the model in 
equilibrium, the internal composition of Mgrs. and PEs starts to change in favour of the non-trained 
categories, as a result of the faster degradation of the HRs’ skills. This consequently pushes the 
overall system to stabilise itself at the vicious state in which all the available Mgrs. and PEs are 
assimilated into the non-trained groups – cf. Table II −, thus implying an increase of the risk of 
fiduciary practices both in recruitment and in career progression. As the change is about the 
internal composition only, the number of vacancies is not influenced. 
Since the simple absence of any error notification by the used modelling software is not 
enough to corroborate the consistency of the measure units with the reality, for this validation test 
it is suggested to read the Appendix B. 
The behavior sensitivity tests (Barlas, 1996) were realised with the aim to corroborate how 
sensitive the levels of trained and non-trained PEs and Mgrs. are compared to variations of 
significant parameters. ‘Latin Hypercube’ is the sampling method adopted, as it ensures the 
representativeness of the samples of the selected parameters for the probability distribution found. 
40 runs were performed, as suggested by the default settings of the software. For the sake of 
simplicity, the identified parameters were considered as normally-truncated distributed, according 
to the range within which they were assumed to vary. The expected values equal the actual ones 
which were used in the model, and the standard deviations were set sufficiently large to corroborate 
their impact on the model, according to the opportune upper and lower limits. 
Structural examinations revealed that some significant exogenous variables specifically 
affect the level variables selected. More precisely, the sensitivity tests were performed in relation 
to five key-stock variables, that is: ‘Trained PEs’, ‘Non-Trained PEs’, ‘Trained Mgrs’, ‘Non-





scores of clientelism and patronage – cf. the Figures H, I, J, K, L being showed below. Moreover, 
the overall system is strongly sensitive to the ‘Competence evanescence time’, which makes the 
quantitative and qualitative depletion of the municipal HR faster and faster as it becomes shorter 
and shorter. 
 












0 29.2700 60.7300 1.4200 2.3600 
1 8.6379 81.3607 0.4205 3.3613 
2 3.7722 86.2254 0.1845 3.5982 
3 2.6080 87.3892 0.1279 3.6553 
4 2.3264 87.6719 0.1141 3.6694 
5 2.2655 87.7520 0.1107 3.6730 
6 2.2654 87.8066 0.1097 3.6740 
7 2.2705 87.8747 0.1094 3.6744 
8 2.2708 87.9529 0.1092 3.6745 
9 2.2652 88.0311 0.1091 3.6746 
10 2.2555 88.1006 0.1091 3.6747 
11 2.2445 88.1568 0.1091 3.6747 
12 2.2344 88.1988 0.1090 3.6748 
13 2.2262 88.2285 0.1090 3.6748 
14 2.2201 88.2485 0.1090 3.6748 
15 2.2159 88.2616 0.1090 3.6748 
16 2.2131 88.2700 0.1090 3.6748 
17 2.2113 88.2753 0.1090 3.6748 
18 2.2102 88.2788 0.1090 3.6748 
19 2.2095 88.2810 0.1090 3.6748 
20 2.2090 88.2825 0.1090 3.6748 
21 2.2087 88.2835 0.1090 3.6748 
22 2.2085 88.2841 0.1090 3.6748 
23 2.2084 88.2846 0.1090 3.6748 
24 2.2083 88.2849 0.1090 3.6748 
25 2.2083 88.2851 0.1090 3.6748 
26 2.2082 88.2852 0.1090 3.6748 
27 2.2082 88.2853 0.1090 3.6748 
28 2.2082 88.2854 0.1090 3.6748 
29 2.2082 88.2854 0.1090 3.6748 











Figure H. Sensitivity test of 'Probability of corruption in recruiting' (expected value: 2; standard deviation: 4; lower limit: 0; upper limit: 4). 
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Figure J. Sensitivity test of 'Probability of corruption in career progression' (expected value: 1; standard deviation: 4; lower limit: 0; upper limit: 4). 
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Figure K. Sensitivity test of 'Weight of corruption in career progression' (expected value: 1; standard deviation: 4; lower limit: 0; upper limit: 4). 
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Figure L. Sensitivity test of 'Competence evanescence time' (expected value: 20 yrs.; standard deviation: 20 yrs.; lower limit: 0 yrs.; upper limit: none). 
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